| Message ID | 20190823021009.3880-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | x86/sgx: Pass userspace source address directly to EADD | expand |
Applied. /Jarkko On Thu, 2019-08-22 at 19:10 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Invoke EADD with the userspace source address instead of first copying > the data to a kernel page to avoid the overhead of alloc_page() and > copy_from_user(). > > Remove all pre-validation of TCS pages. The source page is no longer > readily available since it's not copied into the kernel, and validating > the TCS essentially requires accessing the entire page since the vast > majority of the TCS is reserved bytes. Given that userspace can now > cause EADD to fault simply by passing a bad pointer, validating the TCS > to avoid faults on EADD provides little to no value. > > Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 148 ++++++------------------- > 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c > index 85e36e530baf..f02b31acd3ad 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c > @@ -305,71 +305,46 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) > return 0; > } > > -static bool sgx_validate_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset) > -{ > - if (offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) > - return false; > - > - if (offset >= encl->size) > - return false; > - > - return true; > -} > - > -static int sgx_validate_tcs(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_tcs *tcs) > -{ > - int i; > - > - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->ssa_offset)) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->fs_offset)) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->gs_offset)) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if ((tcs->fs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - if ((tcs->gs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - for (i = 0; i < SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE; i++) > - if (tcs->reserved[i]) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - return 0; > -} > - > static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, > struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, > struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, > - void *data, > - struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, > - unsigned long mrmask) > + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src, > + unsigned long prot, unsigned long mrmask) > { > struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; > + struct vm_area_struct *vma; > int ret; > int i; > > pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); > pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page); > pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; > - pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)data; > + pginfo.contents = src; > > + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + > + /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ > + if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) { > + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); > + if (!vma) { > + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { > + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + return -EACCES; > + } > + } > + > + __uaccess_begin(); > ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_epc_addr(epc_page)); > - if (ret) { > - if (encls_failed(ret)) > - ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EADD"); > + __uaccess_end(); > + > + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > + > + if (ret) > return -EFAULT; > - } > > for_each_set_bit(i, &mrmask, 16) { > ret = __eextend(sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), > @@ -389,9 +364,9 @@ static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, > return 0; > } > > -static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, > - void *data, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, > - unsigned int mrmask, unsigned long prot) > +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, > + struct sgx_enclave_add_page *addp, > + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long prot) > { > u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; > struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; > @@ -399,13 +374,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, > struct sgx_va_page *va_page; > int ret; > > - if (page_type == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) { > - ret = sgx_validate_tcs(encl, data); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - } > - > - encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr, prot, page_type); > + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addp->addr, prot, page_type); > if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) > return PTR_ERR(encl_page); > > @@ -428,8 +397,8 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, > if (ret) > goto err_out_shrink; > > - ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, data, secinfo, > - mrmask); > + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, > + addp->src, prot, addp->mrmask); > if (ret) > goto err_out; > > @@ -451,36 +420,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, > return ret; > } > > -static int sgx_encl_page_import_user(void *dst, unsigned long src, > - unsigned long prot) > -{ > - struct vm_area_struct *vma; > - int ret = 0; > - > - down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > - > - /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ > - if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { > - vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); > - if (!vma) { > - ret = -EFAULT; > - goto out; > - } > - > - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { > - ret = -EACCES; > - goto out; > - } > - } > - > - if (copy_from_user(dst, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE)) > - ret = -EFAULT; > - > -out: > - up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > - return ret; > -} > - > /** > * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE > * > @@ -502,10 +441,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) > struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; > struct sgx_enclave_add_page addp; > struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; > - struct page *data_page; > unsigned long prot; > - void *data; > - int ret; > > if (!(encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -527,12 +463,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) > if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) > return -EINVAL; > > - data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); > - if (!data_page) > - return -ENOMEM; > - > - data = kmap(data_page); > - > /* Set prot bits matching to the SECINFO permissions. */ > prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | > _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | > @@ -546,19 +476,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) > if ((secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) > prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; > > - ret = sgx_encl_page_import_user(data, addp.src, prot); > - if (ret) > - goto out; > - > - ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.addr, data, &secinfo, addp.mrmask, > - prot); > - if (ret) > - goto out; > - > -out: > - kunmap(data_page); > - __free_page(data_page); > - return ret; > + return sgx_encl_add_page(encl, &addp, &secinfo, prot); > } > > static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 07:10:09PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Invoke EADD with the userspace source address instead of first copying > the data to a kernel page to avoid the overhead of alloc_page() and > copy_from_user(). > > Remove all pre-validation of TCS pages. The source page is no longer > readily available since it's not copied into the kernel, and validating > the TCS essentially requires accessing the entire page since the vast > majority of the TCS is reserved bytes. Given that userspace can now > cause EADD to fault simply by passing a bad pointer, validating the TCS > to avoid faults on EADD provides little to no value. > > Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> I already merged this to my tree but just realized that the commit message does not address why get_user_pages() is no option. /Jarkko
On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 09:32:06AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 07:10:09PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > Invoke EADD with the userspace source address instead of first copying > > the data to a kernel page to avoid the overhead of alloc_page() and > > copy_from_user(). > > > > Remove all pre-validation of TCS pages. The source page is no longer > > readily available since it's not copied into the kernel, and validating > > the TCS essentially requires accessing the entire page since the vast > > majority of the TCS is reserved bytes. Given that userspace can now > > cause EADD to fault simply by passing a bad pointer, validating the TCS > > to avoid faults on EADD provides little to no value. > > > > Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > > I already merged this to my tree but just realized that the commit > message does not address why get_user_pages() is no option. AFAICT, gup() would also work, but I don't think it gains us anything, e.g. validating the TCS still doesn't work because nothing prevents userspace from scribbling the TCS page after it's checked by the kernel. If we run into a scenario where we need to check the TCS, e.g. to prevent using a feature the kernel doesn't support, then we'd have no choice but to copy it into kernel memory[*]. Going with gup() would be a little more code, and maybe an imperceptibly small performance hit, but otherwise the two options are more or less the same. I (obviously) have a slight preference for passing the userspace address directly to EADD, but I'm ok with either approach unless the gup code ends up being particularly ugly. [*] While typing this out I realized we *must* copy the SECS into kernel memory for ECREATE, otherwise the kernel would be susceptible to TOCTOU attacks on the allowed attributes. Probably worth a comment.
