From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:12 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826281 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A0A515AC for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6768831549 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 5BA2D327A9; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0556322DF for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726356AbfBVO5v (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:51 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f66.google.com ([209.85.128.66]:34865 "EHLO mail-wm1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726425AbfBVO5v (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:51 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f66.google.com with SMTP id y15so2255048wma.0 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:49 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=i8YHv0/qIqj+KRVAYbor72UyNmxKrCXiH7RYPyw72kU=; b=pYh+dQv+OHV68bHGGNiITLi5+NsXdjgF1rB3veK6sF1RoHF6s/NbfjiLKrsW+fvJSL Hi3s+hEZW6zKU0r9IzA3gCIf7IlO0ZQWP/NN3hRaucNqgRw6oGJt6RDHyDh4q+sPQP/L hac0TovefFl0FMEzp01CdPUDql8/Hg7j+BeTJh/FXNNKavB5XslzWQzwHBkb1EVWctRN 1QJYkeo5DQ7Ayy2vxT8goez7iB6udSRb+g0iPgRMSAWMF+vPR0OrtfQ8P6NymX+JgBRq Ej11zbG92CAhDQ0Snk/O/VaxDPnc1AlegH2SVXObWLTxm3+RmhYt18CPvR1z70MFJyS/ 2ZyQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAuZ2xbrHmYalNgqSrupjo/FOa+mvPKGWy8S0TJMhtEgXx85wPJhr gbzWrW4E9KDxWUGAb49RWJAOCg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3IbGcwdiZdgENhG4RF7d9RUODRKCbnSygvPNXZ+Qqgv2HwmGICokA+II73AJzD51MlMyRRP8oQ== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:6c12:: with SMTP id h18mr2556656wmc.131.1550847468932; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.47 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:48 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 1/7] kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:12 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-2-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Right now, kernfs_iattrs embeds the whole struct iattr, even though it doesn't really use half of its fields... This both leads to wasting space and makes the code look awkward. Let's just list the few fields we need directly in struct kernfs_iattrs. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 10 ++++---- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 6 ++++- fs/kernfs/symlink.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 4ca0b5c18192..e3e00d9be70d 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -795,9 +795,8 @@ int kernfs_add_one(struct kernfs_node *kn) /* Update timestamps on the parent */ ps_iattr = parent->iattr; if (ps_iattr) { - struct iattr *ps_iattrs = &ps_iattr->ia_iattr; - ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattrs->ia_ctime); - ps_iattrs->ia_mtime = ps_iattrs->ia_ctime; + ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime); + ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime; } mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex); @@ -1329,9 +1328,8 @@ static void __kernfs_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn) /* update timestamps on the parent */ if (ps_iattr) { - ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime); - ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_mtime = - ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime; + ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime); + ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime; } kernfs_put(pos); diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index 80cebcd94c90..ffd1ef962728 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) { static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex); struct kernfs_iattrs *ret; - struct iattr *iattrs; mutex_lock(&iattr_mutex); @@ -45,16 +44,14 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) kn->iattr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kernfs_iattrs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kn->iattr) goto out_unlock; - iattrs = &kn->iattr->ia_iattr; /* assign default attributes */ - iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode; - iattrs->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; - iattrs->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; + kn->iattr->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + kn->iattr->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; - ktime_get_real_ts64(&iattrs->ia_atime); - iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime; - iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime; + ktime_get_real_ts64(&kn->iattr->ia_atime); + kn->iattr->ia_mtime = kn->iattr->ia_atime; + kn->iattr->ia_ctime = kn->iattr->ia_atime; simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs); out_unlock: @@ -66,29 +63,24 @@ out_unlock: int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr) { struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; - struct iattr *iattrs; unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); if (!attrs) return -ENOMEM; - iattrs = &attrs->ia_iattr; - if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID) - iattrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid; + attrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid; if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID) - iattrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid; + attrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid; if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME) - iattrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime; + attrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime; if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME) - iattrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime; + attrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime; if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME) - iattrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime; - if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { - umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode; - iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode = mode; - } + attrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime; + if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) + kn->mode = iattr->ia_mode; return 0; } @@ -171,14 +163,15 @@ static inline void set_default_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); } -static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr) +static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, + struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs) { struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; - inode->i_uid = iattr->ia_uid; - inode->i_gid = iattr->ia_gid; - inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran); - inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran); - inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran); + inode->i_uid = attrs->ia_uid; + inode->i_gid = attrs->ia_gid; + inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran); + inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran); + inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran); } static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode) @@ -191,7 +184,7 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode) * kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from * persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ - set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr); + set_inode_attr(inode, attrs); security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata, attrs->ia_secdata_len); } diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h index 3d83b114bb08..388c1193c4fa 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h @@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ #include struct kernfs_iattrs { - struct iattr ia_iattr; + kuid_t ia_uid; + kgid_t ia_gid; + struct timespec64 ia_atime; + struct timespec64 ia_mtime; + struct timespec64 ia_ctime; void *ia_secdata; u32 ia_secdata_len; diff --git a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c index 162f43b80c84..eb46c3a16e2f 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_create_link(struct kernfs_node *parent, kgid_t gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; if (target->iattr) { - uid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_uid; - gid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_gid; + uid = target->iattr->ia_uid; + gid = target->iattr->ia_gid; } kn = kernfs_new_node(parent, name, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, uid, gid, From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:13 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; 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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.48 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:49 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 2/7] kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:13 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-3-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This is a read-only operation, so we can simply return -ENODATA if kn->iattr is NULL. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index ffd1ef962728..7a7985961bbf 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ static const struct inode_operations kernfs_iops = { .listxattr = kernfs_iop_listxattr, }; -static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) +static struct kernfs_iattrs *__kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn, int alloc) { static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex); struct kernfs_iattrs *ret; mutex_lock(&iattr_mutex); - if (kn->iattr) + if (kn->iattr || !alloc) goto out_unlock; kn->iattr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kernfs_iattrs), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ out_unlock: return ret; } +static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 1); +} + +static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 0); +} + int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr) { struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; @@ -306,9 +316,9 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; - attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); + attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn); if (!attrs) - return -ENOMEM; + return -ENODATA; return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size); } From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:14 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826289 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F4BB14E1 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DBFE31549 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 422BE32811; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D4BC31549 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726819AbfBVO5z (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:55 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:52166 "EHLO mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726458AbfBVO5y (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:54 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id n19so2231093wmi.1 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:52 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=c6ozjLnTH4GYJKoNy9kSNyyz4TJc2lzZH0D3kC2Ee84=; b=BqmG+9jw0OnR3QhUgZdxPseuy2G2+WOVNyljISFtzD0LlFi66gt1P23Jf3zzd2bYeb 7qfBorl/AvrEj4W1vlwJc2jO7Z0OHSlRn0C9MRopu9rRCeDySoYWykSiBeZvUH+/99Ks Bzx2PjX435bt/heGIRNVAn5c2y5mj81afquhE+oDPqgxqqYPPvJ7a2EWT55zEURIzyyY sAo0Bx33/F8FR6yGfFAkkGmZ57prnDAGl+80IqCDj2RYWcrnSA3zFGhP6fVyPvl9+fdb Dy1JHHgb3lkT6nfgw3uZyH+/JIzA88XBao2oWY/5o+1gCk39unsKL43kMvW96rao0m0w SJrg== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAubjw2sF8VS2USgbxxpLaGv4cEAq14oMz7US/Ulk4UYY6NNEW69j 1+ZnrFAAHdIbEOR2g17tXNLO3w== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3Ib2iLnJ+4n+rF6qsjB1ZXZ8cW/d58A9t9K9tFh7iN16V4P7LZXBvy+zB/fONTxX0qwCR9En1w== X-Received: by 2002:a7b:c5cc:: with SMTP id n12mr2744333wmk.149.1550847471835; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.50 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:50 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 3/7] selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-4-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call. We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set. This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Acked-by: Stephen Smalley --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 157 +++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 81e012c66d95..0f62757b6634 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -793,11 +793,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; + + if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) - sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* @@ -1392,6 +1394,67 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, return rc; } +static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) +{ +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 + char *context; + unsigned int len; + int rc; + + len = INITCONTEXTLEN; + context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + context[len] = '\0'; + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); + if (rc == -ERANGE) { + kfree(context); + + /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + len = rc; + context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + context[len] = '\0'; + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, + context, len); + } + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(context); + if (rc != -ENODATA) { + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); + return rc; + } + *sid = def_sid; + return 0; + } + + rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + def_sid, GFP_NOFS); + if (rc) { + char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; + unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + + if (rc == -EINVAL) { + pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", + ino, dev, context); + } else { + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } + } + kfree(context); + return 0; +} + /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { @@ -1400,9 +1463,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent u32 task_sid, sid = 0; u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; -#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 - char *context = NULL; - unsigned len = 0; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) @@ -1470,72 +1530,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; } - len = INITCONTEXTLEN; - context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); - if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] = '\0'; - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); - if (rc == -ERANGE) { - kfree(context); - - /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); - if (rc < 0) { - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - len = rc; - context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); - if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] = '\0'; - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); - } + rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, + &sid); dput(dentry); - if (rc < 0) { - if (rc != -ENODATA) { - pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " - "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, - -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); - kfree(context); - goto out; - } - /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ - sid = sbsec->def_sid; - rc = 0; - } else { - rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, - context, rc, &sid, - sbsec->def_sid, - GFP_NOFS); - if (rc) { - char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; - unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; - - if (rc == -EINVAL) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) - pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " - "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " - "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); - } else { - pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " - "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", - __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); - } - kfree(context); - /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ - rc = 0; - break; - } - } - kfree(context); + if (rc) + goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; @@ -1586,9 +1585,21 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); - dput(dentry); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + dput(dentry); goto out; + } + + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) && + (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { + rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, + sid, &sid); + if (rc) { + dput(dentry); + goto out; + } + } + dput(dentry); } break; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index f68fb25b5702..6e5928f951da 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100 #define SE_SBPROC 0x0200 #define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 +#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800 #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:15 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826299 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF4A417E9 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFAC931549 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B3E37327D5; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5736231549 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727041AbfBVO55 (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:57 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-f67.google.com ([209.85.221.67]:36401 "EHLO mail-wr1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726677AbfBVO5y (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:57:54 -0500 Received: by mail-wr1-f67.google.com with SMTP id o17so2715253wrw.3 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:54 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=LtC53CwnIpZppJiGjM2dPMSUQdkOPhnvKUZTLjV/uWw=; b=joMh58NIIJhOzEUDbfJIazaexABf+Zn3QeKCO8jhaH4Q8SYANGIq8YvwxV/bNT0BHw cOEJg1m45pGF8BXEi5cdjRHWtLR+CeYLVZUkpc96kvqLVvL1Mjmmg+taxXqgmkRLsWbq quCfsC6iGXWuKxsdNUSl6643U9JCW5aQgRcrvk7qxJtamCYzBxuytC2c2hYxcLQlboyH EdToU5BXmR2zSIzbgMaLWQlbEV3FMPgZXZeZXAn3pdGBIqATrgqgMt6w0r8H/717FXZi L4XdyLYYbYiMF1T+ifNVIFFYrw6P+mtSW/J0OGMMngLpaIfszr1SCFStIuxEUv/2duvU 5iCA== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAubD9C3WIP8Ra3BPmtMoIFE13iddMb3QO/Zie4LZo1grsFZwztwT jqj31WKaFihbc8pomRj1V3LtwQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3IafQQvCpXtC0mmzQdj04YWnd6hHIiJKlzp1ZbkFQwsaQpEaDW5EebOja8mQysZkx4fVojSulg== X-Received: by 2002:adf:e9c2:: with SMTP id l2mr3096428wrn.315.1550847473411; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.51 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:52 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 4/7] kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:15 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-5-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Replace the special handling of security xattrs with simple_xattrs, as is already done for the trusted xattrs. This simplifies the code and allows LSMs to use more than just a single xattr to do their business. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 7 ++--- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 55 ++----------------------------------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index e3e00d9be70d..6048f2ce85c4 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -531,12 +531,9 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn) kfree_const(kn->name); - if (kn->iattr) { - if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) - security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len); + if (kn->iattr) simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs); - } + kfree(kn->iattr); spin_lock(&kernfs_idr_lock); idr_remove(&root->ino_idr, kn->id.ino); diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index 7a7985961bbf..1acdfbf4b86a 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -137,23 +137,6 @@ out: return error; } -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata, - u32 *secdata_len) -{ - void *old_secdata; - size_t old_secdata_len; - - old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata; - old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; - - attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata; - attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len; - - *secdata = old_secdata; - *secdata_len = old_secdata_len; - return 0; -} - ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size) { struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(dentry); @@ -189,15 +172,12 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode) struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr; inode->i_mode = kn->mode; - if (attrs) { + if (attrs) /* * kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from * persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ set_inode_attr(inode, attrs); - security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata, - attrs->ia_secdata_len); - } if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR) set_nlink(inode, kn->dir.subdirs + 2); @@ -345,41 +325,10 @@ static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = { .set = kernfs_xattr_set, }; -static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, - struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, - const char *suffix, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) -{ - struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; - struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; - void *secdata; - u32 secdata_len = 0; - int error; - - attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); - if (!attrs) - return -ENOMEM; - - error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags); - if (error) - return error; - error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len); - if (error) - return error; - - mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex); - error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len); - mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex); - - if (secdata) - security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len); - return error; -} - static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler = { .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, .get = kernfs_xattr_get, - .set = kernfs_security_xattr_set, + .set = kernfs_xattr_set, }; const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = { diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h index 388c1193c4fa..0e1f1aa7df1e 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ struct kernfs_iattrs { struct timespec64 ia_atime; struct timespec64 ia_mtime; struct timespec64 ia_ctime; - void *ia_secdata; - u32 ia_secdata_len; struct simple_xattrs xattrs; }; From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:16 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826303 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13BFA17E9 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02B3F322DF for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id EAB2B32811; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:57:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93CAA322DF for ; 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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.53 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:53 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 5/7] LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:16 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-6-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. This patch also adds helper functions to for getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs them). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/kernfs.h | 15 ++++++++++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++++++ security/security.c | 6 +++++ 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index 1acdfbf4b86a..a831b2186a27 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -288,12 +288,11 @@ int kernfs_iop_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return generic_permission(inode, mask); } -static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, - struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, - const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size) +static int kernfs_node_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + void *value, size_t size) { const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix); - struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn); @@ -303,13 +302,11 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size); } -static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, - struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, - const char *suffix, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) +static int kernfs_node_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix); - struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); @@ -319,6 +316,25 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, return simple_xattr_set(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size, flags); } +static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, + const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size) +{ + struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; + + return kernfs_node_xattr_get(handler, kn, suffix, value, size); +} + +static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, + const char *suffix, const void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; + + return kernfs_node_xattr_set(handler, kn, suffix, value, size, flags); +} + static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = { .prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, .get = kernfs_xattr_get, @@ -336,3 +352,17 @@ const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = { &kernfs_security_xattr_handler, NULL }; + +int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + void *value, size_t size) +{ + return kernfs_node_xattr_get(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler, + kn, suffix, value, size); +} + +int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + return kernfs_node_xattr_set(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler, + kn, suffix, value, size, flags); +} diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h index 5b36b1287a5a..db8d1aa57e95 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernfs.h +++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h @@ -352,6 +352,11 @@ int kernfs_rename_ns(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct kernfs_node *new_parent, int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr); void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn); +int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + void *value, size_t size); +int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix, + void *value, size_t size, int flags); + const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb); struct dentry *kernfs_mount_ns(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags, struct kernfs_root *root, unsigned long magic, @@ -456,6 +461,16 @@ static inline int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, static inline void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) { } +static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, + const char *suffix, void *value, + size_t size) +{ return -ENOSYS; } + +static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, + const char *suffix, void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ return -ENOSYS; } + static inline const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb) { return NULL; } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 9a0bdf91e646..71af02629c63 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -429,6 +429,15 @@ * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter. * + * Security hooks for kernfs node operations + * + * @kernfs_init_security + * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based + * on its own and its parent's attributes. + * + * @kn_dir the parent kernfs node + * @kn the new child kernfs node + * * Security hooks for file operations * * @file_permission: @@ -1558,6 +1567,9 @@ union security_list_options { int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name); + int (*kernfs_init_security)(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn); + int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask); int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file); void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file); @@ -1858,6 +1870,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head inode_getsecid; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr; + struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security; struct hlist_head file_permission; struct hlist_head file_alloc_security; struct hlist_head file_free_security; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index dbfb5a66babb..f63765af1816 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct fown_struct; struct file_operations; struct msg_msg; struct xattr; +struct kernfs_node; struct xfrm_sec_ctx; struct mm_struct; @@ -291,6 +292,8 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name); +int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn); int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); @@ -783,6 +786,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f1b8d2587639..2864fb99feb2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -892,6 +892,12 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); +} + int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { int ret; From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:17 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826307 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F52715AC for ; 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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.54 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:55 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 6/7] selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:17 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-7-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the actual inodes later by other hooks. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0f62757b6634..42b576d82d7f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* for hashlen_string() */ #include #include "avc.h" @@ -3350,6 +3352,68 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +/* kernfs node operations */ + +int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; + int rc; + char *context; + + rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, NULL, 0); + if (rc == -ENODATA) + return 0; + else if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + clen = (u32)rc; + context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, + clen); + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(context); + return rc; + } + + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, + GFP_KERNEL); + kfree(context); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (tsec->create_sid) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + } else { + u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); + struct qstr q; + + q.name = kn->name; + q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); + + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + parent_sid, secclass, &q, + &newsid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = kernfs_security_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen, + XATTR_CREATE); + kfree(context); + return rc; +} + + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -6796,6 +6860,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security), From patchwork Fri Feb 22 14:57:18 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10826319 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63BCB14E1 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DA0B3147D for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4047032805; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8FE53147D for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:58:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726460AbfBVO6B (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:58:01 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f65.google.com ([209.85.128.65]:37562 "EHLO mail-wm1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727043AbfBVO6A (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 09:58:00 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f65.google.com with SMTP id x10so2226410wmg.2 for ; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:57 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=lIV1fCtG86s0m7c7WVIkMbP81jHJSbE5ZarjCCqDsws=; b=SMj5vA4BRcIK5n7RO2t4YKO5PyfAGeqA+o4BiwLJ0lGE71xhbGgBQIguQXSEyxESGE 4sx6UICTIRkQ5gDKKP/JF2ki5f9/gLhMJ+Vr6Wk+wAPtwAPxQt51Gw1UWQrL/zgVgjYw O4XPZd+sp5uogA8XtaLqHxvwHkQd88xGYs6IuPnK0hUpSi8El6kKQoSgQo2krhuX7W+a 5Hq0pLCse0RC5rWJgUKoXBOActeAGaitZ9QEv372EUh3Yt60SwUsyIODLK/6Gc8KgLcq OCae6jLNguTyESPidmFlbDODVhYtkr96C8aO8aYMBPCVpmd+YWVXdwx+XcrbZZ+dpHfe 8HaA== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAuaQjAl0d9PSVoCRpPH8E4VNewfiXtVa8ABCBfWKoE8MitSOdmgl rrb7av4GdDBDYsbZgg9c9Mb0fw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3IZGtmfvx6O88/ej785uZA2eS30KPDhLGylbngJTAqcI40/W4v3FYL1C1dejIT3+K57f22cKLg== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:1902:: with SMTP id 2mr2872288wmz.150.1550847477314; Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 203sm1503912wme.30.2019.02.22.06.57.55 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Fri, 22 Feb 2019 06:57:56 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v7 7/7] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:18 +0100 Message-Id: <20190222145718.5740-8-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Use the new security_kernfs_init_security() hook to allow LSMs to possibly assign a non-default security context to a newly created kernfs node based on the attributes of the new node and also its parent node. This fixes an issue with cgroupfs under SELinux, where newly created cgroup subdirectories/files would not inherit its parent's context if it had been set explicitly to a non-default value (other than the genfs context specified by the policy). This can be reproduced as follows (on Fedora/RHEL): # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test # # Need permissive to change the label under Fedora policy: # setenforce 0 # chcon -t container_file_t /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.threads drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 init.scope drwxr-xr-x. 26 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:21 system.slice drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 test drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 user.slice # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Actual result: # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Expected result: # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root unconfined_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/39 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 6048f2ce85c4..c5f6e6c76982 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) } static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, + struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name, umode_t mode, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, unsigned flags) @@ -671,6 +672,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } + if (parent) { + ret = security_kernfs_init_security(parent, kn); + if (ret) + goto err_out3; + } + return kn; err_out3: @@ -689,7 +696,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_node *parent, { struct kernfs_node *kn; - kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), + kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), parent, name, mode, uid, gid, flags); if (kn) { kernfs_get(parent); @@ -958,7 +965,7 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_create_root(struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root->supers); root->next_generation = 1; - kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, + kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, NULL, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, KERNFS_DIR); if (!kn) {