From patchwork Wed May 22 00:52:39 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13669848 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E017E568A; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339187; cv=none; b=D0RrOt+ad8jDWKu1nomeeJ0tT7MxF9VgTKofykjcTBByGeGbM+OJ1ilOYC9QYJYnje2uLi/hod9tJkb4mGIu8+txwD2vB2besIFtJTM4ixHIA1u0V2qzPP0lWmQM/GDrs8eYE03uACnxbcvlXV1vAhbGKPhe0vPsNna5MHSJ7tI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339187; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rQTPLrmfpCPpQ7Zz53PlLkcw1m7mUahOVVqZUGpxmKU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=B9zpbc95CuyEHQBqH1lXOHciTfbzZnDusRI+mY6QXCh8imw3IFf/itzRvFvb3s/dDoW+EWFuqWCA+hvqpvDDseHqToR6tiOquBhBdsTBtQMFEeI/iYbyU6wVvczYBfshJN82zGuNj7FH9ghDytlJD7iQtfyVC4CxnUQBpPr5A8o= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=fjjT/6ah; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="fjjT/6ah" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1B8E0C32786; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716339186; bh=rQTPLrmfpCPpQ7Zz53PlLkcw1m7mUahOVVqZUGpxmKU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fjjT/6ahpTP6a+Bs8wKUPMZRh4rOFZoK7T2tHX/Rfe16aMb7kTHzRg4fSW7u1RX8t AjLeDgLuB8djDKF0i4zTtoSsbQdiz/NbsZlVU+kbdSZdJBJXCsNljVg/VVQgtmePaO H6yuAWrKQmvbjj3BVx3YQH+sdXydeiA9wpxV5de8cwwBmVATsnoiBcneVd7gNrGNaQ CmZp8pKGk1AQSZ8a0Z65eQSzL7AT3+xyIgf2g8t/vlY0ZzYW8likNa0Tp/DF0Zg8Kr /5MjXvuVIeWUBsUTKMp3GoBeVVx9R4wrbyIoJLd2NP7Ew0amfDCJYs/ypuiVrMQQRF yCh1AySogOxOQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org (open list:CRYPTO API), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v4 1/5] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: export rsa1_asn_lookup() Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 03:52:39 +0300 Message-ID: <20240522005252.17841-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 ASN.1 template is required for TPM2 asymmetric keys, as it needs to be piggy-packed with the input data before applying TPM2_RSA_Decrypt. This patch prepares crypto subsystem for the addition of those keys. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 16 ++++++++++------ include/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index cd501195f34a..00b6c14f861c 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -79,11 +80,7 @@ static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha3_512[] = { 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 }; -static const struct rsa_asn1_template { - const char *name; - const u8 *data; - size_t size; -} rsa_asn1_templates[] = { +static const struct rsa_asn1_template rsa_asn1_templates[] = { #define _(X) { #X, rsa_digest_info_##X, sizeof(rsa_digest_info_##X) } _(md5), _(sha1), @@ -101,7 +98,13 @@ static const struct rsa_asn1_template { { NULL } }; -static const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name) +/** + * rsa_lookup_asn1() - Lookup the ASN.1 digest info given the hash + * name: hash algorithm name + * + * Returns the ASN.1 digest info on success, and NULL on failure. + */ +const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name) { const struct rsa_asn1_template *p; @@ -110,6 +113,7 @@ static const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name) return p; return NULL; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_lookup_asn1); struct pkcs1pad_ctx { struct crypto_akcipher *child; diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h b/include/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..32c7453ff644 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * RSA padding templates. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_RSA_PKCS1PAD_H +#define _CRYPTO_RSA_PKCS1PAD_H + +/* + * Hash algorithm name to ASN.1 template mapping. + */ +struct rsa_asn1_template { + const char *name; + const u8 *data; + size_t size; +}; + +const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_RSA_PKCS1PAD_H */ From patchwork Wed May 22 00:52:40 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13669849 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3F9CDDDBD; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339191; cv=none; b=YVV37vRR1xlERXgLsKpf/eybADxQeIp9wbaPO9XKZEujypHpfHRDI+QYtxLfaMc3h6SOO0MvKWv9SWhkR5EVj6M/l/RLzD02S/9Yoh2HEL5utN+/UljQzpwq55+oML2hz4BT7Aj2ImGLVvUxmxhOuUQYXigWvBlnvmNtk5JTERY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339191; c=relaxed/simple; bh=h8orBF4zzRfW1mNSKt+5IoMKfbFfiHan4PWjJTDQxIE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=LaXTgtbjGGc8Im5H4PJXJGxHoRrOg1zIF8iPbKsXoIRoxWY1uhn3zubNXl8+kmC+bp2qtzZCm1rSXOwvrbXF8BNdTmohQvEJNs2PE1+BzphyUqQvRwB1j4cbUdxO98diRxBfZ2adQlGJv/i3TumDxlnh+MvbMNoEcsg6C+wEgsw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=jvjiXq3w; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="jvjiXq3w" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 671E5C32786; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716339190; bh=h8orBF4zzRfW1mNSKt+5IoMKfbFfiHan4PWjJTDQxIE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jvjiXq3wwfpzOG8HbOVG43V3jWYQ3L7M9WOAz1QtWgCqZFj1HawzEuVZsGM40z/r5 32qNBPMnk58nZZCk7Fv2lKDLQLtZNXIyKNL7ErtE69fYBgsLf4P+J+MxfP91CESdfK H/PLRgxH2y0IN1Pb9ANisnBOla5PlXG6B3PiRTib1HwXniB1mAZvDnXBHVBeBJwqhM qD5CLzAy0dE6Y/YhZ1hrwyfynLToeikMNW1aARah1tFMxLencZR35+qQuCQRMsph6O u+RuKIQNvTkrNPpnpoVPRbScwcLntRB3zbVXVXSYbXPKaUu+zGSBuUjZ+vUyUkO4HZ t59L+V1vvuFAw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org (open list:CRYPTO API), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v4 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 03:52:40 +0300 Message-ID: <20240522005252.17841-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Report -E2BIG instead of -EINVAL when too large size for the key blob is requested. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 8b7dd73d94c1..06c8fa7b21ae 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return ret; if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; + return -E2BIG; blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); if (!blob) From patchwork Wed May 22 00:52:41 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13669850 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8193414F98; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:17 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339197; cv=none; b=Z01YjE1Avq12SMpsdiG3jcwE9zBtj2+A1j1U9YHjJB0tq8bucFFJu1m0TXrWW7+Q290ocAlkx1XPyRlcjh+iJ6tBoThEuvEgEyAWZizTJ7nUJhLemo3XkaWsY4+R/ym3AsrwY22zK0dJurBWS++0hfhgx9xNB/M8TUIZmYkfikY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339197; c=relaxed/simple; bh=pBB3Sk01ka/1DuHzGrS4YT/uIEGVMzIueTX+A0Oz4io=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Scxlet+1L/imcAQSl2K/oc0KIFmv+hLVriWQUhk0g4SHvDE4JhsZdY7vvSrBph76ITj3ajATPH0joru5p9IdWXvIRYKPupjpPZ8YgarWAm2PlAz99frcsoZ2ugBxjyqZawVlI0R5ROi8gV4CGpqz80tN9u0+xbxVW4eyb+xNw/o= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=if7yVY/l; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="if7yVY/l" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 95E4CC2BD11; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716339197; bh=pBB3Sk01ka/1DuHzGrS4YT/uIEGVMzIueTX+A0Oz4io=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=if7yVY/l7Z3HucBdJkD5b1wp634ug0LZr9ohL1t+WWJ1cYzSO1NRr8w039+wPhb0a se2qf3Wbg8atRS0Ke3rQbPQxlOkpyV/PE6xyG3+cyB/FCcv5SdfJAui1AayPQG2bMs TXs0+mRvIvZaYxlPu1aHOpu7q828LucxB8YNulaFZeUX1qDm8je6n8tN3Bc2qazr/C PbJOVouz8pImyC7OeDnesYS+BU/HSFOUWkKK5f5obAinvdVvvTJ5nPVgzHqTKHlJQm KnzWgw44b0MrtVrZB85uyRomrNssvpzoo6/FqDEoIpHD97BANjomIcyfD2HRQAKqkw fi/rVXxc3nY/A== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org (open list:CRYPTO API), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v4 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Move tpm2_key_decode() to the TPM driver Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 03:52:41 +0300 Message-ID: <20240522005252.17841-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Move tpm2_key_decode() to the TPM driver and export the symbols to make them callable from trusted keys. It can re-used for asymmetric keys. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: Do not allocate blob twice. Use the one inside struct tpm2_key. --- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 5 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c | 111 +++++++++++++++ .../char/tpm}/tpm2key.asn1 | 0 include/crypto/tpm2_key.h | 33 +++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 - security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 127 +++--------------- 7 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c rename {security/keys/trusted-keys => drivers/char/tpm}/tpm2key.asn1 (100%) create mode 100644 include/crypto/tpm2_key.h diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index e63a6a17793c..de2f4093c939 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM tristate "TPM Hardware Support" depends on HAS_IOMEM imply SECURITYFS + select ASN1 select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO help diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..071437058ef6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +# TPM2 Asymmetric Key +$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h +tpm-y += tpm2key.asn1.o +tpm-y += tpm2_key.o + tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7662b2cb85bf --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tpm2_key: "fmt + +int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * tpm_key_decode() - Decode TPM2 ASN.1 key. + * @src: ASN.1 source. + * @src_len: ASN.1 source length. + * @key: TPM2 asymmetric key. + * @max_key_len: Cap the maximum length for the blob allocation. + * + * Decodes TPM2 ASN.1 key on success. Returns POSIX error code on failure. + */ +int tpm2_key_decode(const u8 *src, u32 src_len, struct tpm2_key *key, + u32 max_key_len) +{ + struct tpm2_key ctx; + u32 blob_len; + int ret; + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, src, src_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + blob_len = ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len; + if (blob_len > max_key_len) + return -E2BIG; + + ctx.blob_len = blob_len; + ctx.blob = kmalloc(blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx.blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy((void *)ctx.blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + memcpy((void *)ctx.blob + ctx.priv_len, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + ctx.priv = ctx.blob; + ctx.pub = ctx.blob + ctx.priv_len; + + memcpy(key, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_key_decode); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2key.asn1 similarity index 100% rename from security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 rename to drivers/char/tpm/tpm2key.asn1 diff --git a/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..acf41b2e0c92 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ +#define __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ + +#include + +/* + * TPM2 ASN.1 key + */ +struct tpm2_key { + u32 parent; + const u8 *blob; + u32 blob_len; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +int tpm2_key_decode(const u8 *src, u32 src_len, struct tpm2_key *key, + u32 max_key_len); + +/** + * tpm2_key_free() - Release TPM2 asymmetric key resources and reset values + * @key: TPM2 asymmetric key. + */ +static inline void tpm2_key_destroy(struct tpm2_key *key) +{ + kfree(key->blob); + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); +} + +#endif /* __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ */ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index f0f3b27f688b..2674d5c10fc9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o -$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o -trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 06c8fa7b21ae..7e6eaec8b0bc 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -13,11 +13,10 @@ #include #include +#include #include -#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" - static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -28,9 +27,9 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 }; -static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u8 *src, u32 len) +static int tpm2_trusted_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) { const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -98,106 +97,6 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return ret; } -struct tpm2_key_context { - u32 parent; - const u8 *pub; - u32 pub_len; - const u8 *priv; - u32 priv_len; -}; - -static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u8 **buf) -{ - int ret; - struct tpm2_key_context ctx; - u8 *blob; - - memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - - ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, - payload->blob_len); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) - return -E2BIG; - - blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!blob) - return -ENOMEM; - - *buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; - - memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); - blob += ctx.priv_len; - - memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); - - return 0; -} - -int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) -{ - struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; - const u8 *v = value; - int i; - - ctx->parent = 0; - for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { - ctx->parent <<= 8; - ctx->parent |= v[i]; - } - - return 0; -} - -int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) -{ - enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); - - if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { - char buffer[50]; - - sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); - pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", - buffer); - return -EINVAL; - } - - return 0; -} - -int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) -{ - struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; - - ctx->pub = value; - ctx->pub_len = vlen; - - return 0; -} - -int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, - unsigned char tag, - const void *value, size_t vlen) -{ - struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; - - ctx->priv = value; - ctx->priv_len = vlen; - - return 0; -} - /** * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -347,7 +246,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len); + blob_len = tpm2_trusted_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&sized); @@ -387,21 +287,27 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 *blob_handle) { - struct tpm_buf buf; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob, *pub; + struct tpm2_key key; + struct tpm_buf buf; + const u8 *blob, *pub; int rc; u32 attrs; - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload->blob, payload->blob_len, &key, PAGE_SIZE); if (rc) { /* old form */ blob = payload->blob; payload->old_format = 1; + } else { + blob = key.blob; } + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; @@ -465,7 +371,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, out: