[07/12] spdm: Introduce library to authenticate devices

Commit Message

Lukas Wunner Sept. 28, 2023, 5:32 p.m. UTC

From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>

The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.

A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is attestation.

SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken between
host and attached devices over a variety of transports:

  https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274

This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest version).
It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already supports
two different SPDM-capable transports:

* PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
* Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
  Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)

Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:

* PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31)
* Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
* Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
  https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf

The initial focus of this implementation is enabling PCIe CMA device
authentication.  As such, only a subset of the SPDM specification is
contained herein, namely the request/response sequence GET_VERSION,
GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE
and CHALLENGE.

A simple API is provided for subsystems wishing to authenticate devices:
spdm_create(), spdm_authenticate() (can be called repeatedly for
reauthentication) and spdm_destroy().  Certificates presented by devices
are validated against an in-kernel keyring of trusted root certificates.
A pointer to the keyring is passed to spdm_create().

The set of supported cryptographic algorithms is limited to those
declared mandatory in PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3.  Adding more algorithms
is straightforward as long as the crypto subsystem supports them.

Future commits will extend this implementation with support for
measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions.

So far, only the SPDM requester role is implemented.  Care was taken to
allow for effortless addition of the responder role at a later stage.
This could be needed for a PCIe host bridge operating in endpoint mode.
The responder role will be able to reuse struct definitions and helpers
such as spdm_create_combined_prefix().  Those can be moved to
spdm_common.{h,c} files upon introduction of the responder role.
For now, all is kept in a single source file to avoid polluting the
global namespace with unnecessary symbols.

Credits:  Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this SPDM implementation.
Lukas reworked it for upstream.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
---
 MAINTAINERS          |    9 +
 include/linux/spdm.h |   35 +
 lib/Kconfig          |   15 +
 lib/Makefile         |    2 +
 lib/spdm_requester.c | 1487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/spdm.h
 create mode 100644 lib/spdm_requester.c

Comments

Ilpo Järvinen Oct. 3, 2023, 10:35 a.m. UTC | #1

On Thu, 28 Sep 2023, Lukas Wunner wrote:

> From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> 
> The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.
> 
> A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is attestation.
> 
> SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
> Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken between
> host and attached devices over a variety of transports:
> 
>   https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> 
> This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest version).
> It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already supports
> two different SPDM-capable transports:
> 
> * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
> * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
>   Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)
> 
> Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:
> 
> * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31)
> * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
> * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
>   https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf
> 
> The initial focus of this implementation is enabling PCIe CMA device
> authentication.  As such, only a subset of the SPDM specification is
> contained herein, namely the request/response sequence GET_VERSION,
> GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE
> and CHALLENGE.
> 
> A simple API is provided for subsystems wishing to authenticate devices:
> spdm_create(), spdm_authenticate() (can be called repeatedly for
> reauthentication) and spdm_destroy().  Certificates presented by devices
> are validated against an in-kernel keyring of trusted root certificates.
> A pointer to the keyring is passed to spdm_create().
> 
> The set of supported cryptographic algorithms is limited to those
> declared mandatory in PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3.  Adding more algorithms
> is straightforward as long as the crypto subsystem supports them.
> 
> Future commits will extend this implementation with support for
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions.
> 
> So far, only the SPDM requester role is implemented.  Care was taken to
> allow for effortless addition of the responder role at a later stage.
> This could be needed for a PCIe host bridge operating in endpoint mode.
> The responder role will be able to reuse struct definitions and helpers
> such as spdm_create_combined_prefix().  Those can be moved to
> spdm_common.{h,c} files upon introduction of the responder role.
> For now, all is kept in a single source file to avoid polluting the
> global namespace with unnecessary symbols.
> 
> Credits:  Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this SPDM implementation.
> Lukas reworked it for upstream.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS          |    9 +
>  include/linux/spdm.h |   35 +
>  lib/Kconfig          |   15 +
>  lib/Makefile         |    2 +
>  lib/spdm_requester.c | 1487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/spdm.h
>  create mode 100644 lib/spdm_requester.c
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 90f13281d297..2591d2217d65 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -19299,6 +19299,15 @@ M:	Security Officers <[e-mail]>
>  S:	Supported
>  F:	Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
>  
> +SECURITY PROTOCOL AND DATA MODEL (SPDM)
> +M:	Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> +M:	Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +S:	Maintained
> +F:	include/linux/spdm.h
> +F:	lib/spdm*
> +
>  SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
>  M:	Paul Moore <[e-mail]>
>  M:	James Morris <[e-mail]>
> diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e824063793a7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
> + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
> + *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SPDM_H_
> +#define _SPDM_H_
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct key;
> +struct device;
> +struct spdm_state;
> +
> +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
> +			     const void *request, size_t request_sz,
> +			     void *response, size_t response_sz);

This returns a length or an error, right? If so return ssize_t instead.

If you make this change, alter the caller types too.

