| Message ID | e68be109-7174-2c9e-11a9-9770a6316834@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand |
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and > namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the > access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of > CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials > and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem > remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN > usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to > CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 68e21e828893..5cbfc06c56b3 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT); diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 3f1f77de7247..46464367c47a 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -11205,7 +11205,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } if (attr.namespaces) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; }
Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> --- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)