From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:45 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093854 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B4F0C5479D for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:57:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233794AbjAIQ5Q (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:16 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51670 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236962AbjAIQ4y (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:56:54 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB75222A for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:56:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfH3NCLz9v7Z2 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:11 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S3; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:38 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 1/8] Fix error messages and mdlen init in calc_evm_hmac() Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-2-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S3 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW7try3Cw45Xw1DJw4UZr1DZFb_yoW8Ww18pa 9rWw1DGw18tryj9FWUCF4kCa1UJrWIyr1Utw42ga4fZasrJF9FyayxAF4F9rWUJFWkAa4f JF4Fya4rua1kAr7anT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBFb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26r4j6ryUM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUGw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Jrv_JF4l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwI xGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480 Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7 IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAI w20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x 0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07j4BTOUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAMBF1jj4NhmgAAsD X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Make sure that the function name in the error message corresponds to the actual function called. Also, initialize mdlen to the size of 'hash' (MAX_DIGEST_SIZE), as this is expected by EVP_DigestSignFinal(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- src/evmctl.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c index 0ac7930da6f2..d4912d7ee891 100644 --- a/src/evmctl.c +++ b/src/evmctl.c @@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ static int cmd_setxattr_ima(struct command *cmd) static int calc_evm_hmac(const char *file, const char *keyfile, unsigned char *hash) { - size_t mdlen; + size_t mdlen = MAX_DIGEST_SIZE; EVP_MD_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; struct stat st; @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int calc_evm_hmac(const char *file, const char *keyfile, unsigned char *h pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, evmkey, sizeof(evmkey)); if (!pkey) { - log_err("HMAC_Init() failed\n"); + log_err("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed\n"); goto out; } @@ -1326,12 +1326,12 @@ static int calc_evm_hmac(const char *file, const char *keyfile, unsigned char *h err = EVP_DigestSignUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size); if (err != 1) { - log_err("HMAC_Update() failed\n"); + log_err("EVP_DigestSignUpdate() failed\n"); goto out_ctx_cleanup; } err = EVP_DigestSignFinal(pctx, hash, &mdlen); if (err != 1) - log_err("HMAC_Final() failed\n"); + log_err("EVP_DigestSignFinal() failed\n"); out_ctx_cleanup: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000 From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:46 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093851 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C7BEC61DB3 for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:57:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232953AbjAIQ5O (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51680 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236978AbjAIQ44 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:56:56 -0500 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E01222A for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:56:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfF2hCPz9v7Vm for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:09 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S4; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:42 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 2/8] Add config for UML kernel Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:46 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxtF43Wr17Kr13Gw4kuFykZrb_yoW3ZFWUpr n7JrWxJr4kJr17trW7ArWDGr98tr1DGFWUAr17Xr1UXrykJw4fJr4Ykr1UGr1UXF1UJr48 JF97Gr13Ar1UJ37anT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBFb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26ryj6rWUM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUXw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwI xGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480 Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7 IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAI w20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x 0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07jaUDXUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAMBF1jj4dfhAAAsk X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Add config-uml, with test-specific options that are not enabled in the kernel configuration generated with 'make ARCH=um defconfig'. The new options will be merged with the merge_config.sh script from the kernel source code in a Github workflow step. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- config-uml | 235 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 235 insertions(+) create mode 100644 config-uml diff --git a/config-uml b/config-uml new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2d3bb8ba8edb --- /dev/null +++ b/config-uml @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="-dont-use" +CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE=y +CONFIG_AUDIT=y +CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=y +CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=y +CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT=17 +CONFIG_USER_NS=y +CONFIG_PID_NS=y +CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y +CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION=y +CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y +CONFIG_CON_CHAN="xterm" +CONFIG_SSL_CHAN="pty" +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="sha1" +CONFIG_MODULES_TREE_LOOKUP=y +CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS=y +CONFIG_ASN1=y +CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK=y +CONFIG_SLUB=y +CONFIG_COMPACTION=y +CONFIG_COMPACT_UNEVICTABLE_DEFAULT=1 +CONFIG_MIGRATION=y +CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y +CONFIG_LEGACY_PTY_COUNT=256 +CONFIG_NULL_TTY=y +CONFIG_SERIAL_DEV_BUS=y +CONFIG_SERIAL_DEV_CTRL_TTYPORT=y +CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER=y +CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL=y +CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY=y +CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG=y +CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR=y +CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y +CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY=y +CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL=y +CONFIG_FS_VERITY=y +CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y +CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y +CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y +CONFIG_CONFIGFS_FS=y +CONFIG_KEYS=y +CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y +CONFIG_SECURITY=y +CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT=y +CONFIG_IMA=y +CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10 +CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=y +CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng" +CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=y +CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256" +CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y +CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y +CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y +CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y +CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY=y +CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y +CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=y +CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509=y +CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" +CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y +CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=y +CONFIG_EVM=y +CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID=y +CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS=y +CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509=y +CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_evm.der" +CONFIG_LSM="lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" +CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL2=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y +CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE=y +CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y +CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y +CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER=y +CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y +CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY=y +CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY="certs/signing_key.pem" +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS="" +CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE_SIZE=4096 +CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="" +CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS="" +CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE=y +CONFIG_BINARY_PRINTF=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y +CONFIG_XXHASH=y +CONFIG_AUDIT_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS=y +CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS=y +CONFIG_ZSTD_COMMON=y +CONFIG_ZSTD_COMPRESS=y +CONFIG_ZSTD_DECOMPRESS=y +CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY=y +CONFIG_SGL_ALLOC=y +CONFIG_GLOB=y +CONFIG_CLZ_TAB=y +CONFIG_MPILIB=y +CONFIG_SIGNATURE=y +CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY=y +CONFIG_STACKDEPOT=y +CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT=y +CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y +CONFIG_PRINTK_CALLER=y +CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y +CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_CORE=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF5=y +CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS=y +CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=2048 +CONFIG_READABLE_ASM=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL=y +CONFIG_UBSAN=y +CONFIG_CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_ONLY_BOUNDS=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM=y +CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y +CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC_ENABLE_DEFAULT=y +CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y +CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON=y +CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER=y +CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_PERCPU_COUNTER=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_ENABLE_DEFAULT=1 +CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_MEM_POOL_SIZE=16000 +CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_AUTO_SCAN=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE=y +CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y +CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y +CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE=1 +CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=y +CONFIG_SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y +CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC=y +CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y +CONFIG_DEFAULT_HUNG_TASK_TIMEOUT=120 +CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC=y +CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING=y +CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y +CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y +CONFIG_LOCK_STAT=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=y +CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y +CONFIG_LOCKDEP_BITS=15 +CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CHAINS_BITS=16 +CONFIG_LOCKDEP_STACK_TRACE_BITS=19 +CONFIG_LOCKDEP_STACK_TRACE_HASH_BITS=14 +CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CIRCULAR_QUEUE_BITS=12 +CONFIG_WW_MUTEX_SELFTEST=y +CONFIG_CSD_LOCK_WAIT_DEBUG=y +CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_IRQFLAGS=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_PLIST=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y +CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y +CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y +CONFIG_RCU_TRACE=y +CONFIG_NOP_TRACER=y +CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK=y +CONFIG_RING_BUFFER=y +CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING=y +CONFIG_CONTEXT_SWITCH_TRACER=y +CONFIG_PREEMPTIRQ_TRACEPOINTS=y +CONFIG_TRACING=y From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:47 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093853 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on 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with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S5; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:45 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 3/8] Compile the UML kernel and download it in Github Actions Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3AF1fCrW5Xw13JF17Kr17KFg_yoW7AF4xp3 4Yy34Yvrs7J3W7Awn2vr18Cw4Y9393Ar13C34xJ345AF9xJayv9FsaqryYvF17ZrWxKF4f ZFWUWFyDKayxZaDanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBFb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 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linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Add a build job, prerequisite of the existing job, to compile the UML kernel and upload it and the signing key to a cache. Github configuration should have two secrets: LINUX_URL, the full URL of the kernel repository; LINUX_BRANCH, the branch to check out as fallback if the name of the ima-evm-utils branch is not found in the kernel repository. If there is a cache hit (same kernel commit and same kernel configuration), next time the UML kernel will not be rebuilt. To use the cache, it is necessary to install zstd in the container. Add this dependency to ci/fedora.sh. The cache can be managed at the following URL: https://github.com//ima-evm-utils/actions/caches The page also offers the possibility to clean the cache, to force rebuilding the kernel. Add a new entry in the testing matrix, for the fedora-latest container image, to run the tests with the UML kernel. The entry differs from the others for the new environment variable UML_MODE, set to 1. Add a new volume to the container, /dev/shm from the host, as it is required for running the UML kernel. Extend the existing job with steps to download the UML kernel and signing key from the cache. The new steps are executed only if the matrix entry has UML_MODE set to 1. Finally, pass UML_MODE to the tests. A test should also propagate this variable to the environment created with the UML kernel, by passing it to the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- ci/fedora.sh | 3 +- 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index d2afdfe15467..2e05d0027f83 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -3,7 +3,72 @@ name: "distros" on: [push, pull_request] jobs: + build: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + outputs: + LINUX_SHA: ${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }} + name: build + timeout-minutes: 100 + strategy: + fail-fast: false + + env: + linux_url: ${{ secrets.LINUX_URL }} + linux_branch: ${{ secrets.LINUX_BRANCH }} + + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + - name: Determine last kernel commit + id: last-commit + shell: bash + run: | + mkdir linux-integrity + pushd linux-integrity + git init + git branch -m ${{ secrets.LINUX_BRANCH }} + git remote add origin ${{ secrets.LINUX_URL }} + LINUX_SHA=$(git ls-remote origin $GITHUB_REF_NAME | awk '{print $1}') + [ -z "$LINUX_SHA" ] && LINUX_SHA=$(git ls-remote origin ${{ secrets.LINUX_BRANCH }} | awk '{print $1}') + echo "LINUX_SHA=$LINUX_SHA" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + popd + + - name: Cache UML kernel + id: cache-linux + uses: actions/cache@v3 + with: + path: linux + key: linux-${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/config-uml') }} + + - name: Cache signing key + id: cache-key + uses: actions/cache@v3 + with: + path: signing_key.pem + key: signing_key.pem-${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/config-uml') }} + + - name: Compile UML kernel + if: steps.cache-linux.