diff mbox series

[RFC,v2,5/7] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys

Message ID 20190529190332.29753-6-kristina.martsenko@arm.com (mailing list archive)
State RFC
Headers show
Series arm64: return address signing | expand

Commit Message

Kristina Martsenko May 29, 2019, 7:03 p.m. UTC
Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel
will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently
unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during
fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from
EL0.

A function that changes the key cannot return, so compile such functions
without pointer auth (using __no_ptrauth which will be defined to a
compiler function attribute later).

Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
---

Changes since RFC v1:
 - Updated ptrauth_keys_init to not randomly initialize the other 4 (unused)
   kernel-space keys, to save entropy
 - Replaced __always_inline with __no_ptrauth as it turns out __always_inline
   is only a hint (and could therefore result in crashes)
 - Moved ptrauth_keys_install_kernel earlier in kernel_entry, in case in the
   future C function calls are added in kernel_entry
 - Added ISB after key install in kernel_exit, in case in the future C function
   calls are added after the macro
 - Dropped an outdated comment
 - Updated the commit message

 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h     | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h        |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c           |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                 |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c          |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c               |  3 +++
 arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c                   |  3 +++
 8 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

Comments

Kees Cook May 30, 2019, 3:34 a.m. UTC | #1
On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel
> will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently
> unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during
> fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from
> EL0.
> 
> A function that changes the key cannot return, so compile such functions
> without pointer auth (using __no_ptrauth which will be defined to a
> compiler function attribute later).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>

Just so I'm reading this right: the kernel is only using APIAKey?