> +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
> +			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
> +			       struct key *keyring);
> +
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
> index c686f4adc124..3516cf1dad16 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig
> @@ -764,3 +764,18 @@ config ASN1_ENCODER
>  
>  config POLYNOMIAL
>         tristate
> +
> +config SPDM_REQUESTER
> +	tristate
> +	select KEYS
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
> +	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
> +	help
> +	 The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
> +	 measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.  This
> +	 option enables support for the SPDM requester role.
> +
> +	 Crypto algorithms offered to SPDM responders are limited to those
> +	 enabled in .config.  Drivers selecting SPDM_REQUESTER need to also
> +	 select any algorithms they deem mandatory.
> diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> index 740109b6e2c8..d9ae58a9ca83 100644
> --- a/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/Makefile
> @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
>  
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SPDM_REQUESTER) += spdm_requester.o
> +
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
>  
>  hostprogs	:= gen_crc32table
> diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..407041036599
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1487 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
> + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
> + *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "SPDM: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
> +#include <linux/key.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/spdm.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/unaligned.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <crypto/public_key.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> +#include <keys/x509-parser.h>
> +
> +/* SPDM versions supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_MIN_VER 0x10
> +#define SPDM_MAX_VER 0x13
> +
> +#define SPDM_CACHE_CAP			BIT(0)		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_CERT_CAP			BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_CHAL_CAP			BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(4, 3)	    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_NO		0		    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS		1		    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS_SIG	2		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_MEAS_FRESH_CAP		BIT(5)		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_ENCRYPT_CAP		BIT(6)
> +#define SPDM_MAC_CAP			BIT(7)
> +#define SPDM_MUT_AUTH_CAP		BIT(8)
> +#define SPDM_KEY_EX_CAP			BIT(9)
> +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(11, 10)
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_NO		0
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK		1
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK_CTX		2		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_ENCAP_CAP			BIT(12)
> +#define SPDM_HBEAT_CAP			BIT(13)
> +#define SPDM_KEY_UPD_CAP		BIT(14)
> +#define SPDM_HANDSHAKE_ITC_CAP		BIT(15)
> +#define SPDM_PUB_KEY_ID_CAP		BIT(16)
> +#define SPDM_CHUNK_CAP			BIT(17)		/* 1.2 */
> +#define SPDM_ALIAS_CERT_CAP		BIT(18)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_SET_CERT_CAP		BIT(19)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_CSR_CAP			BIT(20)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_CERT_INST_RESET_CAP	BIT(21)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(23, 22) /* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP		1		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP_SIG	2		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_MEL_CAP			BIT(24)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +#define SPDM_EVENT_CAP			BIT(25)		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(27, 26)	/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_ONLY	1		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_SEL	2		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_GET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(28)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +#define SPDM_SET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(29)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +
> +/* SPDM capabilities supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
> +
> +/* SPDM capabilities required from responders */
> +#define SPDM_MIN_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
> +
> +/*
> + * SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation:
> + * Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals
> + * roughly 1 << 20.  That's within the limits mandated for responders by CMA
> + * (1 << 23 usec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3) and DOE (1 sec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30.2).
> + * Used in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + */
> +#define SPDM_CTEXPONENT			20
> +
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048		BIT(0)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_2048		BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072		BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_3072		BIT(3)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256	BIT(4)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096		BIT(5)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_4096		BIT(6)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384	BIT(7)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521	BIT(8)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256	BIT(9)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED25519		BIT(10)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED448		BIT(11)
> +
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_256		BIT(0)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_384		BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_512		BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_256		BIT(3)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_384		BIT(4)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_512		BIT(5)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SM3_256		BIT(6)
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSA			SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 |		\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 |		\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096 |
> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA			SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 |	\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 |
> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		SPDM_HASH_SHA_256 |
> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512		SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 |		\
> +					SPDM_HASH_SHA_512 |
> +#endif
> +
> +/* SPDM algorithms supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS		       (SPDM_ASYM_RSA			\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA	0)
> +
> +#define SPDM_HASH_ALGOS		       (SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		\
> +					SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512 0)
> +
> +/*
> + * Common header shared by all messages.
> + * Note that the meaning of param1 and param2 is message dependent.
> + */
> +struct spdm_header {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;  /* RequestResponseCode */
> +	u8 param1;
> +	u8 param2;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_REQ 0x80
> +#define SPDM_GET_VERSION 0x84

Align.

> +struct spdm_get_version_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1;
> +	u8 param2;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_get_version_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1;
> +	u8 param2;
> +
> +	u8 reserved;
> +	u8 version_number_entry_count;
> +	__le16 version_number_entries[];

__counted_by(version_number_entry_count) ?

> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES 0xE1

There's non-capital hex later in the file, please try to be consistent.