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' || steps.cache-key.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + shell: bash + run: | + if [ "$DEVTOOLSET" = "yes" ]; then + source /opt/rh/devtoolset-10/enable + fi + if [ "$ARCH" = "i386" ]; then + CROSS_COMPILE_OPT="CROSS_COMPILE=i686-linux-gnu-" + fi + pushd linux-integrity + git pull --depth 5 origin ${{ secrets.LINUX_BRANCH }} + ./scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config ../config-uml + make ARCH=um olddefconfig + make ARCH=um $CROSS_COMPILE_OPT -j$(nproc) + chmod +x linux + cp linux .. + cp certs/signing_key.pem .. + popd + job: + needs: build runs-on: ubuntu-latest strategy: @@ -75,6 +140,12 @@ jobs: CC: clang TSS: ibmtss + - container: "fedora:latest" + env: + CC: clang + TSS: ibmtss + UML_MODE: 1 + - container: "centos:7" env: CC: gcc @@ -98,7 +169,7 @@ jobs: container: image: ${{ matrix.container }} env: ${{ matrix.env }} - options: --privileged --device /dev/loop-control + options: --privileged --device /dev/loop-control -v /dev/shm:/dev/shm steps: - name: Show OS @@ -125,8 +196,25 @@ jobs: fi fi + - name: Retrieve UML kernel + if: ${{ matrix.env.UML_MODE && fromJSON(matrix.env.UML_MODE) == 1 }} + uses: actions/cache@v3 + continue-on-error: false + with: + path: linux + key: linux-${{ needs.build.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/config-uml') }} + + - name: Retrieve signing key + if: ${{ matrix.env.UML_MODE && fromJSON(matrix.env.UML_MODE) == 1 }} + continue-on-error: false + uses: actions/cache@v3 + with: + path: signing_key.pem + key: signing_key.pem-${{ needs.build.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/config-uml') }} + - name: Compiler version run: $CC --version - name: Compile - run: CC="$CC" VARIANT="$VARIANT" COMPILE_SSL="$COMPILE_SSL" ./build.sh + run: | + CC="$CC" VARIANT="$VARIANT" COMPILE_SSL="$COMPILE_SSL" UML_MODE="$UML_MODE" ./build.sh diff --git a/ci/fedora.sh b/ci/fedora.sh index 2272bbc57fae..e60de7981c60 100755 --- a/ci/fedora.sh +++ b/ci/fedora.sh @@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ yum -y install \ util-linux \ vim-common \ wget \ - which + which \ + zstd yum -y install docbook5-style-xsl || true yum -y install swtpm || true From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:48 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093856 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFAFCC678D6 for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:57:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234288AbjAIQ5T (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:19 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51766 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237040AbjAIQ5E (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:04 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5ED672C3 for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:57:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfV3Rhgz9v7YP for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:22 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S6; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:49 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 4/8] Add support for UML in functions.sh Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:48 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S6 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxXw45WrWfuFW5KFykJr13Jwb_yoWrGr4kpw 1UWFyYqas7XF9FvaySg3yxWF1fJrWrCr10qr9xX398Awn8Kr4vqr4IvF1aqry5GrWYg3y0 q3yIqr4rG3W7CwUanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07jD6p9UUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAMBF1jj4NhnAAAsF X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Add the new functions _run_user_mode(), _exit_user_mode(), _init_user_mode() and _cleanup_user_mode() to run the tests inside a system booted with the UML kernel. A typical structure of a script with tests is: trap cleanup SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT _cleanup() { } cleanup() { _cleanup_user_mode _cleanup _report_exit_and_cleanup } _run_user_mode ../linux $PWD/$(basename $0) "env_var1=$env_var1 ..." _exit_user_mode ../linux _init_user_mode If the UML_MODE environment variable is not set to 1, ignore the UML kernel execution and initialization requests, and perform the cleanup in the current environment. Ignore the same also if the script is already run in the UML environment, to avoid loops. Instead, for cleanup, do it only in the UML environment and skip it in the host environment. Signal to the host environment failures of tests run in the UML environment with an unclean shutdown of the UML kernel. Add haveged and systemd as dependencies for the tests in ci/fedora.sh, respectively for initializing the random number generator and for shutting down the system in the environment created by the UML kernel. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- ci/fedora.sh | 4 ++- tests/functions.sh | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ci/fedora.sh b/ci/fedora.sh index e60de7981c60..198034a34e3c 100755 --- a/ci/fedora.sh +++ b/ci/fedora.sh @@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ yum -y install \ vim-common \ wget \ which \ - zstd + zstd \ + haveged \ + systemd yum -y install docbook5-style-xsl || true yum -y install swtpm || true diff --git a/tests/functions.sh b/tests/functions.sh index 8f6f02dfcd95..98829d94fae1 100755 --- a/tests/functions.sh +++ b/tests/functions.sh @@ -267,6 +267,16 @@ _report_exit_and_cleanup() { [ $testsfail -gt 0 ] && echo -n "$RED" || echo -n "$NORM" echo " FAIL: $testsfail" echo "$NORM" + # Signal failure to UML caller with an unclean shutdown. + if [ -n "$UML_MODE" ] && [ "$UML_MODE" -eq 1 ] && [ $$ -eq 1 ]; then + if [ -z "$(which poweroff)" ]; then + echo "Warning: cannot properly shutdown system" + fi + + if [ $testsfail -eq 0 ]; then + poweroff -f + fi + fi if [ $testsfail -gt 0 ]; then exit "$FAIL" elif [ $testspass -gt 0 ]; then @@ -312,4 +322,71 @@ _softhsm_teardown() { rm -rf "${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}" unset SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR SOFTHSM2_CONF PKCS11_KEYURI \ EVMCTL_ENGINE OPENSSL_ENGINE OPENSSL_KEYFORM -} \ No newline at end of file +} + +# Syntax: _run_user_mode +_run_user_mode() { + if [ -z "$UML_MODE" ] || [ "$UML_MODE" -ne 1 ]; then + return + fi + + if [ $$ -eq 1 ]; then + return + fi + + expect_pass $1 rootfstype=hostfs rw init=$2 quiet mem=256M $3 +} + +# Syntax: _exit_user_mode +_exit_user_mode() { + if [ -z "$UML_MODE" ] || [ "$UML_MODE" -ne 1 ]; then + return + fi + + if [ $$ -eq 1 ]; then + return + fi + + if [ -f "$1" ]; then + exit $OK + fi +} + +# Syntax: _init_user_mode +_init_user_mode() { + if [ -z "$UML_MODE" ] || [ "$UML_MODE" -ne 1 ]; then + return + fi + + if [ $$ -ne 1 ]; then + return + fi + + mount -t proc proc /proc + mount -t sysfs sysfs /sys + mount -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security + + if [ -n "$(which haveged 2> /dev/null)" ]; then + $(which haveged) -w 1024 &> /dev/null + fi + + pushd $PWD > /dev/null +} + +# Syntax: _cleanup_user_mode +_cleanup_user_mode() { + if [ -z "$UML_MODE" ] || [ "$UML_MODE" -ne 1 ]; then + $1 + return + fi + + if [ $$ -ne 1 ]; then + return + fi + + $1 + + umount /sys/kernel/security + umount /sys + umount /proc +} From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:49 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093852 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AEE6C67871 for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:57:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233446AbjAIQ5P (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:15 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51804 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237041AbjAIQ5I (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:08 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C8ACB22A