if (blob != payload->blob) - kfree(blob); + tpm2_key_destroy(&key); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Wed May 22 00:52:42 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13669851 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C6D519470; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339201; cv=none; b=RJHjqb9e26lvx49/Japi5t3x2mh1xtSLnrA6WYXswizFJfTehgqL7PjS68LkBlPSMz917M9///ClR+NcnfhLnoTQ41nUkIMqGfNVlCVOmXqpL0+fQwJqzPQmTpN97GCTSN6Gy6oO+VguuNso4hxe2nhA9/nkTJJ3UnP2s0Igsi0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339201; c=relaxed/simple; bh=1rnyBWgefbdvaOcJNmGJS6J3mOl1VZITDy0E+9wgNW8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=t1QcHSb3NadV4up1w1pSKMZQEE630Y+ztqdmXLC0O+LKfK6paKS6sGzDi9gQeIgNF2V+G/B8rh33mJEpbmNWKrio0W4sljhlo4sGpTJIoXPTGleXk1r5ClhOewuBJf7w34PpcA+egP3ENz9MpQ12wQmYrKHsBHJeztIWd3zQ8iE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=kIeRUCp5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="kIeRUCp5" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C1BE3C32789; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716339201; bh=1rnyBWgefbdvaOcJNmGJS6J3mOl1VZITDy0E+9wgNW8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=kIeRUCp5hQu2g+vF/EHPTOeBUZ0OXk2yi0Mi4LiZnmC0wVp16jIJWdu/Fz5LqeS5L B9xgVHIVJDVnYkxUKZyUuVGkwSvbGap7GKRhdDGVlaHHYQw8PyCVrb3Ve8jxx5tdSV rmCumNvfYiziZaIHNSSwfsOqXJ1w8R+AIKqiLW0Qnb5vpMCOi1qK9Xc07RSupCQN7l 7FJmsObUMFcyV4hJdEcL1svdDnlbKCX+8Wgz8ZNhAgMjHWeSQ3P1p12fgy3Po5/7gj CjMzCiwZToQV5CVSuU1bxoU0iErAqcz2HkuNRaFH+9dg4Z0naWeUeLGmE5zZOPXgKu wrUTJ8g01eB6Q== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org (open list:CRYPTO API), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v4 4/5] tpm: tpm2_key: Extend parser to TPM_LoadableKey Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 03:52:42 +0300 Message-ID: <20240522005252.17841-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Extend parser to TPM_LoadableKey. Add field for oid to struct tpm2_key so that callers can differentiate different key types. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v3: * Fixup klog messages: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/SN7PR18MB53140F4341BC441C1C11586EE3EA2@SN7PR18MB5314.namprd18.prod.outlook.com/ --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- include/crypto/tpm2_key.h | 2 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c index 7662b2cb85bf..b5c07288eff5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c @@ -32,16 +32,23 @@ int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); - - if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + struct tpm2_key *key = context; + + switch (oid) { + case OID_TPMSealedData: + pr_debug("TPMSealedData\n"); + break; + case OID_TPMLoadableKey: + pr_debug("TPMLodableKey\n"); + break; + default: char buffer[50]; - sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); - pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", - buffer); + pr_debug("Unknown OID \"%s\"\n", buffer); return -EINVAL; } + key->oid = oid; return 0; } diff --git a/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h index acf41b2e0c92..2d2434233000 100644 --- a/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h @@ -2,12 +2,14 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ #define __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ +#include #include /* * TPM2 ASN.1 key */ struct tpm2_key { + enum OID oid; u32 parent; const u8 *blob; u32 blob_len; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 7e6eaec8b0bc..06a09c399334 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -303,6 +303,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, payload->old_format = 1; } else { blob = key.blob; + if (key.oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + tpm2_key_destroy(&key); + return -EINVAL; + } } if (!blob) From patchwork Wed May 22 00:52:43 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13669852 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A50A71CD16; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339209; cv=none; b=Zh5+ECTDdIVbvZ7sXuZRZ5sNndIj4y38yQeXztQIZfCx6qjf/7jmqYzpjK93yp0k/ctxs4Ygt8aXL07M2zpHZQJTvFejSeibZU2wtDhutPcrwo9DrlCU+HydYNIAyytj8C9B4uEEzzWhHDSSJopWl6RdTbauMKfHrVQyLMsfkE4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716339209; c=relaxed/simple; bh=b/nH9MqgmbCQ+VpUd2BSe5KKpDBI/e3Eh+GRMbNBPB0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=hoAbuLCePbLUU96gvTv3KtV7KWxHp/HoobTW5o9L7JPgOliUKhML4RA8xjjwDUxA48aT0GdpK8x1SLNqhSe5yXe+sLx/dO9BuDzb5LP1EvPPMRt7LNEMGu76l+kibP4iQjl3UqRIk2LHBDDHv4Jo1b+BlDhQ7HiDx6w4BXsV/2M= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=HoS6gskJ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="HoS6gskJ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DCAF4C2BD11; Wed, 22 May 2024 00:53:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716339209; bh=b/nH9MqgmbCQ+VpUd2BSe5KKpDBI/e3Eh+GRMbNBPB0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=HoS6gskJrFiDuxBkhVUxR8tPpSshirAMuD61nJ57rqA/jVmpLGabzdWcLJTtWTy/v