> +#define SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE 42 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 226 */
> +
> +/* For this exchange the request and response messages have the same form */
> +struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1;
> +	u8 param2;
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.0 structure */
> +
> +	u8 reserved1;
> +	u8 ctexponent;
> +	u16 reserved2;
> +
> +	__le32 flags;
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.1 structure */
> +
> +	__le32 data_transfer_size;			/* 1.2+ */
> +	__le32 max_spdm_msg_size;			/* 1.2+ */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS 0xE3
> +
> +struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Number of ReqAlgStruct entries at end */
> +	u8 param2;
> +
> +	__le16 length;
> +	u8 measurement_specification;
> +	u8 other_params_support;			/* 1.2+ */
> +
> +	__le32 base_asym_algo;
> +	__le32 base_hash_algo;
> +
> +	u8 reserved1[12];
> +	u8 ext_asym_count;
> +	u8 ext_hash_count;
> +	u8 reserved2;
> +	u8 mel_specification;				/* 1.3+ */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count
> +	 * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count
> +	 * - ReqAlgStruct: variable size * param1	 * 1.1+ *
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Number of RespAlgStruct entries at end */
> +	u8 param2;
> +
> +	__le16 length;
> +	u8 measurement_specification_sel;
> +	u8 other_params_sel;				/* 1.2+ */
> +
> +	__le32 measurement_hash_algo;
> +	__le32 base_asym_sel;
> +	__le32 base_hash_sel;
> +
> +	u8 reserved1[11];
> +	u8 mel_specification_sel;			/* 1.3+ */
> +	u8 ext_asym_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */
> +	u8 ext_hash_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */
> +	u8 reserved2[2];
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count
> +	 * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count
> +	 * - RespAlgStruct: variable size * param1	 * 1.1+ *
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_req_alg_struct {
> +	u8 alg_type;
> +	u8 alg_count; /* 0x2K where K is number of alg_external entries */
> +	__le16 alg_supported; /* Size is in alg_count[7:4], always 2 */
> +	__le32 alg_external[];
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_GET_DIGESTS 0x81
> +
> +struct spdm_get_digests_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Reserved */
> +	u8 param2; /* Reserved */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_get_digests_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* SupportedSlotMask */		/* 1.3+ */
> +	u8 param2; /* ProvisionedSlotMask */
> +	u8 digests[]; /* Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for each slot */
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * (omitted as long as we do not advertise MULTI_KEY_CAP)
> +	 * - KeyPairID: 1 byte for each slot		 * 1.3+ *
> +	 * - CertificateInfo: 1 byte for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
> +	 * - KeyUsageMask: 2 bytes for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE 0x82
> +#define SPDM_SLOTS 8 /* SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1 */
> +
> +struct spdm_get_certificate_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* SlotSizeRequested */		/* 1.3+ */
> +	__le16 offset;
> +	__le16 length;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* CertModel */			/* 1.3+ */
> +	__le16 portion_length;
> +	__le16 remainder_length;
> +	u8 cert_chain[]; /* PortionLength long */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_cert_chain {
> +	__le16 length;
> +	u8 reserved[2];
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - RootHash: Digest of Root Certificate
> +	 * - Certificates: Chain of ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_CHALLENGE 0x83
> +#define SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA 1024 /* SPDM 1.0.0 table 21 */
> +
> +struct spdm_challenge_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* MeasurementSummaryHash type */
> +	u8 nonce[32];
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */
> +
> +	u8 context[8];					/* 1.3+ */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_challenge_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* Slot mask */
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - CertChainHash: Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for selected slot
> +	 * - Nonce: 32 bytes long
> +	 * - MeasurementSummaryHash: Optional hash of selected measurements
> +	 * - OpaqueDataLength: 2 bytes long
> +	 * - OpaqueData: Up to 1024 bytes long
> +	 * - RequesterContext: 8 bytes long		 * 1.3+ *
> +	 * - Signature
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_ERROR 0x7f
> +
> +enum spdm_error_code {
> +	spdm_invalid_request = 0x01,
> +	spdm_invalid_session = 0x02,			/* 1.1 only */
> +	spdm_busy = 0x03,
> +	spdm_unexpected_request = 0x04,
> +	spdm_unspecified = 0x05,
> +	spdm_decrypt_error = 0x06,
> +	spdm_unsupported_request = 0x07,
> +	spdm_request_in_flight = 0x08,
> +	spdm_invalid_response_code = 0x09,
> +	spdm_session_limit_exceeded = 0x0a,
> +	spdm_session_required = 0x0b,
> +	spdm_reset_required = 0x0c,
> +	spdm_response_too_large = 0x0d,
> +	spdm_request_too_large = 0x0e,
> +	spdm_large_response = 0x0f,
> +	spdm_message_lost = 0x10,
> +	spdm_invalid_policy = 0x11,			/* 1.3+ */
> +	spdm_version_mismatch = 0x41,
> +	spdm_response_not_ready = 0x42,
> +	spdm_request_resynch = 0x43,
> +	spdm_operation_failed = 0x44,			/* 1.3+ */
> +	spdm_no_pending_requests = 0x45,		/* 1.3+ */
> +	spdm_vendor_defined_error = 0xff,

Align values.