for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:57:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.227]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfZ0qPPz9v7Z2 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:26 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S7; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:53 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 5/8] Introduce TST_LIST variable to select a test to execute Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:49 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW7uF4UCr13XrWxJFWDWrWrAFb_yoW8Xry7pa yfCr12gFykuFyak343Wwn7Ga4rCw48Jr17Xr4kJw4j9a15JrsIqr4SkrW3GFy3Kr90vFs5 Za1Iqr1rW3Z5A3DanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07jxwIDUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAMBF1jj4NhnAABsE X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu It might be desirable, due to restrictions in the testing environment, to execute tests individually. Introduce the TST_LIST variable, which can be set with the name of the test to execute. If the variable is set, expect_pass and expect_fail automatically skip the tests when the first argument of those functions does not match the value of TST_LIST. TST_LIST can be also used in conjunction with the UML kernel. It is sufficient to add it to the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- tests/functions.sh | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/functions.sh b/tests/functions.sh index 98829d94fae1..298c30393ce6 100755 --- a/tests/functions.sh +++ b/tests/functions.sh @@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ declare -i TNESTED=0 # just for sanity checking expect_pass() { local -i ret + if [ -n "$TST_LIST" ] && [ "${TST_LIST/$1/}" = $TST_LIST ]; then + [ "$VERBOSE" -gt 1 ] && echo "____ SKIP test: $*" + testsskip+=1 + return $SKIP + fi + if [ $TNESTED -gt 0 ]; then echo $RED"expect_pass should not be run nested"$NORM testsfail+=1 @@ -98,6 +104,12 @@ expect_pass() { expect_fail() { local ret + if [ -n "$TST_LIST" ] && [ "${TST_LIST/$1/}" = $TST_LIST ]; then + [ "$VERBOSE" -gt 1 ] && echo "____ SKIP test: $*" + testsskip+=1 + return $SKIP + fi + if [ $TNESTED -gt 0 ]; then echo $RED"expect_fail should not be run nested"$NORM testsfail+=1 From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:50 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093858 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F089C54EBD for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233657AbjAIQ5p (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:45 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51834 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237122AbjAIQ5M (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:12 -0500 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C73EE22A for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:57:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.229]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfZ52QXz9xFGt for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:26 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S8; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:56:56 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 6/8] Add tests for EVM portable signatures Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:50 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S8 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWftF4UJrW7Gr1xGryrCw18AFb_yoWrXryxCo W8WFWfW3y5Aw17trn3Zrn7AF4UCrs3C3ZrCFWYq3Z8WF15JrZ7uw18G3y3Aw4furW8ArWU Ka4kGa4rZrWDtrnxn29KB7ZKAUJUUUU8529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYZ7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_JF 0E3s1l82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vE j48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxV AFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x02 67AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F4 0Ex7xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1Y6r17McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC 6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lc7CjxVAaw2AFwI0_GFv_Wryl42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26r126r1DMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0x vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1lIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUI1v3UUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAMBF1jj4dfhQAAsl X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Verify that operations on files with EVM portable signatures succeed and that the new kernel patch set does not break the existing kernel integrity expectations. Build and install mount-idmapped for ci/fedora.sh, to additionally test idmapped mounts. To run the tests, pass the path of the kernel private key with the TST_KEY_PATH environment variable. If not provided, the script searches the key in /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem and in the current directory. Root privileges are required to mount the image, configure IMA/EVM and set xattrs. Set UML_MODE to 1, to relaunch the script in a new environment after booting an UML kernel. The UML kernel must be named 'linux' and placed in the ima-evm-utils directory. Alternatively, set the TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE variable to 1, to change the current EVM mode, if a test needs a different one. Otherwise, execute only the tests compatible with the current EVM mode. Also set the EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES flag in the EVM mode, before launching the script, to run the check_evm_revalidate() test. Execute: echo 4 > /sys/kernel/security/evm The last two environment variables above affect which tests will run the next time the script is executed. Without setting UML_MODE to 1, changes to the current EVM mode will be irreversibly done in the host. Next time, unless the host is rebooted, only tests compatible with the last EVM mode set will run. The others will be skipped. With the UML kernel, this problem does not arise as, every time the UML kernel is executed, it will create a clean environment with no flags set in the EVM mode. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- build.sh | 5 + ci/fedora.sh | 7 +- tests/Makefile.am | 2 +- tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh | 7 + tests/portable_signatures.test | 1173 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 1192 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh create mode 100755 tests/portable_signatures.test diff --git a/build.sh b/build.sh index 4e2f1bb7353b..0920599b2780 100755 --- a/build.sh +++ b/build.sh @@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then grep "skipped" tests/fsverity.log && \ grep "skipped" tests/fsverity.log | wc -l fi + if [ -f tests/portable_signatures.log ]; then + [ -n "$CI" ] && cat tests/portable_signatures.log || tail tests/portable_signatures.log + grep "skipped" tests/portable_signatures.log && \ + grep "skipped" tests/portable_signatures.log | wc -l + fi exit 0 fi diff --git a/ci/fedora.sh b/ci/fedora.sh index 198034a34e3c..3f75d2e1ddbd 100755 --- a/ci/fedora.sh +++ b/ci/fedora.sh @@ -47,7 +47,11 @@ yum -y install \ which \ zstd \ haveged \ - systemd + systemd \ + keyutils \ + e2fsprogs \ + acl \ + libcap yum -y install docbook5-style-xsl || true yum -y install swtpm || true @@ -59,3 +63,4 @@ fi yum -y install softhsm || true ./tests/install-fsverity.sh +./tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am index 305082483f36..421fac577b55 100644 --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ check_SCRIPTS = TESTS = $(check_SCRIPTS) check_SCRIPTS += ima_hash.test sign_verify.test boot_aggregate.test \ - fsverity.test + fsverity.test portable_signatures.test clean-local: -rm -f *.txt *.out *.sig *.sig2 diff --git a/tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh b/tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..e9768e2fbf7a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +git clone https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped.git +cd mount-idmapped +gcc -o mount-idmapped mount-idmapped.c +cd .. +rm -rf mount-idmapped diff --git a/tests/portable_signatures.test b/tests/portable_signatures.test new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..a6d79c929281 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/portable_signatures.test @@ -0,0 +1,1173 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu +# +# Check if operations on files with EVM portable signatures succeed. + +trap cleanup SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT + +# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set. +VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}" +TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE="${TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE:-0}" +UML_MODE="${UML_MODE:-0}" + +# From security/integrity/evm/evm.h in kernel source directory. +let "EVM_INIT_HMAC=0x0001" +let "EVM_INIT_X509=0x0002" +let "EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES=0x0004" +let "EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE=0x80000000" + +cd "$(dirname "$0")" +export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD/../mount-idmapped:$PATH +export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH +. ./functions.sh +_require evmctl + +_cleanup() { + if [ "$loop_mounted" = "1" ]; then + popd > /dev/null + + if [ -n "$mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then + umount $mountpoint_idmapped + fi + + umount $mountpoint + fi + + if [ -n "$dev" ]; then + losetup -d $dev + fi + + if [ -n "$image" ]; then + rm -f $image + fi + + if [ -n "$key_path_der" ]; then + rm -f $key_path_der + fi + + if [ -n "$mountpoint" ]; then + rm -Rf $mountpoint + fi + + if [ -n "$mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then + rm -Rf $mountpoint_idmapped + fi +} + +cleanup() { + _cleanup_user_mode _cleanup + _report_exit_and_cleanup +} + +get_xattr() { + format="hex" + + if [ "$1" = "security.selinux" ]; then + format="text" + fi + + getfattr -n $1 -e $format -d $2 2> /dev/null | awk -F "=" '$1 == "'$1'" {if ("'$format'" == "hex") v=substr($2, 3); else { split($2, temp, "\""); v=temp[2] }; print v}' +} + +# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the +# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by +# individual tests. +IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26d" +APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER=2000 +APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER appraise_type=imasig" +MEASURE_FOWNER=2001 +MEASURE_RULE="measure fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_FOWNER template=ima-sig" +APPRAISE_FOWNER=2002 +APPRAISE_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_FOWNER" +METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER=3001 +METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2=3002 + +check_load_ima_rule() { + rule_loaded=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy | grep "$1") + if [ -z "$rule_loaded" ]; then + new_policy=$(mktemp -p $mountpoint) + echo $1 > $new_policy + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imasig --key $key_path $new_policy &> /dev/null + echo $new_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy + result=$? + rm -f $new_policy + + if [ $result -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + fi + + return $OK +} + +# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Allow imasig +# requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures' didn't break the +# current behavior (IMA signatures still satisfy the imasig requirement). +check_ima_sig_appraisal() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $((evm_value & (EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_INIT_HMAC))) -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode 0 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE" + result=$? + if [ $result -ne $OK ]; then + return $result + fi + + # Check if appraisal works. + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Ensure that files with IMA signature cannot be updated (immutable). + echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable file)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Requires: +# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Introduce template +# field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback' still allows IMA signatures +# to be displayed in the measurement list. +check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --imasig --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $MEASURE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE" + result=$? + if [ $result -ne $OK ]; then + return $result + fi + + # Read the file to add it to the measurement list. + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + ima_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file) + if [ -z "$ima_sig_fs" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Search security.ima in the measurement list. + ima_sig_list=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | awk '$6 == "'$ima_sig_fs'"') + if [ -z "$ima_sig_list" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that new files can be created when EVM +# is initialized only with a public key. +check_create_file() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + # To trigger the bug we need to enable public key verification without HMAC key loaded. + if [ $((evm_value & $EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + if [ $((evm_value & $EVM_INIT_HMAC)) -eq $EVM_INIT_HMAC ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_HMAC must be disabled${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_create_file() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors +# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that EVM with the patches above allows +# metadata to copied one by one, even if the portable signature verification +# temporarily fails until the copy is completed. +check_cp_preserve_xattrs() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $evm_value -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Check if cp is allowed to set metadata for the new file. + cp -a test-file test-file.copy + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot copy test-file with attrs/xattrs preserved${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs() { + rm -f test-file test-file.copy +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors +# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised +# +# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous test, with the +# difference that tar is used instead of cp. One remark is that the owner is +# intentionally different (or it should be) from the current owner, to +# incrementally test the patches without 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() +# for unmodified metadata'. +check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $evm_value -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + mkdir in out + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + echo "test" > in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown 3000 in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chmod 600 in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key $key_path in/test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file. + # Ensure that the owner from the archive is different from the + # owner of the extracted file to avoid that portable signature + # verification succeeds before restoring original metadata + # (a patch allows modification of immutable metadata if portable + # signature verification fails). + tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() { + rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors +# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures +# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks +# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised +# +# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous two tests. The +# difference is that tar is used instead of cp, and the extracted files have +# the same owner as the current one. Thus, this test requires 'evm: Allow +# setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata'. +check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $evm_value -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + mkdir in out + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + echo "test" > in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key $key_path in/test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file. + # This test is different from the previous one, as the owner + # from the archive is the same of the owner of the extracted + # file. tar will attempt anyway to restore