diff mbox series

[net-next,v2,10/10] crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES

Message ID 20230530141635.136968-11-dhowells@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Delegated to: Netdev Maintainers
Headers show
Series crypto, splice, net: Make AF_ALG handle sendmsg(MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
netdev/series_format success Posting correctly formatted
netdev/tree_selection success Clearly marked for net-next
netdev/fixes_present success Fixes tag not required for -next series
netdev/header_inline success No static functions without inline keyword in header files
netdev/build_32bit success Errors and warnings before: 8 this patch: 8
netdev/cc_maintainers success CCed 3 of 3 maintainers
netdev/build_clang success Errors and warnings before: 8 this patch: 8
netdev/verify_signedoff success Signed-off-by tag matches author and committer
netdev/deprecated_api success None detected
netdev/check_selftest success No net selftest shell script
netdev/verify_fixes success No Fixes tag
netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn success Errors and warnings before: 8 this patch: 8
netdev/checkpatch warning CHECK: Lines should not end with a '('
netdev/kdoc success Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0
netdev/source_inline success Was 0 now: 0

Commit Message

David Howells May 30, 2023, 2:16 p.m. UTC
Make AF_ALG sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES in the hashing code.  This
causes pages to be spliced from the source iterator if possible.

This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---

Notes:
    ver #2)
     - Fixed some checkpatch warnings.

 crypto/af_alg.c     |  11 +++--
 crypto/algif_hash.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

Comments

Herbert Xu June 6, 2023, 8:43 a.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 03:16:34PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> -	if (limit > sk->sk_sndbuf)
> -		limit = sk->sk_sndbuf;
> +	/* Don't limit to ALG_MAX_PAGES if the pages are all already pinned. */
> +	if (!user_backed_iter(&msg->msg_iter))
> +		max_pages = INT_MAX;
> +	else
> +		max_pages = min_t(size_t, max_pages,
> +				  DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));

What's the purpose of relaxing this limit? Even if there is a reason
for this shouldn't this be in a patch by itself?

Thanks,
David Howells June 6, 2023, 9:24 a.m. UTC | #2
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:

> > -	if (limit > sk->sk_sndbuf)
> > -		limit = sk->sk_sndbuf;
> > +	/* Don't limit to ALG_MAX_PAGES if the pages are all already pinned. */
> > +	if (!user_backed_iter(&msg->msg_iter))
> > +		max_pages = INT_MAX;

If the iov_iter is a kernel-backed type (BVEC, KVEC, XARRAY) then (a) all the
pages it refers to must already be pinned in memory and (b) the caller must
have limited it in some way (splice is limited by the pipe capacity, for
instance).  In which case, it seems pointless taking more than one pass of the
while loop if we can avoid it - at least from the point of view of memory
handling; granted there might be other criteria such as hogging crypto offload
hardware.

> > +	else
> > +		max_pages = min_t(size_t, max_pages,
> > +				  DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
> 
> What's the purpose of relaxing this limit?

If the iov_iter is a user-backed type (IOVEC or UBUF) then it's not relaxed.
max_pages is ALG_MAX_PAGES here (actually, I should just move that here so
that it's clearer).

I am, however, applying the sk_sndbuf limit here also - there's no point
extracting more pages than we need to if ALG_MAX_PAGES of whole pages would
overrun the byte limit.

> Even if there is a reason for this shouldn't this be in a patch by itself?

I suppose I could do it as a follow-on patch; use ALG_MAX_PAGES and sk_sndbuf
before that as for user-backed iterators.

Actually, is it worth paying attention to sk_sndbuf for kernel-backed
iterators?

David
Herbert Xu June 6, 2023, 9:30 a.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, Jun 06, 2023 at 10:24:55AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> If the iov_iter is a user-backed type (IOVEC or UBUF) then it's not relaxed.
> max_pages is ALG_MAX_PAGES here (actually, I should just move that here so
> that it's clearer).

Even if it's kernel memory they can't be freed during the hashing
operation, which could be long if the amount is large (or the algo
is slow).