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
> 
> Changes since RFC v1:
>  - Updated ptrauth_keys_init to not randomly initialize the other 4 (unused)
>    kernel-space keys, to save entropy
>  - Replaced __always_inline with __no_ptrauth as it turns out __always_inline
>    is only a hint (and could therefore result in crashes)
>  - Moved ptrauth_keys_install_kernel earlier in kernel_entry, in case in the
>    future C function calls are added in kernel_entry
>  - Added ISB after key install in kernel_exit, in case in the future C function
>    calls are added after the macro
>  - Dropped an outdated comment
>  - Updated the commit message
> 
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 16 +++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h     | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h        |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c           |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                 |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c          |  2 +-
>  arch/arm64/kernel/process.c               |  3 +++
>  arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c                   |  3 +++
>  8 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> index e3bfddfe80b6..f595da9661a4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> @@ -25,11 +25,24 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB]
>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> +	isb
>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>  alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH
>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA]
>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> +	isb
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +	.endm
> +
> +	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
> +	mov	\tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL
> +	add	\tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1
> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
> +	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA]
> +	msr_s	SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
> +	msr_s	SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> +	isb
>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>  	.endm
>  
> @@ -38,6 +51,9 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>  	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
>  	.endm
>  
> +	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
> +	.endm
> +
>  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
>  
>  #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> index a97b7dc10bdb..79f35f5ecff5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> @@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ struct ptrauth_key {
>  	unsigned long lo, hi;
>  };
>  
> -/*
> - * We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys
> - * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*().
> - */
>  struct ptrauth_keys {
>  	struct ptrauth_key apia;
>  	struct ptrauth_key apib;
> @@ -37,16 +33,18 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {
>  	struct ptrauth_key apga;
>  };
>  
> -static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
> +static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys, bool user)
>  {
>  	if (system_supports_address_auth()) {
>  		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
> -		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
> -		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
> -		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
> +		if (user) {
> +			get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
> +			get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
> +			get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
> +		}
>  	}
>  
> -	if (system_supports_generic_auth())
> +	if (system_supports_generic_auth() && user)
>  		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
>  }
>  
> @@ -57,6 +55,15 @@ do {								\
>  	write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1);	\
>  } while (0)
>  
> +static inline void __no_ptrauth ptrauth_keys_switch(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
> +{
> +	if (!system_supports_address_auth())
> +		return;
> +
> +	__ptrauth_key_install(APIA, keys->apia);
> +	isb();
> +}
> +
>  static inline void __no_ptrauth ptrauth_cpu_enable(void)
>  {
>  	if (!system_supports_address_auth())
> @@ -82,7 +89,11 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
>  }
>  
>  #define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)					\
> -	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)
> +	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user, true)
> +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(tsk)					\
> +	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel, false)
> +#define ptrauth_thread_switch(tsk)					\
> +	ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)
>  
>  #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
>  #define __no_ptrauth
> @@ -90,6 +101,8 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
>  #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(tsk, arg)	(-EINVAL)
>  #define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(lr)	(lr)
>  #define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)
> +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(tsk)
> +#define ptrauth_thread_switch(tsk)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
>  
>  #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> index 5d9ce62bdebd..f7684a021ca2 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
>  	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>  	struct ptrauth_keys	keys_user;
> +	struct ptrauth_keys	keys_kernel;
>  #endif
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> index edc471e4acb1..7dfebecd387d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ int main(void)
>    DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>    DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user));
> +  DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));
>  #endif
>    BLANK();
>    DEFINE(S_X0,			offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> index 73a28d88f78d..001d508cd63f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ alternative_cb_end
>  
>  	apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23
>  
> +	ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23
>  	.else
>  	add	x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE
>  	get_current_task tsk
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
> index 95985be67891..4ca141b8c581 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
> @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	if (!arg) {
> -		ptrauth_keys_init(keys);
> +		ptrauth_keys_init(keys, true);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> index a9b30111b725..890d7185641b 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> @@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
>  	 */
>  	fpsimd_flush_task_state(p);
>  
> +	ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(p);
> +
>  	if (likely(!(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
>  		*childregs = *current_pt_regs();
>  		childregs->regs[0] = 0;
> @@ -481,6 +483,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
>  	contextidr_thread_switch(next);
>  	entry_task_switch(next);
>  	uao_thread_switch(next);
> +	ptrauth_thread_switch(next);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> index eca6aa05ac66..c5a6f3e8660b 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
> @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
>  	 */
>  	check_local_cpu_capabilities();
>  
> +	ptrauth_thread_switch(current);
>  	ptrauth_cpu_enable();
>  
>  	if (cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot)
> @@ -456,6 +457,8 @@ void __init __no_ptrauth smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
>  	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
>  		init_gic_priority_masking();
>  
> +	ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(current);
> +	ptrauth_thread_switch(current);
>  	ptrauth_cpu_enable();
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.11.0
>
Kristina Martsenko May 30, 2019, 4:26 p.m. UTC | #2
On 30/05/2019 04:34, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
>> Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel
>> will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently
>> unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during
>> fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from
>> EL0.
>>
>> A function that changes the key cannot return, so compile such functions
>> without pointer auth (using __no_ptrauth which will be defined to a
>> compiler function attribute later).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
> 
> Just so I'm reading this right: the kernel is only using APIAKey?

Yes, that's right. The compiler options (in patch #7) will compile the
kernel with only APIAKey instructions, so the kernel will only use
APIAKey. We don't initialize or install the other 4 keys for the kernel
(only for userspace). Let me know if the commit message could be clearer
in some way.

> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Thanks for all the review!

Kristina
Dave Martin June 4, 2019, 10:03 a.m. UTC | #3
On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel
> will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently
> unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during
> fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from
> EL0.
> 
> A function that changes the key cannot return, so compile such functions
> without pointer auth (using __no_ptrauth which will be defined to a
> compiler function attribute later).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
> ---

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> index a97b7dc10bdb..79f35f5ecff5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
> @@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ struct ptrauth_key {
>  	unsigned long lo, hi;
>  };
>  
> -/*
> - * We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys
> - * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*().
> - */
>  struct ptrauth_keys {
>  	struct ptrauth_key apia;
>  	struct ptrauth_key apib;
> @@ -37,16 +33,18 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {
>  	struct ptrauth_key apga;
>  };

Do we need all this struct for the kernel thread case?

It may be a bit pointless trying to optimise this, though.

