From patchwork Sat Mar 16 20:42:04 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 10856041 X-Patchwork-Delegate: johannes@sipsolutions.net Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F2D114DE for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:58:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C3B6296AF for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:58:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 08F57296E1; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:58:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31F12296AF for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726661AbfCPU5n (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:57:43 -0400 Received: from 8.mo69.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.56.233]:57014 "EHLO 8.mo69.mail-out.ovh.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726376AbfCPU5n (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:57:43 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 600 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:57:41 EDT Received: from player693.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.146.5]) by mo69.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D92F4A73C for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from awhome.eu (p4FF91B93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.27.147]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player693.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1386D3B8EB58; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:22 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1552768941; bh=Mm5WJmP1LlnoIR5Nr7742HVlV8w0jWAt7447vqNGjis=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=XWzeaQUexw5lDgupzvdOgU3uUihEKqqy7d6pH7Yqi3owvoqz6Dg0fCy8U1Iua0XWo bIx9cfMFL4jjvfctYgBG+q5xIpUe1LTkMnpplY2m0ydiT5COMI1Y70ZsX74gze0fmj qq+8YjcwppfjcNWnxo8vr7qSEp3jI7SIzWhqTpbI= To: johannes@sipsolutions.net Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Wetzel Subject: [PATCH 1/5] nl80211/cfg80211: Extended Key ID support Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:04 +0100 Message-Id: <20190316204208.16497-2-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 6894729556258659527 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedutddrheejgddugeefucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenuc Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add support for IEEE 802.11-2016 "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames". Extend cfg80211 and nl80211 to allow pairwise keys to be installed for Rx only, enable Tx separately and allow Key ID 1 for pairwise keys. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- include/net/cfg80211.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/wireless/nl80211.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/wireless/rdev-ops.h | 3 ++- net/wireless/trace.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/wireless/util.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 6 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/cfg80211.h b/include/net/cfg80211.h index bb307a11ee63..d89053de2fbb 100644 --- a/include/net/cfg80211.h +++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h @@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ struct vif_params { * with the get_key() callback, must be in little endian, * length given by @seq_len. * @seq_len: length of @seq. + * @mode: key install mode (RX_TX, NO_TX or SET_TX) */ struct key_params { const u8 *key; @@ -492,6 +493,7 @@ struct key_params { int key_len; int seq_len; u32 cipher; + enum nl80211_key_mode mode; }; /** diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h b/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h index dd4f86ee286e..098534d8a573 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h @@ -4134,6 +4134,27 @@ enum nl80211_channel_type { NL80211_CHAN_HT40PLUS }; +/** + * enum nl80211_key_mode - Key mode + * + * @NL80211_KEY_RX_TX: (Default) + * Key can be used for Rx and Tx immediately + * + * The following modes can only be selected for unicast keys and when the + * driver supports @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID: + * + * @NL80211_KEY_NO_TX: Only allowed in combination with @NL80211_CMD_NEW_KEY: + * Unicast key can only be used for Rx, Tx not allowed, yet + * @NL80211_KEY_SET_TX: Only allowed in combination with @NL80211_CMD_SET_KEY: + * The unicast key identified by idx and mac is cleared for Tx and becomes + * the preferred Tx key for the station. + */ +enum nl80211_key_mode { + NL80211_KEY_RX_TX, + NL80211_KEY_NO_TX, + NL80211_KEY_SET_TX +}; + /** * enum nl80211_chan_width - channel width definitions * @@ -4377,6 +4398,9 @@ enum nl80211_key_default_types { * @NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES: A nested attribute containing flags * attributes, specifying what a key should be set as default as. * See &enum nl80211_key_default_types. + * @NL80211_KEY_MODE: the mode from enum nl80211_key_mode. + * Defaults to @NL80211_KEY_RX_TX. + * * @__NL80211_KEY_AFTER_LAST: internal * @NL80211_KEY_MAX: highest key attribute */ @@ -4390,6 +4414,7 @@ enum nl80211_key_attributes { NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_MGMT, NL80211_KEY_TYPE, NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES, + NL80211_KEY_MODE, /* keep last */ __NL80211_KEY_AFTER_LAST, @@ -5335,6 +5360,8 @@ enum nl80211_feature_flags { * able to rekey an in-use key correctly. Userspace must not rekey PTK keys * if this flag is not set. Ignoring this can leak clear text packets and/or * freeze the connection. + * @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID: Driver supports "Extended Key ID for + * Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE802.11-2016. * * @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_AIRTIME_FAIRNESS: Driver supports getting airtime * fairness for transmitted packets and has enabled airtime fairness @@ -5384,6 +5411,7 @@ enum nl80211_ext_feature_index { NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_ENABLE_FTM_RESPONDER, NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_AIRTIME_FAIRNESS, NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_AP_PMKSA_CACHING, + NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID, /* add new features before the definition below */ NUM_NL80211_EXT_FEATURES, diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index 25a9e3b5c154..4167dcdf516e 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_key_policy[NL80211_KEY_MAX + 1] = { [NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_MGMT] = { .type = NLA_FLAG }, [NL80211_KEY_TYPE] = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, NUM_NL80211_KEYTYPES - 1), [NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, + [NL80211_KEY_MODE] = { .type = NLA_U8 }, }; /* policy for the key default flags */ @@ -958,6 +959,9 @@ static int nl80211_parse_key_new(struct genl_info *info, struct nlattr *key, k->def_multi = kdt[NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPE_MULTICAST]; } + if (tb[NL80211_KEY_MODE]) + k->p.mode = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_KEY_MODE]); + return 0; } @@ -3634,8 +3638,11 @@ static int nl80211_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (key.idx < 0) return -EINVAL; - /* only support setting default key */ - if (!key.def && !key.defmgmt) + /* Only support setting default key and + * Extended Key ID action NL80211_KEY_SET_TX. + */ + if (!key.def && !key.defmgmt && + !