From patchwork Fri Jan 27 22:15:29 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13119459 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B8C35221 for ; Fri, 27 Jan 2023 22:15:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B6422C433EF; Fri, 27 Jan 2023 22:15:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1674857746; bh=nby6qwkp63ZY6a1Um6aeO+ZU/IqyXTEx5svGq8gIjQ4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=cCD6JPF/4WV7GFZZ6rXaKk9s7/V1xRfpE5AdOmyP4l0xe15qqZGq0GXBxtRfXbNAM +H2DflV/hlqP86yEyj8e9mdHJMHUh4jlGzNcQ1Bk1KdM7bhYIN7dyCgP5/oLPhoX3p fvvxRAIOoZ7xsiDjIzuUkITgiP6CcjGYegjIRS79UHxpKKnN2sE1isaPNRDiTSEeTo NWQrYFeIe44l14ZIUNLThgdhOzmqxOjRtj55xXB9W4wgDgW83jK58U78yNxlgVv8OW tijPEpblKi5+93y923mDB1qSUIImyGALMEIGbj4CbB4tJ9g+DGXdLQSpIYzutvHOVV cw22AJlglyrnw== From: Eric Biggers To: fsverity@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox Subject: [PATCH] fsverity: support verifying data from large folios Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 14:15:29 -0800 Message-Id: <20230127221529.299560-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: fsverity@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Eric Biggers Try to make fs/verity/verify.c aware of large folios. This includes making fsverity_verify_bio() support the case where the bio contains large folios, and adding a function fsverity_verify_folio() which is the equivalent of fsverity_verify_page(). There's no way to actually test this with large folios yet, but I've tested that this doesn't cause any regressions. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- This patch is targeting 6.3, and it applies to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux.git/log/?h=for-next Note: to avoid a cross-tree dependency, in fs/buffer.c I used page_folio(bh->b_page) instead of bh->b_folio. Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 20 ++++++------ fs/buffer.c | 3 +- fs/verity/verify.c | 43 +++++++++++++------------- include/linux/fsverity.h | 15 ++++++--- 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) base-commit: 245edf445c3421584f541307cd7a8cd847c3d8d7 diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst index 2d9ef906aa2a3..ede672dedf110 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst @@ -568,22 +568,22 @@ Pagecache ~~~~~~~~~ For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->read_folio()`` and -``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they -are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be +``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify folios before +they are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps. Therefore, fs/verity/ provides the function fsverity_verify_blocks() which verifies data that has been read into the pagecache of a verity -inode. The containing page must still be locked and not Uptodate, so +inode. The containing folio must still be locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable by userspace. As needed to do the verification, fsverity_verify_blocks() will call back into the filesystem to read hash blocks via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page(). fsverity_verify_blocks() returns false if verification failed; in this -case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this, +case, the filesystem must not set the folio Uptodate. Following this, as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to -read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with -EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS. +read() from the part of the file containing the folio will fail with +EIO, and accesses to the folio within a memory map will raise SIGBUS. In principle, verifying a data block requires verifying the entire path in the Merkle tree from the data block to the root hash. @@ -624,8 +624,8 @@ each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``:: verity, or both is enabled. After the bio completes, for each needed postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or -verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error -occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked. +verification. Finally, folios where no decryption or verity error +occurred are marked Uptodate, and the folios are unlocked. On many filesystems, files can contain holes. Normally, ``->readahead()`` simply zeroes hole blocks and considers the @@ -791,9 +791,9 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document. :A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very difficult, including the following: - - To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked + - To prevent bypassing verification, folios must not be marked Uptodate until they've been verified. Currently, each - filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via + filesystem is responsible for marking folios Uptodate via ``->readahead()``. Therefore, currently it's not possible for the VFS to do the verification on its own. Changing this would require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems. diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c index 2e65ba2b3919b..8499c79ae13d4 100644 --- a/fs/buffer.c +++ b/fs/buffer.c @@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ static void verify_bh(struct work_struct *work) struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh; bool valid; - valid = fsverity_verify_blocks(bh->b_page, bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh)); + valid = fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(bh->b_page), bh->b_size, + bh_offset(bh)); end_buffer_async_read(bh, valid); kfree(ctx); } diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c index e59ef9d0e21cf..f50e3b5b52c93 100644 --- a/fs/verity/verify.c +++ b/fs/verity/verify.c @@ -266,20 +266,23 @@ verify_data_block(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi, static bool verify_data_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi, - struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page, - unsigned int len, unsigned int offset, - unsigned long max_ra_pages) + struct ahash_request *req, struct folio *data_folio, + size_t len, size_t offset, unsigned long max_ra_pages) { const unsigned int block_size = vi->tree_params.block_size; - u64 pos = (u64)data_page->index << PAGE_SHIFT; + u64 pos = (u64)data_folio->index << PAGE_SHIFT; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offset, block_size))) return false; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page) || PageUptodate(data_page))) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(data_folio) || + folio_test_uptodate(data_folio))) return false; do { - if (!verify_data_block(inode, vi, req, data_page, - pos + offset, offset, max_ra_pages)) + struct page *data_page = + folio_page(data_folio, offset >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + if (!verify_data_block(inode, vi, req, data_page, pos + offset, + offset & ~PAGE_MASK, max_ra_pages)) return false; offset += block_size; len -= block_size; @@ -288,21 +291,20 @@ verify_data_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi, } /** - * fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a page - * @page: the page containing the data to verify - * @len: the length of the data to verify in the page - * @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the page + * fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a folio + * @folio: the folio containing the data to verify + * @len: the length of the data to verify in the folio + * @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the folio * * Verify data that has just been read from a verity file. The data must be - * located in a pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The + * located in a pagecache folio that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The * length and offset of the data must be Merkle tree block size aligned. * * Return: %true if the data is valid, else %false. */ -bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, - unsigned int offset) +bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset) { - struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host; + struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host; struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; struct ahash_request *req; bool valid; @@ -310,7 +312,7 @@ bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); - valid = verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, page, len, offset, 0); + valid = verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, folio, len, offset, 0); fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req); @@ -338,8 +340,7 @@ void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio) struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host; struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; struct ahash_request *req; - struct bio_vec *bv; - struct bvec_iter_all iter_all; + struct folio_iter fi; unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0; /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ @@ -358,9 +359,9 @@ void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio) max_ra_pages = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 2); } - bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) { - if (!verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, bv->bv_page, bv->bv_len, - bv->bv_offset, max_ra_pages)) { + bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) { + if (!verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, fi.folio, fi.length, + fi.offset, max_ra_pages)) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR; break; } diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index 991a444589966..119a3266791fd 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -169,8 +170,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg); /* verify.c */ -bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, - unsigned int offset); +bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset); void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio); void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work); @@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, /* verify.c */ -static inline bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, - unsigned int offset) +static inline bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, + size_t offset) { WARN_ON(1); return false; @@ -249,9 +249,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work) #endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ +static inline bool fsverity_verify_folio(struct folio *folio) +{ + return fsverity_verify_blocks(folio, folio_size(folio), 0); +} + static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page) { - return fsverity_verify_blocks(page, PAGE_SIZE, 0); + return fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(page), PAGE_SIZE, 0); } /**