[...]

Cheers
---Dave
Catalin Marinas June 6, 2019, 4:44 p.m. UTC | #4
On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:

>  - Added ISB after key install in kernel_exit, in case in the future C function
>    calls are added after the macro
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> index e3bfddfe80b6..f595da9661a4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> @@ -25,11 +25,24 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB]
>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> +	isb
>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>  alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH
>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA]
>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> +	isb
> +alternative_else_nop_endif

I couldn't find the previous discussions, so why are the ISBs needed
here? Is this macro not invoked only on the kernel_exit path?
Kristina Martsenko June 12, 2019, 4:21 p.m. UTC | #5
On 06/06/2019 17:44, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> 
>>  - Added ISB after key install in kernel_exit, in case in the future C function
>>    calls are added after the macro
> [...]
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
>> index e3bfddfe80b6..f595da9661a4 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
>> @@ -25,11 +25,24 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
>>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB]
>>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
>> +	isb
>>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>>  alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH
>>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA]
>>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
>>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
>> +	isb
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> 
> I couldn't find the previous discussions, so why are the ISBs needed
> here? Is this macro not invoked only on the kernel_exit path?

It is invoked only in kernel_exit. There weren't any previous
discussions, I just started thinking that in the future someone could
add a call to a C function in kernel_exit after this macro (there are a
few C calls in kernel_exit already). If the function is compiled with
ptrauth instructions, and the above key system register writes take
effect in the middle of the function, then authentication would fail,
because we would enter the function with one key but exit with another.

This is probably overly cautious, so I'd be happy to remove the ISBs if
you prefer. Could also add a comment in kernel_exit. Also, thinking
about it now, we only use APIA key in the kernel, so the ISB after APGA
key is actually unnecessary, so I'll go ahead and remove that one.

Thanks,
Kristina
Catalin Marinas June 13, 2019, 10:44 a.m. UTC | #6
Hi Kristina,

On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 05:21:20PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> On 06/06/2019 17:44, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 08:03:30PM +0100, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
> > 
> >>  - Added ISB after key install in kernel_exit, in case in the future C function
> >>    calls are added after the macro
> > [...]
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> >> index e3bfddfe80b6..f595da9661a4 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
> >> @@ -25,11 +25,24 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
> >>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB]
> >>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
> >>  	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> >> +	isb
> >>  alternative_else_nop_endif
> >>  alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH
> >>  	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA]
> >>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
> >>  	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
> >> +	isb
> >> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> > 
> > I couldn't find the previous discussions, so why are the ISBs needed
> > here? Is this macro not invoked only on the kernel_exit path?
> 
> It is invoked only in kernel_exit. There weren't any previous
> discussions, I just started thinking that in the future someone could
> add a call to a C function in kernel_exit after this macro (there are a
> few C calls in kernel_exit already). If the function is compiled with
> ptrauth instructions, and the above key system register writes take
> effect in the middle of the function, then authentication would fail,
> because we would enter the function with one key but exit with another.

You are right if there are subsequent function calls after this but I
don't think we should allow them. For example, you already restored the
keys to the user ones, do we want to run further kernel code with the
user keys?

> This is probably overly cautious, so I'd be happy to remove the ISBs if
> you prefer. Could also add a comment in kernel_exit. Also, thinking
> about it now, we only use APIA key in the kernel, so the ISB after APGA
> key is actually unnecessary, so I'll go ahead and remove that one.