(key.p.mode == NL80211_KEY_SET_TX)) return -EINVAL; wdev_lock(dev->ieee80211_ptr); @@ -3659,7 +3666,7 @@ static int nl80211_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) #ifdef CONFIG_CFG80211_WEXT dev->ieee80211_ptr->wext.default_key = key.idx; #endif - } else { + } else if (key.defmgmt) { if (key.def_uni || !key.def_multi) { err = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -3681,8 +3688,25 @@ static int nl80211_set_key(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) #ifdef CONFIG_CFG80211_WEXT dev->ieee80211_ptr->wext.default_mgmt_key = key.idx; #endif - } + } else if (key.p.mode == NL80211_KEY_SET_TX && + wiphy_ext_feature_isset(&rdev->wiphy, + NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID)) { + u8 *mac_addr = NULL; + if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC]) + mac_addr = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC]); + + if (!mac_addr || key.idx < 0 || key.idx > 1) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + err = rdev_add_key(rdev, dev, key.idx, + NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE, + mac_addr, &key.p); + } else { + err = -EINVAL; + } out: wdev_unlock(dev->ieee80211_ptr); diff --git a/net/wireless/rdev-ops.h b/net/wireless/rdev-ops.h index 5cb48d135fab..5044e634a455 100644 --- a/net/wireless/rdev-ops.h +++ b/net/wireless/rdev-ops.h @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static inline int rdev_add_key(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, struct key_params *params) { int ret; - trace_rdev_add_key(&rdev->wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr); + trace_rdev_add_key(&rdev->wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, + mac_addr, params->mode); ret = rdev->ops->add_key(&rdev->wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr, params); trace_rdev_return_int(&rdev->wiphy, ret); diff --git a/net/wireless/trace.h b/net/wireless/trace.h index 44b2ce1bb13a..0876f3eb3b3b 100644 --- a/net/wireless/trace.h +++ b/net/wireless/trace.h @@ -430,22 +430,43 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(key_handle, BOOL_TO_STR(__entry->pairwise), MAC_PR_ARG(mac_addr)) ); -DEFINE_EVENT(key_handle, rdev_add_key, +DEFINE_EVENT(key_handle, rdev_get_key, TP_PROTO(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *netdev, u8 key_index, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr), TP_ARGS(wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr) ); -DEFINE_EVENT(key_handle, rdev_get_key, +DEFINE_EVENT(key_handle, rdev_del_key, TP_PROTO(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *netdev, u8 key_index, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr), TP_ARGS(wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr) ); -DEFINE_EVENT(key_handle, rdev_del_key, +TRACE_EVENT(rdev_add_key, TP_PROTO(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *netdev, u8 key_index, - bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr), - TP_ARGS(wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr) + bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr, u8 mode), + TP_ARGS(wiphy, netdev, key_index, pairwise, mac_addr, mode), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + WIPHY_ENTRY + NETDEV_ENTRY + MAC_ENTRY(mac_addr) + __field(u8, key_index) + __field(bool, pairwise) + __field(u8, mode) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + WIPHY_ASSIGN; + NETDEV_ASSIGN; + MAC_ASSIGN(mac_addr, mac_addr); + __entry->key_index = key_index; + __entry->pairwise = pairwise; + __entry->mode = mode; + ), + TP_printk(WIPHY_PR_FMT ", " NETDEV_PR_FMT ", key_index: %u, " + "mode: %u, pairwise: %s, mac addr: " MAC_PR_FMT, + WIPHY_PR_ARG, NETDEV_PR_ARG, __entry->key_index, + __entry->mode, BOOL_TO_STR(__entry->pairwise), + MAC_PR_ARG(mac_addr)) ); TRACE_EVENT(rdev_set_default_key, diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index e4b8db5e81ec..6c02c9cf7aa9 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -237,14 +237,23 @@ int cfg80211_validate_key_settings(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: - /* Disallow pairwise keys with non-zero index unless it's WEP - * or a vendor specific cipher (because current deployments use - * pairwise WEP keys with non-zero indices and for vendor - * specific ciphers this should be validated in the driver or - * hardware level - but 802.11i clearly specifies to use zero) + /* IEEE802.11-2016 allows only 0 and - when using Extended Key + * ID - 1 as index for pairwise keys. + * @NL80211_KEY_NO_TX is only allowed for pairwise keys when + * the driver supports Extended Key ID. + * @NL80211_KEY_SET_TX can't be set when installing and + * validating a key. */ - if (pairwise && key_idx) + if (params->mode == NL80211_KEY_NO_TX) { + if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(&rdev->wiphy, + NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID)) + return -EINVAL; + else if (!pairwise || key_idx < 0 || key_idx > 1) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((pairwise && key_idx) || + params->mode == NL80211_KEY_SET_TX) { return -EINVAL; + } break; case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: From patchwork Sat Mar 16 20:42:05 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 10856019 X-Patchwork-Delegate: johannes@sipsolutions.net Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A2FC21823 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AB2429A00 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 7F37D299F6; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 471A529A00 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726776AbfCPUm1 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:27 -0400 Received: from 3.mo177.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.36.172]:44565 "EHLO 3.mo177.mail-out.ovh.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726493AbfCPUm1 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:27 -0400 Received: from player770.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.143.249]) by mo177.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B3DCE4E21 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from awhome.eu (p4FF91B93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.27.147]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player770.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 176AC3BF8024; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:22 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1552768941; bh=K6drBFFx3/0EzZQwGdHncaZWhJ4EYYdNLk7mFx8AWdw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=k1KZ0VfMw5JGWFWMOEqqpAe5xDQSSiMZ7poQjBaEezLOexNIy++A8EEhyEr6TWOE3 dgjUzJrWY85igeZEe/0PRYjrjOsz6OTLToalnyZ76fWkD5/esZyQOLa64w2m9d/eIb W3iDonf3cOK8XqsqjqztjshKl3fP4K/FLL4ueT+w= To: johannes@sipsolutions.net Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Wetzel Subject: [PATCH 2/5] mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:05 +0100 Message-Id: <20190316204208.16497-3-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 6894729555619093703 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedutddrheejgddugeefucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenuc Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- Bugs fixed compared to last RFC patch: - Off by one: ieee80211_get_keyid() no longer accepts invalid keyID 4 include/net/mac80211.h | 6 ++++ net/mac80211/cfg.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ net/mac80211/debugfs.c | 1 + net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +- net/mac80211/key.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- net/mac80211/key.h | 2 ++ net/mac80211/main.c | 21 +++++++++++ net/mac80211/rx.