@@ -4951,7 +4951,13 @@ using this ioctl.
:Architectures: x86
:Type: vm ioctl
:Parameters: struct kvm_pmu_event_filter (in)
-:Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+:Returns: 0 on success,
+ -EFAULT args[0] cannot be accessed.
+ -EINVAL args[0] contains invalid data in the filter or events field.
+ Note: event validation is only done for modes where
+ the flags field is non-zero.
+ -E2BIG nevents is too large.
+ -ENOMEM not enough memory to allocate the filter.
::
@@ -4964,14 +4970,42 @@ using this ioctl.
__u64 events[0];
};
-This ioctl restricts the set of PMU events that the guest can program.
-The argument holds a list of events which will be allowed or denied.
-The eventsel+umask of each event the guest attempts to program is compared
-against the events field to determine whether the guest should have access.
+This ioctl restricts the set of PMU events the guest can program. The
+argument holds a list of events which will be allowed or denied.
+
The events field only controls general purpose counters; fixed purpose
counters are controlled by the fixed_counter_bitmap.
-No flags are defined yet, the field must be zero.
+Valid values for 'flags'::
+
+``0``
+
+This is the default behavior for the pmu event filter, and used when the
+flags field is clear. In this mode the eventsel+umask for the event the
+guest is attempting to program is compared against each event in the events
+field to determine whether the guest should have access to it.
+
+``KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS``
+
+In this mode each event in the events field will be encoded with mask, match,
+and invert values in addition to an eventsel. These encoded events will be
+matched against the event the guest is attempting to program to determine
+whether the guest should have access to it. When matching an encoded event
+with a guest event these steps are followed:
+ 1. Match the encoded eventsel to the guest eventsel.
+ 2. If that matches, match the mask and match values from the encoded event to
+ the guest's unit mask (ie: unit_mask & mask == match).
+ 3. If that matches, the guest is allow to program the event if its an allow
+ list or the guest is not allow to program the event if its a deny list.
+ 4. If the invert value is set in the encoded event, reverse the meaning of #3
+ (ie: deny if its an allow list, allow if it's a deny list).
+
+To encode an event in the pmu_event_filter use
+KVM_PMU_EVENT_ENCODE_MASKED_EVENT().
+
+If a bit is set in an encoded event that is not apart of the bits used for
+eventsel, mask, match or invert a call to KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER will
+return -EINVAL.
Valid values for 'action'::
@@ -521,6 +521,14 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
#define KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW 0
#define KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY 1
+#define KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS (1u << 0)
+
+#define KVM_PMU_EVENT_ENCODE_MASKED_EVENT(select, mask, match, invert) \
+ ((select) & 0xfful) | (((select) & 0xf00ul) << 24) | \
+ (((mask) & 0xfful) << 24) | \
+ (((match) & 0xfful) << 8) | \
+ (((invert) & 0x1ul) << 23)
+
/* for KVM_{GET,SET,HAS}_DEVICE_ATTR */
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL 0 /* control group for the timestamp counter (TSC) */
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET 0 /* attribute for the TSC offset */
@@ -171,14 +171,99 @@ static bool pmc_resume_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
return true;
}
-static int cmp_u64(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+static inline u64 get_event(u64 eventsel)
{
- u64 a = *(u64 *)pa;
- u64 b = *(u64 *)pb;
+ return eventsel & AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+}
+static inline u8 get_unit_mask(u64 eventsel)
+{
+ return (eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
+}
+
+static inline u8 get_counter_mask(u64 eventsel)
+{
+ return (eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK) >> 24;
+}
+
+static inline bool get_invert_comparison(u64 eventsel)
+{
+ return !!(eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INV);
+}
+
+static inline int cmp_safe64(u64 a, u64 b)
+{
return (a > b) - (a < b);
}
+static int cmp_eventsel_event(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+{
+ return cmp_safe64(*(u64*)pa & AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT,
+ *(u64*)pb & AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT);
+}
+
+static int cmp_u64(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+{
+ return cmp_safe64(*(u64 *)pa,
+ *(u64 *)pb);
+}
+
+static bool is_match(u64 masked_event, u64 eventsel)
+{
+ u8 mask = get_counter_mask(masked_event);
+ u8 match = get_unit_mask(masked_event);
+ u8 unit_mask = get_unit_mask(eventsel);
+
+ return (unit_mask & mask) == match;
+}
+
+static bool is_event_allowed(u64 masked_event, u32 action)
+{
+ if (get_invert_comparison(masked_event))
+ return action != KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW;
+
+ return action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW;
+}
+
+static bool filter_masked_event(struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *filter,
+ u64 eventsel)
+{
+ u64 key = get_event(eventsel);
+ u64 *event, *evt;
+
+ event = bsearch(&key, filter->events, filter->nevents, sizeof(u64),
+ cmp_eventsel_event);
+
+ if(event) {
+ /* Walk the masked events backward looking for a match. */
+ for (evt = event; evt >= filter->events &&
+ get_event(*evt) == get_event(eventsel); evt--)
+ if (is_match(*evt, eventsel))
+ return is_event_allowed(*evt, filter->action);
+
+ /* Walk the masked events forward looking for a match. */
+ for (evt = event + 1;
+ evt < (filter->events + filter->nevents) &&
+ get_event(*evt) == get_event(eventsel); evt++)
+ if(is_match(*evt, eventsel))
+ return is_event_allowed(*evt, filter->action);
+ }
+
+ return filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY;
+}
+
+static bool filter_default_event(struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *filter,
+ u64 eventsel)
+{
+ u64 key = eventsel & AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB;
+
+ if (bsearch(&key, filter->events, filter->nevents,
+ sizeof(u64), cmp_u64))
+ return filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW;
+
+ return filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY;
+}
+
void reprogram_gp_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 eventsel)
{
u64 config;
@@ -200,14 +285,11 @@ void reprogram_gp_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 eventsel)
filter = srcu_dereference(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, &kvm->srcu);
if (filter) {
- __u64 key = eventsel & AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB;
-
- if (bsearch(&key, filter->events, filter->nevents,
- sizeof(__u64), cmp_u64))
- allow_event = filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW;
- else
- allow_event = filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY;
+ allow_event = (filter->flags & KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS) ?