The reason for the limit here is to stop a malicious user from
pinning an unlimited amount of memory by doing a hashing operation,
IOW a DoS attack.

So I think we should keep the limit as is.

Cheers,
David Howells June 6, 2023, 10:08 a.m. UTC | #4
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:

> So I think we should keep the limit as is.

Okay.

David
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index e2fc9051ba39..b78a399d0e19 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -542,9 +542,14 @@  void af_alg_free_sg(struct af_alg_sgl *sgl)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (sgl->need_unpin)
-		for (i = 0; i < sgl->sgt.nents; i++)
-			unpin_user_page(sg_page(&sgl->sgt.sgl[i]));
+	if (sgl->sgt.sgl) {
+		if (sgl->need_unpin)
+			for (i = 0; i < sgl->sgt.nents; i++)
+				unpin_user_page(sg_page(&sgl->sgt.sgl[i]));
+		if (sgl->sgt.sgl != sgl->sgl)
+			kvfree(sgl->sgt.sgl);
+		sgl->sgt.sgl = NULL;
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_free_sg);
 
diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 16c69c4b9c62..2f7a98b0eae3 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -63,78 +63,106 @@  static void hash_free_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
 static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			size_t ignored)
 {
-	int limit = ALG_MAX_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
 	struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
-	long copied = 0;
+	ssize_t copied = 0;
+	size_t len, max_pages = ALG_MAX_PAGES, npages;
+	bool continuing = ctx->more, need_init = false;
 	int err;
 
-	if (limit > sk->sk_sndbuf)
-		limit = sk->sk_sndbuf;
+	/* Don't limit to ALG_MAX_PAGES if the pages are all already pinned. */
+	if (!user_backed_iter(&msg->msg_iter))
+		max_pages = INT_MAX;
+	else
+		max_pages = min_t(size_t, max_pages,
+				  DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
-	if (!ctx->more) {
+	if (!continuing) {
 		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
 			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
-
-		err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req), &ctx->wait);
-		if (err)
-			goto unlock;
+		need_init = true;
 	}
 
 	ctx->more = false;
 
 	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
-		int len = msg_data_left(msg);
-
-		if (len > limit)
-			len = limit;
-
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0;
 
-		len = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, &ctx->sgl.sgt,
-					 ALG_MAX_PAGES, 0);
-		if (len < 0) {
-			err = copied ? 0 : len;
-			goto unlock;
+		err = -EIO;
+		npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages);
+		if (npages == 0)
+			goto unlock_free;
+
+		if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl =
+				kvmalloc(array_size(npages,
+						    sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)),
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)
+				goto unlock_free;
 		}
-		sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents);
+		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
 
 		ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
 
-		ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl, NULL, len);
+		err = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, LONG_MAX,
+					 &ctx->sgl.sgt, npages, 0);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto unlock_free;
+		len = err;
+		sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1);
 
-		err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req),
-				      &ctx->wait);
-		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
-		if (err) {
-			iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, len);
-			goto unlock;
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
+			err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
 		}
 
-		copied += len;
-	}
+		ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl,
+					ctx->result, len);
 
-	err = 0;
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg) && !continuing &&
+		    !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
+			err = crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req);
+		} else {
+			if (need_init) {
+				err = crypto_wait_req(
+					crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
+					&ctx->wait);
+				if (err)
+					goto unlock_free;
+				need_init = false;
+			}
+
+			if (msg_data_left(msg) || (msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
+				err = crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req);
+			else
+				err = crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->req);
+			continuing = true;
+		}
 
-	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
-	if (!ctx->more) {
-		err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
+		err = crypto_wait_req(err, &ctx->wait);
 		if (err)
-			goto unlock;
+			goto unlock_free;
 
-		ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0);
-		err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
-				      &ctx->wait);
+		copied += len;
+		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
 	}
 
+	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
+	err = 0;
 unlock:
 	release_sock(sk);
+	return copied ?: err;
 
-	return err ?: copied;
+unlock_free:
+	af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
+	goto unlock;
 }
 
 static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,