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 9 +++++ net/mac80211/tx.c | 13 ++----- 10 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h index ac2ed8ec662b..c10abca55fde 100644 --- a/include/net/mac80211.h +++ b/include/net/mac80211.h @@ -1697,6 +1697,7 @@ struct wireless_dev *ieee80211_vif_to_wdev(struct ieee80211_vif *vif); * @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE: This flag should be set by the driver for * a TKIP key if it only requires MIC space. Do not set together with * @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC on the same key. + * @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX: Key needs explicit Tx activation. */ enum ieee80211_key_flags { IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT = BIT(0), @@ -1708,6 +1709,7 @@ enum ieee80211_key_flags { IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT = BIT(6), IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM = BIT(7), IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE = BIT(8), + IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX = BIT(9), }; /** @@ -2243,6 +2245,9 @@ struct ieee80211_txq { * @IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_ONLY_HE_MULTI_BSSID: Hardware supports multi BSSID * only for HE APs. Applies if @IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID is set. * + * @IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE: Driver and hardware are supporting Extended + * Key ID and can handle two unicast keys per station for Rx and Tx. + * * @NUM_IEEE80211_HW_FLAGS: number of hardware flags, used for sizing arrays */ enum ieee80211_hw_flags { @@ -2294,6 +2299,7 @@ enum ieee80211_hw_flags { IEEE80211_HW_TX_STATUS_NO_AMPDU_LEN, IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID, IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_ONLY_HE_MULTI_BSSID, + IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE, /* keep last, obviously */ NUM_IEEE80211_HW_FLAGS diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index 09dd1c2860fc..14bbb7e8ad0e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -351,6 +351,36 @@ static int ieee80211_set_noack_map(struct wiphy *wiphy, return 0; } +static int ieee80211_set_tx(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + const u8 *mac_addr, u8 key_idx) +{ + struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; + struct ieee80211_key *key; + struct sta_info *sta; + int ret = -EINVAL; + + if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy, + NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID)) + return -EINVAL; + + sta = sta_info_get_bss(sdata, mac_addr); + + if (!sta) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sta->ptk_idx == key_idx) + return 0; + + mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); + key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[key_idx]); + + if (key && key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) + ret = ieee80211_set_tx_key(key); + + mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); + return ret; +} + static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, u8 key_idx, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr, struct key_params *params) @@ -365,6 +395,9 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, if (!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) return -ENETDOWN; + if (pairwise && params->mode == NL80211_KEY_SET_TX) + return ieee80211_set_tx(sdata, mac_addr, key_idx); + /* reject WEP and TKIP keys if WEP failed to initialize */ switch (params->cipher) { case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: @@ -396,6 +429,9 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, if (pairwise) key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; + if (params->mode == NL80211_KEY_NO_TX) + key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX; + mutex_lock(&local->sta_mtx); if (mac_addr) { diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs.c index 2d43bc127043..aa6f23e1a457 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/debugfs.c +++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs.c @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static const char *hw_flag_names[] = { FLAG(TX_STATUS_NO_AMPDU_LEN), FLAG(SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID), FLAG(SUPPORTS_ONLY_HE_MULTI_BSSID), + FLAG(EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE), #undef FLAG }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index e170f986d226..e5d95d2233e3 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ struct ieee80211_local { /* * Key mutex, protects sdata's key_list and sta_info's - * key pointers (write access, they're RCU.) + * key pointers and ptk_idx (write access, they're RCU.) */ struct mutex key_mtx; diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index b9f2bfc00263..20bf9db7a388 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -264,9 +264,24 @@ static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); } +int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) +{ + struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; + struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; + struct ieee80211_key *old; + + assert_key_lock(local); + + old = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); + sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; + ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); + + return 0; +} + static int ieee80211_hw_key_replace(struct ieee80211_key *old_key, struct ieee80211_key *new_key, - bool ptk0rekey) + bool pairwise) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; struct ieee80211_local *local; @@ -283,8 +298,9 @@ static int ieee80211_hw_key_replace(struct ieee80211_key *old_key, assert_key_lock(old_key->local); sta = old_key->sta; - /* PTK only using key ID 0 needs special handling on rekey */ - if (new_key && sta && ptk0rekey) { + /* Unicast rekey without Extended Key ID needs special handling */ + if (new_key && sta && pairwise && + rcu_access_pointer(sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]) == old_key) { local = old_key->local; sdata = old_key->sdata; @@ -400,10 +416,6 @@ static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (old) { idx = old->conf.keyidx; - /* TODO: proper implement and test "Extended Key ID for - * Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE 802.11-2016. - * Till then always assume only key ID 0 is used for - * pairwise keys.*/ ret = ieee80211_hw_key_replace(old, new, pairwise); } else { /* new must be provided in case old is not */ @@ -420,15 +432,20 @@ static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (sta) { if (pairwise) { rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new); - sta->ptk_idx = idx; - if (new) { + if (new && + !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX)) { + sta->ptk_idx = idx; clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); } } else { rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new); } - if (new) + /* Only needed for transition from no key -> key. + * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID + * and installing the second key ID the first time. + */ + if (new && !old) ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta); } else { defunikey = old && @@ -744,16 +761,34 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, * can cause warnings to appear. */ bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION; - int ret; + int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); - if (sta && pairwise) + if (sta && pairwise) { + struct ieee80211_key *alt_key; + old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx]); - else if (sta) + alt_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]); + + /* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using + * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys. + */ + if (key && + ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) || + (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher))) + goto out; + } else if (sta) { old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]); - else + } else { old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); + } + + /* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */ + if (!pairwise) { + if (key && old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) + goto out; + } /* * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h index ebdb80b85dc3..f06fbd03d235 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.h +++ b/net/mac80211/key.