k2pYXCsKnYiTgbtApVRhcJSAlphuv7LSxJDqcNsGtc3fj89ucQudWD1yk7JssJDjQv bCDuFPKfcdXDAFkgeru5RDyHK7CvVgUYujOaNmVCf1B7681kimE88F+hTHMHlA2WtW +GCq7Ky1gt6rai6i733nXPVJNqH1kQYfiZt5/WXjAkipUXdwd+Vy5fbXxElr8ZkrEg OYqDs0Q9wOsx0q2OMOUOJbj0xG3vN/SV1nDxQttd0pjocTSMTzbJcvvBG01566Z1zl qSEB/uIpaa1Lw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org (open list:CRYPTO API), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), David Howells , James Bottomley , Stefan Berger , Ard Biesheuvel , Mario Limonciello Subject: [PATCH v4 5/5] keys: asymmetric: ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 03:52:43 +0300 Message-ID: <20240522005252.17841-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240522005252.17841-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: James Prestwood Based on earlier work by James Prestwood. Add ASN.1 compatible asymmetric TPM2 RSA key subtype: 1. Signing and decryption (with the private key) is handled by TPM2_RSA_Decrypt. 2. Encryption (with the public key) is handled by the kernel RSA implementation. Signed-off-by: James Prestwood Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v4: * Just put the values to the buffer instead of encoding them. * Adjust buffer sizes. * Make tpm2_rsa_key_encode() not to allocate from heap and simplify the serialization. v3: * Drop the special case for null handle i.e. do not define policy. * Remove extra empty line. v2: * Remove two spurios pr_info() messsages that I forgot to remove. * Clean up padding functions and add additional checks for length also in tpm2_unpad_pcks1(). * Add the missing success check kzalloc() in tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(). * Check that params->out_len for capacity before copying the result. --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 15 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c | 670 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 688 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index e1345b8f39f1..71448c2f0a8f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE select MPILIB select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_RSA select CRYPTO_SIG select CRYPTO_HASH help @@ -23,6 +24,20 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available. ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. +config ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE + tristate "Asymmetric TPM2 RSA crypto algorithm subtype" + depends on TCG_TPM + select TCG_TPM2_HMAC + select CRYPTO_RSA + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1 + help + This option provides support for asymmetric TPM2 key type handling. + If signature generation and/or verification are to be used, + appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-256) must be available. + ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable. + config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER tristate "X.509 certificate parser" depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index bc65d3b98dcb..c6da84607824 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := \ signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE) += tpm2_key_rsa.o # # X.509 Certificate handling diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f611da3b92d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,670 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* TPM2 asymmetric public-key crypto subtype + * + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst + * + * Copyright (c) 2020 Intel Corporation + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tpm2_key_rsa: "fmt + +/* 4096 bits */ +#define TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_SIZE 512 +#define TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_ENC_SIZE (TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_SIZE + 16) +/* 4x 4096bits */ +#define TPM2_KEY_RSA_BUFFER_SIZE (TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_SIZE * 4) + +#define PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE 11 + +struct tpm2_key_rsa { + struct tpm2_key key; + const u8 *pub; + int pub_len; +}; + +/* + * Fill the data with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. + */ +static int tpm2_pad_pkcs1(const u8 *in, int in_len, u8 *out, int out_len) +{ + unsigned int prefix_len = out_len - in_len - 3; + + if (in_len > out_len - PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* prefix */ + out[0] = 0; + out[1] = 1; + memset(&out[2], 0xff, prefix_len); + out[2 + prefix_len] = 0; + /* payload */ + memcpy(&out[2 + prefix_len + 1], in, in_len); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * RFC 3447 - Section 7.2.2 + * Size of the input data should be checked against public key size by + * the caller. + */ +static const u8 *tpm2_unpad_pkcs1(const u8 *in, int in_len, int *out_len) +{ + int i; + + if (in[0] != 0 || in[1] != 2) + return NULL; + + i = 2; + while (in[i] != 0 && i < in_len) + i++; + + if (i == in_len || i < (PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE - 1)) + return NULL; + + *out_len = in_len - i - 1; + return in + i + 1; +} + +/* + * Outputs the cipher algorithm name on success, and retuns -ENOPKG + * on failure. + */ +static int tpm2_key_get_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, + char *cipher) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { + if (!hash_algo) { + strcpy(cipher, "pkcs1pad(rsa)"); + return 0; + } + + ret = snprintf(cipher, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)", + hash_algo); + if (ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + return -ENOPKG; + + return 0; + } + + if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0) { + strcpy(cipher, "rsa"); + return 0; + } + + return -ENOPKG; +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_extract_pub(struct tpm2_key_rsa *key_rsa) +{ + struct tpm2_key *key = &key_rsa->key; + struct tpm_buf buf; + off_t offset = 2; + u16 policy_len; + u32 attr; + u16 bits; + u16 type; + u16 len; + u16 alg; + u32 exp; + + buf.flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B; + buf.length = key->pub_len; + buf.data = (void *)key->pub; + + if (get_unaligned_be16(key->pub) != buf.length - 2) + return -EINVAL; + + type = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub type: 0x%04x\n", type); + if (type != TPM_ALG_RSA) + return -EINVAL; + + alg = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub name alg: 0x%04x\n", alg); + attr = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub attributes: 0x%08x\n", attr); + policy_len = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub policy length: %u bytes\n", policy_len); + offset += policy_len; + + alg = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub symmetric: 0x%04x\n", alg); + if (alg != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + alg = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub symmetric scheme: 0x%04x\n", alg); + if (alg != TPM_ALG_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + bits = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub bits: %u\n", bits); + + exp = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub exponent: 0x%08x\n", exp); + if (exp != 0x00000000 && exp != 0x00010001) + return -EINVAL; + + len = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + pr_debug("pub modulus: %u bytes\n", len); + key_rsa->pub = key->pub + offset; + key_rsa->pub_len = len; + + return buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR ? -EIO : 0; +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_encode(const struct tpm2_key_rsa *key, u8 *buf) +{ + int pub_len = key->pub_len; + const u8 *pub = key->pub; + u8 *start = &buf[4]; + u8 *work = &buf[4]; + u32 seq_len; + + work[0] = 0x02; /* INTEGER */ + work[1] = 0x82; /* u16 */ + work[2] = pub_len >> 8; + work[3] = pub_len & 0xff; + work = &work[4]; + memcpy(work, pub, pub_len); + work = &work[pub_len]; + work[0] = 0x02; /* INTEGER */ + work[1] = 3; /* < 128 */ + work[2] = 1; /* 65537 */ + work[3] = 0; + work[4] = 1; + work = &work[5]; + memset(work, 0, 8); + seq_len = work - start; + buf[0] = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE */ + buf[1] = 0x82; /* u16 */ + buf[2] = seq_len >> 8; + buf[3] = seq_len & 0xff; + + return seq_len + 4; +} + +/* + * Encryption operation is performed with the public key. Hence it is done + * in software + */ +static int tpm2_key_rsa_encrypt(struct tpm2_key_rsa *key, + struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out) +{ + u8 enc_pub_key[TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_ENC_SIZE]; + char cipher[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg; + struct akcipher_request *req; + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; + struct crypto_wait cwait; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo, cipher); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(cipher, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + rc = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(key, enc_pub_key); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + rc = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, enc_pub_key, rc); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err_tfm; + } + + sg_init_one(&in_sg, in, params->in_len); + sg_init_one(&out_sg, out, params->out_len); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &in_sg, &out_sg, params->in_len, + params->out_len); + + crypto_init_wait(&cwait); + akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &cwait); + + rc = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req); + rc = crypto_wait_req(rc, &cwait); + if (!rc) + rc = req->dst_len; + + akcipher_request_free(req); + +err_tfm: + crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); + + return rc; +} + +static int __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_key_rsa *key, + struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, int in_len, void *out) +{ + unsigned int offset = 0; + u32 key_handle = 0; + struct tpm_buf buf; + u16 decrypted_len; + u32 parent; + u8 *pos; + int