+ filter_masked_event(filter, eventsel) :
+ filter_default_event(filter, eventsel);
}
+
if (!allow_event)
return;
@@ -548,8 +630,22 @@ void kvm_pmu_trigger_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 perf_hw_id)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pmu_trigger_event);
+int has_invalid_event(struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *filter)
+{
+ u64 event_mask;
+ int i;
+
+ event_mask = kvm_x86_ops.pmu_ops->get_event_mask(filter->flags);
+ for(i = 0; i < filter->nevents; i++)
+ if (filter->events[i] & ~event_mask)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
+ int (*cmp)(const void *a, const void *b) = cmp_u64;
struct kvm_pmu_event_filter tmp, *filter;
size_t size;
int r;
@@ -561,7 +657,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
tmp.action != KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY)
return -EINVAL;
- if (tmp.flags != 0)
+ if (tmp.flags & ~KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS)
return -EINVAL;
if (tmp.nevents > KVM_PMU_EVENT_FILTER_MAX_EVENTS)
@@ -579,10 +675,18 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
/* Ensure nevents can't be changed between the user copies. */
*filter = tmp;
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ /* To maintain backwards compatibility don't validate flags == 0. */
+ if (filter->flags != 0 && has_invalid_event(filter))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (filter->flags & KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS)
+ cmp = cmp_eventsel_event;
+
/*
* Sort the in-kernel list so that we can search it with bsearch.
*/
- sort(&filter->events, filter->nevents, sizeof(__u64), cmp_u64, NULL);
+ sort(&filter->events, filter->nevents, sizeof(u64), cmp, NULL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
filter = rcu_replace_pointer(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, filter,
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_ops {
void (*reset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*deliver_pmi)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*cleanup)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ u64 (*get_event_mask)(u32 flag);
};
static inline u64 pmc_bitmask(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
@@ -342,6 +342,17 @@ static void amd_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
+static u64 amd_pmu_get_event_mask(u32 flag)
+{
+ if (flag == KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS)
+ return AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INV |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK;
+ return AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK;
+}
+
struct kvm_pmu_ops amd_pmu_ops = {
.pmc_perf_hw_id = amd_pmc_perf_hw_id,
.pmc_is_enabled = amd_pmc_is_enabled,
@@ -355,4 +366,5 @@ struct kvm_pmu_ops amd_pmu_ops = {
.refresh = amd_pmu_refresh,
.init = amd_pmu_init,
.reset = amd_pmu_reset,
+ .get_event_mask = amd_pmu_get_event_mask,
};
@@ -719,6 +719,17 @@ static void intel_pmu_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
intel_pmu_release_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
}
+static u64 intel_pmu_get_event_mask(u32 flag)
+{
+ if (flag == KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS)
+ return ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INV |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_CMASK;
+ return ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+ ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK;
+}
+
struct kvm_pmu_ops intel_pmu_ops = {
.pmc_perf_hw_id = intel_pmc_perf_hw_id,
.pmc_is_enabled = intel_pmc_is_enabled,
@@ -734,4 +745,5 @@ struct kvm_pmu_ops intel_pmu_ops = {
.reset = intel_pmu_reset,
.deliver_pmi = intel_pmu_deliver_pmi,
.cleanup = intel_pmu_cleanup,
+ .get_event_mask = intel_pmu_get_event_mask,
};
When building an event list for the pmu event filter, fitting all the events in the limited space can be a challenge. It becomes particularly challenging when trying to include various unit mask combinations for a particular event the guest is allow to or not allow to program. Instead of increasing the size of the list to allow for these, add a new encoding in the pmu event filter's events field. These encoded events can then be used to test against the event the guest is attempting to program to determine if the guest should have access to it. The encoded values are: mask, match, and invert. When filtering events the mask is applied to the guest's unit mask to see if it matches the match value (ie: unit_mask & mask == match). If it does and the pmu event filter is an allow list the event is allowed, and denied if it's a deny list. Additionally, the result is reversed if the invert flag is set in the encoded event. This feature is enabled by setting the flags field to KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS. Events can be encoded by using KVM_PMU_EVENT_ENCODE_MASKED_EVENT(). It is an error to have a bit set outside valid encoded bits, and calls to KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER will return -EINVAL in such cases, including bits that are set in the high nybble[1] for AMD if called on Intel. [1] bits 35:32 in the event and bits 11:8 in the eventsel. Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Change-Id: I64a0d54f0215eb09f3bb9ecae5c2a6dbcec32f93 --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 46 ++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c | 12 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 12 +++ 6 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)