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #define NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS 4 #define NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS 2 +#define INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX 2 /* Keyidx always pointing to a NULL key for PTK */ struct ieee80211_local; struct ieee80211_sub_if_data; @@ -146,6 +147,7 @@ ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len, int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct sta_info *sta); +int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key); void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom); void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key); void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx, diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c index 800e67615e2a..c212615f1bdc 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/main.c +++ b/net/mac80211/main.c @@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ #include "led.h" #include "debugfs.h" +static int ieee80211_extended_key_id = 1; /* Driver setting */ +module_param(ieee80211_extended_key_id, int, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ieee80211_extended_key_id, + "IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support. 0: Force off 1: Driver setting 2: Force on. (default: 1)"); + void ieee80211_configure_filter(struct ieee80211_local *local) { u64 mc; @@ -1051,6 +1056,22 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee80211_hw *hw) } } + switch (ieee80211_extended_key_id) { + case 2: + /* Force on */ + ieee80211_hw_set(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE); + /* fall trough */ + case 1: + if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE)) + wiphy_ext_feature_set(local->hw.wiphy, + NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID); + wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "Extended Key ID support enabled.\n"); + break; + default: + /* Force off */ + wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "Extended Key ID not supported.\n"); + } + /* * Calculate scan IE length -- we need this to alloc * memory and to subtract from the driver limit. It diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 7f8d93401ce0..4a03c18b39a8 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1005,23 +1005,43 @@ static int ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(struct sk_buff *skb) return -1; } -static int ieee80211_get_cs_keyid(const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static int ieee80211_get_keyid(struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; __le16 fc; int hdrlen; + int minlen; + u8 key_idx_off; + u8 key_idx_shift; u8 keyid; fc = hdr->frame_control; hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc); - if (skb->len < hdrlen + cs->hdr_len) + if (cs) { + minlen = hdrlen + cs->hdr_len; + key_idx_off = hdrlen + cs->key_idx_off; + key_idx_shift = cs->key_idx_shift; + } else { + /* WEP, TKIP, CCMP and GCMP */ + minlen = hdrlen + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN; + key_idx_off = hdrlen + 3; + key_idx_shift = 6; + } + + if (unlikely(skb->len < minlen)) return -EINVAL; - skb_copy_bits(skb, hdrlen + cs->key_idx_off, &keyid, 1); - keyid &= cs->key_idx_mask; - keyid >>= cs->key_idx_shift; + skb_copy_bits(skb, key_idx_off, &keyid, 1); + + if (cs) + keyid &= cs->key_idx_mask; + keyid >>= key_idx_shift; + + /* cs could use more than the usual two bits for the keyid */ + if (unlikely(keyid >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)) + return -EINVAL; return keyid; } @@ -1852,9 +1872,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; int keyidx; - int hdrlen; ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL; + struct ieee80211_key *ptk_idx = NULL; int mmie_keyidx = -1; __le16 fc; const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL; @@ -1892,21 +1912,24 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (rx->sta) { int keyid = rx->sta->ptk_idx; + sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk[keyid]); - if (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && rx->sta->cipher_scheme) { + if (ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme; - keyid = ieee80211_get_cs_keyid(cs, rx->skb); + keyid = ieee80211_get_keyid(rx->skb, cs); + if (unlikely(keyid < 0)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + ptk_idx = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk[keyid]); } - sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk[keyid]); } if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb); if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) { - rx->key = sta_ptk; + rx->key = ptk_idx ? ptk_idx : sta_ptk; if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -1966,8 +1989,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) } return RX_CONTINUE; } else { - u8 keyid; - /* * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we @@ -1981,23 +2002,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return RX_CONTINUE; - hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc); - - if (cs) { - keyidx = ieee80211_get_cs_keyid(cs, rx->skb); + keyidx = ieee80211_get_keyid(rx->skb, cs); - if (unlikely(keyidx < 0)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } else { - if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */ - /* - * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx, - * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already - */ - skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1); - keyidx = keyid >> 6; - } + if (unlikely(keyidx < 0)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta) @@ -4042,12 +4050,8 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_info *sta) case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: break; default: - /* we also don't want to deal with WEP or cipher scheme - * since those require looking up the key idx in the - * frame, rather than assuming the PTK is used - * (we need to revisit this once we implement the real - * PTK index, which is now valid in the spec, but we - * haven't implemented that part yet) + /* We also don't want to deal with + * WEP or cipher scheme. */ goto clear_rcu; } diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index 11f058987a54..7c61f6aee873 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -347,6 +347,15 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sta->sta.max_rx_aggregation_subframes = local->hw.max_rx_aggregation_subframes; + /* Extended Key ID needs to install keys for keyid 0 and 1 Rx-only. + * The Tx path starts to use a key as soon as the key slot ptk_idx + * references to is not NULL. To not use the initial Rx-only key + * prematurely for Tx initialize ptk_idx to an impossible PTK keyid + * which always will refer to a NULL key. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(sta->ptk) <= INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX); + sta->ptk_idx = INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX; + sta->local = local; sta->sdata = sdata; sta->rx_stats.last_rx = jiffies; diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 8a49a74c0a37..111bd6c490a6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -3000,23 +3000,15 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(struct sta_info *sta) switch (build.key->conf.cipher) { case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: - /* add fixed key ID */ - if (gen_iv) { - (build.hdr + build.hdr_len)[3] = - 0x20 | (build.key->conf.keyidx << 6); + if (gen_iv) build.pn_offs = build.hdr_len; - } if (gen_iv || iv_spc) build.hdr_len += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; break; case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: - /* add fixed key ID */ - if (gen_iv) { - (build.hdr + build.hdr_len)[3] = - 0x20 | (build.key->conf.keyidx << 6); + if (gen_iv) build.pn_offs = build.hdr_len; - } if (gen_iv || iv_spc) build.hdr_len += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; break; @@ -3383,6 +3375,7 @@ static void ieee80211_xmit_fast_finish(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); crypto_hdr[0] = pn; crypto_hdr[1] = pn >> 8; + crypto_hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key->conf.keyidx << 6); crypto_hdr[4] = pn >> 16; crypto_hdr[5] = pn >> 24; crypto_hdr[6] = pn >> 32; From patchwork Sat Mar 16 20:42:06 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 10856021 X-Patchwork-Delegate: johannes@sipsolutions.net Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBE2517E6 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B52F52847A for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id A9431299F6; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C4EF29A50 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726796AbfCPUm2 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:28 -0400 Received: from 9.mo7.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.60.248]:52006 "EHLO 9.mo7.mail-out.ovh.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726647AbfCPUm2 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:28 -0400 Received: from player793.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.143.238]) by mo7.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 661C4102DD5 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from awhome.eu (p4FF91B93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.27.147]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player793.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 26E0B3D4F1FB; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:22 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1552768941; bh=Q7sDAM49amMrz/4tSp92SWSSEkwPalbzuZ2FNxCin9k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=VwyVdrkWcm3ByMMDIbRAba+aiybY1zFVQj+ccHGLSgjuHIE+o41r9enFCv3LrLsb4 LrZLoyle4YZwmdDXPwFtZdTJWs0tD/bFpf63j/yW9Sf7TEleRL23L5mrV50haWVw4g 1xX4uBTA+8bdhlSP9mvxdQIwc+NXM358vVIHuqcw= To: johannes@sipsolutions.net Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Wetzel Subject: [PATCH 3/5] mac80211: Compatibility Extended Key ID support Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:06 +0100 Message-Id: <20190316204208.16497-4-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 6894729555110206663 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedutddrheejgddugeefucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenuc Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Allow drivers to support Extended Key ID when they are not able to handle two unicast keys per station for Rx by falling back to software decryption when replacing keys. Drivers using this mode may drop some MPDUs when Rx acceleration is enabled too soon again. We rely on retransmits to recover the scrambled MPDUs, making this better than a classical rekey but worse than NATIVE Extended Key ID support. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- include/net/mac80211.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/mac80211/debugfs.c | 1 + net/mac80211/key.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/mac80211/key.h | 5 ++++ net/mac80211/main.c | 8 +++-- net/mac80211/rx.c | 6 ++++ net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 2 ++ net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 3 ++ 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h index c10abca55fde..63bd3d5aa707 100644 --- a/include/net/mac80211.h +++ b/include/net/mac80211.h @@ -1829,9 +1829,17 @@ struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme { * * @SET_KEY: a key is set * @DISABLE_KEY: a key must be disabled + * + * Additional driver commands for COMPAT Extended Key ID support: + * + * @ENABLE_KEY_RX: Rx acceleration can be activated for a key + * @DISABLE_KEY_RX: Rx acceleration must be deactivated for a key */ enum set_key_cmd { - SET_KEY, DISABLE_KEY, + SET_KEY, + DISABLE_KEY, + ENABLE_KEY_RX, + DISABLE_KEY_RX, }; /** @@ -2248,6 +2256,10 @@ struct ieee80211_txq { * @IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE: Driver and hardware are supporting Extended * Key ID and can handle two unicast keys per station for Rx and Tx. * + * @IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT: Driver and hardware support Extended Key ID + * when mac80211 handles Rx decryption during transition from one keyid to + * the next. + * * @NUM_IEEE80211_HW_FLAGS: number of hardware flags, used for sizing arrays */ enum ieee80211_hw_flags { @@ -2300,6 +2312,7 @@ enum ieee80211_hw_flags { IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID, IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_ONLY_HE_MULTI_BSSID, IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE, + IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT, /* keep last, obviously */ NUM_IEEE80211_HW_FLAGS @@ -2660,6 +2673,36 @@ void ieee80211_free_txskb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb); Mac80211 will not queue any new frames for a deleted key to the driver. */ +/** + * DOC: Extended Key ID support + * + * Mac80211 supports "Extended Key ID" from IEEE 802.11-2016, allowing to rekey + * the in-use unicast key with no impact for ongoing transmissions. + * + * There are two ways mac80211 drivers can support Extended Key ID: + * 1) Native + * When using "Native" Extended Key ID mode mac80211 can install two unicast + * keys per station to the driver, using the two key IDs "0" and "1". + * Compatible drivers/cards can simply set @IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE, + * allowing mac80211 to install two unicast keys per station to the driver + * with %SET_KEY. + * + * 2) Compatibility + * This mode is for drivers and cards which are not able to handle two + * unicast key for a station for Rx. For drivers setting + * @IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT mac80211 will make sure that never more + * than one unicast key is active for Rx in the hardware, falling back to + * software decryption while installing a new unicast key. Divers using this + * mode must implement the additional key commands %ENABLE_KEY_RX and + * %DISABLE_KEY_RX to allow switching Rx crypto offload on and off without + * impact for Tx. Drivers also must not activate Rx crypto offload when + * %SET_KEY is called for a key with @IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX set. + * Compatibility mode will only be really lossless when there is a clean cut + * over to the new key and MPDUs using both key IDs are not mixed. It can + * also cause CPU spikes when falling back to software encryption, depending + * on the amount of Rx packets at that time. + */ + /** * DOC: Powersave support * diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs.c index aa6f23e1a457..9c4899aaf346 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/debugfs.c +++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs.c @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static const char *hw_flag_names[] = { FLAG(SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID), FLAG(SUPPORTS_ONLY_HE_MULTI_BSSID), FLAG(EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE), + FLAG(EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT), #undef FLAG }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index 20bf9db7a388..bd38167916ad 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -127,7 +127,9 @@ static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; + struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; struct sta_info *sta; + bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; might_sleep(); @@ -150,10 +152,10 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) return -EINVAL; } - if (!key->local->ops->set_key) + if (!local->ops->set_key) goto out_unsupported; - assert_key_lock(key->local); + assert_key_lock(local); sta = key->sta; @@ -161,8 +163,8 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it * is supported; if not, return. */ - if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && - !ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK)) + if (sta && !pairwise && + !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK)) goto out_unsupported; if (sta && !sta->uploaded) @@ -173,13 +175,33 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. */ - if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { + if (!pairwise) { ret = 1; goto out_unsupported; } } - ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, + if (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) { + /* EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT drivers may scramble the payload when + * using the wrong HW key for decryption. Therefore only use SW + * decryption for the critical window. + */ + if (sta && pairwise && !local->wowlan && + ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT) && + sta->ptk_idx != key->conf.keyidx) { + struct ieee80211_key *old; + + old = key_mtx_dereference(local, + sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); + if (old) { + if (drv_set_key(local, DISABLE_KEY_RX, + sdata, &sta->sta, &old->conf)) + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + + ret = drv_set_key(local, SET_KEY, sdata, sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); if (!ret) { @@ -221,7 +243,7 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */ if (ret == 1) return 0; - if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) + if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) return -EINVAL; return 0; default: @@ -276,6 +298,10 @@ int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); + if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT) && + key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) + key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_DELAYED_RX_ACCEL; + return 0; } @@ -1063,6 +1089,31 @@ void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local, mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); } +/* EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT support can't install PTK keys to the card/driver for + * hardware decryption as long as the remote sta may use both keyids. Those + * cards are not aware that the keyid must be checked and try to decrypt the + * payload with the wrong key, which would effectively scrambling it. This + * worker is therefore used to activate Rx hardware decryption when we assume + * the remote sta has switched over to the new key. + */ +void delayed_rx_accel_work(struct work_struct *wk) +{ + struct sta_info *sta; + struct ieee80211_local *local; + struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; + struct ieee80211_key *key; + + sta = container_of(wk, struct sta_info, delayed_rx_accel_wk); + local = sta->local; + sdata = sta->sdata; + + mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); + key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); + drv_set_key(local, ENABLE_KEY_RX, sdata, &sta->sta, &key->conf); + + mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); +} + void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h index f06fbd03d235..21e8618b1d55 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.h +++ b/net/mac80211/key.h @@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ struct sta_info; * in the hardware for TX crypto hardware acceleration. * @KEY_FLAG_TAINTED: Key is tainted and packets should be dropped. * @KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME: This key is for a hardware cipher scheme + * @KEY_FLAG_DELAYED_RX_ACCEL: This key has to use Rx SW decryption till we get + * at least one MPDU from the remote sta encrypted with the key. (Needed + * for COMPAT Extended ID support.) */ enum ieee80211_internal_key_flags { KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE = BIT(0), KEY_FLAG_TAINTED = BIT(1), KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME = BIT(2), + KEY_FLAG_DELAYED_RX_ACCEL = BIT(3), }; enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state { @@ -165,5 +169,6 @@ void ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata); rcu_dereference_protected(ref, lockdep_is_held(&((local)->key_mtx))) void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk); +void delayed_rx_accel_work(struct work_struct *wk); #endif /* IEEE80211_KEY_H */ diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c index c212615f1bdc..2ce747d43a81 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/main.c +++ b/net/mac80211/main.c @@ -1058,11 +1058,13 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee80211_hw *hw) switch (ieee80211_extended_key_id) { case 2: - /* Force on */ - ieee80211_hw_set(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE); + /* Force on when driver is not supporting COMPAT mode */ + if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT)) + ieee80211_hw_set(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE); /* fall trough */ case 1: - if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE)) + if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT) || + ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE)) wiphy_ext_feature_set(local->hw.wiphy, NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID); wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "Extended Key ID support enabled.\n"); diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 4a03c18b39a8..e3e4fb1073d6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2032,6 +2032,12 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED)) return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_DELAYED_RX_ACCEL)) { + rx->key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_DELAYED_RX_ACCEL; + ieee80211_queue_work(&rx->local->hw, + &rx->sta->delayed_rx_accel_wk); + } + /* TODO: add threshold stuff again */ } else { return RX_DROP_MONITOR; diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index 7c61f6aee873..41ea1d05a946 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ static void __cleanup_single_sta(struct sta_info *sta) if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) mesh_sta_cleanup(sta); + cancel_work_sync(&sta->delayed_rx_accel_wk); cancel_work_sync(&sta->drv_deliver_wk); /* @@ -326,6 +327,7 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, spin_lock_init(&sta->ps_lock); INIT_WORK(&sta->drv_deliver_wk, sta_deliver_ps_frames); INIT_WORK(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work, ieee80211_ba_session_work); + INIT_WORK(&sta->delayed_rx_accel_wk, delayed_rx_accel_work); mutex_init(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx); #ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_MESH if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) { diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index 71f7e4973329..45f7cbfe9698 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -450,6 +450,8 