the original owner but + # unlike the previous test, portable signature verification already + # succeeds at the time the owner is set (another patch allows + # metadata operations if those operations don't modify current + # values). + tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() { + rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors +# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures +# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks +# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata +# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# +# The purpose of this test is to further verify the patches above, by executing +# commands to set the same or different metadata. Setting the same metadata +# should be allowed, setting different metadata should be denied. +check_metadata_change() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $evm_value -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chgrp $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change group of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chmod 2644 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # If metadata modification is not allowed, EVM should deny any + # operation that modifies metadata. Check if setting the same + # value is allowed. + chown $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set same owner for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Setting a different value should not be allowed. + chown $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2 test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Owner change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Repeat the test for the file mode. + chmod 2644 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set same mode for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chmod 2666 test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Mode change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + if [ -n "$(which chcon 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ -n "$(which getenforce 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ]; then + # Repeat the test for the SELinux label. + label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file) + + if [ -n "$label" ]; then + chcon $label test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.selinux for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + fi + + chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}security.selinux change for test file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + fi + + # Repeat the test for the IMA signature. + ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file) + if [ -z "$ima_xattr" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x$ima_xattr test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.ima for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + last_char=${ima_xattr: -1} + ((last_char += 1)) + ((last_char %= 10)) + ima_xattr=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char + + setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x$ima_xattr test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Change of security.ima for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Repeat the test for ACLs. + msg=$(exec 2>&1 && setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file) + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + if [ "${msg%not supported}" != "$msg" ]; then + return $OK + fi + + echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Change of system.posix_acl_access for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + if [ -n "$mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then + pushd $mountpoint_idmapped > /dev/null + + # Repeat the test for ACLs on an idmapped mount. + # + # This test relies on the fact that the caller of this script (root) is in + # the same owning group of test-file (in the idmapped mount the group is + # root, not $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER and, for this reason, the S_ISGID bit + # is not cleared. If EVM was not aware of the mapping, it would have + # determined that root is not in the owning group of test-file and given + # that also CAP_FSETID is cleared, the S_ISGID bit would have been cleared + # and thus the operation would fail (file metadata changed). + capsh --drop='cap_fsetid' -- -c 'setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file' + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}" + popd + return $FAIL + fi + + popd > /dev/null + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_metadata_change() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status() +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# +# Note: +# This test can be run if EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set in advance +# before running this script. If it is not set before, this script sets +# EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE, disabling further EVM mode modifications until reboot. +# +# Without EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES, EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is necessary to ignore +# the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL and INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS errors. +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA detected a metadata change +# when EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set (metadata operations are always +# allowed). After the first successful appraisal, the test intentionally changes +# metadata and verifies that IMA revoked access to the file. The test also +# verifies that IMA grants access again to the file after restoring the correct +# metadata. +check_evm_revalidate() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $evm_value -ne $(($EVM_INIT_X509 | $EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $(($EVM_INIT_X509 | $EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) required, execute echo 4 > /sys/kernel/security/evm before running this test${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chmod 600 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be + # already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the + # file to calculate the digest. + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid $APPRAISE_FOWNER --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $APPRAISE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_RULE" + result=$? + if [ $result -ne $OK ]; then + return $result + fi + + # Read the file so that IMA would not re-appraise it next time. + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # After enabling metadata modification, operations should succeed even + # if the file has a portable signature. However, the previously cached + # appraisal status should be invalidated. + chmod 644 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Here check if IMA re-appraised the file. The read should fail + # since now file metadata is invalid. + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid mode)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Restore metadata back to the original value. + chmod 600 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot restore original mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Ensure that now IMA appraisal succeeds. + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct mode${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + if [ -n "$(which chcon 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ -n "$(which getenforce 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ]; then + # Repeat the test for the SELinux label. + label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file) + + chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change security.selinux of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.selinux)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + if [ -n "$label" ]; then + chcon $label test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.selinux of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + else + attr -S -r selinux test-file + fi + + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.selinux${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + fi + + # Repeat the test for the IMA signature. + ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file) + if [ -z "$ima_xattr" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + last_char=${ima_xattr: -1} + ((last_char += 1)) + ((last_char %= 10)) + ima_xattr_new=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char + + setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x$ima_xattr_new test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set security.ima of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.ima)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x$ima_xattr test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.ima of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.ima${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Repeat the test for the EVM signature. + evm_xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file) + if [ -z "$evm_xattr" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + last_char=${evm_xattr: -1} + ((last_char += 1)) + ((last_char %= 10)) + evm_xattr_new=${evm_xattr:0:-1}$last_char + + setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x$evm_xattr_new test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot set security.evm of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.evm)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x$evm_xattr test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.evm of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.evm${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Repeat the test for ACLs. + setfacl -m u::rwx test-file 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change system.posix_acl_access${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid system.posix_acl_access)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + setfacl -m u::rw test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot restore original system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct system.posix_acl_access${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_evm_revalidate() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Requires: +# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors +# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status() +# - ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA manages files with an EVM +# portable signature similarly to those with an IMA signature: content can be +# written to new files after adding the signature and files can be accessed +# when the imasig requirement is specified in the IMA policy. +check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM flag $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}" + return $SKIP + fi + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chmod 600 test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be + # already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the + # file to calculate the digest. + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid $APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE" + result=$? + if [ $result -ne $OK ]; then + return $result + fi + + # Ensure that a file with a portable signature satisfies the + # appraise_type=imasig requirement specified in the IMA policy. + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Even files with a portable signature should be considered as + # immutable by IMA. Write should fail. + echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable metadata)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + mkdir out + + # Appraisal of the new file, extracted by tar, should succeed + # not only if the new file has an IMA signature but also if + # it has a portable signature. + tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Check if xattrs have been correctly set. + xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file) + xattr=$(get_xattr security.selinux out/test-file) + if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.selinux mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file) + xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima out/test-file) + if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file) + xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm out/test-file) + if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Check if attrs have been correctly set. + owner=$(stat -c "%u" out/test-file) + if [ "$owner" != "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" ]; then + echo "${RED}owner mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + mode=$(stat -c "%a" out/test-file) + if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then + echo "${RED}mode mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() { + rm -f test-file test-archive.tar + rm -Rf out +} + +# Requires: +# - ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback +# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded +# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised +# +# The purpose of this test is to verify that the EVM portable signature is +# displayed in the measurement list. +check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() { + echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)" + + echo "test" > test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + chown $MEASURE_FOWNER test-file + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key $key_path test-file &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE" + result=$? + if [ $result -ne $OK ]; then + return $result + fi + + # Invalidate previous measurement to add new entry + touch test-file + + # Read the file to add it to the measurement list. + cat test-file > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + evm_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file) + if [ -z "$evm_sig_fs" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + # Search security.evm in the measurement list. + evm_sig_list=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | awk '$6 == "'$evm_sig_fs'"') + if [ -z "$evm_sig_list" ]; then + echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}" + return $FAIL + fi + + return $OK +} + +cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() { + rm -f test-file +} + +# Run in User Mode Linux. +_run_user_mode ../linux $PWD/$(basename $0) "UML_MODE=$UML_MODE PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH" + +# Run in User Mode Linux (skipped test). +_run_user_mode ../linux $PWD/$(basename $0) "UML_MODE=$UML_MODE PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH TST_LIST=check_evm_revalidate" + +# Exit from the parent if UML was used. +_exit_user_mode ../linux + +# Mount filesystems in UML environment. +_init_user_mode + +mountpoint=$(mktemp -d) +image=$(mktemp) + +if [ -z "$mountpoint" ]; then + echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +if [ $(whoami) != "root" ]; then + echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}" + exit $SKIP +fi + +key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" +if [ -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ]; then + key_path=$PWD/../signing_key.pem +fi + +if [ -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then + key_path=$TST_KEY_PATH +fi + +if [ ${key_path:0:1} != "/" ]; then + echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +key_path_der=$(mktemp) + +if [ ! -f $key_path ]; then + echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found in $key_path${NORM}" + exit $SKIP +fi + +if [ ! -f "/sys/kernel/security/evm" ]; then + echo "${CYAN}EVM support in the kernel disabled${NORM}" + exit $SKIP +fi + +# Assume that the EVM mode can be changed in a UML kernel +if [ -f $PWD/../linux ]; then + TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=1 +fi + +evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm) + +openssl x509 -in $key_path -out $key_path_der -outform der +cat $key_path_der | keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima &> /dev/null +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +dd if=/dev/zero of=$image bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +dev=$(losetup -f $image --show) +if [ -z "$dev" ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +mkfs.ext4 -U $IMA_UUID -b 4096 $dev &> /dev/null +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot format $dev${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +mount -o i_version $dev $mountpoint +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}" + exit $FAIL +fi + +if [ -n "$(which mount-idmapped 2> /dev/null)" ]; then + mountpoint_idmapped=$(mktemp -d) + mount-idmapped --map-mount