So SPDM_ERROR is in caps but the error codes aren't?

> +};
> +
> +struct spdm_error_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	enum spdm_error_code error_code:8;

Is this always going to produce the layout you want given the alignment 
requirements for the storage unit for u8 and enum are probably different?

> +	u8 error_data;
> +
> +	u8 extended_error_data[];
> +} __packed;
> +
> +static int spdm_err(struct device *dev, struct spdm_error_rsp *rsp)
> +{
> +	switch (rsp->error_code) {
> +	case spdm_invalid_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid request\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_invalid_session:
> +		if (rsp->version == 0x11) {
> +			dev_err(dev, "Invalid session %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +		break;
> +	case spdm_busy:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Busy\n");
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	case spdm_unexpected_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unexpected request\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_unspecified:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unspecified error\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_decrypt_error:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Decrypt error\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	case spdm_unsupported_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported request %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_request_in_flight:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request in flight\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_invalid_response_code:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid response code\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_session_limit_exceeded:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Session limit exceeded\n");
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	case spdm_session_required:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Session required\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_reset_required:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Reset required\n");
> +		return -ERESTART;

Is it really good to use this return code? Isn't there even some special 
handling for it, hopefully it never leaks to anything that will take it as 
special.

If these occur (this and the one below) after there was an existing 
session, -EPIPE would be one potential alternative which kinda matches 
what's going on. If that's not acceptable perhaps some connection oriented 
return codes would be close enough (session is conceptually close to 
connection anyway).

> +	case spdm_response_too_large:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Response too large\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_request_too_large:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request too large\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_large_response:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Large response\n");
> +		return -EMSGSIZE;
> +	case spdm_message_lost:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Message lost\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	case spdm_invalid_policy:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid policy\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_version_mismatch:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Version mismatch\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_response_not_ready:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Response not ready\n");
> +		return -EINPROGRESS;
> +	case spdm_request_resynch:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request resynchronization\n");
> +		return -ERESTART;
> +	case spdm_operation_failed:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Operation failed\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_no_pending_requests:
> +		return -ENOENT;
> +	case spdm_vendor_defined_error:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Vendor defined error\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	dev_err(dev, "Undefined error %#x\n", rsp->error_code);
> +	return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * struct spdm_state - SPDM session state
> + *
> + * @lock: Serializes multiple concurrent spdm_authenticate() calls.
> + * @authenticated: Whether device was authenticated successfully.
> + * @dev: Transport device.  Used for error reporting and passed to @transport.
> + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange.
> + * @transport_priv: Transport private data.
> + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes).
> + *	Used as DataTransferSize in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + * @version: Maximum common supported version of requester and responder.
> + *	Negotiated during GET_VERSION exchange.
> + * @responder_caps: Cached capabilities of responder.
> + *	Received during GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + * @base_asym_alg: Asymmetric key algorithm for signature verification of
> + *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
> + *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
> + * @base_hash_alg: Hash algorithm for signature verification of
> + *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
> + *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
> + * @slot_mask: Bitmask of populated certificate slots in the responder.
> + *	Received during GET_DIGESTS exchange.
> + * @base_asym_enc: Human-readable name of @base_asym_alg's signature encoding.
> + *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling verify_signature().
> + * @s: Signature length of @base_asym_alg (in bytes).  S or SigLen in SPDM
> + *	specification.
> + * @base_hash_alg_name: Human-readable name of @base_hash_alg.
> + *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling crypto_alloc_shash() and
> + *	verify_signature().
> + * @shash: Synchronous hash handle for @base_hash_alg computation.
> + * @desc: Synchronous hash context for @base_hash_alg computation.
> + * @h: Hash length of @base_hash_alg (in bytes).  H in SPDM specification.
> + * @leaf_key: Public key portion of leaf certificate against which to check
> + *	responder's signatures.
> + * @root_keyring: Keyring against which to check the first certificate in
> + *	responder's certificate chain.
> + */
> +struct spdm_state {
> +	struct mutex lock;
> +	unsigned int authenticated:1;
> +
> +	/* Transport */
> +	struct device *dev;
> +	spdm_transport *transport;
> +	void *transport_priv;
> +	u32 transport_sz;
> +
> +	/* Negotiated state */
> +	u8 version;
> +	u32 responder_caps;
> +	u32 base_asym_alg;
> +	u32 base_hash_alg;
> +	unsigned long slot_mask;
> +
> +	/* Signature algorithm */
> +	const char *base_asym_enc;
> +	size_t s;
> +
> +	/* Hash algorithm */
> +	const char *base_hash_alg_name;
> +	struct crypto_shash *shash;
> +	struct shash_desc *desc;
> +	size_t h;

I understand this h and s come directly from the naming in the spec but it 
feels unnecessarily obfuscated from code reading PoV to not use hash_len 
and sig_len.