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { * @sdata: virtual interface this station belongs to * @ptk: peer keys negotiated with this station, if any * @ptk_idx: last installed peer key index + * @delayed_rx_accel_wk: Used to activate Rx crypto offload only after + * we have seen one MPDU encrypted with the key. * @gtk: group keys negotiated with this station, if any * @rate_ctrl: rate control algorithm reference * @rate_ctrl_lock: spinlock used to protect rate control data @@ -530,6 +532,7 @@ struct sta_info { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; struct ieee80211_key __rcu *gtk[NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS]; struct ieee80211_key __rcu *ptk[NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS]; + struct work_struct delayed_rx_accel_wk; u8 ptk_idx; struct rate_control_ref *rate_ctrl; void *rate_ctrl_priv; From patchwork Sat Mar 16 20:42:07 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 10856039 X-Patchwork-Delegate: johannes@sipsolutions.net Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8479F1575 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:49:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68A5E291D7 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:49:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 588D2291E7; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:49:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A2FE291D7 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:49:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726828AbfCPUtK (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:49:10 -0400 Received: from 3.mo3.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.44.175]:36134 "EHLO 3.mo3.mail-out.ovh.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726493AbfCPUtJ (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:49:09 -0400 Received: from player799.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.159.157]) by mo3.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 525B72038ED for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from awhome.eu (p4FF91B93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.27.147]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player799.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1677A3BED76C; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:22 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1552768941; bh=SmD9mpw6P2ITAQBLUBkyrK4DrSttCAU9lypGIBQTVl0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=D80lH4M1r0Fyz1eJUtNrDfeBeE7iPhDKZbS6ywSAHzuduWu2IMgsxEU4ZCgU4sU8T AH4gWsffwYg/ndSGTSgdCt0E/CHKvqFIlxC5Bf/tv9sqPtaSqXFZwL4hNhflAqlPzS z6+Qg2oEOnD+UP5xALAdyttB48pRIOy5NxFjs+w8= To: johannes@sipsolutions.net Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Wetzel Subject: [PATCH 4/5] mac80211: Mark A-MPDU keyid borders for drivers Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:07 +0100 Message-Id: <20190316204208.16497-5-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 6894729555529440455 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedutddrheejgddugeefucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenuc Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP IEEE 802.11-2016 "9.7.3 A-MPDU contents" forbids aggregating MPDUs with different keyids. Without Extended Key ID support this can't happen, since we only aggregate unicast frames using either no key or key ID 0. Extended Key ID support can also use key ID 1 for unicast frames and a rekey with A-MPDU active will therefore need special handling to not violate the above requirement. To support drivers handling the key ID borders in A-MPDUs mac80211 will set the new @IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMPDU_FLUSH flag for the last MPDU using the current keyid. Drivers should then aggregate the MPDU and send out all A-MPDUs with one or more MPDUs aggregated for all affected TIDs immediately. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- Bugs fixed compared to last RFC patch: - Initial key install is directly used for Tx (last RFC patch hung for 10s). - Always activating Rx accel for correct key in COMPAT mode. include/net/mac80211.h | 4 +++ net/mac80211/key.c | 21 ++++++++++++--- net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 1 + net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 4 ++- net/mac80211/tx.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h index 63bd3d5aa707..922239a451c0 100644 --- a/include/net/mac80211.h +++ b/include/net/mac80211.h @@ -807,6 +807,9 @@ enum mac80211_tx_info_flags { * @IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_RATE_INJECT: This frame is injected with rate information * @IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMSDU: This frame is an A-MSDU frame * @IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_FAST_XMIT: This frame is going through the fast_xmit path + * @IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMPDU_FLUSH: This frame is the last one allowed to be + * aggregated with previous frames to an A-MPDU. Driver has to flush all + * running A-MPDU aggreagations (TIDs) for sta. * * These flags are used in tx_info->control.flags. */ @@ -816,6 +819,7 @@ enum mac80211_tx_control_flags { IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_RATE_INJECT = BIT(2), IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMSDU = BIT(3), IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_FAST_XMIT = BIT(4), + IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMPDU_FLUSH = BIT(5), }; /* diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index bd38167916ad..c174f102f72b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -294,9 +294,17 @@ int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) assert_key_lock(local); + /* Two key activations must not overlap */ + if (WARN_ON(sta->ptk_idx_next != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + old = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); - sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; - ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); + + /* The initial key still must be used immediately */ + if (sta->ptk_idx == INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX) + sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; + else + sta->ptk_idx_next = key->conf.keyidx; if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, EXT_KEY_ID_COMPAT) && key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) @@ -1102,13 +1110,20 @@ void delayed_rx_accel_work(struct work_struct *wk) struct ieee80211_local *local; struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key; + int keyid; sta = container_of(wk, struct sta_info, delayed_rx_accel_wk); local = sta->local; sdata = sta->sdata; + /* sta->ptk_idx_next is the new key if not set to INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX */ + if (sta->ptk_idx_next != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX) + keyid = sta->ptk_idx_next; + else + keyid = sta->ptk_idx; + mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); - key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); + key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[keyid]); drv_set_key(local, ENABLE_KEY_RX, sdata, &sta->sta, &key->conf); mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index 41ea1d05a946..7aa85cc7a667 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, */ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(sta->ptk) <= INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX); sta->ptk_idx = INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX; + sta->ptk_idx_next = INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX; sta->local = local; sta->sdata = sdata; diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index 45f7cbfe9698..271c0075f4e2 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -449,7 +449,8 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { * @local: pointer to the global information * @sdata: virtual interface this station belongs to * @ptk: peer keys negotiated with this station, if any - * @ptk_idx: last installed peer key index + * @ptk_idx: activated peer key index + * @ptk_idx_next: peer key index in activation (Extended Key ID only) * @delayed_rx_accel_wk: Used to activate Rx crypto offload only after * we have seen one MPDU encrypted with the key. * @gtk: group keys negotiated with this station, if any @@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ struct sta_info { struct ieee80211_key __rcu *ptk[NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS]; struct work_struct delayed_rx_accel_wk; u8 ptk_idx; + u8 ptk_idx_next; struct rate_control_ref *rate_ctrl; void *rate_ctrl_priv; spinlock_t rate_ctrl_lock; diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 111bd6c490a6..c3ea5107d8f9 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -586,6 +586,47 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_check_control_port_protocol(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) return TX_CONTINUE; } +static struct ieee80211_key debug_noinline +*ieee80211_select_sta_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)tx->skb->data; + struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb); + struct sta_info *sta = tx->sta; + struct ieee80211_key *key; + struct ieee80211_key *next_key; + + key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx]); + + if (likely(sta->ptk_idx_next == INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX)) + return key; + + /* Only when using Extended Key ID the code below can be executed */ + + if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) + return key; + + if (sta->ptk_idx_next == sta->ptk_idx) { + /* First packet using new key with A-MPDU active */ + sta->ptk_idx_next = INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX; + ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(tx->sta); + return key; + } + + next_key = rcu_dereference(sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx_next]); + sta->ptk_idx = sta->ptk_idx_next; + + if (key && info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU) { + /* Last packet with old key with A-MPDU active */ + info->control.flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMPDU_FLUSH; + return key; + } + + /* No A-MPDU active or no encryption, just use the new key */ + sta->ptk_idx_next = INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX; + ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(tx->sta); + return next_key; +} + static ieee80211_tx_result debug_noinline ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { @@ -595,9 +636,8 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)) tx->key = NULL; - else if (tx->sta && - (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sta->ptk[tx->sta->ptk_idx]))) - tx->key = key; + else if (tx->sta) + tx->key = ieee80211_select_sta_key(tx); else if (ieee80211_is_group_privacy_action(tx->skb) && (key = rcu_dereference(tx->sdata->default_multicast_key))) tx->key = key; @@ -3414,6 +3454,10 @@ static bool ieee80211_xmit_fast(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (skb->sk && skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_WIFI_STATUS) return false; + /* ieee80211_key_activate() requests to change key */ + if (unlikely(sta->ptk_idx_next != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX)) + return false; + if (hdr->frame_control & cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA)) { tid = skb->priority & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TAG1D_MASK; tid_tx = rcu_dereference(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[tid]); @@ -3556,6 +3600,11 @@ struct sk_buff *ieee80211_tx_dequeue(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, if (txq->sta) tx.sta = container_of(txq->sta, struct sta_info, sta); + if (test_bit(IEEE80211_TXQ_AMPDU, &txqi->flags)) + info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU; + else + info->flags &= ~IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU; + /* * The key can be removed while the packet was queued, so need to call * this here to get the current key. @@ -3566,11 +3615,6 @@ struct sk_buff *ieee80211_tx_dequeue(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, goto begin; } - if (test_bit(IEEE80211_TXQ_AMPDU, &txqi->flags)) - info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU; - else - info->flags &= ~IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU; - if (info->control.flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_FAST_XMIT) { struct sta_info *sta = container_of(txq->sta, struct sta_info, sta); From patchwork Sat Mar 16 20:42:08 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 10856017 X-Patchwork-Delegate: johannes@sipsolutions.net Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B7C81669 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3A5C2847A for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C124329A77; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23AA5299F6 for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726573AbfCPUm0 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:26 -0400 Received: from 9.mo7.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.60.248]:55140 "EHLO 9.mo7.mail-out.ovh.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726418AbfCPUm0 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Mar 2019 16:42:26 -0400 Received: from player746.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.146.5]) by mo7.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD8B6102E5F for ; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:24 +0100 (CET) Received: from awhome.eu (p4FF91B93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.27.147]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player746.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B358F3D706C3; Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:42:23 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1552768941; bh=xVpjDvkfCmB7qct8MkcAccM3kMFfOaVLGK3mwYoZbMM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=kujlx6Sj4w5azp/sevTRXlgCaT2Kt3nPrf7bZHzHq4QObnp5o79FRwJjr3PfYnzgu OJgBmwcN3ohQW9r4m52fM4JjO8zCD9i6qsxtKV/rq200R4UwfPHShxwRaNOsO3eiN0 syQa5snwfSs9YwzQOQamVFjk3/tGPqsmVF/24MAA= To: johannes@sipsolutions.net Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Wetzel Subject: [PATCH 5/5] mac80211_hwsim: Ext Key ID support (NATIVE) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 21:42:08 +0100 Message-Id: <20190316204208.16497-6-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190316204208.16497-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 6895011033778822343 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedutddrheejgddugeefucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenuc Sender: linux-wireless-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Driver is not supporting hardware encryption and therefore fully compatible with Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c index 0838af04d681..8cbadf825c76 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c @@ -2799,6 +2799,7 @@ static int mac80211_hwsim_new_radio(struct genl_info *info, ieee80211_hw_set(hw, SIGNAL_DBM); ieee80211_hw_set(hw, SUPPORTS_PS); ieee80211_hw_set(hw, TDLS_WIDER_BW); + ieee80211_hw_set(hw, EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE); if (rctbl) ieee80211_hw_set(hw, SUPPORTS_RC_TABLE); ieee80211_hw_set(hw, SUPPORTS_MULTI_BSSID);