From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:32 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403370 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 721C1E81810 for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:41:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232119AbjI1RlV (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:41:21 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50272 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232102AbjI1RlT (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:41:19 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 427 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:41:17 PDT Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:4f8:150:2161:1:b009:f236:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03B7819D; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:41:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.28]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5803810029AD0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:34:07 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0D11B60E0037; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:34:07 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From e3d7c94d89e09a6985ac2bf0a6d192b007f454bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] X.509: Make certificate parser public To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org The upcoming support for PCI device authentication with CMA-SPDM (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) requires validating the Subject Alternative Name in X.509 certificates. High-level functions for X.509 parsing such as key_create_or_update() throw away the internal, low-level struct x509_certificate after extracting the struct public_key and public_key_signature from it. The Subject Alternative Name is thus inaccessible when using those functions. Afford CMA-SPDM access to the Subject Alternative Name by making struct x509_certificate public, together with the functions for parsing an X.509 certificate into such a struct and freeing such a struct. The private header file x509_parser.h previously included for the definition of time64_t. That definition was since moved to by commit 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64"), so adjust the #include directive as part of the move to the new public header file . No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Dan Williams --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 37 +---------------------- include/keys/x509-parser.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/x509-parser.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index a299c9c56f40..a7ef43c39002 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -5,40 +5,7 @@ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) */ -#include -#include -#include - -struct x509_certificate { - struct x509_certificate *next; - struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ - struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ - struct public_key_signature *sig; /* Signature parameters */ - char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ - char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */ - time64_t valid_from; - time64_t valid_to; - const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ - unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ - unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of signature */ - const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */ - const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ - unsigned raw_serial_size; - unsigned raw_issuer_size; - const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ - const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ - unsigned raw_subject_size; - unsigned raw_skid_size; - const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */ - unsigned index; - bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ - bool verified; - bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ - bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ - bool blacklisted; -}; +#include /* * selftest.c @@ -52,8 +19,6 @@ static inline int fips_signature_selftest(void) { return 0; } /* * x509_cert_parser.c */ -extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert); -extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen); extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen); diff --git a/include/keys/x509-parser.h b/include/keys/x509-parser.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7c2ebc84791f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/x509-parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* X.509 certificate parser + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +struct x509_certificate { + struct x509_certificate *next; + struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ + struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ + struct public_key_signature *sig; /* Signature parameters */ + char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ + char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */ + struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */ + time64_t valid_from; + time64_t valid_to; + const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ + unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ + unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of signature */ + const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */ + const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ + unsigned raw_serial_size; + unsigned raw_issuer_size; + const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ + const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ + unsigned raw_subject_size; + unsigned raw_skid_size; + const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */ + unsigned index; + bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ + bool verified; + bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ + bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ + bool blacklisted; +}; + +struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen); +void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert); From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:32 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403372 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E561CE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:43:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231446AbjI1Rnv (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:43:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35548 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229478AbjI1Rnu (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:43:50 -0400 Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:4f8:150:2161:1:b009:f236:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BEA0E199; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:43:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8DD0110029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:43:46 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4305960E0037; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:43:46 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 704291cbc90ca3aaaaa56b191017c1400963cf12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <704291cbc90ca3aaaaa56b191017c1400963cf12.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org The upcoming support for PCI device authentication with CMA-SPDM (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) requires validating the Subject Alternative Name in X.509 certificates. Store a pointer to the Subject Alternative Name upon parsing for consumption by CMA-SPDM. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa Acked-by: Dan Williams --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/keys/x509-parser.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 0a7049b470c1..18dfd564740b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -579,6 +579,21 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return 0; } + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectAltName) { + /* + * A certificate MUST NOT include more than one instance + * of a particular extension (RFC 5280 sec 4.2). + */ + if (ctx->cert->raw_san) { + pr_err("Duplicate Subject Alternative Name\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ctx->cert->raw_san = v; + ctx->cert->raw_san_size = vlen; + return 0; + } + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) { /* * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string diff --git a/include/keys/x509-parser.h b/include/keys/x509-parser.h index 7c2ebc84791f..9c6e7cdf4870 100644 --- a/include/keys/x509-parser.h +++ b/include/keys/x509-parser.h @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ struct x509_certificate { unsigned raw_subject_size; unsigned raw_skid_size; const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */ + const void *raw_san; /* Raw subjectAltName in ASN.1 */ + unsigned raw_san_size; unsigned index; bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ bool verified; From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:32 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403380 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87368CE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:46:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231332AbjI1RqR (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:46:17 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40824 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229478AbjI1RqQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:46:16 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 721 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:46:13 PDT Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [176.9.242.54]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F1B5319D; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:46:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7914310029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:46:11 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EFDC160E0037; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:46:10 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 16c06528d13b2c0081229a45cacd4b1b9cdff738 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <16c06528d13b2c0081229a45cacd4b1b9cdff738.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org The upcoming in-kernel SPDM library (Security Protocol and Data Model, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274) needs to retrieve the length from ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 certificates. Such code already exists in x509_load_certificate_list(), so move it into a new helper for reuse by SPDM. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Dan Williams --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++--------- include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c index a41741326998..121460a0de46 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c @@ -4,28 +4,42 @@ #include #include +int x509_get_certificate_length(const u8 *p, unsigned long buflen) +{ + int plen; + + /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more + * than 256 bytes in size. + */ + if (buflen < 4) + return -EINVAL; + + if (p[0] != 0x30 && + p[1] != 0x82) + return -EINVAL; + + plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + plen += 4; + if (plen > buflen) + return -EINVAL; + + return plen; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_certificate_length); + int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], const unsigned long list_size, const struct key *keyring) { key_ref_t key; const u8 *p, *end; - size_t plen; + int plen; p = cert_list; end = p + list_size; while (p < end) { - /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more - * than 256 bytes in size. - */ - if (end - p < 4) - goto dodgy_cert; - if (p[0] != 0x30 && - p[1] != 0x82) - goto dodgy_cert; - plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; - plen += 4; - if (plen > end - p) + plen = x509_get_certificate_length(p, end - p); + if (plen < 0) goto dodgy_cert; key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h index 69a13e1e5b2e..6705cfde25b9 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h @@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_2, bool partial); +int x509_get_certificate_length(const u8 *p, unsigned long buflen); + int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], const unsigned long list_size, const struct key *keyring); From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:32 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403389 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A11ACE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:55:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230291AbjI1Rzk (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:55:40 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52172 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229478AbjI1Rzj (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:55:39 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 418 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:55:37 PDT Received: from mailout2.hostsharing.net (mailout2.hostsharing.net [83.223.78.233]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 72D5CDD; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:55:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout2.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E7CA51018978B; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:48:34 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C05E860E0037; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:48:34 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 3db7a8856833dfcbc4b122301f233828379d67db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <3db7a8856833dfcbc4b122301f233828379d67db.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] certs: Create blacklist keyring earlier To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org The upcoming support for PCI device authentication with CMA-SPDM (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) requires parsing X.509 certificates upon device enumeration, which happens in a subsys_initcall(). Parsing X.509 certificates accesses the blacklist keyring: x509_cert_parse() x509_get_sig_params() is_hash_blacklisted() keyring_search() So far the keyring is created much later in a device_initcall(). Avoid a NULL pointer dereference on access to the keyring by creating it one initcall level earlier than PCI device enumeration, i.e. in an arch_initcall(). Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis --- certs/blacklist.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index 675dd7a8f07a..34185415d451 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring, * Initialise the blacklist * * The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via - * device_initcall(). As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for + * arch_initcall(). As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for * any reason the kernel continues to execute. While cleanly returning -ENODEV * could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist * keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) /* * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. */ -device_initcall(blacklist_init); +arch_initcall(blacklist_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST /* From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:35 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403390 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D898CE7B06 for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:57:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229478AbjI1R47 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:56:59 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42164 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229870AbjI1R47 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:56:59 -0400 Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:4f8:150:2161:1:b009:f236:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E913519D; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:56:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2E8710029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:56:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 66DAD60D850C; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:56:54 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From f4a63091203d09e275c3df983692b630ffca4bca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] crypto: akcipher - Support more than one signature encoding To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org Currently only a single default signature encoding is supported per akcipher. A subsequent commit will allow a second encoding for ecdsa, namely P1363 alternatively to X9.62. To accommodate for that, amend struct akcipher_request and struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data to store the desired signature encoding for verify and sign ops. Amend akcipher_request_set_crypt(), crypto_sig_verify() and crypto_sig_sign() with an additional parameter which specifies the desired signature encoding. Adjust all callers. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron --- crypto/akcipher.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 4 ++-- crypto/internal.h | 1 + crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 11 +++++++---- crypto/sig.c | 6 ++++-- crypto/testmgr.c | 8 +++++--- crypto/testmgr.h | 1 + include/crypto/akcipher.h | 10 +++++++++- include/crypto/sig.h | 6 ++++-- 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/akcipher.c b/crypto/akcipher.c index 52813f0b19e4..88501c0886d2 100644 --- a/crypto/akcipher.c +++ b/crypto/akcipher.c @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int crypto_akcipher_sync_prep(struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data *data) sg = &data->sg; sg_init_one(sg, buf, mlen); akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, data->dst ? sg : NULL, - data->slen, data->dlen); + data->slen, data->dlen, data->enc); crypto_init_wait(&data->cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index abeecb8329b3..7f96e8e501db 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, if (!issig) break; ret = crypto_sig_sign(sig, in, params->in_len, - out, params->out_len); + out, params->out_len, params->encoding); break; default: BUG(); @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, goto error_free_key; ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size, - sig->digest, sig->digest_size); + sig->digest, sig->digest_size, sig->encoding); error_free_key: kfree_sensitive(key); diff --git a/crypto/internal.h b/crypto/internal.h index 63e59240d5fb..268315b13ccd 100644 --- a/crypto/internal.h +++ b/crypto/internal.h @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data { void *dst; unsigned int slen; unsigned int dlen; + const char *enc; struct akcipher_request *req; struct crypto_wait cwait; diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index d2e5e104f8cf..5f9313a3b01e 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req) /* Reuse output buffer */ akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg, - req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len); + req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len, + NULL); err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_decrypt(struct akcipher_request *req) /* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */ akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src, req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len, - ctx->key_size); + ctx->key_size, NULL); err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) @@ -419,7 +420,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req) /* Reuse output buffer */ akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg, - req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len); + req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len, + req->enc); err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) @@ -551,7 +553,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) /* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */ akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src, - req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size); + req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size, + req->enc); err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) diff --git a/crypto/sig.c b/crypto/sig.c index 224c47019297..4fc1a8f865e4 100644 --- a/crypto/sig.c +++ b/crypto/sig.c @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sig_maxsize); int crypto_sig_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const void *src, unsigned int slen, - void *dst, unsigned int dlen) + void *dst, unsigned int dlen, const char *enc) { struct crypto_akcipher **ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm); struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data data = { @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ int crypto_sig_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, .dst = dst, .slen = slen, .dlen = dlen, + .enc = enc, }; return crypto_akcipher_sync_prep(&data) ?: @@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sig_sign); int crypto_sig_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const void *src, unsigned int slen, - const void *digest, unsigned int dlen) + const void *digest, unsigned int dlen, const char *enc) { struct crypto_akcipher **ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm); struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data data = { @@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ int crypto_sig_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm, .src = src, .slen = slen, .dlen = dlen, + .enc = enc, }; int err; diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 216878c8bc3d..d5dd715673dd 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -4154,11 +4154,12 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, goto free_all; memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size); sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size, + vecs->enc); } else { sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max); akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size, - out_len_max); + out_len_max, NULL); } akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &wait); @@ -4217,7 +4218,8 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], c_size); sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_dec, out_len_max); crypto_init_wait(&wait); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max, + vecs->enc); err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? /* Run asymmetric signature generation */ diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 5ca7a412508f..ad57e7af2e14 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ struct akcipher_testvec { const unsigned char *params; const unsigned char *m; const unsigned char *c; + const char *enc; unsigned int key_len; unsigned int param_len; unsigned int m_size; diff --git a/include/crypto/akcipher.h b/include/crypto/akcipher.h index 670508f1dca1..00bbec69af3b 100644 --- a/include/crypto/akcipher.h +++ b/include/crypto/akcipher.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ * In case of error where the dst sgl size was insufficient, * it will be updated to the size required for the operation. * For verify op this is size of digest part in @src. + * @enc: For verify op it's the encoding of the signature part of @src. + * For sign op it's the encoding of the signature in @dst. * @__ctx: Start of private context data */ struct akcipher_request { @@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ struct akcipher_request { struct scatterlist *dst; unsigned int src_len; unsigned int dst_len; + const char *enc; void *__ctx[] CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR; }; @@ -272,17 +275,22 @@ static inline void akcipher_request_set_callback(struct akcipher_request *req, * @src_len: size of the src input scatter list to be processed * @dst_len: size of the dst output scatter list or size of signature * portion in @src for verify op + * @enc: encoding of signature portion in @src for verify op, + * encoding of signature in @dst for sign op, + * NULL for encrypt and decrypt op */ static inline void akcipher_request_set_crypt(struct akcipher_request *req, struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst, unsigned int src_len, - unsigned int dst_len) + unsigned int dst_len, + const char *enc) { req->src = src; req->dst = dst; req->src_len = src_len; req->dst_len = dst_len; + req->enc = enc; } /** diff --git a/include/crypto/sig.h b/include/crypto/sig.h index 641b4714c448..1df18005c854 100644 --- a/include/crypto/sig.h +++ b/include/crypto/sig.h @@ -81,12 +81,13 @@ int crypto_sig_maxsize(struct crypto_sig *tfm); * @slen: source length * @dst: destinatino obuffer * @dlen: destination length + * @enc: signature encoding * * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error */ int crypto_sig_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const void *src, unsigned int slen, - void *dst, unsigned int dlen); + void *dst, unsigned int dlen, const char *enc); /** * crypto_sig_verify() - Invoke signature verification @@ -99,12 +100,13 @@ int crypto_sig_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, * @slen: source length * @digest: digest * @dlen: digest length + * @enc: signature encoding * * Return: zero on verification success; error code in case of error. */ int crypto_sig_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const void *src, unsigned int slen, - const void *digest, unsigned int dlen); + const void *digest, unsigned int dlen, const char *enc); /** * crypto_sig_set_pubkey() - Invoke set public key operation From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:36 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403399 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDDDCE732FD for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 17:59:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230349AbjI1R7t (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:59:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44784 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229870AbjI1R7s (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 13:59:48 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 1627 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:59:45 PDT Received: from mailout1.hostsharing.net (mailout1.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.204]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C03C019E; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 10:59:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.28]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout1.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EE9201019263D; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:59:43 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C88CE60D850C; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:59:43 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 4f98bb7ee2e660a8b4513a94ed79f4f29d1ff379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <4f98bb7ee2e660a8b4513a94ed79f4f29d1ff379.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] crypto: ecdsa - Support P1363 signature encoding To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org Alternatively to the X9.62 encoding of ecdsa signatures, which uses ASN.1 and is already supported by the kernel, there's another common encoding called P1363. It stores r and s as the concatenation of two big endian, unsigned integers. The name originates from IEEE P1363. The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification prescribes that ecdsa signatures are encoded according to P1363: "For ECDSA signatures, excluding SM2, in SPDM, the signature shall be the concatenation of r and s. The size of r shall be the size of the selected curve. Likewise, the size of s shall be the size of the selected curve. See BaseAsymAlgo in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS for the size of r and s. The byte order for r and s shall be in big endian order. When placing ECDSA signatures into an SPDM signature field, r shall come first followed by s." (SPDM 1.2.1 margin no 44, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0274_1.2.1.pdf) A subsequent commit introduces an SPDM library to enable PCI device authentication, so add support for P1363 ecdsa signature verification. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 8 ++++++-- crypto/ecdsa.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- crypto/testmgr.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 7f96e8e501db..84c4ed02a270 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, return -EINVAL; *sig = false; } else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { - if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0) + if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0 && + strcmp(encoding, "p1363") != 0) return -EINVAL; /* * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't @@ -246,7 +247,10 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here. */ - info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2; + if (strcmp(params->encoding, "x962") == 0) + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2; + else if (strcmp(params->encoding, "p1363") == 0) + info->max_sig_size = 2 * len; } else { info->max_data_size = len; info->max_sig_size = len; diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c index fbd76498aba8..cc3082c6f67d 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c @@ -159,10 +159,20 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len + req->dst_len), buffer, req->src_len + req->dst_len, 0); - ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&ecdsasignature_decoder, &sig_ctx, - buffer, req->src_len); - if (ret < 0) + if (strcmp(req->enc, "x962") == 0) { + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&ecdsasignature_decoder, &sig_ctx, + buffer, req->src_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + } else if (strcmp(req->enc, "p1363") == 0 && + req->src_len == 2 * keylen) { + ecc_swap_digits(buffer, sig_ctx.r, ctx->curve->g.ndigits); + ecc_swap_digits(buffer + keylen, + sig_ctx.s, ctx->curve->g.ndigits); + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; goto error; + } /* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndigits */ diff = keylen - req->dst_len; diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index ad57e7af2e14..f12f70818147 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -674,6 +674,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { "\x68\x01\x9d\xba\xce\x83\x08\xef\x95\x52\x7b\xa0\x0f\xe4\x18\x86" "\x80\x6f\xa5\x79\x77\xda\xd0", .c_size = 55, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -698,6 +699,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { "\x4f\x53\x75\xc8\x02\x48\xeb\xc3\x92\x0f\x1e\x72\xee\xc4\xa3\xe3" "\x5c\x99\xdb\x92\x5b\x36", .c_size = 54, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -722,6 +724,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { "\x69\x43\xfd\x48\x19\x86\xcf\x32\xdd\x41\x74\x6a\x51\xc7\xd9\x7d" "\x3a\x97\xd9\xcd\x1a\x6a\x49", .c_size = 55, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -747,6 +750,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { "\xbc\x5a\x1f\x82\x96\x61\xd7\xd1\x01\x77\x44\x5d\x53\xa4\x7c\x93" "\x12\x3b\x3b\x28\xfb\x6d\xe1", .c_size = 55, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -773,6 +777,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = { "\xb4\x22\x9a\x98\x73\x3c\x83\xa9\x14\x2a\x5e\xf5\xe5\xfb\x72\x28" "\x6a\xdf\x97\xfd\x82\x76\x24", .c_size = 55, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, @@ -803,6 +808,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { "\x8a\xfa\x54\x93\x29\xa7\x70\x86\xf1\x03\x03\xf3\x3b\xe2\x73\xf7" "\xfb\x9d\x8b\xde\xd4\x8d\x6f\xad", .c_size = 72, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -829,6 +835,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { "\x4a\x77\x22\xec\xc8\x66\xbf\x50\x05\x58\x39\x0e\x26\x92\xce\xd5" "\x2e\x8b\xde\x5a\x04\x0e", .c_size = 70, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -855,6 +862,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { "\xa9\x81\xac\x4a\x50\xd0\x91\x0a\x6e\x1b\xc4\xaf\xe1\x83\xc3\x4f" "\x2a\x65\x35\x23\xe3\x1d\xfa", .c_size = 71, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -882,6 +890,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { "\x19\xfb\x5f\x92\xf4\xc9\x23\x37\x69\xf4\x3b\x4f\x47\xcf\x9b\x16" "\xc0\x60\x11\x92\xdc\x17\x89\x12", .c_size = 72, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -910,6 +919,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = { "\x00\xdd\xab\xd4\xc0\x2b\xe6\x5c\xad\xc3\x78\x1c\xc2\xc1\x19\x76" "\x31\x79\x4a\xe9\x81\x6a\xee", .c_size = 71, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, @@ -944,6 +954,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { "\x74\xa0\x0f\xbf\xaf\xc3\x36\x76\x4a\xa1\x59\xf1\x1c\xa4\x58\x26" "\x79\x12\x2a\xb7\xc5\x15\x92\xc5", .c_size = 104, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -974,6 +985,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { "\x4d\xd0\xc6\x6e\xb0\xe9\xfc\x14\x9f\x19\xd0\x42\x8b\x93\xc2\x11" "\x88\x2b\x82\x26\x5e\x1c\xda\xfb", .c_size = 104, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -1004,6 +1016,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { "\xc0\x75\x3e\x23\x5e\x36\x4f\x8d\xde\x1e\x93\x8d\x95\xbb\x10\x0e" "\xf4\x1f\x39\xca\x4d\x43", .c_size = 102, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -1035,6 +1048,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { "\x44\x92\x8c\x86\x99\x65\xb3\x97\x96\x17\x04\xc9\x05\x77\xf1\x8e" "\xab\x8d\x4e\xde\xe6\x6d\x9b\x66", .c_size = 104, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, { @@ -1067,6 +1081,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template[] = { "\x5f\x8d\x7a\xf9\xfb\x34\xe4\x8b\x80\xa5\xb6\xda\x2c\x4e\x45\xcf" "\x3c\x93\xff\x50\x5d", .c_size = 101, + .enc = "x962", .public_key_vec = true, .siggen_sigver_test = true, }, From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:37 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403400 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A085E732FD for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:02:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231986AbjI1SC1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:02:27 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42432 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232020AbjI1SCW (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:02:22 -0400 Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [176.9.242.54]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B78CCD6; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 11:02:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.28]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D452B10029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:02:02 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4B32060D850C; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:02:02 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 89a83f42ae3c411f46efd968007e9b2afd839e74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <89a83f42ae3c411f46efd968007e9b2afd839e74.