> +
> +	/* Certificates */
> +	struct public_key *leaf_key;
> +	struct key *root_keyring;
> +};
> +
> +static int __spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			   const void *req, size_t req_sz,
> +			   void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
> +{
> +	const struct spdm_header *request = req;
> +	struct spdm_header *response = rsp;
> +	int length;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_state->transport(spdm_state->transport_priv, spdm_state->dev,
> +				   req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	length = rc;

rc feels pretty unnecessary variable here.

> +	if (length < sizeof(struct spdm_header))
> +		return -EPROTO;
> +
> +	if (response->code == SPDM_ERROR)
> +		return spdm_err(spdm_state->dev, (struct spdm_error_rsp *)rsp);
> +
> +	if (response->code != (request->code & ~SPDM_REQ)) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +			"Response code %#x does not match request code %#x\n",
> +			response->code, request->code);
> +		return -EPROTO;
> +	}
> +
> +	return length;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			 void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_header *req_header = req;
> +
> +	if (req_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header) ||
> +	    rsp_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header))

Variable names that close to each other seem like a disaster awaiting to 
happen. Even changing rsp -> resp would be a huge improvement.

> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	req_header->version = spdm_state->version;
> +
> +	return __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct spdm_get_version_req spdm_get_version_req = {
> +	.version = 0x10,
> +	.code = SPDM_GET_VERSION,
> +};
> +
> +static int spdm_get_version(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			    struct spdm_get_version_rsp *rsp, size_t *rsp_sz)
> +{
> +	u8 version = SPDM_MIN_VER;
> +	bool foundver = false;
> +	int rc, length, i;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Bypass spdm_exchange() to be able to set version = 0x10.
> +	 * rsp buffer is large enough for the maximum possible 255 entries.
> +	 */
> +	rc = __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &spdm_get_version_req,
> +			     sizeof(spdm_get_version_req), rsp,
> +			     struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries, 255));
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
> +	    length < struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries,
> +				 rsp->version_number_entry_count)) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated version response\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < rsp->version_number_entry_count; i++) {
> +		u8 ver = get_unaligned_le16(&rsp->version_number_entries[i]) >> 8;

Name field you're after with #define and use FIELD_GET() here?

> +
> +		if (ver >= version && ver <= SPDM_MAX_VER) {
> +			foundver = true;
> +			version = ver;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	if (!foundver) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No common supported version\n");
> +		return -EPROTO;
> +	}
> +	spdm_state->version = version;
> +
> +	*rsp_sz = struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries,
> +			      rsp->version_number_entry_count);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_get_capabilities(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +				 struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *req,
> +				 size_t *reqrsp_sz)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *rsp;
> +	size_t req_sz;
> +	size_t rsp_sz;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	req->code = SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES;
> +	req->ctexponent = SPDM_CTEXPONENT;
> +	req->flags = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_CAPS);
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version == 0x10) {
> +		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), reserved1);
> +		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
> +	} else if (spdm_state->version == 0x11) {
> +		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), data_transfer_size);
> +		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
> +	} else {
> +		req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> +		rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> +		req->data_transfer_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +		req->max_spdm_msg_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +	}

Use switch?

> +
> +	rsp = (void *)req + req_sz;

It would be more logical (and not require relying on C extension) to cast 
to u8 * but that will then require another cast.

> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < rsp_sz) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated capabilities response\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags);

Earlier, unaligned accessors where used with the version_number_entries.
Is it intentional they're not used here (I cannot see what would be 
reason for this difference)?

> +	if ((spdm_state->responder_caps & SPDM_MIN_CAPS) != SPDM_MIN_CAPS)
> +		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x12) {
> +		u32 data_transfer_size = le32_to_cpu(rsp->data_transfer_size);
> +		if (data_transfer_size < SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +				"Malformed capabilities response\n");
> +			return -EPROTO;
> +		}
> +		spdm_state->transport_sz = min(spdm_state->transport_sz,
> +					       data_transfer_size);
> +	}
> +
> +	*reqrsp_sz += req_sz + rsp_sz;

Would just total_sz of something along those lines do?

> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_start_hash() - Build first part of CHALLENGE_AUTH hash
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @transcript: GET_VERSION request and GET_CAPABILITIES request and response
> + * @transcript_sz: length of @transcript
> + * @req: NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request
> + * @req_sz: length of @req
> + * @rsp: ALGORITHMS response
> + * @rsp_sz: length of @rsp
> + *
> + * We've just learned the hash algorithm to use for CHALLENGE_AUTH signature
> + * verification.  Hash the GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges which
> + * have been stashed in @transcript, as well as the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS
> + * exchange which has just been performed.  Subsequent requests and responses
> + * will be added to the hash as they become available.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
> + */
> +static int spdm_start_hash(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			   void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz,
> +			   void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	spdm_state->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
> +					       0, 0);
> +	if (!spdm_state->shash)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	spdm_state->desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state->desc) +
> +				   crypto_shash_descsize(spdm_state->shash),
> +				   GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!spdm_state->desc)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	spdm_state->desc->tfm = spdm_state->shash;
> +
> +	/* Used frequently to compute offsets, so cache H */
> +	spdm_state->h = crypto_shash_digestsize(spdm_state->shash);
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_init(spdm_state->desc);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;

Leak spdm_state->desc on error? (Similarly the returns below.)

> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
> +				 (u8 *)&spdm_get_version_req,
> +				 sizeof(spdm_get_version_req));
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
> +				 (u8 *)transcript, transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)req, req_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_parse_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) {
> +	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048:
> +		spdm_state->s = 256;
> +		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072:
> +		spdm_state->s = 384;
> +		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096:
> +		spdm_state->s = 512;
> +		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256:
> +		spdm_state->s = 64;
> +		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384:
> +		spdm_state->s = 96;
> +		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363";
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown asym algorithm\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	switch (spdm_state->base_hash_alg) {
> +	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_256:
> +		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha256";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_384:
> +		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha384";
> +		break;
> +	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_512:
> +		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha512";
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown hash algorithm\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			       void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct;
> +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req;
> +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp;
> +	size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> +	size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	/* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128);

I don't know why this really has to be here? This could be static_assert()
below the struct declaration.

> +	req = kzalloc(req_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!req)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	req->code = SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS;
> +	req->length = cpu_to_le16(req_sz);
> +	req->base_asym_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS);
> +	req->base_hash_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_HASH_ALGOS);
> +
> +	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp) {
> +		rc = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto err_free_req;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
> +	    length < sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct)) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated algorithms response\n");
> +		rc = -EIO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	spdm_state->base_asym_alg =
> +		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_asym_sel) & SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS;
> +	spdm_state->base_hash_alg =
> +		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_hash_sel) & SPDM_HASH_ALGOS;
> +
> +	/* Responder shall select exactly 1 alg (SPDM 1.0.0 table 14) */
> +	if (hweight32(spdm_state->base_asym_alg) != 1 ||
> +	    hweight32(spdm_state->base_hash_alg) != 1 ||
> +	    rsp->ext_asym_sel_count != 0 ||
> +	    rsp->ext_hash_sel_count != 0 ||
> +	    rsp->param1 > req->param1) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed algorithms response\n");
> +		rc = -EPROTO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = spdm_parse_algs(spdm_state);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If request contained a ReqAlgStruct not supported by responder,
> +	 * the corresponding RespAlgStruct may be omitted in response.
> +	 * Calculate the actual (possibly shorter) response length:
> +	 */
> +	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct);
> +
> +	rc = spdm_start_hash(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz,
> +			     req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +
> +err_free_rsp:
> +	kfree(rsp);
> +err_free_req:
> +	kfree(req);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_get_digests(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_get_digests_req req = { .code = SPDM_GET_DIGESTS };
> +	struct spdm_get_digests_rsp *rsp;
> +	size_t rsp_sz;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Assume all 8 slots are populated.  We know the hash length (and thus
> +	 * the response size) because the responder only returns digests for
> +	 * the hash algorithm selected during the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange
> +	 * (SPDM 1.1.2 margin no 206).
> +	 */
> +	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + SPDM_SLOTS * spdm_state->h;
> +	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
> +	    length < sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated digests response\n");
> +		rc = -EIO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Authentication-capable endpoints must carry at least 1 cert chain
> +	 * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1).
> +	 */
> +	spdm_state->slot_mask = rsp->param2;
> +	if (!spdm_state->slot_mask) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No certificates provisioned\n");
> +		rc = -EPROTO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, sizeof(req));
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz);
> +
> +err_free_rsp:
> +	kfree(rsp);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_validate_cert_chain(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot,
> +				    u8 *certs, size_t total_length)
> +{
> +	struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev = NULL;
> +	bool is_leaf_cert;
> +	size_t offset = 0;
> +	struct key *key;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	while (offset < total_length) {
> +		rc = x509_get_certificate_length(certs + offset,
> +						 total_length - offset);
> +		if (rc < 0) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Invalid certificate length "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_prev;
> +		}
> +
> +		length = rc;
> +		is_leaf_cert = offset + length == total_length;
> +
> +		cert = x509_cert_parse(certs + offset, length);
> +		if (IS_ERR(cert)) {
> +			rc = PTR_ERR(cert);
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Certificate parse error %d "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_prev;
> +		}
> +		if ((is_leaf_cert ==
> +		     test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &cert->pub->key_eflags)) ||
> +		    (is_leaf_cert &&
> +		     !test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &cert->pub->key_eflags))) {
> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed certificate "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +		if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unsupported signature "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +		if (cert->blacklisted) {
> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (!prev) {
> +			/* First cert in chain, check against root_keyring */
> +			key = find_asymmetric_key(spdm_state->root_keyring,
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[0],
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[1],
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[2],
> +						  false);
> +			if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> +				dev_info(spdm_state->dev, "Root certificate "
> +					 "for slot %u not found in %s "
> +					 "keyring: %s\n", slot,
> +					 spdm_state->root_keyring->description,
> +					 cert->issuer);
> +				rc = PTR_ERR(key);
> +				goto err_free_cert;
> +			}
> +
> +			rc = verify_signature(key, cert->sig);
> +			key_put(key);
> +		} else {
> +			/* Subsequent cert in chain, check against previous */
> +			rc = public_key_verify_signature(prev->pub, cert->sig);
> +		}
> +
> +		if (rc) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Signature validation error "
> +				"%d at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +
> +		x509_free_certificate(prev);
> +		offset += length;
> +		prev = cert;
> +	}
> +
> +	prev = NULL;
> +	spdm_state->leaf_key = cert->pub;
> +	cert->pub = NULL;
> +
> +err_free_cert:
> +	x509_free_certificate(cert);
> +err_free_prev:
> +	x509_free_certificate(prev);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = {
> +		.code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE,
> +		.param1 = slot,
> +	};
> +	struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp;
> +	struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL;
> +	size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length;
> +	u16 remainder_length = 0xffff;

