From patchwork Mon Dec 11 09:29:21 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alex Lu X-Patchwork-Id: 13486902 Received: from rtits2.realtek.com.tw (rtits2.realtek.com [211.75.126.72]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C998AF5; Mon, 11 Dec 2023 01:29:40 -0800 (PST) X-SpamFilter-By: ArmorX SpamTrap 5.78 with qID 3BB9TUX902633390, This message is accepted by code: ctloc85258 Received: from RSEXMBS01.realsil.com.cn ([172.29.17.195]) by rtits2.realtek.com.tw (8.15.2/2.95/5.92) with ESMTPS id 3BB9TUX902633390 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=FAIL); Mon, 11 Dec 2023 17:29:32 +0800 Received: from alexlu (172.29.36.158) by RSEXMBS01.realsil.com.cn (172.29.17.195) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.27; Mon, 11 Dec 2023 17:29:30 +0800 Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 17:29:21 +0800 From: Alex Lu To: Marcel Holtmann , Johan Hedberg , Luiz Augusto von Dentz , , CC: Max Chou , Karen Hsu Subject: [PATCH v2] Bluetooth: Add more enc key size check Message-ID: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline X-ClientProxiedBy: RSEXH36502.realsil.com.cn (172.29.17.3) To RSEXMBS01.realsil.com.cn (172.29.17.195) From: Alex Lu When we are slave role and receives l2cap conn req when encryption has started, we should check the enc key size to avoid KNOB attack or BLUFFS attack. From SIG recommendation, implementations are advised to reject service-level connections on an encrypted baseband link with key strengths below 7 octets. The btmon log below shows the case that lacks enc key size check. > HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Class: 0x480104 Major class: Computer (desktop, notebook, PDA, organizers) Minor class: Desktop workstation Capturing (Scanner, Microphone) Telephony (Cordless telephony, Modem, Headset) Link type: ACL (0x01) < HCI Command: Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) plen 7 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Role: Peripheral (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) ncmd 2 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Link type: ACL (0x01) Encryption: Disabled (0x00) ... > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01) < HCI Command: Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) plen 2 Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7 Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 2 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Key size: 6 ... // We should check the enc key size > ACL Data RX: Handle 1 flags 0x02 dlen 12 L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 3 len 4 PSM: 25 (0x0019) Source CID: 64 < ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 64 Result: Connection pending (0x0001) Status: Authorization pending (0x0002) > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 Num handles: 1 Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33) Count: 1 #35: len 16 (25 Kb/s) Latency: 5 msec (2-7 msec ~4 msec) < ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16 L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8 Destination CID: 64 Source CID: 64 Result: Connection successful (0x0000) Status: No further information available (0x0000) Signed-off-by: Alex Lu Signed-off-by: Max Chou --- Changes in v2: - Fix compiling issue reported by sparse net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 17ca13e8c044..a9809fbe6b00 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1669,7 +1669,13 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn) rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid); if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) { - if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { + if (!l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) { + l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_DISCONN); + __set_chan_timer(chan, + L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); + rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK); + rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO); + } else if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_PEND); rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND); chan->ops->defer(chan); @@ -4202,7 +4208,15 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) { if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) { - if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { + /* As slave role, we should check the enc key size when + * l2cap conn req is received. + */ + if (!l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) { + l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_DISCONN); + __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); + result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; + status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO; + } else if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECT2); result = L2CAP_CR_PEND; status = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;