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] spdm: Introduce library to authenticate devices To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org From: Jonathan Cameron The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication, measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices. A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is attestation. SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF). Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken between host and attached devices over a variety of transports: https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274 This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest version). It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already supports two different SPDM-capable transports: * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c) * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP, Documentation/networking/mctp.rst) Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to: * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6) * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0) https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf The initial focus of this implementation is enabling PCIe CMA device authentication. As such, only a subset of the SPDM specification is contained herein, namely the request/response sequence GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE. A simple API is provided for subsystems wishing to authenticate devices: spdm_create(), spdm_authenticate() (can be called repeatedly for reauthentication) and spdm_destroy(). Certificates presented by devices are validated against an in-kernel keyring of trusted root certificates. A pointer to the keyring is passed to spdm_create(). The set of supported cryptographic algorithms is limited to those declared mandatory in PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3. Adding more algorithms is straightforward as long as the crypto subsystem supports them. Future commits will extend this implementation with support for measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions. So far, only the SPDM requester role is implemented. Care was taken to allow for effortless addition of the responder role at a later stage. This could be needed for a PCIe host bridge operating in endpoint mode. The responder role will be able to reuse struct definitions and helpers such as spdm_create_combined_prefix(). Those can be moved to spdm_common.{h,c} files upon introduction of the responder role. For now, all is kept in a single source file to avoid polluting the global namespace with unnecessary symbols. Credits: Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this SPDM implementation. Lukas reworked it for upstream. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner --- MAINTAINERS | 9 + include/linux/spdm.h | 35 + lib/Kconfig | 15 + lib/Makefile | 2 + lib/spdm_requester.c | 1487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/spdm.h create mode 100644 lib/spdm_requester.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 90f13281d297..2591d2217d65 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -19299,6 +19299,15 @@ M: Security Officers S: Supported F: Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst +SECURITY PROTOCOL AND DATA MODEL (SPDM) +M: Jonathan Cameron +M: Lukas Wunner +L: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org +L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: include/linux/spdm.h +F: lib/spdm* + SECURITY SUBSYSTEM M: Paul Moore M: James Morris diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e824063793a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274 + * + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei + * Jonathan Cameron + * + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation + */ + +#ifndef _SPDM_H_ +#define _SPDM_H_ + +#include + +struct key; +struct device; +struct spdm_state; + +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev, + const void *request, size_t request_sz, + void *response, size_t response_sz); + +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, + void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz, + struct key *keyring); + +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); + +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); + +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); + +#endif diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index c686f4adc124..3516cf1dad16 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -764,3 +764,18 @@ config ASN1_ENCODER config POLYNOMIAL tristate + +config SPDM_REQUESTER + tristate + select KEYS + select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + help + The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication, + measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices. This + option enables support for the SPDM requester role. + + Crypto algorithms offered to SPDM responders are limited to those + enabled in .config. Drivers selecting SPDM_REQUESTER need to also + select any algorithms they deem mandatory. diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index 740109b6e2c8..d9ae58a9ca83 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SPDM_REQUESTER) += spdm_requester.o + obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ hostprogs := gen_crc32table diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..407041036599 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c @@ -0,0 +1,1487 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274 + * + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei + * Jonathan Cameron + * + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation + */ + +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "SPDM: " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* SPDM versions supported by this implementation */ +#define SPDM_MIN_VER 0x10 +#define SPDM_MAX_VER 0x13 + +#define SPDM_CACHE_CAP BIT(0) /* response only */ +#define SPDM_CERT_CAP BIT(1) +#define SPDM_CHAL_CAP BIT(2) +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MASK GENMASK(4, 3) /* response only */ +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_NO 0 /* response only */ +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS 1 /* response only */ +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS_SIG 2 /* response only */ +#define SPDM_MEAS_FRESH_CAP BIT(5) /* response only */ +#define SPDM_ENCRYPT_CAP BIT(6) +#define SPDM_MAC_CAP BIT(7) +#define SPDM_MUT_AUTH_CAP BIT(8) +#define SPDM_KEY_EX_CAP BIT(9) +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_MASK GENMASK(11, 10) +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_NO 0 +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK 1 +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK_CTX 2 /* response only */ +#define SPDM_ENCAP_CAP BIT(12) +#define SPDM_HBEAT_CAP BIT(13) +#define SPDM_KEY_UPD_CAP BIT(14) +#define SPDM_HANDSHAKE_ITC_CAP BIT(15) +#define SPDM_PUB_KEY_ID_CAP BIT(16) +#define SPDM_CHUNK_CAP BIT(17) /* 1.2 */ +#define SPDM_ALIAS_CERT_CAP BIT(18) /* 1.2 response only */ +#define SPDM_SET_CERT_CAP BIT(19) /* 1.2 response only */ +#define SPDM_CSR_CAP BIT(20) /* 1.2 response only */ +#define SPDM_CERT_INST_RESET_CAP BIT(21) /* 1.2 response only */ +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_MASK GENMASK(23, 22) /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_NO 0 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP 1 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP_SIG 2 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_MEL_CAP BIT(24) /* 1.3 response only */ +#define SPDM_EVENT_CAP BIT(25) /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_MASK GENMASK(27, 26) /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_NO 0 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_ONLY 1 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_SEL 2 /* 1.3 */ +#define SPDM_GET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP BIT(28) /* 1.3 response only */ +#define SPDM_SET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP BIT(29) /* 1.3 response only */ + +/* SPDM capabilities supported by this implementation */ +#define SPDM_CAPS (SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP) + +/* SPDM capabilities required from responders */ +#define SPDM_MIN_CAPS (SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP) + +/* + * SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation: + * Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals + * roughly 1 << 20. That's within the limits mandated for responders by CMA + * (1 << 23 usec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3) and DOE (1 sec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30.2). + * Used in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange. + */ +#define SPDM_CTEXPONENT 20 + +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 BIT(0) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_2048 BIT(1) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 BIT(2) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_3072 BIT(3) +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 BIT(4) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096 BIT(5) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_4096 BIT(6) +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 BIT(7) +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521 BIT(8) +#define SPDM_ASYM_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256 BIT(9) +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED25519 BIT(10) +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED448 BIT(11) + +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_256 BIT(0) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 BIT(1) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_512 BIT(2) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_256 BIT(3) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_384 BIT(4) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_512 BIT(5) +#define SPDM_HASH_SM3_256 BIT(6) + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSA SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 | \ + SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 | \ + SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096 | +#endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 | \ + SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 | +#endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256 SPDM_HASH_SHA_256 | +#endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512) +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512 SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 | \ + SPDM_HASH_SHA_512 | +#endif + +/* SPDM algorithms supported by this implementation */ +#define SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS (SPDM_ASYM_RSA \ + SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA 0) + +#define SPDM_HASH_ALGOS (SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256 \ + SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512 0) + +/* + * Common header shared by all messages. + * Note that the meaning of param1 and param2 is message dependent. + */ +struct spdm_header { + u8 version; + u8 code; /* RequestResponseCode */ + u8 param1; + u8 param2; +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_REQ 0x80 +#define SPDM_GET_VERSION 0x84 + +struct spdm_get_version_req { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; + u8 param2; +} __packed; + +struct spdm_get_version_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; + u8 param2; + + u8 reserved; + u8 version_number_entry_count; + __le16 version_number_entries[]; +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES 0xE1 +#define SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE 42 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 226 */ + +/* For this exchange the request and response messages have the same form */ +struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; + u8 param2; + /* End of SPDM 1.0 structure */ + + u8 reserved1; + u8 ctexponent; + u16 reserved2; + + __le32 flags; + /* End of SPDM 1.1 structure */ + + __le32 data_transfer_size; /* 1.2+ */ + __le32 max_spdm_msg_size; /* 1.2+ */ +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS 0xE3 + +struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Number of ReqAlgStruct entries at end */ + u8 param2; + + __le16 length; + u8 measurement_specification; + u8 other_params_support; /* 1.2+ */ + + __le32 base_asym_algo; + __le32 base_hash_algo; + + u8 reserved1[12]; + u8 ext_asym_count; + u8 ext_hash_count; + u8 reserved2; + u8 mel_specification; /* 1.3+ */ + + /* + * Additional optional fields at end of this structure: + * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count + * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count + * - ReqAlgStruct: variable size * param1 * 1.1+ * + */ +} __packed; + +struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Number of RespAlgStruct entries at end */ + u8 param2; + + __le16 length; + u8 measurement_specification_sel; + u8 other_params_sel; /* 1.2+ */ + + __le32 measurement_hash_algo; + __le32 base_asym_sel; + __le32 base_hash_sel; + + u8 reserved1[11]; + u8 mel_specification_sel; /* 1.3+ */ + u8 ext_asym_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */ + u8 ext_hash_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */ + u8 reserved2[2]; + + /* + * Additional optional fields at end of this structure: + * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count + * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count + * - RespAlgStruct: variable size * param1 * 1.1+ * + */ +} __packed; + +struct spdm_req_alg_struct { + u8 alg_type; + u8 alg_count; /* 0x2K where K is number of alg_external entries */ + __le16 alg_supported; /* Size is in alg_count[7:4], always 2 */ + __le32 alg_external[]; +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_GET_DIGESTS 0x81 + +struct spdm_get_digests_req { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Reserved */ + u8 param2; /* Reserved */ +} __packed; + +struct spdm_get_digests_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* SupportedSlotMask */ /* 1.3+ */ + u8 param2; /* ProvisionedSlotMask */ + u8 digests[]; /* Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for each slot */ + /* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */ + + /* + * Additional optional fields at end of this structure: + * (omitted as long as we do not advertise MULTI_KEY_CAP) + * - KeyPairID: 1 byte for each slot * 1.3+ * + * - CertificateInfo: 1 byte for each slot * 1.3+ * + * - KeyUsageMask: 2 bytes for each slot * 1.3+ * + */ +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE 0x82 +#define SPDM_SLOTS 8 /* SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1 */ + +struct spdm_get_certificate_req { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */ + u8 param2; /* SlotSizeRequested */ /* 1.3+ */ + __le16 offset; + __le16 length; +} __packed; + +struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */ + u8 param2; /* CertModel */ /* 1.3+ */ + __le16 portion_length; + __le16 remainder_length; + u8 cert_chain[]; /* PortionLength long */ +} __packed; + +struct spdm_cert_chain { + __le16 length; + u8 reserved[2]; + /* + * Additional fields at end of this structure: + * - RootHash: Digest of Root Certificate + * - Certificates: Chain of ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates + */ +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_CHALLENGE 0x83 +#define SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA 1024 /* SPDM 1.0.0 table 21 */ + +struct spdm_challenge_req { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */ + u8 param2; /* MeasurementSummaryHash type */ + u8 nonce[32]; + /* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */ + + u8 context[8]; /* 1.3+ */ +} __packed; + +struct spdm_challenge_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */ + u8 param2; /* Slot mask */ + /* + * Additional fields at end of this structure: + * - CertChainHash: Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for selected slot + * - Nonce: 32 bytes long + * - MeasurementSummaryHash: Optional hash of selected measurements + * - OpaqueDataLength: 2 bytes long + * - OpaqueData: Up to 1024 bytes long + * - RequesterContext: 8 bytes long * 1.3+ * + * - Signature + */ +} __packed; + +#define SPDM_ERROR 0x7f + +enum spdm_error_code { + spdm_invalid_request = 0x01, + spdm_invalid_session = 0x02, /* 1.1 only */ + spdm_busy = 0x03, + spdm_unexpected_request = 0x04, + spdm_unspecified = 0x05, + spdm_decrypt_error = 0x06, + spdm_unsupported_request = 0x07, + spdm_request_in_flight = 0x08, + spdm_invalid_response_code = 0x09, + spdm_session_limit_exceeded = 0x0a, + spdm_session_required = 0x0b, + spdm_reset_required = 0x0c, + spdm_response_too_large = 0x0d, + spdm_request_too_large = 0x0e, + spdm_large_response = 0x0f, + spdm_message_lost = 0x10, + spdm_invalid_policy = 0x11, /* 1.3+ */ + spdm_version_mismatch = 0x41, + spdm_response_not_ready = 0x42, + spdm_request_resynch = 0x43, + spdm_operation_failed = 0x44, /* 1.3+ */ + spdm_no_pending_requests = 0x45, /* 1.3+ */ + spdm_vendor_defined_error = 0xff, +}; + +struct spdm_error_rsp { + u8 version; + u8 code; + enum spdm_error_code error_code:8; + u8 error_data; + + u8 extended_error_data[]; +} __packed; + +static int spdm_err(struct device *dev, struct spdm_error_rsp *rsp) +{ + switch (rsp->error_code) { + case spdm_invalid_request: + dev_err(dev, "Invalid request\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_invalid_session: + if (rsp->version == 0x11) { + dev_err(dev, "Invalid session %#x\n", rsp->error_data); + return -EINVAL; + } + break; + case spdm_busy: + dev_err(dev, "Busy\n"); + return -EBUSY; + case spdm_unexpected_request: + dev_err(dev, "Unexpected request\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_unspecified: + dev_err(dev, "Unspecified error\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_decrypt_error: + dev_err(dev, "Decrypt error\n"); + return -EIO; + case spdm_unsupported_request: + dev_err(dev, "Unsupported request %#x\n", rsp->error_data); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_request_in_flight: + dev_err(dev, "Request in flight\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_invalid_response_code: + dev_err(dev, "Invalid response code\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_session_limit_exceeded: + dev_err(dev, "Session limit exceeded\n"); + return -EBUSY; + case spdm_session_required: + dev_err(dev, "Session required\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_reset_required: + dev_err(dev, "Reset required\n"); + return -ERESTART; + case spdm_response_too_large: + dev_err(dev, "Response too large\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_request_too_large: + dev_err(dev, "Request too large\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_large_response: + dev_err(dev, "Large response\n"); + return -EMSGSIZE; + case spdm_message_lost: + dev_err(dev, "Message lost\n"); + return -EIO; + case spdm_invalid_policy: + dev_err(dev, "Invalid policy\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_version_mismatch: + dev_err(dev, "Version mismatch\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_response_not_ready: + dev_err(dev, "Response not ready\n"); + return -EINPROGRESS; + case spdm_request_resynch: + dev_err(dev, "Request resynchronization\n"); + return -ERESTART; + case spdm_operation_failed: + dev_err(dev, "Operation failed\n"); + return -EINVAL; + case spdm_no_pending_requests: + return -ENOENT; + case spdm_vendor_defined_error: + dev_err(dev, "Vendor defined error\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + dev_err(dev, "Undefined error %#x\n", rsp->error_code); + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * struct spdm_state - SPDM session state + * + * @lock: Serializes multiple concurrent spdm_authenticate() calls. + * @authenticated: Whether device was authenticated successfully. + * @dev: Transport device. Used for error reporting and passed to @transport. + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange. + * @transport_priv: Transport private data. + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes). + * Used as DataTransferSize in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange. + * @version: Maximum common supported version of requester and responder. + * Negotiated during GET_VERSION exchange. + * @responder_caps: Cached capabilities of responder. + * Received during GET_CAPABILITIES exchange. + * @base_asym_alg: Asymmetric key algorithm for signature verification of + * CHALLENGE_AUTH messages. + * Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange. + * @base_hash_alg: Hash algorithm for signature verification of + * CHALLENGE_AUTH messages. + * Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange. + * @slot_mask: Bitmask of populated certificate slots in the responder. + * Received during GET_DIGESTS exchange. + * @base_asym_enc: Human-readable name of @base_asym_alg's signature encoding. + * Passed to crypto subsystem when calling verify_signature(). + * @s: Signature length of @base_asym_alg (in bytes). S or SigLen in SPDM + * specification. + * @base_hash_alg_name: Human-readable name of @base_hash_alg. + * Passed to crypto subsystem when calling crypto_alloc_shash() and + * verify_signature(). + * @shash: Synchronous hash handle for @base_hash_alg computation. + * @desc: Synchronous hash context for @base_hash_alg computation. + * @h: Hash length of @base_hash_alg (in bytes). H in SPDM specification. + * @leaf_key: Public key portion of leaf certificate against which to check + * responder's signatures. + * @root_keyring: Keyring against which to check the first certificate in + * responder's certificate chain. + */ +struct spdm_state { + struct mutex lock; + unsigned int authenticated:1; + + /* Transport */ + struct device *dev; + spdm_transport *transport; + void *transport_priv; + u32 transport_sz; + + /* Negotiated state */ + u8 version; + u32 responder_caps; + u32 base_asym_alg; + u32 base_hash_alg; + unsigned long slot_mask; + + /* Signature algorithm */ + const char *base_asym_enc; + size_t s; + + /* Hash algorithm */ + const char *base_hash_alg_name; + struct crypto_shash *shash; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t h; + + /* Certificates */ + struct public_key *leaf_key; + struct key *root_keyring; +}; + +static int __spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + const void *req, size_t req_sz, + void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz) +{ + const struct spdm_header *request = req; + struct spdm_header *response = rsp; + int length; + int rc; + + rc = spdm_state->transport(spdm_state->transport_priv, spdm_state->dev, + req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + length = rc; + if (length < sizeof(struct spdm_header)) + return -EPROTO; + + if (response->code == SPDM_ERROR) + return spdm_err(spdm_state->dev, (struct spdm_error_rsp *)rsp); + + if (response->code != (request->code & ~SPDM_REQ)) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Response code %#x does not match request code %#x\n", + response->code, request->code); + return -EPROTO; + } + + return length; +} + +static int spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz) +{ + struct spdm_header *req_header = req; + + if (req_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header) || + rsp_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header)) + return -EINVAL; + + req_header->version = spdm_state->version; + + return __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz); +} + +static const struct spdm_get_version_req spdm_get_version_req = { + .version = 0x10, + .code = SPDM_GET_VERSION, +}; + +static int spdm_get_version(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + struct spdm_get_version_rsp *rsp, size_t *rsp_sz) +{ + u8 version = SPDM_MIN_VER; + bool foundver = false; + int rc, length, i; + + /* + * Bypass spdm_exchange() to be able to set version = 0x10. + * rsp buffer is large enough for the maximum possible 255 entries. + */ + rc = __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &spdm_get_version_req, + sizeof(spdm_get_version_req), rsp, + struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries, 255)); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + length = rc; + if (length < sizeof(*rsp) || + length < struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries, + rsp->version_number_entry_count)) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated version response\n"); + return -EIO; + } + + for (i = 0; i < rsp->version_number_entry_count; i++) { + u8 ver = get_unaligned_le16(&rsp->version_number_entries[i]) >> 8; + + if (ver >= version && ver <= SPDM_MAX_VER) { + foundver = true; + version = ver; + } + } + if (!foundver) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No common supported version\n"); + return -EPROTO; + } + spdm_state->version = version; + + *rsp_sz = struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries, + rsp->version_number_entry_count); + + return 0; +} + +static int spdm_get_capabilities(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *req, + size_t *reqrsp_sz) +{ + struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *rsp; + size_t req_sz; + size_t rsp_sz; + int rc, length; + + req->code = SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES; + req->ctexponent = SPDM_CTEXPONENT; + req->flags = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_CAPS); + + if (spdm_state->version == 0x10) { + req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), reserved1); + rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size); + } else if (spdm_state->version == 0x11) { + req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), data_transfer_size); + rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size); + } else { + req_sz = sizeof(*req); + rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp); + req->data_transfer_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz); + req->max_spdm_msg_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz); + } + + rsp = (void *)req + req_sz; + + rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + length = rc; + if (length < rsp_sz) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated capabilities response\n"); + return -EIO; + } + + spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags); + if ((spdm_state->responder_caps & SPDM_MIN_CAPS) != SPDM_MIN_CAPS) + return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; + + if (spdm_state->version >= 0x12) { + u32 data_transfer_size = le32_to_cpu(rsp->data_transfer_size); + if (data_transfer_size < SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Malformed capabilities response\n"); + return -EPROTO; + } + spdm_state->transport_sz = min(spdm_state->transport_sz, + data_transfer_size); + } + + *reqrsp_sz += req_sz + rsp_sz; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * spdm_start_hash() - Build first part of CHALLENGE_AUTH hash + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * @transcript: GET_VERSION request and GET_CAPABILITIES request and response + * @transcript_sz: length of @transcript + * @req: NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request + * @req_sz: length of @req + * @rsp: ALGORITHMS response + * @rsp_sz: length of @rsp + * + * We've just learned the hash algorithm to use for CHALLENGE_AUTH signature + * verification. Hash the GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges which + * have been stashed in @transcript, as well as the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS + * exchange which has just been performed. Subsequent requests and responses + * will be added to the hash as they become available. + * + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno. + */ +static int spdm_start_hash(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz, + void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz) +{ + int rc; + + spdm_state->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name, + 0, 0); + if (!spdm_state->shash) + return -ENOMEM; + + spdm_state->desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state->desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(spdm_state->shash), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!spdm_state->desc) + return -ENOMEM; + + spdm_state->desc->tfm = spdm_state->shash; + + /* Used frequently to compute offsets, so cache H */ + spdm_state->h = crypto_shash_digestsize(spdm_state->shash); + + rc = crypto_shash_init(spdm_state->desc); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, + (u8 *)&spdm_get_version_req, + sizeof(spdm_get_version_req)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, + (u8 *)transcript, transcript_sz); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)req, req_sz); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz); + + return rc; +} + +static int spdm_parse_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) { + case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048: + spdm_state->s = 256; + spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1"; + break; + case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072: + spdm_state->s = 384; + spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1"; + break; + case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096: + spdm_state->s = 512; + spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1"; + break; + case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256: + spdm_state->s = 64; + spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363"; + break; + case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384: + spdm_state->s = 96; + spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363"; + break; + default: + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown asym algorithm\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + switch (spdm_state->base_hash_alg) { + case SPDM_HASH_SHA_256: + spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha256"; + break; + case SPDM_HASH_SHA_384: + spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha384"; + break; + case SPDM_HASH_SHA_512: + spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha512"; + break; + default: + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown hash algorithm\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz) +{ + struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct; + struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req; + struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp; + size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req); + size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp); + int rc, length; + + /* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128); + + req = kzalloc(req_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + req->code = SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS; + req->length = cpu_to_le16(req_sz); + req->base_asym_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS); + req->base_hash_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_HASH_ALGOS); + + rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rsp) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_req; + } + + rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_free_rsp; + + length = rc; + if (length < sizeof(*rsp) || + length < sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct)) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated algorithms response\n"); + rc = -EIO; + goto err_free_rsp; + } + + spdm_state->base_asym_alg = + le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_asym_sel) & SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS; + spdm_state->base_hash_alg = + le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_hash_sel) & SPDM_HASH_ALGOS; + + /* Responder shall select exactly 1 alg (SPDM 1.0.0 table 14) */ + if (hweight32(spdm_state->base_asym_alg) != 1 || + hweight32(spdm_state->base_hash_alg) != 1 || + rsp->ext_asym_sel_count != 0 || + rsp->ext_hash_sel_count != 0 || + rsp->param1 > req->param1) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed algorithms response\n"); + rc = -EPROTO; + goto err_free_rsp; + } + + rc = spdm_parse_algs(spdm_state); + if (rc) + goto err_free_rsp; + + /* + * If request contained a ReqAlgStruct not supported by responder, + * the corresponding RespAlgStruct may be omitted in response. + * Calculate the actual (possibly shorter) response length: + */ + rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct); + + rc = spdm_start_hash(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz, + req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz); + +err_free_rsp: + kfree(rsp); +err_free_req: + kfree(req); + + return rc; +} + +static int spdm_get_digests(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + struct spdm_get_digests_req req = { .code = SPDM_GET_DIGESTS }; + struct spdm_get_digests_rsp *rsp; + size_t rsp_sz; + int rc, length; + + /* + * Assume all 8 slots are populated. We know the hash length (and thus + * the response size) because the responder only returns digests for + * the hash algorithm selected during the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange + * (SPDM 1.1.2 margin no 206). + */ + rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + SPDM_SLOTS * spdm_state->h; + rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rsp) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_free_rsp; + + length = rc; + if (length < sizeof(*rsp) || + length < sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated digests response\n"); + rc = -EIO; + goto err_free_rsp; + } + + rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h; + + /* + * Authentication-capable endpoints must carry at least 1 cert chain + * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1). + */ + spdm_state->slot_mask = rsp->param2; + if (!spdm_state->slot_mask) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No certificates provisioned\n"); + rc = -EPROTO; + goto err_free_rsp; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, sizeof(req)); + if (rc) + goto err_free_rsp; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz); + +err_free_rsp: + kfree(rsp); + + return rc; +} + +static int spdm_validate_cert_chain(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot, + u8 *certs, size_t total_length) +{ + struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev = NULL; + bool is_leaf_cert; + size_t offset = 0; + struct key *key; + int rc, length; + + while (offset < total_length) { + rc = x509_get_certificate_length(certs + offset, + total_length - offset); + if (rc < 0) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Invalid certificate length " + "at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset); + goto err_free_prev; + } + + length = rc; + is_leaf_cert = offset + length == total_length; + + cert = x509_cert_parse(certs + offset, length); + if (IS_ERR(cert)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(cert); + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Certificate parse error %d " + "at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset); + goto err_free_prev; + } + if ((is_leaf_cert == + test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &cert->pub->key_eflags)) || + (is_leaf_cert && + !test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &cert->pub->key_eflags))) { + rc = -EKEYREJECTED; + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed certificate " + "at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset); + goto err_free_cert; + } + if (cert->unsupported_sig) { + rc = -EKEYREJECTED; + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unsupported signature " + "at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset); + goto err_free_cert; + } + if (cert->blacklisted) { + rc = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto err_free_cert; + } + + if (!prev) { + /* First cert in chain, check against root_keyring */ + key = find_asymmetric_key(spdm_state->root_keyring, + cert->sig->auth_ids[0], + cert->sig->auth_ids[1], + cert->sig->auth_ids[2], + false); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + dev_info(spdm_state->dev, "Root certificate " + "for slot %u not found in %s " + "keyring: %s\n", slot, + spdm_state->root_keyring->description, + cert->issuer); + rc = PTR_ERR(key); + goto err_free_cert; + } + + rc = verify_signature(key, cert->sig); + key_put(key); + } else { + /* Subsequent cert in chain, check against previous */ + rc = public_key_verify_signature(prev->pub, cert->sig); + } + + if (rc) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Signature validation error " + "%d at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset); + goto err_free_cert; + } + + x509_free_certificate(prev); + offset += length; + prev = cert; + } + + prev = NULL; + spdm_state->leaf_key = cert->pub; + cert->pub = NULL; + +err_free_cert: + x509_free_certificate(cert); +err_free_prev: + x509_free_certificate(prev); + return rc; +} + +static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot) +{ + struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = { + .code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE, + .param1 = slot, + }; + struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp; + struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL; + size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length; + u16 remainder_length = 0xffff; + u16 portion_length; + u16 offset = 0; + int rc, length; + + /* + * It is legal for the responder to send more bytes than requested. + * (Note the "should" in SPDM 1.0.0 table 19.) If we allocate a + * too small buffer, we can't calculate the hash over the (truncated) + * response. Only choice is thus to allocate the maximum possible 64k. + */ + rsp_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(*rsp) + 0xffff, spdm_state->transport_sz); + rsp = kvmalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rsp) + return -ENOMEM; + + do { + /* + * If transport_sz is sufficiently large, first request will be + * for offset 0 and length 0xffff, which means entire cert + * chain (SPDM 1.0.0 table 18). + */ + req.offset = cpu_to_le16(offset); + req.length = cpu_to_le16(min_t(size_t, remainder_length, + rsp_sz - sizeof(*rsp))); + + rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_free_certs; + + length = rc; + if (length < sizeof(*rsp) || + length < sizeof(*rsp) + le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length)) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Truncated certificate response\n"); + rc = -EIO; + goto err_free_certs; + } + + portion_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length); + remainder_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->remainder_length); + + /* + * On first response we learn total length of cert chain. + * Should portion_length + remainder_length exceed 0xffff, + * the min() ensures that the malformed check triggers below. + */ + if (!certs) { + total_length = min(portion_length + remainder_length, + 0xffff); + certs = kvmalloc(total_length, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!certs) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_certs; + } + } + + if (!portion_length || + (rsp->param1 & 0xf) != slot || + offset + portion_length + remainder_length != total_length) + { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Malformed certificate response\n"); + rc = -EPROTO; + goto err_free_certs; + } + + memcpy((u8 *)certs + offset, rsp->cert_chain, portion_length); + offset += portion_length; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, + sizeof(req)); + if (rc) + goto err_free_certs; + + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, + sizeof(*rsp) + portion_length); + if (rc) + goto err_free_certs; + + } while (remainder_length > 0); + + header_length = sizeof(struct spdm_cert_chain) + spdm_state->h; + + if (total_length < header_length || + total_length != le16_to_cpu(certs->length)) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Malformed certificate chain in slot %u\n", slot); + rc = -EPROTO; + goto err_free_certs; + } + + rc = spdm_validate_cert_chain(spdm_state, slot, + (u8 *)certs + header_length, + total_length - header_length); + +err_free_certs: + kvfree(certs); + kvfree(rsp); + return rc; +} + +#define SPDM_PREFIX_SZ 64 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 803 */ +#define SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ 100 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 806 */ + +/** + * spdm_create_combined_prefix() - Create combined_spdm_prefix for a hash + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * @spdm_context: SPDM context + * @buf: Buffer to receive combined_spdm_prefix (100 bytes) + * + * From SPDM 1.2, a hash is prefixed with the SPDM version and context before + * a signature is generated (or verified) over the resulting concatenation + * (SPDM 1.2.0 section 15). Create that prefix. + */ +static void spdm_create_combined_prefix(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + const char *spdm_context, void *buf) +{ + u8 minor = spdm_state->version & 0xf; + u8 major = spdm_state->version >> 4; + size_t len = strlen(spdm_context); + int rc, zero_pad; + + rc = snprintf(buf, SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1, + "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*" + "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*", + major, minor, major, minor, major, minor, major, minor); + WARN_ON(rc != SPDM_PREFIX_SZ); + + zero_pad = SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ - SPDM_PREFIX_SZ - 1 - len; + WARN_ON(zero_pad < 0); + + memset(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1, 0, zero_pad); + memcpy(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1 + zero_pad, spdm_context, len); +} + +/** + * spdm_verify_signature() - Verify signature against leaf key + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * @s: Signature + * @spdm_context: SPDM context (used to create combined_spdm_prefix) + * + * Implementation of the abstract SPDMSignatureVerify() function described in + * SPDM 1.2.0 section 16: Compute the hash in @spdm_state->desc and verify + * that its signature @s was generated with @spdm_state->leaf_key. + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno. + */ +static int spdm_verify_signature(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 *s, + const char *spdm_context) +{ + struct public_key_signature sig = { + .s = s, + .s_size = spdm_state->s, + .encoding = spdm_state->base_asym_enc, + .hash_algo = spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name, + }; + u8 *m, *mhash = NULL; + int rc; + + m = kmalloc(SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!m) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = crypto_shash_final(spdm_state->desc, m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ); + if (rc) + goto err_free_m; + + if (spdm_state->version <= 0x11) { + /* + * Until SPDM 1.1, the signature is computed only over the hash + * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.7). + */ + sig.digest = m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ; + sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h; + } else { + /* + * From SPDM 1.2, the hash is prefixed with spdm_context before + * computing the signature over the resulting message M + * (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 841). + */ + spdm_create_combined_prefix(spdm_state, spdm_context, m); + + /* + * RSA and ECDSA algorithms require that M is hashed once more. + * EdDSA and SM2 algorithms omit that step. + * The switch statement prepares for their introduction. + */ + switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) { + default: + mhash = kmalloc(spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mhash) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_m; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_digest(spdm_state->desc, m, + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h, + mhash); + if (rc) + goto err_free_mhash; + + sig.digest = mhash; + sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h; + break; + } + } + + rc = public_key_verify_signature(spdm_state->leaf_key, &sig); + +err_free_mhash: + kfree(mhash); +err_free_m: + kfree(m); + return rc; +} + +/** + * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional) + * + * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields + * as well as optional fields. This helper eases calculating its size. + * + * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes + * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21). Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp. + * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack + * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request. + * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field, + * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261). + */ +static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, + struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp) +{ + size_t size = sizeof(*rsp) /* Header */ + + spdm_state->h /* CertChainHash */ + + 32; /* Nonce */ + + if (rsp) + /* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */ + size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size); + else + size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA; /* OpaqueData */ + + size += 2; /* OpaqueDataLength */ + + if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13) + size += 8; /* RequesterContext */ + + return size + spdm_state->s; /* Signature */ +} + +static int spdm_challenge(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot) +{ + size_t req_sz, rsp_sz, rsp_sz_max, sig_offset; + struct spdm_challenge_req req = { + .code = SPDM_CHALLENGE, + .param1 = slot, + .param2 = 0, /* no measurement summary hash */ + }; + struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp; + int rc, length; + + get_random_bytes(&req.nonce, sizeof(req.nonce)); + + if (spdm_state->version <= 0x12) + req_sz = offsetof(typeof(req), context); + else + req_sz = sizeof(req); + + rsp_sz_max = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, NULL); + rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz_max, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rsp) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz_max); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_free_rsp; + + length = rc; + rsp_sz = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, rsp); + if (length < rsp_sz) { + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated challenge_auth response\n"); + rc = -EIO; + goto err_free_rsp; + } + + /* Last step of building the hash */ + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, req_sz); + if (rc) + goto err_free_rsp; + + sig_offset = rsp_sz - spdm_state->s; + rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, sig_offset); + if (rc) + goto err_free_rsp; + + /* Hash is complete and signature received; verify against leaf key */ + rc = spdm_verify_signature(spdm_state, (u8 *)rsp + sig_offset, + "responder-challenge_auth signing"); + if (rc) + dev_err(spdm_state->dev, + "Failed to verify challenge_auth signature: %d\n", rc); + +err_free_rsp: + kfree(rsp); + return rc; +} + +static void spdm_reset(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + public_key_free(spdm_state->leaf_key); + spdm_state->leaf_key = NULL; + + kfree(spdm_state->desc); + spdm_state->desc = NULL; + + crypto_free_shash(spdm_state->shash); + spdm_state->shash = NULL; +} + +/** + * spdm_authenticate() - Authenticate device + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * + * Authenticate a device through a sequence of GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, + * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE exchanges. + * + * Perform internal locking to serialize multiple concurrent invocations. + * Can be called repeatedly for reauthentication. + * + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno. In particular, -EPROTONOSUPPORT + * indicates that authentication is not supported by the device. + */ +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + size_t transcript_sz; + void *transcript; + int rc = -ENOMEM; + u8 slot; + + mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock); + spdm_reset(spdm_state); + + /* + * For CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification, a hash is computed over + * all exchanged messages to detect modification by a man-in-the-middle + * or media error. However the hash algorithm is not known until the + * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS response has been received. The preceding + * GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges are therefore stashed + * in a transcript buffer and consumed once the algorithm is known. + * The buffer size is sufficient for the largest possible messages with + * 255 version entries and the capability fields added by SPDM 1.2. + */ + transcript = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct spdm_get_version_rsp, + version_number_entries, 255) + + sizeof(struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp) * 2, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!transcript) + goto unlock; + + rc = spdm_get_version(spdm_state, transcript, &transcript_sz); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + rc = spdm_get_capabilities(spdm_state, transcript + transcript_sz, + &transcript_sz); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + rc = spdm_negotiate_algs(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + rc = spdm_get_digests(spdm_state); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + for_each_set_bit(slot, &spdm_state->slot_mask, SPDM_SLOTS) { + rc = spdm_get_certificate(spdm_state, slot); + if (rc == 0) + break; /* success */ + if (rc != -ENOKEY && rc != -EKEYREJECTED) + break; /* try next slot only on signature error */ + } + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot); + +unlock: + if (rc) + spdm_reset(spdm_state); + spdm_state->authenticated = !rc; + mutex_unlock(&spdm_state->lock); + kfree(transcript); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticate); + +/** + * spdm_authenticated() - Whether device was authenticated successfully + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + * + * Return true if the most recent spdm_authenticate() call was successful. + */ +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + return spdm_state->authenticated; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticated); + +/** + * spdm_create() - Allocate SPDM session + * + * @dev: Transport device + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange + * @transport_priv: Transport private data + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes) + * @keyring: Trusted root certificates + * + * Returns a pointer to the allocated SPDM session state or NULL on error. + */ +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, + void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz, + struct key *keyring) +{ + struct spdm_state *spdm_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state), GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!spdm_state) + return NULL; + + spdm_state->dev = dev; + spdm_state->transport = transport; + spdm_state->transport_priv = transport_priv; + spdm_state->transport_sz = transport_sz; + spdm_state->root_keyring = keyring; + + mutex_init(&spdm_state->lock); + + return spdm_state; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_create); + +/** + * spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + */ +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + spdm_reset(spdm_state); + mutex_destroy(&spdm_state->lock); + kfree(spdm_state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_destroy); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:38 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403401 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6AE78E732FD for ; 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Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:04:21 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C685960D850C; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:04:21 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 7721bfa3b4f8a99a111f7808ad8890c3c13df56d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <7721bfa3b4f8a99a111f7808ad8890c3c13df56d.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] PCI/CMA: Authenticate devices on enumeration To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org From: Jonathan Cameron Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) allows for measurement and authentication of PCIe devices. It is based on the Security Protocol and Data Model specification (SPDM, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274). CMA-SPDM in turn forms the basis for Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.33) because the key material used by IDE is exchanged over a CMA-SPDM session. As a first step, authenticate CMA-capable devices on enumeration. A subsequent commit will expose the result in sysfs. When allocating SPDM session state with spdm_create(), the maximum SPDM message length needs to be passed. Make the PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH macro public and calculate the maximum payload length from it. Credits: Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this CMA implementation. Lukas reworked it for upstream. Wilfred contributed fixes for issues discovered during testing. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Wilfred Mallawa Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/pci/Kconfig | 13 ++++++ drivers/pci/Makefile | 2 + drivers/pci/cma.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/doe.c | 3 -- drivers/pci/pci.h | 8 ++++ drivers/pci/probe.c | 1 + drivers/pci/remove.c | 1 + include/linux/pci-doe.h | 4 ++ include/linux/pci.h | 4 ++ 10 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/pci/cma.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2591d2217d65..70a2beb4a278 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -19305,6 +19305,7 @@ M: Lukas Wunner L: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained +F: drivers/pci/cma* F: include/linux/spdm.h F: lib/spdm* diff --git a/drivers/pci/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/Kconfig index e9ae66cc4189..c9aa5253ac1f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/pci/Kconfig @@ -116,6 +116,19 @@ config XEN_PCIDEV_FRONTEND config PCI_ATS bool +config PCI_CMA + bool "Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM)" + select CRYPTO_ECDSA + select CRYPTO_RSA + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select PCI_DOE + select SPDM_REQUESTER + help + Authenticate devices on enumeration per PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31. + A PCI DOE mailbox is used as transport for DMTF SPDM based + attestation, measurement and secure channel establishment. + config PCI_DOE bool diff --git a/drivers/pci/Makefile b/drivers/pci/Makefile index cc8b4e01e29d..e0705b82690b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/Makefile +++ b/drivers/pci/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_VGA_ARB) += vgaarb.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DOE) += doe.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES) += of_property.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA) += cma.o + # Endpoint library must be initialized before its users obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_ENDPOINT) += endpoint/ diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.c b/drivers/pci/cma.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..06e5846325e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Huawei + * Jonathan Cameron + * + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation + */ + +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "CMA: " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "pci.h" + +#define PCI_DOE_PROTOCOL_CMA 1 + +/* Keyring that userspace can poke certs into */ +static struct key *pci_cma_keyring; + +static int pci_doe_transport(void *priv, struct device *dev, + const void *request, size_t request_sz, + void *response, size_t response_sz) +{ + struct pci_doe_mb *doe = priv; + int rc; + + /* + * CMA-SPDM operation in non-D0 states is optional (PCIe r6.1 + * sec 6.31.3). The spec does not define a way to determine + * if it's supported, so resume to D0 unconditionally. + */ + rc = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = pci_doe(doe, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG, PCI_DOE_PROTOCOL_CMA, + request, request_sz, response, response_sz); + + pm_runtime_put(dev); + + return rc; +} + +void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + struct pci_doe_mb *doe; + int rc; + + if (!pci_cma_keyring) { + return; + } + + if (!pci_is_pcie(pdev)) + return; + + doe = pci_find_doe_mailbox(pdev, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG, + PCI_DOE_PROTOCOL_CMA); + if (!doe) + return; + + pdev->spdm_state = spdm_create(&pdev->dev, pci_doe_transport, doe, + PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD, pci_cma_keyring); + if (!pdev->spdm_state) { + return; + } + + rc = spdm_authenticate(pdev->spdm_state); +} + +void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + if (pdev->spdm_state) + spdm_destroy(pdev->spdm_state); +} + +__init static int pci_cma_keyring_init(void) +{ + pci_cma_keyring = keyring_alloc(".cma", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), + current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP, NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pci_cma_keyring)) { + pr_err("Could not allocate keyring\n"); + return PTR_ERR(pci_cma_keyring); + } + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(pci_cma_keyring_init); diff --git a/drivers/pci/doe.c b/drivers/pci/doe.c index e3aab5edaf70..79f0336eb0c3 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/doe.c +++ b/drivers/pci/doe.c @@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ #define PCI_DOE_FLAG_CANCEL 0 #define PCI_DOE_FLAG_DEAD 1 -/* Max data object length is 2^18 dwords */ -#define PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH (1 << 18) - /** * struct pci_doe_mb - State for a single DOE mailbox * diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index 39a8932dc340..bd80a0369c9c 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -322,6 +322,14 @@ static inline void pci_doe_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } static inline void pci_doe_disconnected(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA +void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev); +void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev); +#else +static inline void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } +static inline void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } +#endif + /** * pci_dev_set_io_state - Set the new error state if possible. * diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c index 795534589b98..1420a8d82386 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/probe.c +++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c @@ -2487,6 +2487,7 @@ static void pci_init_capabilities(struct pci_dev *dev) pci_dpc_init(dev); /* Downstream Port Containment */ pci_rcec_init(dev); /* Root Complex Event Collector */ pci_doe_init(dev); /* Data Object Exchange */ + pci_cma_init(dev); /* Component Measurement & Auth */ pcie_report_downtraining(dev); pci_init_reset_methods(dev); diff --git a/drivers/pci/remove.c b/drivers/pci/remove.c index d749ea8250d6..f009ac578997 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/remove.c +++ b/drivers/pci/remove.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void pci_destroy_dev(struct pci_dev *dev) list_del(&dev->bus_list); up_write(&pci_bus_sem); + pci_cma_destroy(dev); pci_doe_destroy(dev); pcie_aspm_exit_link_state(dev); pci_bridge_d3_update(dev); diff --git a/include/linux/pci-doe.h b/include/linux/pci-doe.h index 1f14aed4354b..0d3d7656c456 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci-doe.h +++ b/include/linux/pci-doe.h @@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ struct pci_doe_mb; +/* Max data object length is 2^18 dwords (including 2 dwords for header) */ +#define PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH (1 << 18) +#define PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD ((PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH - 2) * sizeof(u32)) + struct pci_doe_mb *pci_find_doe_mailbox(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 vendor, u8 type); diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index 8c7c2c3c6c65..0c0123317df6 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -515,6 +516,9 @@ struct pci_dev { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_DOE struct xarray doe_mbs; /* Data Object Exchange mailboxes */ +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA + struct spdm_state *spdm_state; /* Security Protocol and Data Model */ #endif u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */ phys_addr_t rom; /* Physical address if not from BAR */ From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:39 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403417 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE0C0CE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:07:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231670AbjI1SHx (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:07:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56928 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231667AbjI1SHw (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:07:52 -0400 Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:4f8:150:2161:1:b009:f236:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6CB6E19E; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 11:07:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.28]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C7A410029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:07:47 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F395760D850C; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:07:46 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From bc1efd945f5d76587787f8351199e1ea45eaf2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3 stipulates requirements for X.509 Leaf Certificates presented by devices, in particular the presence of a Subject Alternative Name extension with a name that encodes the Vendor ID, Device ID, Device Serial Number, etc. This prevents a mismatch between the device identity in Config Space and the certificate. A device cannot misappropriate a certificate from a different device without also spoofing Config Space. As a corollary, it cannot dupe an arbitrary driver into binding to it. (Only those which bind to the device identity in the Subject Alternative Name work.) Parse the Subject Alternative Name using a small ASN.1 module and validate its contents. The theory of operation is explained in a code comment at the top of the newly added cma-x509.c. This functionality is introduced in a separate commit on top of basic CMA-SPDM support to split the code into digestible, reviewable chunks. The CMA OID added here is taken from the official OID Repository (it's not documented in the PCIe Base Spec): https://oid-rep.orange-labs.fr/get/2.23.147 Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron --- drivers/pci/Makefile | 4 +- drivers/pci/cma-x509.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/cma.asn1 | 36 +++++++++++ drivers/pci/cma.c | 3 +- drivers/pci/pci.h | 2 + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 3 + include/linux/spdm.h | 6 +- lib/spdm_requester.c | 14 ++++- 8 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/pci/cma-x509.c create mode 100644 drivers/pci/cma.asn1 diff --git a/drivers/pci/Makefile b/drivers/pci/Makefile index e0705b82690b..a18812b8832b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/Makefile +++ b/drivers/pci/Makefile @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_VGA_ARB) += vgaarb.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DOE) += doe.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES) += of_property.o -obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA) += cma.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA) += cma.o cma-x509.o cma.asn1.o +$(obj)/cma-x509.o: $(obj)/cma.asn1.h +$(obj)/cma.asn1.o: $(obj)/cma.asn1.c $(obj)/cma.asn1.h # Endpoint library must be initialized before its users obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_ENDPOINT) += endpoint/ diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma-x509.c b/drivers/pci/cma-x509.