From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:01 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808910 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E87B61547DA; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920502; cv=none; b=dHof5KqyVigwgU5DxRfC1SxrFC5PLEkEb5FaRs8ymjDSFhZM3sRNnjqKo7Q0Q7ymhiatw5USPtZ1RXavVFKl4YQzU7FG7mpkD8aYnh9SbqKqwzdfRMJsnkvbjvdZFvyxyN3kbQyYmGBzW0XVAebEunzYjMTih3Pq58iaioIQNEo= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920502; c=relaxed/simple; bh=emJg9Q6RhIzPfgJr3GQ05y7BJpoPEwXcyHUOVtxUKqQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=iJXTv8OXasQGBUWqhQDkeP+cCLU+/nLzrPZWQ7bdRa5890XKOmWwDXddUNTWV17iuwvIlLCg0zgh8SuJkzbFoS41VFf+EOUi0jqKbKEBijO0GxR952mWpdZebaIlwlodn1ovFgTFllY8jxm532CjIp132FkftEDmtAkMQMGSzZ0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ec4AbweI; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ec4AbweI" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 223C1C4CEC2; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726920501; bh=emJg9Q6RhIzPfgJr3GQ05y7BJpoPEwXcyHUOVtxUKqQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ec4AbweIc3du/s0Z3pJ4PVXePv2GIgtMlaCUxjk/briBHgOp7i/S1XveevQPUD8J0 Z9VWitPESuqMBLJJUFof7qUG8jMx58uKRwH3T/Cnz1khEDKR9JQ0y5JMPcZ1dYVvgK 3nDbBNbLPM2k+si/ZDgp1ZxpTBg3FmlkNJNcbhQ96P1QSt5LN8gYbV5jv9o5Ts0C2N vuJciSripTYXE33yZQZSACGwXCl/aueqlymT1DLHYOdSOXXqyfTGY4dhi6H5yJgr1U X3TSTFKvtPb6KUovsToV9/CV5lqdudXH8exXHZMpp5eEU/uFo4tm49BLB/Zwp7zwRx HmX8Ah4bPxkvw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:01 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 tpm2_sessions_init() does not ignores the result of tpm2_create_null_primary(). Address this by returning -ENODEV to the caller. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: - Do not print klog messages on error, as tpm2_save_context() already takes care of this. v4: - Fixed up stable version. v3: - Handle TPM and POSIX error separately and return -ENODEV always back to the caller. v2: - Refined the commit message. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index d3521aadd43e..0f09ac33ae99 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -1338,7 +1338,8 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); } - return rc; + /* Map all errors to -ENODEV: */ + return rc ? -ENODEV : rc; } /** @@ -1354,7 +1355,7 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip); if (rc) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc); + return rc; chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chip->auth) From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:02 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808911 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC29E16F0CF; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920507; cv=none; b=fwYvdz2cIbHzuaeaFiL4KMeM3qrER5M6aVQX11b12XKN6cbgJc7hdD+4EDHSlxjDasQNfhUgBrrTdZ3jntJY9+ZN1u4auyO1I5IPBfvd/f1rwAwwPFITuJNDb6CNd00cm+h+kcgvnRdrmylRvq8aoAfnKEIvtx8KZiI5C9b4HV8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920507; c=relaxed/simple; bh=P2zhXgB97Gxeg1yK0YAqaMJDy5+vnJ15TAuh79GHT0U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=HwlKo9E+orS5XjofNSOJAruJs9WY3iQFeNjwfSQL4s0pJy3/jI2JRm0dNGGFrocwNJiA6eVDgtMmOgBxL3H5h/HkwiZNUmwFbEt4x+7yLbfLwfL5N9+HSpbb/F9jIUSIlCncIX7AB+KUxOTFk7w/Sxn5KA7v2xsoIEV5KSBThmw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=fobVuybM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="fobVuybM" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 247BFC4CEC2; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726920506; bh=P2zhXgB97Gxeg1yK0YAqaMJDy5+vnJ15TAuh79GHT0U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fobVuybM1pslwg1Oap86V0LW1hIOdpy0cEPAOWTu84qTD3izKV8tYechEYI6Y/Etp N1bdIFcR6dS3J67VAGeZSVmra21+Jd3Juhc35Rv/uvVW4kIchWRsHjYRbfmZnVBNBx pjrE7F0jy++BEsDoaiaDxwk1XsGeUwx/MeYJlkraFc00DvDKW27R972lYcUo64AzJQ vM5Qxxk7Tmw+WN9PyVplpW/acQQ/gcjk/tJqftA1Ija5AQKW2iWkGw8vSihCnkSZTj /QtpeU2D72LZg1U9xrkTYAyEPjiXzSAKmSeGjv39j5zd+/7tmFgVUAniOuDERml5yz Qcgmx/akzHy3A== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:02 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 tpm2_load_null() has weak and broken error handling: - The return value of tpm2_create_primary() is ignored. - Leaks TPM return codes from tpm2_load_context() to the caller. - If the key name comparison succeeds returns previous error instead of zero to the caller. Implement a proper error rollback. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: - Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context(). v4: - No changes. v3: - Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the check is done *after* the load operation. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 0f09ac33ae99..a856adef18d3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -915,33 +915,36 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) - return rc; + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } - /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ - return rc; - /* - * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so - * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM - * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be - * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so - * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. - */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "the null key integrity check failedh\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; - return rc; +err: + return rc ? -ENODEV : rc; } /** From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:03 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808912 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7650516F0CF; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920511; cv=none; b=bNknLheOXFxzyRXrj9up1mlCqp1uI68TGQa89LNHyHaiVNqHVwSgAitVWST5TTbdtMoml+l4Po/D0vbgIvcYNtM4YSSTiTZKbCoNaEyV6XOsLhqOkpd8Yldy0gyPo5rOTWJHH99TfNglTU9KAvqZNddqg5V6Gb6fyHC7kk+0B2k= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920511; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nmi25mZVmErDo+TwPXlXN4vwRXn8YXHDfLB5USUyAIE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=DeIV4sknsaBHVSthpcvzVyKYLMJZ3LNRWWBVPdt29QFXF8UFq9oBqfPR+R9KyK4QO0V8HUX3Y7mIu5OoGMM1VZvKKFzhtPu6BSaJ60v9tdrZUOu8xVnNbgQCIegsGR8KTpCQz/VmcoDqsM5h60RHQ/Dnq9ufN7Ig13gSEUQMdUk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=XxXSoxFQ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="XxXSoxFQ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F2901C4CEC2; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726920511; bh=nmi25mZVmErDo+TwPXlXN4vwRXn8YXHDfLB5USUyAIE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XxXSoxFQBscxlmQcfL9llm/NeO4tFd8oLfHCC2N2t5RqrMnTRAhaIU+eDLpGtrffe Db0HgU5FL3Db3JD4LcomVfmJ+9z2r9GVYEOkj1hG/ACCdZJTIpoRt8eBPLWXZLmlez u++SAlbup4pKjH6LN0vxL6kROl5IjsIevYG2pJNZfex1eKKJk+kiSz87s/jUof9Q64 OpvFHJwkkPJbBCsqoQyJM3uKyS/Pq9Gy4ddVJ2hWipo2CVkanMsiU70CW7ucryReln ZWmxch4870XRpZsHskS8SiQuzTaB3wfX1ZoCme5G7Xnprj/ZJtUCfFyQvoMoHMglRw 5AeY6MhBrQLzg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:03 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Instead of flushing and reloading the null key for every single auth session, flush it only when: 1. User space needs to access /dev/tpm{rm}0. 2. When going to sleep. 3. When unregistering the chip. This removes the need to load and swap the null key between TPM and regular memory per transaction, when the user space is not using the chip. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Tested-by: Pengyu Ma Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Changed to bug fix as not having the patch there is a major hit to bootup times. v3: - Unchanged. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Added tested-by from Pengyu Ma . - Removed spurious pr_info() statement. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 +++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 854546000c92..0ea00e32f575 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -674,6 +674,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register); */ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + int rc; + + rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!rc) { + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } +#endif + tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); if (tpm_is_hwrng_enabled(chip)) hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index 30b4c288c1bb..4eaa8e05c291 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, struct tpm_header *header = (void *)buf; ssize_t ret, len; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; + } +#endif + ret = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, buf, bufsiz); /* If the command is not implemented by the TPM, synthesize a * response with a TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE return for user-space. diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 5da134f12c9a..bfa47d48b0f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -379,10 +379,15 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (!rc) { - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); + chip->null_key = 0; +#endif tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_STATE); - else + } else { rc = tpm1_pm_suspend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr); + } tpm_put_ops(chip); } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 1e856259219e..aba024cbe7c5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) struct tpm_buf buf; int rc; + if (!handle) + return; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT); if (rc) { dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n", diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index a856adef18d3..1aef5b1f9c90 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -920,11 +920,19 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) u32 tmp_null_key; int rc; + /* fast path */ + if (chip->null_key) { + *null_key = chip->null_key; + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, &tmp_null_key); if (rc != -EINVAL) { - if (!rc) + if (!rc) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; + } goto err; } @@ -934,6 +942,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + chip->null_key = tmp_null_key; *null_key = tmp_null_key; return 0; } @@ -1006,7 +1015,6 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session"); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf); @@ -1338,7 +1346,10 @@ static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context, sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + if (rc) + tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key); + else + chip->null_key = null_key; } /* Map all errors to -ENODEV: */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index e93ee8d936a9..4eb39db80e05 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* details for communication security via sessions */ + /* loaded null key */ + u32 null_key; /* saved context for NULL seed */ u8 null_key_context[TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE]; /* name of NULL seed */ From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808913 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B4221714A1; 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Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session() Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:04 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1aef5b1f9c90..a8d3d5d52178 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1371,10 +1382,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808914 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46F1F38FAD; 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dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Fd/Ttpe/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7603EC4CEC2; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726920520; bh=SOjzs+v7eOzqwKR2G9Ne4OiyrZ1NGf7Gf9sTP1nFP5U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Fd/Ttpe/Z/Ej6Gy+jSS+qHgZn94zmhs+S2KBDGEam7ViCbpuNxYCYTTwZe1QXQnNr +W5v/v1xdET1KZsxq1ZSy8Rxe6ufNFxo1vDbOaoG5BZdzE5Cqa5cfkaloCWVGNCVXH 8eKxX7VIRfiAQ2bFvoKiydVuLSWRpfj+N8UHOODnLqNbscJk7nj60AcoYZy0RM1lcd ATojI4nJwusjhexfLE/dkLRtuS0MFfK5XguyxXl/p+KxYrufc/h+JF6W14+ybq3L8w ZFZRgtXOkivXuBogvCA5oC6zxF8Klavo3lcErgIvVtB9GAWT873Jb/EqRbip1ZfUCl dkiq+4BzJy6Sg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:05 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every single transaction, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used. In practice this means applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION to the session attributes. Flush the session always when /dev/tpm0 is written. Reported-by: Pengyu Ma Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()") Tested-by: Pengyu Ma Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Changed as bug. v3: - Refined the commit message. - Removed the conditional for applying TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION only when /dev/tpm0 is open. It is not required as the auth session is flushed, not saved. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 0ea00e32f575..7a6bb30d1f32 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (!rc) { if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c index 4eaa8e05c291..a3ed7a99a394 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_dev_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index bfa47d48b0f2..2363018fa8fb 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (!rc) { if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->null_key); chip->null_key = 0; #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index a8d3d5d52178..38b92ad9e75f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* The first write to /dev/tpm{rm0} will flush the session. */ + attributes |= TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION; + /* * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros * before computing the HMAC