ret; + + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); + if (ret) + goto err_ops; + + parent = key->key.parent; + + ret = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_auth; + + tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, parent, NULL); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION | + TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, key->key.blob, key->key.blob_len); + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + ret = -E2BIG; + goto err_buf; + } + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "RSA key loading"); + ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret); + if (ret) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err_buf; + } + key_handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + + tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_RSA_DECRYPT); + tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, key_handle, NULL); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, in_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, in, in_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "RSA key decrypting"); + ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret); + if (ret) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err_blob; + } + + pos = buf.data + TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4; + decrypted_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)pos); + pos += 2; + + if (params->out_len < decrypted_len) { + ret = -EMSGSIZE; + goto err_blob; + } + + memcpy(out, pos, decrypted_len); + ret = decrypted_len; + +err_blob: + tpm2_flush_context(chip, key_handle); + +err_buf: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + +err_auth: + if (ret < 0) + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + +err_ops: + tpm_put_ops(chip); + return ret; +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_key_rsa *key, + struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out) +{ + const u8 *ptr; + int out_len; + u8 *work; + int ret; + + work = kzalloc(params->out_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!work) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, in, params->in_len, + work); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + ptr = tpm2_unpad_pkcs1(work, ret, &out_len); + if (!ptr) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + if (out_len > params->out_len) { + ret = -EMSGSIZE; + goto err; + } + + memcpy(out, ptr, out_len); + kfree(work); + return out_len; + +err: + kfree(work); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Sign operation is an encryption using the TPM's private key. With RSA the + * only difference between encryption and decryption is where the padding goes. + * Since own padding can be used, TPM2_RSA_Decrypt can be repurposed to do + * encryption. + */ +static int tpm2_key_rsa_sign(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_key_rsa *key, + struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out) +{ + const struct rsa_asn1_template *asn1; + u32 in_len = params->in_len; + void *asn1_wrapped = NULL; + int pub_len = key->pub_len; + u8 *padded; + int ret; + + if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") != 0) { + ret = -ENOPKG; + goto err; + } + + if (params->hash_algo) { + asn1 = rsa_lookup_asn1(params->hash_algo); + if (!asn1) { + ret = -ENOPKG; + goto err; + } + + /* Request enough space for the ASN.1 template + input hash */ + asn1_wrapped = kzalloc(in_len + asn1->size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!asn1_wrapped) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + /* Copy ASN.1 template, then the input */ + memcpy(asn1_wrapped, asn1->data, asn1->size); + memcpy(asn1_wrapped + asn1->size, in, in_len); + + in = asn1_wrapped; + in_len += asn1->size; + } + + /* with padding: */ + padded = kmalloc(pub_len, GFP_KERNEL); + tpm2_pad_pkcs1(in, in_len, padded, pub_len); + ret = __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, padded, pub_len, out); + kfree(padded); + +err: + kfree(asn1_wrapped); + return ret; +} + +static void tpm2_key_rsa_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, + struct seq_file *m) +{ + struct tpm2_key_rsa *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + + if (!key) { + pr_err("key blob missing"); + return; + } + + seq_puts(m, "TPM2/RSA"); +} + +static void tpm2_key_rsa_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) +{ + struct tpm2_key *key = payload0; + + if (!key) + return; + + tpm2_key_destroy(key); + kfree(key); +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out) +{ + struct tpm2_key_rsa *key = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + struct tpm_chip *chip = tpm_default_chip(); + + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + switch (params->op) { + case kernel_pkey_encrypt: + return tpm2_key_rsa_encrypt(key, params, in, out); + case kernel_pkey_decrypt: + return tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, in, out); + case kernel_pkey_sign: + return tpm2_key_rsa_sign(chip, key, params, in, out); + default: + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_verify(const struct key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig) +{ + const struct tpm2_key_rsa *tpm2_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + u8 enc_pub_key[TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_ENC_SIZE]; + char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct akcipher_request *req; + struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; + struct crypto_wait cwait; + int rc; + + if (!sig->digest) + return -ENOPKG; + + rc = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + rc = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(tpm2_key, enc_pub_key); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + rc = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, enc_pub_key, rc); + if (rc < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto err_tfm; + + sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size); + crypto_init_wait(&cwait); + akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &cwait); + rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); + + akcipher_request_free(req); + +err_tfm: + crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); + return rc; +} + +static int tpm2_key_rsa_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + struct kernel_pkey_query *info) +{ + struct tpm2_key_rsa *tk = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + u8 enc_pub_key[TPM2_KEY_RSA_PUB_ENC_SIZE]; + char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; + unsigned int len; + int ret; + + ret = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo, alg_name); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + ret = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(tk, enc_pub_key); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, enc_pub_key, ret); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_tfm; + + len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); + + info->key_size = tk->pub_len * 8; + info->max_data_size = tk->pub_len; + info->max_sig_size = len; + info->max_enc_size = len; + info->max_dec_size = tk->pub_len; + + info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT | + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY | + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN; + +err_tfm: + crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Asymmetric TPM2 RSA key. Signs and decrypts with TPM. + */ +struct asymmetric_key_subtype tpm2_key_rsa_subtype = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .name = "tpm2_key_rsa", + .name_len = sizeof("tpm2_key_rsa") - 1, + .describe = tpm2_key_rsa_describe, + .destroy = tpm2_key_rsa_destroy, + .query = tpm2_key_rsa_query, + .eds_op = tpm2_key_rsa_eds_op, + .verify_signature = tpm2_key_rsa_verify, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_key_rsa_subtype); + +/* + * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as a TPM private key blob. + */ +static int tpm2_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct tpm2_key_rsa *key; + int ret; + + key = kzalloc(sizeof(*key), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!key) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (prep->datalen > TPM2_KEY_RSA_BUFFER_SIZE) { + kfree(key); + return -EMSGSIZE; + } + + ret = tpm2_key_decode(prep->data, prep->datalen, &key->key, + TPM2_KEY_RSA_BUFFER_SIZE); + if (ret) { + kfree(key); + return ret; + } + + if (key->key.oid != OID_TPMLoadableKey) { + tpm2_key_destroy(&key->key); + kfree(key); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ret = tpm2_key_rsa_extract_pub(key); + if (ret < 0) { + tpm2_key_destroy(&key->key); + kfree(key); + return ret; + } + + prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &tpm2_key_rsa_subtype; + prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = key; + prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL; + prep->quotalen = 100; + return 0; +} + +static struct asymmetric_key_parser tpm2_key_rsa_parser = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .name = "tpm2_key_rsa_parser", + .parse = tpm2_key_preparse, +}; + +static int __init tpm2_key_rsa_init(void) +{ + return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_rsa_parser); +} + +static void __exit tpm2_key_rsa_exit(void) +{ + unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_rsa_parser); +} + +module_init(tpm2_key_rsa_init); +module_exit(tpm2_key_rsa_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Asymmetric TPM2 RSA key"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index c17e4efbb2e5..040be2c75868 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum tpm2_session_types { /* if you add a new hash to this, increment TPM_MAX_HASHES below */ enum tpm_algorithms { TPM_ALG_ERROR = 0x0000, + TPM_ALG_RSA = 0x0001, TPM_ALG_SHA1 = 0x0004, TPM_ALG_AES = 0x0006, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH = 0x0008, @@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, + TPM2_CC_RSA_DECRYPT = 0x0159, TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,