From patchwork Thu Jul 20 00:44:09 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kuniyuki Iwashima X-Patchwork-Id: 13319667 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40173621 for ; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp-fw-52005.amazon.com (smtp-fw-52005.amazon.com [52.119.213.156]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A41912100 for ; Wed, 19 Jul 2023 17:45:16 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=amazon.com; i=@amazon.com; q=dns/txt; s=amazon201209; t=1689813917; x=1721349917; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ilr1spx6x8Sja/x4OJeBwc7Btf7Qagl8uMdd/OqmKW8=; b=q8CfgbvMfJEi28dHZ2bDEyFxyGTzex916pod5jEkeCBFbgCkTcyL4apb EeFd66sFBBPUZRLqktxaYu3oNTYHorMSVZiE9vPk2t7i0wZh45i+r8gdZ FAkQuMN9siyXrTGiXaXNRCe3tj9IyYcysBKlzq/oFmFdHkk4wF1qUw9Ax I=; X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.01,216,1684800000"; d="scan'208";a="593943980" Received: from iad12-co-svc-p1-lb1-vlan3.amazon.com (HELO email-inbound-relay-iad-1a-m6i4x-bbc6e425.us-east-1.amazon.com) ([10.43.8.6]) by smtp-border-fw-52005.iad7.amazon.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Jul 2023 00:45:15 +0000 Received: from EX19MTAUWC002.ant.amazon.com (iad12-ws-svc-p26-lb9-vlan3.iad.amazon.com [10.40.163.38]) by email-inbound-relay-iad-1a-m6i4x-bbc6e425.us-east-1.amazon.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E79AE8059C; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) by EX19MTAUWC002.ant.amazon.com (10.250.64.143) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.1118.30; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:11 +0000 Received: from 88665a182662.ant.amazon.com (10.106.101.39) by EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.1118.30; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:07 +0000 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima To: "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni CC: Willem de Bruijn , Kees Cook , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , "Breno Leitao" , Kuniyuki Iwashima , "Kuniyuki Iwashima" , , syzkaller , Willem de Bruijn Subject: [PATCH v2 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd(). Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 17:44:09 -0700 Message-ID: <20230720004410.87588-2-kuniyu@amazon.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20230720004410.87588-1-kuniyu@amazon.com> References: <20230720004410.87588-1-kuniyu@amazon.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.106.101.39] X-ClientProxiedBy: EX19D038UWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.13.139.213) To EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) Precedence: Bulk X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL, SPF_HELO_NONE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,T_SPF_PERMERROR autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108. 108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate. However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in struct sockaddr_storage. Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size. [0]: detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 sp : ffff800089817af0 x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68 x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140 x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c Call trace: fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline] unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline] unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000) Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") Reported-by: syzkaller Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 123b35ddfd71..e1b1819b96d1 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len) ((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] = 0; } +static int unix_strlen_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr) +{ + /* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, the + * max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if + * CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() know that + * the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108 + * is within __data[]. See also: unix_mkname_bsd(). + */ + return strlen(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1; +} + static void __unix_remove_socket(struct sock *sk) { sk_del_node_init(sk); @@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int err; unix_mkname_bsd(sunaddr, addr_len); - addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) + - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1; - + addr_len = unix_strlen_bsd(sunaddr); addr = unix_create_addr(sunaddr, addr_len); if (!addr) return -ENOMEM; From patchwork Thu Jul 20 00:44:10 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kuniyuki Iwashima X-Patchwork-Id: 13319671 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFA0C7E0 for ; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp-fw-52002.amazon.com (smtp-fw-52002.amazon.com [52.119.213.150]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 61FDF1FFD for ; Wed, 19 Jul 2023 17:45:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=amazon.com; i=@amazon.com; q=dns/txt; s=amazon201209; t=1689813943; x=1721349943; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Ud9p+d2ehr8KGZLNgvfUhOMspfIutXmuAmFtJ00Q46Q=; b=ocM6E0zdaEJYGa52tUSIC3IizUDtoSxcXqSpnAVuql4RZx9g9q6PzcHt h02w8XAehfoWSkvUjcG3xBKPtaNGn4GG5U5RqWdI6zBYOEn/V0rc1NYwl jw0Q94emuwNud55HPBS9hAI5C++zi/NU2398rfZ+NtXN2oESxIvkszlJq g=; X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.01,216,1684800000"; d="scan'208";a="573146730" Received: from iad12-co-svc-p1-lb1-vlan3.amazon.com (HELO email-inbound-relay-iad-1e-m6i4x-529f0975.us-east-1.amazon.com) ([10.43.8.6]) by smtp-border-fw-52002.iad7.amazon.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Jul 2023 00:45:41 +0000 Received: from EX19MTAUWC001.ant.amazon.com (iad12-ws-svc-p26-lb9-vlan3.iad.amazon.com [10.40.163.38]) by email-inbound-relay-iad-1e-m6i4x-529f0975.us-east-1.amazon.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AAF8946C5F; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) by EX19MTAUWC001.ant.amazon.com (10.250.64.174) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.1118.30; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:36 +0000 Received: from 88665a182662.ant.amazon.com (10.106.101.39) by EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.1118.30; Thu, 20 Jul 2023 00:45:33 +0000 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima To: "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni CC: Willem de Bruijn , Kees Cook , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , "Breno Leitao" , Kuniyuki Iwashima , "Kuniyuki Iwashima" , , syzkaller Subject: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname(). Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 17:44:10 -0700 Message-ID: <20230720004410.87588-3-kuniyu@amazon.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20230720004410.87588-1-kuniyu@amazon.com> References: <20230720004410.87588-1-kuniyu@amazon.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.106.101.39] X-ClientProxiedBy: EX19D040UWA003.ant.amazon.com (10.13.139.6) To EX19D004ANA001.ant.amazon.com (10.37.240.138) Precedence: Bulk X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_NONE, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,T_SPF_PERMERROR autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org syzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8]. Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN. The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[]. To avoid the warning, we need to let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size. Another option would be to use strncpy() and limit the copied length to sizeof(sll_addr), but it will return the partial address and break an application that passes sockaddr_storage to getsockname(). [0]: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "sll->sll_addr" at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 (size 8) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 255 at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor750 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 lr : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 sp : ffff800089887bc0 x29: ffff800089887bc0 x28: ffff000010f80f80 x27: 0000000000000003 x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff700011310f80 x24: ffff800087d55000 x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089887c2c x21: 0000000000000010 x20: ffff00000de08310 x19: ffff800089887c20 x18: ffff800086ab1630 x17: 20646c6569662065 x16: 6c676e697320666f x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1fffe0000d56d7ca x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x8 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff8000898874f8 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff8000803f8808 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 __sys_getsockname+0x168/0x24c net/socket.c:2042 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2057 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2054 [inline] __arm64_sys_getsockname+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:2054 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") Reported-by: syzkaller Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 85ff90a03b0c..7f60b78f170f 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3601,7 +3601,12 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, if (dev) { sll->sll_hatype = dev->type; sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len; - memcpy(sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); + + /* Let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size. */ + memcpy(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sll)->__data + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr) - + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_protocol), + dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); } else { sll->sll_hatype = 0; /* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */ sll->sll_halen = 0;