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Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v8 1/6] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:17 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-2-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002143_485955_1DA63038 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 26.03 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DCP (Data Co-Processor) is able to derive private keys for a fused random seed, which can be referenced by handle but not accessed by the CPU. Similarly, DCP is able to store arbitrary keys in four dedicated key slots located in its secure memory area (internal SRAM). These keys can be used to perform AES encryption. Expose these derived keys and key slots through the crypto API via their handle. The main purpose is to add DCP-backed trusted keys. Other use cases are possible too (see similar existing paes implementations), but these should carefully be evaluated as e.g. enabling AF_ALG will give userspace full access to use keys. In scenarios with untrustworthy userspace, this will enable en-/decryption oracles. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/soc/fsl/dcp.h | 20 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/dcp.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index 2b3ebe0db3a6..057d73c370b7 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct dcp_async_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher *fallback; unsigned int key_len; uint8_t key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + bool key_referenced; }; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx { @@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM (1 << 13) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT (1 << 12) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY (1 << 11) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY (1 << 10) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT (1 << 9) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH (1 << 6) @@ -168,6 +171,8 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_ECB (0 << 4) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_SELECT_AES128 (0 << 0) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT 8 + static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) { int dma_err; @@ -224,13 +229,16 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + bool key_referenced = actx->key_referenced; int ret; - key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, - 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (!key_referenced) { + key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); + if (ret) + return ret; + } src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); @@ -255,8 +263,12 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT | MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER; - /* Payload contains the key. */ - desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + if (key_referenced) + /* Set OTP key bit to select the key via KEY_SELECT. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY; + else + /* Payload contains the key. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; if (rctx->enc) desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; @@ -270,6 +282,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, else desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + if (key_referenced) + desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT; + desc->next_cmd_addr = 0; desc->source = src_phys; desc->destination = dst_phys; @@ -284,9 +299,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, err_dst: dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); err_src: - dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - + if (!key_referenced) + dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); return ret; } @@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb) struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); int ret; - if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) + if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && !actx->key_referenced)) return mxs_dcp_block_fallback(req, enc); rctx->enc = enc; @@ -500,6 +515,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, * there can still be an operation in progress. */ actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = false; if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { memcpy(actx->key, key, len); return 0; @@ -516,6 +532,32 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, return crypto_skcipher_setkey(actx->fallback, key, len); } +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (key[0]) { + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP: + memcpy(actx->key, key, len); + actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = true; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static int mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); @@ -539,6 +581,13 @@ static void mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) crypto_free_skcipher(actx->fallback); } +static int mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct dcp_aes_req_ctx)); + + return 0; +} + /* * Hashing (SHA1/SHA256) */ @@ -889,6 +938,39 @@ static struct skcipher_alg dcp_aes_algs[] = { .