On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 06:20:49PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 09:32:06AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 07:10:09PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > Invoke EADD with the userspace source address instead of first copying > > > the data to a kernel page to avoid the overhead of alloc_page() and > > > copy_from_user(). > > > > > > Remove all pre-validation of TCS pages. The source page is no longer > > > readily available since it's not copied into the kernel, and validating > > > the TCS essentially requires accessing the entire page since the vast > > > majority of the TCS is reserved bytes. Given that userspace can now > > > cause EADD to fault simply by passing a bad pointer, validating the TCS > > > to avoid faults on EADD provides little to no value. > > > > > > Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > > > > I already merged this to my tree but just realized that the commit > > message does not address why get_user_pages() is no option. > > AFAICT, gup() would also work, but I don't think it gains us anything, > e.g. validating the TCS still doesn't work because nothing prevents > userspace from scribbling the TCS page after it's checked by the kernel. > If we run into a scenario where we need to check the TCS, e.g. to prevent > using a feature the kernel doesn't support, then we'd have no choice but > to copy it into kernel memory[*]. > > Going with gup() would be a little more code, and maybe an imperceptibly > small performance hit, but otherwise the two options are more or less the > same. > > I (obviously) have a slight preference for passing the userspace address > directly to EADD, but I'm ok with either approach unless the gup code ends > up being particularly ugly. > > [*] While typing this out I realized we *must* copy the SECS into kernel > memory for ECREATE, otherwise the kernel would be susceptible to > TOCTOU attacks on the allowed attributes. Probably worth a comment. Lets stick to what was merged. /Jarkko
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c index 85e36e530baf..f02b31acd3ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c @@ -305,71 +305,46 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) return 0; } -static bool sgx_validate_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset) -{ - if (offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) - return false; - - if (offset >= encl->size) - return false; - - return true; -} - -static int sgx_validate_tcs(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_tcs *tcs) -{ - int i; - - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK) - return -EINVAL; - - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->ssa_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->fs_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->gs_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if ((tcs->fs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) - return -EINVAL; - - if ((tcs->gs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) - return -EINVAL; - - for (i = 0; i < SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE; i++) - if (tcs->reserved[i]) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; -} - static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, - void *data, - struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, - unsigned long mrmask) + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long mrmask) { struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; int ret; int i; pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page); pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; - pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)data; + pginfo.contents = src; + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + + /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ + if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) { + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); + if (!vma) { + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + return -EACCES; + } + } + + __uaccess_begin(); ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_epc_addr(epc_page)); - if (ret) { - if (encls_failed(ret)) - ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EADD"); + __uaccess_end(); + + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + + if (ret) return -EFAULT; - } for_each_set_bit(i, &mrmask, 16) { ret = __eextend(sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), @@ -389,9 +364,9 @@ static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, return 0; } -static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, - void *data, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, - unsigned int mrmask, unsigned long prot) +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_enclave_add_page *addp, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long prot) { u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; @@ -399,13 +374,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, struct sgx_va_page *va_page; int ret; - if (page_type == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) { - ret = sgx_validate_tcs(encl, data); - if (ret) - return ret; - } - - encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr, prot, page_type); + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addp->addr, prot, page_type); if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) return PTR_ERR(encl_page); @@ -428,8 +397,8 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, if (ret) goto err_out_shrink; - ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, data, secinfo, - mrmask); + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + addp->src, prot, addp->mrmask); if (ret) goto err_out; @@ -451,36 +420,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, return ret; } -static int sgx_encl_page_import_user(void *dst, unsigned long src, - unsigned long prot) -{ - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - int ret = 0; - - down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); - - /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ - if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { - vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); - if (!vma) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { - ret = -EACCES; - goto out; - } - } - - if (copy_from_user(dst, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE)) - ret = -EFAULT; - -out: - up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); - return ret; -} - /** * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE * @@ -502,10 +441,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; struct sgx_enclave_add_page addp; struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; - struct page *data_page; unsigned long prot; - void *data; - int ret; if (!(encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)) return -EINVAL; @@ -527,12 +463,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) return -EINVAL; - data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); - if (!data_page) - return -ENOMEM; - - data = kmap(data_page); - /* Set prot bits matching to the SECINFO permissions. */ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | @@ -546,19 +476,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) if ((secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - ret = sgx_encl_page_import_user(data, addp.src, prot); - if (ret) - goto out; - - ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.addr, data, &secinfo, addp.mrmask, - prot); - if (ret) - goto out; - -out: - kunmap(data_page); - __free_page(data_page); - return ret; + return sgx_encl_add_page(encl, &addp, &secinfo, prot); } static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
Invoke EADD with the userspace source address instead of first copying the data to a kernel page to avoid the overhead of alloc_page() and copy_from_user(). Remove all pre-validation of TCS pages. The source page is no longer readily available since it's not copied into the kernel, and validating the TCS essentially requires accessing the entire page since the vast majority of the TCS is reserved bytes. Given that userspace can now cause EADD to fault simply by passing a bad pointer, validating the TCS to avoid faults on EADD provides little to no value. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 148 ++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)