b:$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER:0:1 $mountpoint $mountpoint_idmapped + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}mount-idmapped failed${NORM}" + exit $FAIL + fi +fi + +loop_mounted=1 +pushd $mountpoint > /dev/null + +expect_pass check_ima_sig_appraisal +cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal +expect_pass check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list +cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list + +if [ $(echo -e "$(uname -r)\n5.12" | sort -V | head -n 1) != "5.12" ]; then + exit $OK +fi + +if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne $EVM_INIT_X509 ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then + cat $key_path_der | keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.evm &> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the EVM keyring${NORM}" + exit $FAIL + fi + + echo $EVM_INIT_X509 > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null +fi + +if [ $(expr index "$TST_LIST" "check_evm_revalidate") -gt 0 ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then + echo $EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null +fi + +# We cannot determine from securityfs if EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is set, so we set it unless EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set. +if [ $((evm_value & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) -ne $EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then + echo $EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null +fi + +evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm) + +expect_pass check_create_file +cleanup_create_file +expect_pass check_cp_preserve_xattrs +cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs +expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner +cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner +expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner +cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner +expect_pass check_metadata_change +cleanup_metadata_change +expect_pass check_evm_revalidate +cleanup_evm_revalidate +expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal +cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal +expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list +cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:51 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093857 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0123C5479D for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234178AbjAIQ5q (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:46 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51868 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229648AbjAIQ5P (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:15 -0500 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86F0EE0DC for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:57:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.229]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfc0Dvtz9v7Vg for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:28 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S9; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:57:00 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 7/8] Adapt fsverity.test to work with UML kernel Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:51 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-8-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S9 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW7Ar17Wr43ZF1DWFWDJr18Krg_yoW8Wr43pF yUWFyYkrZ3tFyIyw4xWay7AFy0k3y5Zr4UWr97Z3Z5ur95Ar1qyr48tw12gFy5CrZFqa1r C3yF9F15G3srCrUanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07jxwIDUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAMBF1jj4dfhQABsk X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Adapt fsverity.test by adding calls to the UML kernel API in functions.sh. If the UML_MODE environment variable is set to 1, run first the UML kernel specified as first argument of _run_user_mode() and execute the tests in the new environment. Otherwise, keep the current behavior. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- tests/fsverity.test | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/fsverity.test b/tests/fsverity.test index 549c42a32608..84312aa08a30 100755 --- a/tests/fsverity.test +++ b/tests/fsverity.test @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ _require dd mkfs blkid e2fsck tune2fs evmctl setfattr trap cleanup SIGINT SIGTERM EXIT -cleanup() { +_cleanup() { if [ -e $TST_MNT ]; then if [ $LOOPBACK_MOUNTED -eq 1 ]; then umount $TST_MNT @@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ cleanup() { _report_exit_and_cleanup } +cleanup() { + _cleanup_user_mode _cleanup + _report_exit_and_cleanup +} + # Loopback mount a file mount_loopback_file() { local ret @@ -309,6 +314,15 @@ measure-ima() { return "$error" } +# Run in User Mode Linux. +_run_user_mode ../linux $PWD/$(basename $0) "UML_MODE=$UML_MODE PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE" + +# Exit from the parent if UML was used. +_exit_user_mode ../linux + +# Mount filesystems in UML environment. +_init_user_mode + # Dependency on being able to read and write the IMA policy file. # Requires both CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY, CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY be # enabled. From patchwork Mon Jan 9 16:55:52 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13093859 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E408AC61DB3 for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235031AbjAIQ5r (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:47 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52064 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229789AbjAIQ51 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Jan 2023 11:57:27 -0500 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58DE3614F for ; Mon, 9 Jan 2023 08:57:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.227]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4NrKfn31Q5z9v7Yw for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2023 00:49:37 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S10; Mon, 09 Jan 2023 17:57:04 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vt@altlinux.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH ima-evm-utils 8/8] Use in-place built fsverity binary instead of installing it Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 17:55:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20230109165552.3409716-9-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230109165552.3409716-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwCXHWQ9R7xjPQWBAA--.14103S10 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW7XrWfCw1xJryDJr4fAw1kKrg_yoW8JrWfp3 Wjv3W0krn3XFnrCr18GFsFya4Ik395Wr1UZrWkXa4xZFWkAr4Utr1S9r4rWr1fXrWUXrna yw40vrn5Ka1DArJanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCY1x0262kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_JF0_Jw1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07jxwIDUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAMBF1jj4NhnQAAsE X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Instead of making changes to the system, use in-place built fsverity binary by adding ../fsverity-utils to the PATH variable, so that the binary can be found with the 'which' command. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- tests/fsverity.test | 2 +- tests/install-fsverity.sh | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/fsverity.test b/tests/fsverity.test index 84312aa08a30..e05978be7ea6 100755 --- a/tests/fsverity.test +++ b/tests/fsverity.test @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ # custom policy rules might take precedence. cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1 -PATH=../src:$PATH +PATH=../src:../fsverity-utils:$PATH source ./functions.sh # Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set. diff --git a/tests/install-fsverity.sh b/tests/install-fsverity.sh index 418fc42f472b..d00674c0d3a2 100755 --- a/tests/install-fsverity.sh +++ b/tests/install-fsverity.sh @@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ git clone https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git cd fsverity-utils -CC=gcc make -j$(nproc) && sudo make install +CC=gcc make -j$(nproc) cd .. rm -rf fsverity-utils