I think it's better if we just add a comment in the kernel_exit(),
something along the lines of no function calls after this point. IIRC,
we only have the ssbd macro after this followed by register restoring
(you could as well move the ptrauth key restoration after the apply_ssbd
one.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
index e3bfddfe80b6..f595da9661a4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h
@@ -25,11 +25,24 @@  alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
 	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APDB]
 	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
 	msr_s	SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
+	isb
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH
 	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APGA]
 	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
 	msr_s	SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
+	isb
+alternative_else_nop_endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
+	mov	\tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL
+	add	\tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1
+alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH
+	ldp	\tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KEY_APIA]
+	msr_s	SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2
+	msr_s	SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3
+	isb
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.endm
 
@@ -38,6 +51,9 @@  alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
 	.endm
 
+	.macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
+	.endm
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
 
 #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
index a97b7dc10bdb..79f35f5ecff5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@  struct ptrauth_key {
 	unsigned long lo, hi;
 };
 
-/*
- * We give each process its own keys, which are shared by all threads. The keys
- * are inherited upon fork(), and reinitialised upon exec*().
- */
 struct ptrauth_keys {
 	struct ptrauth_key apia;
 	struct ptrauth_key apib;
@@ -37,16 +33,18 @@  struct ptrauth_keys {
 	struct ptrauth_key apga;
 };
 
-static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
+static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys, bool user)
 {
 	if (system_supports_address_auth()) {
 		get_random_bytes(&keys->apia, sizeof(keys->apia));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
-		get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		if (user) {
+			get_random_bytes(&keys->apib, sizeof(keys->apib));
+			get_random_bytes(&keys->apda, sizeof(keys->apda));
+			get_random_bytes(&keys->apdb, sizeof(keys->apdb));
+		}
 	}
 
-	if (system_supports_generic_auth())
+	if (system_supports_generic_auth() && user)
 		get_random_bytes(&keys->apga, sizeof(keys->apga));
 }
 
@@ -57,6 +55,15 @@  do {								\
 	write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1);	\
 } while (0)
 
+static inline void __no_ptrauth ptrauth_keys_switch(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
+{
+	if (!system_supports_address_auth())
+		return;
+
+	__ptrauth_key_install(APIA, keys->apia);
+	isb();
+}
+
 static inline void __no_ptrauth ptrauth_cpu_enable(void)
 {
 	if (!system_supports_address_auth())
@@ -82,7 +89,11 @@  static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
 }
 
 #define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)					\
-	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user)
+	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user, true)
+#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(tsk)					\
+	ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel, false)
+#define ptrauth_thread_switch(tsk)					\
+	ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)
 
 #else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
 #define __no_ptrauth
@@ -90,6 +101,8 @@  static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
 #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(tsk, arg)	(-EINVAL)
 #define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(lr)	(lr)
 #define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)
+#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(tsk)
+#define ptrauth_thread_switch(tsk)
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
 
 #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
index 5d9ce62bdebd..f7684a021ca2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@  struct thread_struct {
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	struct ptrauth_keys	keys_user;
+	struct ptrauth_keys	keys_kernel;
 #endif
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index edc471e4acb1..7dfebecd387d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@  int main(void)
   DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
   DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user));
+  DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));
 #endif
   BLANK();
   DEFINE(S_X0,			offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 73a28d88f78d..001d508cd63f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@  alternative_cb_end
 
 	apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23
 
+	ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23
 	.else
 	add	x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE
 	get_current_task tsk
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
index 95985be67891..4ca141b8c581 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@  int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!arg) {
-		ptrauth_keys_init(keys);
+		ptrauth_keys_init(keys, true);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index a9b30111b725..890d7185641b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@  int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
 	 */
 	fpsimd_flush_task_state(p);
 
+	ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(p);
+
 	if (likely(!(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
 		*childregs = *current_pt_regs();
 		childregs->regs[0] = 0;
@@ -481,6 +483,7 @@  __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
 	contextidr_thread_switch(next);
 	entry_task_switch(next);
 	uao_thread_switch(next);
+	ptrauth_thread_switch(next);
 
 	/*
 	 * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
index eca6aa05ac66..c5a6f3e8660b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@  asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 */
 	check_local_cpu_capabilities();
 
+	ptrauth_thread_switch(current);
 	ptrauth_cpu_enable();
 
 	if (cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot)
@@ -456,6 +457,8 @@  void __init __no_ptrauth smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
 	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
 		init_gic_priority_masking();
 
+	ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(current);
+	ptrauth_thread_switch(current);
 	ptrauth_cpu_enable();
 }