0xffff in this function should use either U16_MAX or SZ_64K - 1.

> +	u16 portion_length;
> +	u16 offset = 0;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * It is legal for the responder to send more bytes than requested.
> +	 * (Note the "should" in SPDM 1.0.0 table 19.)  If we allocate a
> +	 * too small buffer, we can't calculate the hash over the (truncated)
> +	 * response.  Only choice is thus to allocate the maximum possible 64k.
> +	 */
> +	rsp_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(*rsp) + 0xffff, spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +	rsp = kvmalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	do {
> +		/*
> +		 * If transport_sz is sufficiently large, first request will be
> +		 * for offset 0 and length 0xffff, which means entire cert
> +		 * chain (SPDM 1.0.0 table 18).
> +		 */
> +		req.offset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
> +		req.length = cpu_to_le16(min_t(size_t, remainder_length,
> +					       rsp_sz - sizeof(*rsp)));
> +
> +		rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz);
> +		if (rc < 0)
> +			goto err_free_certs;
> +
> +		length = rc;
> +		if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
> +		    length < sizeof(*rsp) + le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length)) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +				"Truncated certificate response\n");
> +			rc = -EIO;
> +			goto err_free_certs;
> +		}
> +
> +		portion_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length);
> +		remainder_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->remainder_length);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * On first response we learn total length of cert chain.
> +		 * Should portion_length + remainder_length exceed 0xffff,
> +		 * the min() ensures that the malformed check triggers below.
> +		 */
> +		if (!certs) {
> +			total_length = min(portion_length + remainder_length,
> +					   0xffff);
> +			certs = kvmalloc(total_length, GFP_KERNEL);
> +			if (!certs) {
> +				rc = -ENOMEM;
> +				goto err_free_certs;
> +			}
> +		}
> +
> +		if (!portion_length ||
> +		    (rsp->param1 & 0xf) != slot ||

Name the field with #define?

> +		    offset + portion_length + remainder_length != total_length)
> +		{
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +				"Malformed certificate response\n");
> +			rc = -EPROTO;
> +			goto err_free_certs;
> +		}
> +
> +		memcpy((u8 *)certs + offset, rsp->cert_chain, portion_length);
> +		offset += portion_length;
> +
> +		rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req,
> +					 sizeof(req));
> +		if (rc)
> +			goto err_free_certs;
> +
> +		rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp,
> +					 sizeof(*rsp) + portion_length);
> +		if (rc)
> +			goto err_free_certs;
> +
> +	} while (remainder_length > 0);
> +
> +	header_length = sizeof(struct spdm_cert_chain) + spdm_state->h;
> +
> +	if (total_length < header_length ||
> +	    total_length != le16_to_cpu(certs->length)) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +			"Malformed certificate chain in slot %u\n", slot);
> +		rc = -EPROTO;
> +		goto err_free_certs;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = spdm_validate_cert_chain(spdm_state, slot,
> +				      (u8 *)certs + header_length,
> +				      total_length - header_length);
> +
> +err_free_certs:
> +	kvfree(certs);
> +	kvfree(rsp);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +#define SPDM_PREFIX_SZ 64 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 803 */
> +#define SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ 100 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 806 */
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_create_combined_prefix() - Create combined_spdm_prefix for a hash
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @spdm_context: SPDM context
> + * @buf: Buffer to receive combined_spdm_prefix (100 bytes)
> + *
> + * From SPDM 1.2, a hash is prefixed with the SPDM version and context before
> + * a signature is generated (or verified) over the resulting concatenation
> + * (SPDM 1.2.0 section 15).  Create that prefix.
> + */
> +static void spdm_create_combined_prefix(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +					const char *spdm_context, void *buf)
> +{
> +	u8 minor = spdm_state->version & 0xf;
> +	u8 major = spdm_state->version >> 4;

Name the fields with define and use FIELD_GET().