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..614590303b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/pci/cma-x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) + * + * The spdm_requester.c library calls pci_cma_validate() to check requirements + * for X.509 Leaf Certificates per PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3. + * + * It parses the Subject Alternative Name using the ASN.1 module cma.asn1, + * which calls pci_cma_note_oid() and pci_cma_note_san() to compare an + * OtherName against the expected name. + * + * The expected name is constructed beforehand by pci_cma_construct_san(). + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 Intel Corporation + */ + +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "CMA: " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cma.asn1.h" +#include "pci.h" + +#define CMA_NAME_MAX sizeof("Vendor=1234:Device=1234:CC=123456:" \ + "REV=12:SSVID=1234:SSID=1234:1234567890123456") + +struct pci_cma_x509_context { + struct pci_dev *pdev; + enum OID last_oid; + char expected_name[CMA_NAME_MAX]; + unsigned int expected_len; + unsigned int found:1; +}; + +int pci_cma_note_oid(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pci_cma_x509_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + return 0; +} + +int pci_cma_note_san(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pci_cma_x509_context *ctx = context; + + /* These aren't the drOIDs we're looking for. */ + if (ctx->last_oid != OID_CMA) + return 0; + + if (tag != ASN1_UTF8STR || + vlen != ctx->expected_len || + memcmp(value, ctx->expected_name, vlen) != 0) { + pci_err(ctx->pdev, "Invalid X.509 Subject Alternative Name\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ctx->found = true; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned int pci_cma_construct_san(struct pci_dev *pdev, char *name) +{ + unsigned int len; + u64 serial; + + len = snprintf(name, CMA_NAME_MAX, + "Vendor=%04hx:Device=%04hx:CC=%06x:REV=%02hhx", + pdev->vendor, pdev->device, pdev->class, pdev->revision); + + if (pdev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL) + len += snprintf(name + len, CMA_NAME_MAX - len, + ":SSVID=%04hx:SSID=%04hx", + pdev->subsystem_vendor, pdev->subsystem_device); + + serial = pci_get_dsn(pdev); + if (serial) + len += snprintf(name + len, CMA_NAME_MAX - len, + ":%016llx", serial); + + return len; +} + +int pci_cma_validate(struct device *dev, struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); + struct pci_cma_x509_context ctx; + int ret; + + if (!leaf_cert->raw_san) { + pci_err(pdev, "Missing X.509 Subject Alternative Name\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ctx.pdev = pdev; + ctx.found = false; + ctx.expected_len = pci_cma_construct_san(pdev, ctx.expected_name); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&cma_decoder, &ctx, leaf_cert->raw_san, + leaf_cert->raw_san_size); + if (ret == -EBADMSG || ret == -EMSGSIZE) + pci_err(pdev, "Malformed X.509 Subject Alternative Name\n"); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (!ctx.found) { + pci_err(pdev, "Missing X.509 OtherName with CMA OID\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.asn1 b/drivers/pci/cma.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10f90e107009 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +-- Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3) +-- X.509 Subject Alternative Name (RFC 5280 sec 4.2.1.6) +-- +-- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6 +-- +-- The ASN.1 module in RFC 5280 appendix A.1 uses EXPLICIT TAGS whereas the one +-- in appendix A.2 uses IMPLICIT TAGS. The kernel's simplified asn1_compiler.c +-- always uses EXPLICIT TAGS, hence this ASN.1 module differs from RFC 5280 in +-- that it adds IMPLICIT to definitions from appendix A.2 (such as OtherName) +-- and omits EXPLICIT in those definitions. + +SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + +GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName + +GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + otherName [0] IMPLICIT OtherName, + rfc822Name [1] IMPLICIT IA5String, + dNSName [2] IMPLICIT IA5String, + x400Address [3] ANY, + directoryName [4] ANY, + ediPartyName [5] IMPLICIT EDIPartyName, + uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IMPLICIT IA5String, + iPAddress [7] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, + registeredID [8] IMPLICIT OBJECT IDENTIFIER + } + +OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pci_cma_note_oid }), + value [0] ANY ({ pci_cma_note_san }) + } + +EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + nameAssigner [0] ANY OPTIONAL, + partyName [1] ANY + } diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.c b/drivers/pci/cma.c index 06e5846325e3..012190c54ab6 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/cma.c +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.c @@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) return; pdev->spdm_state = spdm_create(&pdev->dev, pci_doe_transport, doe, - PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD, pci_cma_keyring); + PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD, pci_cma_keyring, + pci_cma_validate); if (!pdev->spdm_state) { return; } diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index bd80a0369c9c..6c4755a2c91c 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ static inline void pci_doe_disconnected(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev); void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev); +struct x509_certificate; +int pci_cma_validate(struct device *dev, struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert); #else static inline void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } static inline void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index f86a08ba0207..cafec7111473 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ enum OID { OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ + /* PCI */ + OID_CMA, /* 2.23.147 */ + OID__NR }; diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h index e824063793a7..69a83bc2eb41 100644 --- a/include/linux/spdm.h +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h @@ -17,14 +17,18 @@ struct key; struct device; struct spdm_state; +struct x509_certificate; typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev, const void *request, size_t request_sz, void *response, size_t response_sz); +typedef int (spdm_validate)(struct device *dev, + struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert); + struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz, - struct key *keyring); + struct key *keyring, spdm_validate *validate); int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c index 407041036599..b2af2074ba6f 100644 --- a/lib/spdm_requester.c +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c @@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ static int spdm_err(struct device *dev, struct spdm_error_rsp *rsp) * responder's signatures. * @root_keyring: Keyring against which to check the first certificate in * responder's certificate chain. + * @validate: Function to validate additional leaf certificate requirements. */ struct spdm_state { struct mutex lock; @@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ struct spdm_state { /* Certificates */ struct public_key *leaf_key; struct key *root_keyring; + spdm_validate *validate; }; static int __spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, @@ -1003,6 +1005,13 @@ static int spdm_validate_cert_chain(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot, } prev = NULL; + + if (spdm_state->validate) { + rc = spdm_state->validate(spdm_state->dev, cert); + if (rc) + goto err_free_cert; + } + spdm_state->leaf_key = cert->pub; cert->pub = NULL; @@ -1447,12 +1456,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticated); * @transport_priv: Transport private data * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes) * @keyring: Trusted root certificates + * @validate: Function to validate additional leaf certificate requirements + * (optional, may be %NULL) * * Returns a pointer to the allocated SPDM session state or NULL on error. */ struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz, - struct key *keyring) + struct key *keyring, spdm_validate *validate) { struct spdm_state *spdm_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1464,6 +1475,7 @@ struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, spdm_state->transport_priv = transport_priv; spdm_state->transport_sz = transport_sz; spdm_state->root_keyring = keyring; + spdm_state->validate = validate; mutex_init(&spdm_state->lock); From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:40 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403425 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EFE3CCE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:10:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230523AbjI1SKx (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:10:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59220 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230239AbjI1SKx (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:10:53 -0400 Received: from mailout2.hostsharing.net (mailout2.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:3000::53df:4ee9:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E21B819E; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 11:10:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout2.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06A2210189DFC; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:10:49 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D3CBF60DFEBD; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:10:48 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From e71af6b0bf695694d4a6de2c44356fe4fda97fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] PCI/CMA: Reauthenticate devices on reset and resume To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org CMA-SPDM state is lost when a device undergoes a Conventional Reset. (But not a Function Level Reset, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.6.2.) A D3cold to D0 transition implies a Conventional Reset (PCIe r6.1 sec 5.8). Thus, reauthenticate devices on resume from D3cold and on recovery from a Secondary Bus Reset or DPC-induced Hot Reset. The requirement to reauthenticate devices on resume from system sleep (and in the future reestablish IDE encryption) is the reason why SPDM needs to be in-kernel: During ->resume_noirq, which is the first phase after system sleep, the PCI core walks down the hierarchy, puts each device in D0, restores its config space and invokes the driver's ->resume_noirq callback. The driver is afforded the right to access the device already during this phase. To retain this usage model in the face of authentication and encryption, CMA-SPDM reauthentication and IDE reestablishment must happen during the ->resume_noirq phase, before the driver's first access to the device. The driver is thus afforded seamless authenticated and encrypted access until the last moment before suspend and from the first moment after resume. During the ->resume_noirq phase, device interrupts are not yet enabled. It is thus impossible to defer CMA-SPDM reauthentication to a user space component on an attached disk or on the network, making an in-kernel SPDM implementation mandatory. The same catch-22 exists on recovery from a Conventional Reset: A user space SPDM implementation might live on a device which underwent reset, rendering its execution impossible. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner --- drivers/pci/cma.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 1 + drivers/pci/pci.c | 12 ++++++++++-- drivers/pci/pci.h | 5 +++++ drivers/pci/pcie/err.c | 3 +++ include/linux/pci.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.c b/drivers/pci/cma.c index 012190c54ab6..89d23fdc37ec 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/cma.c +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.c @@ -71,6 +71,16 @@ void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) } rc = spdm_authenticate(pdev->spdm_state); + if (rc != -EPROTONOSUPPORT) + pdev->cma_capable = true; +} + +int pci_cma_reauthenticate(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + if (!pdev->cma_capable) + return -ENOTTY; + + return spdm_authenticate(pdev->spdm_state); } void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-driver.c b/drivers/pci/pci-driver.c index a79c110c7e51..b5d47eefe8df 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-driver.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-driver.c @@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ static void pci_pm_default_resume_early(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) pci_pm_power_up_and_verify_state(pci_dev); pci_restore_state(pci_dev); pci_pme_restore(pci_dev); + pci_cma_reauthenticate(pci_dev); } static void pci_pm_bridge_power_up_actions(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 59c01d68c6d5..0f36e6082579 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5248,8 +5248,16 @@ static int pci_reset_bus_function(struct pci_dev *dev, bool probe) rc = pci_dev_reset_slot_function(dev, probe); if (rc != -ENOTTY) - return rc; - return pci_parent_bus_reset(dev, probe); + goto done; + + rc = pci_parent_bus_reset(dev, probe); + +done: + /* CMA-SPDM state is lost upon a Conventional Reset */ + if (!probe) + pci_cma_reauthenticate(dev); + + return rc; } void pci_dev_lock(struct pci_dev *dev) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index 6c4755a2c91c..71092ccf4fbd 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -325,11 +325,16 @@ static inline void pci_doe_disconnected(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev); void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev); +int pci_cma_reauthenticate(struct pci_dev *pdev); struct x509_certificate; int pci_cma_validate(struct device *dev, struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert); #else static inline void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } static inline void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } +static inline int pci_cma_reauthenticate(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} #endif /** diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c index 59c90d04a609..4783bd907b54 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/err.c @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ static int report_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *dev, void *data) pci_ers_result_t vote, *result = data; const struct pci_error_handlers *err_handler; + /* CMA-SPDM state is lost upon a Conventional Reset */ + pci_cma_reauthenticate(dev); + device_lock(&dev->dev); pdrv = dev->driver; if (!pdrv || diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index 0c0123317df6..2bc11d8b567e 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ struct pci_dev { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA struct spdm_state *spdm_state; /* Security Protocol and Data Model */ + unsigned int cma_capable:1; /* Authentication supported */ #endif u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */ phys_addr_t rom; /* Physical address if not from BAR */ From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:41 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403426 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32309CE7B08 for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:13:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232032AbjI1SNv (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:13:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41212 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231965AbjI1SNv (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:13:51 -0400 Received: from mailout2.hostsharing.net (mailout2.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:3000::53df:4ee9:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD8E398; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 11:13:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [83.223.95.28]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout2.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8EA11018978B; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:13:45 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7BE1F60DFEBD; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:13:45 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 821682573e57e0384162f365652171e5ee1e6611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <821682573e57e0384162f365652171e5ee1e6611.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] PCI/CMA: Expose in sysfs whether devices are authenticated To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org The PCI core has just been amended to authenticate CMA-capable devices on enumeration and store the result in an "authenticated" bit in struct pci_dev->spdm_state. Expose the bit to user space through an eponymous sysfs attribute. Allow user space to trigger reauthentication (e.g. after it has updated the CMA keyring) by writing to the sysfs attribute. Subject to further discussion, a future commit might add a user-defined policy to forbid driver binding to devices which failed authentication, similar to the "authorized" attribute for USB. Alternatively, authentication success might be signaled to user space through a uevent, whereupon it may bind a (blacklisted) driver. A uevent signaling authentication failure might similarly cause user space to unbind or outright remove the potentially malicious device. Traffic from devices which failed authentication could also be filtered through ACS I/O Request Blocking Enable (PCIe r6.1 sec 7.7.11.3) or through Link Disable (PCIe r6.1 sec 7.5.3.7). Unlike an IOMMU, that will not only protect the host, but also prevent malicious peer-to-peer traffic to other devices. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci | 27 +++++++++ drivers/pci/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/pci/Makefile | 1 + drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/cma.c | 2 + drivers/pci/doe.c | 2 + drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 3 + drivers/pci/pci.h | 1 + include/linux/pci.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 114 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci index ecf47559f495..2ea9b8deffcc 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci @@ -500,3 +500,30 @@ Description: console drivers from the device. Raw users of pci-sysfs resourceN attributes must be terminated prior to resizing. Success of the resizing operation is not guaranteed. + +What: /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../authenticated +Date: September 2023 +Contact: Lukas Wunner +Description: + This file contains 1 if the device authenticated successfully + with CMA-SPDM (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31). It contains 0 if the + device failed authentication (and may thus be malicious). + + Writing anything to this file causes reauthentication. + That may be opportune after updating the .cma keyring. + + The file is not visible if authentication is unsupported + by the device. + + If the kernel could not determine whether authentication is + supported because memory was low or DOE communication with + the device was not working, the file is visible but accessing + it fails with error code ENOTTY. + + This prevents downgrade attacks where an attacker consumes + memory or disturbs DOE communication in order to create the + appearance that a device does not support authentication. + + The reason why authentication support could not be determined + is apparent from "dmesg". To probe for authentication support + again, exercise the "remove" and "rescan" attributes. diff --git a/drivers/pci/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/Kconfig index c9aa5253ac1f..51df3be3438e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/pci/Kconfig @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ config PCI_CMA A PCI DOE mailbox is used as transport for DMTF SPDM based attestation, measurement and secure channel establishment. +config PCI_CMA_SYSFS + def_bool PCI_CMA && SYSFS + config PCI_DOE bool diff --git a/drivers/pci/Makefile b/drivers/pci/Makefile index a18812b8832b..612ae724cd2d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/Makefile +++ b/drivers/pci/Makefile @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DOE) += doe.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES) += of_property.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA) += cma.o cma-x509.o cma.asn1.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA_SYSFS) += cma-sysfs.o $(obj)/cma-x509.o: $(obj)/cma.asn1.h $(obj)/cma.asn1.o: $(obj)/cma.asn1.c $(obj)/cma.asn1.h diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b2d45f96601a --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 Intel Corporation + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "pci.h" + +static ssize_t authenticated_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); + ssize_t rc; + + if (!pdev->cma_capable && + (pdev->cma_init_failed || pdev->doe_init_failed)) + return -ENOTTY; + + rc = pci_cma_reauthenticate(pdev); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return count; +} + +static ssize_t authenticated_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); + + if (!pdev->cma_capable && + (pdev->cma_init_failed || pdev->doe_init_failed)) + return -ENOTTY; + + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", spdm_authenticated(pdev->spdm_state)); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(authenticated); + +static struct attribute *pci_cma_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_authenticated.attr, + NULL +}; + +static umode_t pci_cma_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj, + struct attribute *a, int n) +{ + struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj); + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); + + /* + * If CMA or DOE initialization failed, CMA attributes must be visible + * and return an error on access. This prevents downgrade attacks + * where an attacker disturbs memory allocation or DOE communication + * in order to create the appearance that CMA is unsupported. + * The attacker may achieve that by simply hogging memory. + */ + if (!pdev->cma_capable && + !pdev->cma_init_failed && !pdev->doe_init_failed) + return 0; + + return a->mode; +} + +const struct attribute_group pci_cma_attr_group = { + .attrs = pci_cma_attrs, + .is_visible = pci_cma_attrs_are_visible, +}; diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.c b/drivers/pci/cma.c index 89d23fdc37ec..c539ad85a28f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/cma.c +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) int rc; if (!pci_cma_keyring) { + pdev->cma_init_failed = true; return; } @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD, pci_cma_keyring, pci_cma_validate); if (!pdev->spdm_state) { + pdev->cma_init_failed = true; return; } diff --git a/drivers/pci/doe.c b/drivers/pci/doe.c index 79f0336eb0c3..fabbda68edac 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/doe.c +++ b/drivers/pci/doe.c @@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ void pci_doe_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_DOE))) { doe_mb = pci_doe_create_mb(pdev, offset); if (IS_ERR(doe_mb)) { + pdev->doe_init_failed = true; pci_err(pdev, "[%x] failed to create mailbox: %ld\n", offset, PTR_ERR(doe_mb)); continue; @@ -693,6 +694,7 @@ void pci_doe_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) rc = xa_insert(&pdev->doe_mbs, offset, doe_mb, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { + pdev->doe_init_failed = true; pci_err(pdev, "[%x] failed to insert mailbox: %d\n", offset, rc); pci_doe_destroy_mb(doe_mb); diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index d9eede2dbc0e..7024e08e1b9a 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -1655,6 +1655,9 @@ static const struct attribute_group *pci_dev_attr_groups[] = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCIEASPM &aspm_ctrl_attr_group, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA_SYSFS + &pci_cma_attr_group, #endif NULL, }; diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index 71092ccf4fbd..d80cc06be0cc 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev); int pci_cma_reauthenticate(struct pci_dev *pdev); struct x509_certificate; int pci_cma_validate(struct device *dev, struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert); +extern const struct attribute_group pci_cma_attr_group; #else static inline void pci_cma_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } static inline void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index 2bc11d8b567e..2c5fde81bb85 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -516,10 +516,12 @@ struct pci_dev { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_DOE struct xarray doe_mbs; /* Data Object Exchange mailboxes */ + unsigned int doe_init_failed:1; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA struct spdm_state *spdm_state; /* Security Protocol and Data Model */ unsigned int cma_capable:1; /* Authentication supported */ + unsigned int cma_init_failed:1; #endif u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */ phys_addr_t rom; /* Physical address if not from BAR */ From patchwork Thu Sep 28 17:32:42 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lukas Wunner X-Patchwork-Id: 13403448 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCCC5CE7AFC for ; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:17:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231701AbjI1SRF (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:17:05 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33220 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231584AbjI1SRE (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Sep 2023 14:17:04 -0400 Received: from mailout3.hostsharing.net (mailout3.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:4f8:150:2161:1:b009:f236:0]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 82C96AC; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 11:17:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by mailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A72F10029AE0; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:16:59 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [89.246.108.87]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B232060DFEBD; Thu, 28 Sep 2023 20:16:58 +0200 (CEST) X-Mailbox-Line: From 467bff0c4bab93067b1e353e5b8a92f1de353a3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Message-Id: <467bff0c4bab93067b1e353e5b8a92f1de353a3f.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de> In-Reply-To: References: From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] PCI/CMA: Grant guests exclusive control of authentication To: Bjorn Helgaas , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Alex Williamson , , , , , , Cc: Jonathan Cameron , , David Box , Dan Williams , Dave Jiang , "Li, Ming" , Zhi Wang , Alistair Francis , Wilfred Mallawa , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Tom Lendacky , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Graf Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org At any given time, only a single entity in a physical system may have an SPDM connection to a device. That's because the GET_VERSION request (which begins an authentication sequence) resets "the connection and all context associated with that connection" (SPDM 1.3.0 margin no 158). Thus, when a device is passed through to a guest and the guest has authenticated it, a subsequent authentication by the host would reset the device's CMA-SPDM session behind the guest's back. Prevent by letting the guest claim exclusive CMA ownership of the device during passthrough. Refuse CMA reauthentication on the host as long. After passthrough has concluded, reauthenticate the device on the host. Store the flag indicating guest ownership in struct pci_dev's priv_flags to avoid the concurrency issues observed by commit 44bda4b7d26e ("PCI: Fix is_added/is_busmaster race condition"). Side note: The Data Object Exchange r1.1 ECN (published Oct 11 2022) retrofits DOE with Connection IDs. In theory these allow simultaneous CMA-SPDM connections by multiple entities to the same device. But the first hardware generation capable of CMA-SPDM only supports DOE r1.0. The specification also neglects to reserve unique Connection IDs for hosts and guests, which further limits its usefulness. In general, forcing the transport to compensate for SPDM's lack of a connection identifier feels like a questionable layering violation. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Cc: Alex Williamson --- drivers/pci/cma.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/pci.h | 1 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 9 +++++-- include/linux/pci.h | 8 +++++++ include/linux/spdm.h | 2 ++ lib/spdm_requester.c | 11 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma.c b/drivers/pci/cma.c index c539ad85a28f..b3eee137ffe2 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/cma.c +++ b/drivers/pci/cma.c @@ -82,9 +82,50 @@ int pci_cma_reauthenticate(struct pci_dev *pdev) if (!pdev->cma_capable) return -ENOTTY; + if (test_bit(PCI_CMA_OWNED_BY_GUEST, &pdev->priv_flags)) + return -EPERM; + return spdm_authenticate(pdev->spdm_state); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_CORE) +/** + * pci_cma_claim_ownership() - Claim exclusive CMA-SPDM control for guest VM + * @pdev: PCI device + * + * Claim exclusive CMA-SPDM control for a guest virtual machine before + * passthrough of @pdev. The host refrains from performing CMA-SPDM + * authentication of the device until passthrough has concluded. + * + * Necessary because the GET_VERSION request resets the SPDM connection + * and DOE r1.0 allows only a single SPDM connection for the entire system. + * So the host could reset the guest's SPDM connection behind the guest's back. + */ +void pci_cma_claim_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + set_bit(PCI_CMA_OWNED_BY_GUEST, &pdev->priv_flags); + + if (pdev->cma_capable) + spdm_await(pdev->spdm_state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_cma_claim_ownership); + +/** + * pci_cma_return_ownership() - Relinquish CMA-SPDM control to the host + * @pdev: PCI device + * + * Relinquish CMA-SPDM control to the host after passthrough of @pdev to a + * guest virtual machine has concluded. + */ +void pci_cma_return_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + clear_bit(PCI_CMA_OWNED_BY_GUEST, &pdev->priv_flags); + + pci_cma_reauthenticate(pdev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_cma_return_ownership); +#endif + void pci_cma_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { if (pdev->spdm_state) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h index d80cc06be0cc..05ae6359b152 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ static inline bool pci_dev_is_disconnected(const struct pci_dev *dev) #define PCI_DEV_ADDED 0 #define PCI_DPC_RECOVERED 1 #define PCI_DPC_RECOVERING 2 +#define PCI_CMA_OWNED_BY_GUEST 3 static inline void pci_dev_assign_added(struct pci_dev *dev, bool added) { diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c index 1929103ee59a..6f300664a342 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c @@ -487,10 +487,12 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) if (ret) goto out_power; + pci_cma_claim_ownership(pdev); + /* If reset fails because of the device lock, fail this path entirely */ ret = pci_try_reset_function(pdev); if (ret == -EAGAIN) - goto out_disable_device; + goto out_cma_return; vdev->reset_works = !ret; pci_save_state(pdev); @@ -549,7 +551,8 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) out_free_state: kfree(vdev->pci_saved_state); vdev->pci_saved_state = NULL; -out_disable_device: +out_cma_return: + pci_cma_return_ownership(pdev); pci_disable_device(pdev); out_power: if (!disable_idle_d3) @@ -678,6 +681,8 @@ void vfio_pci_core_disable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(vdev->vdev.dev_set); + pci_cma_return_ownership(pdev); + /* Put the pm-runtime usage counter acquired during enable */ if (!disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h index 2c5fde81bb85..c14ea0e74fc4 100644 --- a/include/linux/pci.h +++ b/include/linux/pci.h @@ -2386,6 +2386,14 @@ static inline resource_size_t pci_iov_resource_size(struct pci_dev *dev, int res static inline void pci_vf_drivers_autoprobe(struct pci_dev *dev, bool probe) { } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_CMA +void pci_cma_claim_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev); +void pci_cma_return_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev); +#else +static inline void pci_cma_claim_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } +static inline void pci_cma_return_ownership(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } +#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI) || defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_MODULE) void pci_hp_create_module_link(struct pci_slot *pci_slot); void pci_hp_remove_module_link(struct pci_slot *pci_slot); diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h index 69a83bc2eb41..d796127fbe9a 100644 --- a/include/linux/spdm.h +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); +void spdm_await(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); + void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state); #endif diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c index b2af2074ba6f..99424d6aebf5 100644 --- a/lib/spdm_requester.c +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c @@ -1483,6 +1483,17 @@ struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_create); +/** + * spdm_await() - Wait for ongoing spdm_authenticate() to finish + * + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state + */ +void spdm_await(struct spdm_state *spdm_state) +{ + mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock); + mutex_unlock(&spdm_state->lock); +} + /** * spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session *