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .init = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm, .exit = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_decrypt, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_decrypt, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, }, }; diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ec335d8ca8b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + * + * Specifies paes key slot handles for NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) to be used + * with the crypto_skcipher_setkey(). + */ + +#ifndef MXS_DCP_H +#define MXS_DCP_H + +#define DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE 1 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0 0x00 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1 0x01 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2 0x02 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3 0x03 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE 0xfe +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP 0xff + +#endif /* MXS_DCP_H */ From patchwork Wed Apr 3 07:21:18 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13615067 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DF9B2C6FD1F for ; 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Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id v13-20020a5d4b0d000000b0034356c434d0sm1436269wrq.117.2024.04.03.00.21.42 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:43 -0700 (PDT) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 2/6] KEYS: trusted: improve scalability of trust source config Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:18 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-3-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002145_752161_350D3C92 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 13.62 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Enabling trusted keys requires at least one trust source implementation (currently TPM, TEE or CAAM) to be enabled. Currently, this is done by checking each trust source's config option individually. This does not scale when more trust sources like the one for DCP are added, because the condition will get long and hard to read. Add config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS which is set to true by each trust source once its enabled and adapt the check for having at least one active trust source to use this option. Whenever a new trust source is added, it now needs to select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS. Signed-off-by: David Gstir Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen # for TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index dbfdd8536468..553dc117f385 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + bool + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS @@ -9,6 +12,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, @@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted key backend. @@ -29,10 +34,11 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM -comment "No trust source selected!" +if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + comment "No trust source selected!" endif From patchwork Wed Apr 3 07:21:19 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13615070 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00A3BCD128D for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2024 07:22:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=3sewoZv4Jqt11WtjCE/h38d2+kAT330IvUEAxzBPtEA=; b=expfiXjZeUbUEL ubaDzG1sT5mtPB8GyAnGidJWjv1oBrlvk3Ts8xV035DCEsyUA8wTYyPvssQ6z77T4CilLiHxiY1L2 68q7P/SCRArWYa+BrUgqiu+Ntrxk9n96NWQw4d5JY3cp0imyYYDmADmmgqtp9sNhi6Av5WL+QOTvx D+4PNHymUlhkg/xjmNcCvuOkgoJ4hYLd1VDsYgs0CfvhQLje5gut3PpPSBnMMsO4hlGSU5bqlIw/Z o7rUiPImHSicAzDax6dYQc1h8ww27x3LrNhtJMXynCYQw2ALkqPSIxrEEjzl79Hx1q6lgsj33ow58 En2nb2E4EgLW7BdI5mPQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwU-0000000ETGf-2SEJ; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:21:54 +0000 Received: from mail-lj1-x22e.google.com ([2a00:1450:4864:20::22e]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwO-0000000ETAt-2Ojh for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:21:51 +0000 Received: by mail-lj1-x22e.google.com with SMTP id 38308e7fff4ca-2d718ee7344so62709901fa.2 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1712128906; x=1712733706; darn=lists.infradead.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=Jk3bunkUZB3eJdbTI0pWomxdZHb/buVMZM8Xz7Iwzes=; b=HJEnW3Q8IoGQRieGFj4ThRwZewkKtsZMFua2OdWMU1WEK+UfKCoDYNn5m3PSvFxAHH lu9SMrbnreD0kKWp0Wm37ZbkbI6pqpAaYTeav5G0nPBadsVf9udRJyf3GSAE9cqI/MxY J5vwfTHtjY85/p3J31Y1Q7/QZKU8H8/IlXariuNXIOldLn4yRZklehXzAf4U96uvkCyJ nXMW8dJUmWeqHSyHWH4lsnf9VqswwvDTCxP4luXnVk9mVGPjoxT/qyRZF/rYm3mmx9kM boyc70DlVz6rbwOJkVrl9SkJ9h8cEdJyBPZDOXVNTuoa2IC1IJiIj+vONw4VsWLPJAr9 tLMg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1712128906; x=1712733706; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Jk3bunkUZB3eJdbTI0pWomxdZHb/buVMZM8Xz7Iwzes=; b=QO9nWbdgG5cNjctZ3ATlxpxVveNz4HqaoXT7e115gFutz33HFBcM7rsKhquibeLtg3 1tilT3555qAu4eupCMMDXfNPuytALtf/vs7qkmEbMi5Kp9EsGxO/34fT6bQ/VAKNTDu9 O9fjhW9DrRhk1kvx6PbSXInvr/vyWCMle3LQjVGqsdcrcpS07rqNBBAaFeBWLHEWJJq+ ZlRQUnAvo4bd0gOVauERqT+nDFkOQh/fSjJ2ONRgcMJnTWRhrLh7h3jprVSTME0e00hi 9U1+bJbNyq9gLFpFTS7yLFKkR2e3WvRAcnrgutrb6rur9xpfYzIl1k4Yq9zRYxWp65AO Vb5w== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCWsCligzHLA8m8fv3X26sw0iLJWlgl/Eqv0RhE9W04jeFJY3hG6bbfDg6lmRJbir+N2eGyhKDaS2lExVEPHaAw7JZ2NYzAXFaw0p190MoljhNX5B8U= X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Ywb5HeaLg3cUH0jxfl1FT3/4TcSHPbImGVpgO6KayFRHZbBtvRW YRwuuPvnYOauf+rXWWdShxJ7SvsXjpCAM4JrcHZh+zL58OP7epHYzomJ6mzPhgk= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IH5/K7tQY1uHWLJZh+1tYssQqr2S9wbeCqkTZZCK7bTiTKetkOQk2HJl5RIALY+t9C8rhC8Yg== X-Received: by 2002:a2e:6a14:0:b0:2d6:8e88:5a6c with SMTP id f20-20020a2e6a14000000b002d68e885a6cmr9957510ljc.49.1712128906016; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id p6-20020a05600c468600b0041477f3f99fsm23581891wmo.30.2024.04.03.00.21.44 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:45 -0700 (PDT) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v8 3/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:19 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-4-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002148_844670_969F68D1 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 31.08 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP. Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel). The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce. The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique or OTP key. The DCP trusted key blob format is: /* * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. * * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. * * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. */ struct dcp_blob_fmt { __u8 fmt_version; __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __le32 payload_len; __u8 payload[]; } __packed; By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as well via the use_otp_key module parameter. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- include/keys/trusted_dcp.h | 11 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 8 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 313 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 339 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9aaa42075b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H + +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 553dc117f385..1fb8aa001995 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP + bool "DCP-based trusted keys" + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + help + Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. + if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS comment "No trust source selected!" endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 735aa0bc08ef..f0f3b27f688b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o + +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index fee1ab2c734d..5113aeae5628 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)"); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam or dcp)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) + { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..16c44aafeab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 + +/** + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1. + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN. + */ +struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[]; +} __packed; + +static bool use_otp_key; +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing"); + +static bool skip_zk_test; +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed"); + +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len) +{ + return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN; +} + +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool do_encrypt) +{ + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + int res = 0; + + if (use_otp_key) + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP; + else + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + res = PTR_ERR(tfm); + tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key)); + if (res < 0) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128, + NULL); + + if (do_encrypt) + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + else + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); + +out: + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + + return res; +} + +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce, + bool do_encrypt) +{ + struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + int ret; + + aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(aead); + goto out; + } + + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; + } + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_aead; + } + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len); + if (do_encrypt) { + /* + * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag. + */ + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len); + } + + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, + NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_req; + } + + if (do_encrypt) + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + else + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + +free_req: + aead_request_free(aead_req); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(aead); +out: + return ret; +} + +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false); +} + +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true); +} + +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION; + get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + + ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key, + b->nonce, true); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len); + p->blob_len = blen; + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n", + b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len); + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen != p->blob_len) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen, + p->blob_len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN, + b->blob_key, b->nonce, false); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + +static int test_for_zero_key(void) +{ + /* + * Encrypting a plaintext of all 0x55 bytes will yield + * this ciphertext in case the DCP test key is used. + */ + static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f}; + void *buf = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (skip_zk_test) + goto out; + + buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + pr_warn("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (use_otp_key) + pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n"); + + ret = test_for_zero_key(); + if (ret) { + pr_warn("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret); + + return -EINVAL; + } + + return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = { + .exit = trusted_dcp_exit, + .init = trusted_dcp_init, + .seal = trusted_dcp_seal, + .unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal, + .migratable = 0, +}; From patchwork Wed Apr 3 07:21:20 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 4/6] MAINTAINERS: add entry for DCP-based trusted keys Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:20 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-5-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002150_324271_7EEEB9C4 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 10.75 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org This covers trusted keys backed by NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) chip found in smaller i.MX SoCs. Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- MAINTAINERS | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 976a5cea1577..ca7f42ca9338 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12019,6 +12019,15 @@ S: Maintained F: include/keys/trusted_caam.h F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP +M: David Gstir +R: sigma star Kernel Team +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: include/keys/trusted_dcp.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE M: Sumit Garg L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From patchwork Wed Apr 3 07:21:21 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13615068 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6631FCD1288 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2024 07:22:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=8QD+iC9CwIXl7xYTcigMww0IalUSYdKhny16OTRvG6M=; b=PgxfaL8IylQavu NtBQlgF+l7USJdwypigMuxKhZQYOQBYqHPM6YhR5Jijtzq4HDPq++z0zrEWsPBp1cjIQYp1YaeKt4 JPDCnp0kUiqg2U+Dq50VxrB0aAEgIxsAM2cNrETviOq7d6ET8n+X+8+yHHi4GzDUWwnLBh+/SEbJ0 rvUGM/QUKt4Fp5togUfDOrOVovlgn9btKz1z80eNo9SRKSEVddpAA1OQAfzozL/d1zgifRmphbtaI chnX1Ghb5GLde2QqkdHIyy0EhxMKdjjv0yuwN+GomLrgnrje/60I13D9M9/eoo1dMgFUPt2brELjL fwjO/L811rdMfPPhlLmA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwW-0000000ETIx-2Idh; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:21:56 +0000 Received: from mail-wm1-x331.google.com ([2a00:1450:4864:20::331]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwR-0000000ETE5-1hfU for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:21:53 +0000 Received: by mail-wm1-x331.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-41624d2fe53so467055e9.1 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1712128910; x=1712733710; darn=lists.infradead.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=qXAm+jrLSudJosqOThMSAUphAoCkUssK7J5hWO/tUg8=; b=apiBDRpE2zg3U7aTTmyOEkvwnkLnqzl1mTnwSdB33bgYvlwPqhNnqcEPm0+eH8ySGU FEff0wzyAZ0+lCdKiBTX9F/b/fz5xu9HkImwQW5Ze8fVIJEpF0y6UQjxNh7uL9/qxzkC 5Bj6iZcgM65CdUs3Y3lNhJ0l5B3jQU5ZSALHnOsvyA/E5Arw95cAEjuPMn7x/Q48pDiK QzWowHOYdsO+QcWWalS8mwftcr73LJRKmQLjlExWaj+oMIQly/fS1p9eCYhOYehiojp8 K+FOWh4Yl5Q2KkK9f0Th+KTL4MthKo+6yd9G6TJa0s9iSEKtXhzl0Oa0YevNDITD337b h1JQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1712128910; x=1712733710; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=qXAm+jrLSudJosqOThMSAUphAoCkUssK7J5hWO/tUg8=; b=PstbZ0/XEROMEvbiWHP59eXVjD6+Vq411TojWR5sHEwUYBJdyLAgMT4lSMnmn02/H2 Vvfh21ARDXMOG1GR8kdRZ4G5DQ4OUPUW2v/7mcCti/wbzNGwyQm0jwWTSezlalJk/OYm EVvMAbXn33xFC+8Gdy2ZAuzQMQumpZmK+HuLNqYCmdbva5wPNx0NDGAjhVyBaGXkKw8B pwYcx+iZuMFDyVa5pjkR7Wua2vISauDB5p41YkdYTJs7aYwGJhYWWzlYZQ2hh8KoSHiM yx7urDl3CbARGXI4ITL9HlAFVSrDUb+lniv2dJeVRt2knjvJhtvKFK022en33OWhOsJZ uyog== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCX0MB4f/kHDYkbmAhQMUvPehr6UtyPxZpE+I+76/IBtvSVREebyYDC2DWEuvnJ0LmQp+dns5FD9UcY7/coUH/0Yia+4lED/lXAWnA3FpJjidz1tGAk= X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzjOGD5xpQQ9c5yuIUIa6SUunBHXdHdy6RJg3At3JOhoBcU06XF I0M9h6MqGtAazZAg5L5D2IJf7uOwEaaHGPDa8eO3CU78r6sAWRm3AId3ktdH3RI= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHMXJyB4E69/ab6cpDC6ve2WzDG37buI/9MLXEGacy21VN01NO4piAk3DTCP7MyWInRIdzfrA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:1c14:b0:416:24a1:4313 with SMTP id j20-20020a05600c1c1400b0041624a14313mr358429wms.19.1712128910048; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id m6-20020a05600c4f4600b004147db8a91asm23762409wmq.40.2024.04.03.00.21.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:49 -0700 (PDT) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v8 5/6] docs: document DCP-backed trusted keys kernel params Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:21 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-6-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002151_696503_FF616E8D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 15.90 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Document the kernel parameters trusted.dcp_use_otp_key and trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test for DCP-backed trusted keys. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 24c02c704049..3a59abf06039 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6698,6 +6698,7 @@ - "tpm" - "tee" - "caam" + - "dcp" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized @@ -6713,6 +6714,18 @@ If not specified, "default" is used. In this case, the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source. + trusted.dcp_use_otp_key + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will select the DCP OTP key + instead of the DCP UNIQUE key blob encryption. + + trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will disable the check if the + blob key is all zeros. This is helpful for situations where + having this key zero'ed is acceptable. E.g. in testing + scenarios. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this From patchwork Wed Apr 3 07:21:22 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13615072 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CF3DECD1288 for ; Wed, 3 Apr 2024 07:22:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=bjCiy8/FcjPxqJxr7QU62elir8KPIMR/1B+XdqQL9yM=; b=qy6cCvJWZSRpQi 9fqz1Sbgy6mGwO/VFZkyMJx6NekiWK43seJaU3H9ee2sAL6DGakGCkpW7Yp7GOT0npacbmb/i7TLR O23AdftCIOHMER4hUEt6iZ0cBTn414iELsT9sVe3iDXFcTLUaqYs9Vc/swDAMU0GCBtR4rlGW3uu+ L+TUDFIpCycUupI2fpwQUtMi9nAsfKKiPU58Ub0N2eIXdUd0nhcLJ7omekW1OYTsQzcfsQSXO4I97 GvfZnUb3RLCFH/XwUSeCSvgMmlAnB/C7q5Vn83b1SnUzhOcjQVBy0Oe9c/xu3cHfJt7SrMPyYkYDn c7wSRWzjnZ/mPapytiqw==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwx-0000000ETal-0CLu; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:22:23 +0000 Received: from mail-wm1-x334.google.com ([2a00:1450:4864:20::334]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1rruwe-0000000ETFn-36TG for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 07:22:14 +0000 Received: by mail-wm1-x334.google.com with SMTP id 5b1f17b1804b1-41624c40b44so897765e9.0 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1712128912; x=1712733712; darn=lists.infradead.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=ht1KLnNvKBCCICp+Y6JpKOSNrIWAe17k5/lz/+k/t0k=; b=C0eChBDzNFIuwdMoxFZw218rW+7Sg9GRjnYNuvCz/w5m+BUQ6SFU9u36HpfXjiHZrD 6jNkO7F/u6JLs8PB5Xm4KC23LrMMJg5cq4se2oZ5yhoCYuJ5HD7XHbKjVihHfOUWU12W b0F6orpnO8SS9gRFFkIdjP6o6GQV/Dtd1LG5LmNy9S6KNl6FVY757WhsXdlDtVOh480x HTpZ+mzewz0+WP2AK9WVs/RK/z/Wg+wVnXe9H28uDrhwihrPPbNQ2u3HnT/fN2fGk2Py ZJQKhA/b4B/FCviDZOWym7kCcZbbPJG62iIv7fa7WJRw5Ajti5zlKa6AfOENz+b1Mj8F D1Lw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1712128912; x=1712733712; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=ht1KLnNvKBCCICp+Y6JpKOSNrIWAe17k5/lz/+k/t0k=; b=WU09OJT4sOLlv3kdvPldI7XJOKj8aq5w0YvPC2RAtbmvFxO0n5YkCJJxROXZyuM5tQ mTH/1Djk+HkCnBRXequ+WBfHk69vsDeCiPTDBx1Y6cEsNYsStWErEpsnBvI5uvpRRBgW CofivDjiP42yvUBSMoobkcFpNKLkUb8zo5Dpx9AaKMS9RqSOilwmiIuxUE5FXkH1wlMv oe3okjvW8Pvpon9tcDFCqYRf2MOiNDUK+zkouK09OHTZz8fna5F/JNd5z5AYCx8IzuXh hIKGTet70A9+BSahBcmScMCyiWW6TofEVbdtaxtk0HuyFW5gfqZwSCWQfeDl2vws2GLh q8iw== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCXO+446k6SI5u4ksVMq+50tidCIZibVEZbhZ17o09Q9w1aXAeyDPqBPHAba7dwmAQnUZw5o+yX/tEfyA6vhtHllKnGPBT7tMZTFcHIfLGHCEKOEMrc= X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzHr1WD3yjWxAjiBBtJe66EQ1aWAwzOLuyLjJY2lu9UkyWSvqfn SGViA/xU367rkvI5VbGpLmvMWqNGgaHzu+XQarS6/Cd0RhXIllBN/dzmmgWL/W8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHxnLJChRG6eyzjNgzPrS0ONsTJ00ZbGMzOG5HnqpNOaErE7IvWFJCS+7/AvipAmrK+4XCdlA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:2d06:b0:413:e19:337f with SMTP id x6-20020a05600c2d0600b004130e19337fmr3324441wmf.22.1712128912023; Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id f11-20020a05600c4e8b00b004154e48bcdesm17187826wmq.14.2024.04.03.00.21.50 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Apr 2024 00:21:51 -0700 (PDT) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v8 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 09:21:22 +0200 Message-ID: <20240403072131.54935-7-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240403072131.54935-1-david@sigma-star.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240403_002205_675833_3042E302 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.24 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 19 +++++++ 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index e989b9802f92..f4d7e162d5e4 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + (4) DCP + + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs for platform integrity. + (4) DCP + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for + platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. Interface is specific to silicon vendor. + (4) DCP + + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. + * Threat model The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device is probed. + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled + to back the kernel RNG. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: DCP +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- @@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length. privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed string length. + +DCP Blob Format +--------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + :doc: dcp blob format + +.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + :identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c index 16c44aafeab3..b5f81a05be36 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -19,6 +19,25 @@ #define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 #define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 +/** + * DOC: dcp blob format + * + * The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its + * AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. + * To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define + * our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing + * key stored in the key blob. + * + * Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit + * blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to + * encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. + * + * The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES + * encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, + * BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together + * with a version number, payload length and authentication tag. + */ + /** * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. *