| Message ID | a386925835e49d319e70c4d7404b1f6c3c2e3702.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v2,1/8] x86/vsyscall: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation | expand |
On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 09:45:08PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > The vDSO is only configurable by command-line options, so make its > global variables __ro_after_init. This seems highly unlikely to > ever stop an exploit, but I think it's nice anyway. > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> > Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > index 9c58ab807aeb..07003f3f1bfc 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > #include "vsyscall_trace.h" > > -static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode = > +static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init = > #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE > NONE; > #elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) > @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma) > static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = { > .name = gate_vma_name, > }; > -static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma = { > +static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = { > .vm_start = VSYSCALL_ADDR, > .vm_end = VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE, > .vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, > -- > 2.21.0 >
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index 9c58ab807aeb..07003f3f1bfc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "vsyscall_trace.h" -static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode = +static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init = #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE NONE; #elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma) static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = { .name = gate_vma_name, }; -static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma = { +static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = { .vm_start = VSYSCALL_ADDR, .vm_end = VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE, .vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
The vDSO is only configurable by command-line options, so make its global variables __ro_after_init. This seems highly unlikely to ever stop an exploit, but I think it's nice anyway. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)