| Message ID | 20210415221419.31835-31-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack | expand |
On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 03:14:19PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: > an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). > Each has its advantages and compromises. > > An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 > arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be > passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in > registers [1], but no active discussion on that. > > A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame > work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of > mmap()/mprotect(). > > The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of Maybe PROT_SHADOW_STACK? > existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to > VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing > the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one > would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the > attacker would have to get to the syscall first. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/ > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > --- > v24: > - Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to > arch_validate_prot(). > - Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to > arch_validate_flags(). > - Add arch_validate_flags(). > > arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + > include/linux/mm.h | 1 + > 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > index 629f6c81263a..1821c179f35d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h > @@ -20,11 +20,68 @@ > ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ > ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) > > -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ > +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ > ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ > ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) > +#else > +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0) > #endif > > +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, > + unsigned long pkey) > +{ > + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey); > + > + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) > + vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK; > + > + return vm_prot_bits; > +} > + > +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK > +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) > +{ > + unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM | > + PROT_SHSTK; > + > + if (prot & ~valid) > + return false; > + > + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) { > + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only > + * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write > + * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually > + * exclusive. > + */ > + if (prot & PROT_WRITE) > + return false; > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot > + > +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon) > +{ > + if (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) { > + if ((vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || !is_anon) VM_SHARED check is redundant. vma_is_anonymous() should be enough. Anonymous shared mappings would fail vma_is_anonymous(). > + return false; > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > +#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) > + > +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */ > + > #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > index 3ce1923e6ed9..39bb7db344a6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > > #define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */ > > +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */ > > #include <asm-generic/mman.h> > > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); > > #if defined(CONFIG_X86) > # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ > +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHADOW_STACK > #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) > # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ > #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC) > -- > 2.21.0 > >
On 4/25/2021 11:52 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 03:14:19PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: >> There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: >> an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). >> Each has its advantages and compromises. >> >> An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 >> arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be >> passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in >> registers [1], but no active discussion on that. >> >> A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame >> work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of >> mmap()/mprotect(). >> >> The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of > > Maybe PROT_SHADOW_STACK? > >> existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to >> VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing >> the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one >> would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the >> attacker would have to get to the syscall first. >> >> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/ >> >> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> >> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> >> --- >> v24: >> - Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to >> arch_validate_prot(). >> - Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to >> arch_validate_flags(). >> - Add arch_validate_flags(). >> >> arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + >> include/linux/mm.h | 1 + >> 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h >> index 629f6c81263a..1821c179f35d 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h [...] >> + >> +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot >> + >> +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon) >> +{ >> + if (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) { >> + if ((vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || !is_anon) > > VM_SHARED check is redundant. vma_is_anonymous() should be enough. > Anonymous shared mappings would fail vma_is_anonymous(). > Thanks for looking into this. I will update and send another version. Yu-cheng
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h index 629f6c81263a..1821c179f35d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h @@ -20,11 +20,68 @@ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0) #endif +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, + unsigned long pkey) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey); + + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) + vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK; + + return vm_prot_bits; +} + +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM | + PROT_SHSTK; + + if (prot & ~valid) + return false; + + if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) { + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) + return false; + + /* + * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only + * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write + * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually + * exclusive. + */ + if (prot & PROT_WRITE) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot + +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon) +{ + if (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) { + if ((vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || !is_anon) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */ + #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h index 3ce1923e6ed9..39bb7db344a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */ #include <asm-generic/mman.h> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #if defined(CONFIG_X86) # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHADOW_STACK #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises. An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that. A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect(). The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- v24: - Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to arch_validate_prot(). - Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to arch_validate_flags(). - Add arch_validate_flags(). arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + include/linux/mm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)