> +	size_t len = strlen(spdm_context);
> +	int rc, zero_pad;
> +
> +	rc = snprintf(buf, SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1,
> +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*"
> +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*",

Why are these using s8 formatting specifier %hhx ??

> +		      major, minor, major, minor, major, minor, major, minor);
> +	WARN_ON(rc != SPDM_PREFIX_SZ);
> +
> +	zero_pad = SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ - SPDM_PREFIX_SZ - 1 - len;
> +	WARN_ON(zero_pad < 0);
> +
> +	memset(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1, 0, zero_pad);
> +	memcpy(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1 + zero_pad, spdm_context, len);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_verify_signature() - Verify signature against leaf key
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @s: Signature
> + * @spdm_context: SPDM context (used to create combined_spdm_prefix)
> + *
> + * Implementation of the abstract SPDMSignatureVerify() function described in
> + * SPDM 1.2.0 section 16:  Compute the hash in @spdm_state->desc and verify
> + * that its signature @s was generated with @spdm_state->leaf_key.
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
> + */
> +static int spdm_verify_signature(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 *s,
> +				 const char *spdm_context)
> +{
> +	struct public_key_signature sig = {
> +		.s = s,
> +		.s_size = spdm_state->s,
> +		.encoding = spdm_state->base_asym_enc,
> +		.hash_algo = spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
> +	};
> +	u8 *m, *mhash = NULL;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	m = kmalloc(SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!m)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_final(spdm_state->desc, m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_m;
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version <= 0x11) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Until SPDM 1.1, the signature is computed only over the hash
> +		 * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.7).
> +		 */
> +		sig.digest = m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ;
> +		sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
> +	} else {
> +		/*
> +		 * From SPDM 1.2, the hash is prefixed with spdm_context before
> +		 * computing the signature over the resulting message M
> +		 * (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 841).
> +		 */
> +		spdm_create_combined_prefix(spdm_state, spdm_context, m);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * RSA and ECDSA algorithms require that M is hashed once more.
> +		 * EdDSA and SM2 algorithms omit that step.
> +		 * The switch statement prepares for their introduction.
> +		 */
> +		switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) {
> +		default:
> +			mhash = kmalloc(spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
> +			if (!mhash) {
> +				rc = -ENOMEM;
> +				goto err_free_m;
> +			}
> +
> +			rc = crypto_shash_digest(spdm_state->desc, m,
> +				SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h,
> +				mhash);
> +			if (rc)
> +				goto err_free_mhash;
> +
> +			sig.digest = mhash;
> +			sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = public_key_verify_signature(spdm_state->leaf_key, &sig);
> +
> +err_free_mhash:
> +	kfree(mhash);
> +err_free_m:
> +	kfree(m);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional)
> + *
> + * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields
> + * as well as optional fields.  This helper eases calculating its size.
> + *
> + * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes
> + * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21).  Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp.
> + * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack
> + * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request.
> + * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field,
> + * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261).
> + */
> +static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +				    struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp)
> +{
> +	size_t  size  = sizeof(*rsp)		/* Header */

extra space between size_t and size.

> +		      + spdm_state->h		/* CertChainHash */
> +		      + 32;			/* Nonce */

Add SPDM_NONCE_SIZE ?

> +
> +	if (rsp)
> +		/* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */
> +		size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size);
> +	else
> +		size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA;	/* OpaqueData */
> +
> +	size += 2;				/* OpaqueDataLength */
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13)
> +		size += 8;			/* RequesterContext */
> +
> +	return  size  + spdm_state->s;		/* Signature */

Remove the extra space.

> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_challenge(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
> +{
> +	size_t req_sz, rsp_sz, rsp_sz_max, sig_offset;
> +	struct spdm_challenge_req req = {
> +		.code = SPDM_CHALLENGE,
> +		.param1 = slot,
> +		.param2 = 0, /* no measurement summary hash */
> +	};
> +	struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	get_random_bytes(&req.nonce, sizeof(req.nonce));
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version <= 0x12)
> +		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(req), context);
> +	else
> +		req_sz = sizeof(req);
> +
> +	rsp_sz_max = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, NULL);
> +	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz_max, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz_max);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	rsp_sz = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, rsp);
> +	if (length < rsp_sz) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated challenge_auth response\n");
> +		rc = -EIO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Last step of building the hash */
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, req_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	sig_offset = rsp_sz - spdm_state->s;
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, sig_offset);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	/* Hash is complete and signature received; verify against leaf key */
> +	rc = spdm_verify_signature(spdm_state, (u8 *)rsp + sig_offset,
> +				   "responder-challenge_auth signing");
> +	if (rc)
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +			"Failed to verify challenge_auth signature: %d\n", rc);
> +
> +err_free_rsp:
> +	kfree(rsp);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void spdm_reset(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	public_key_free(spdm_state->leaf_key);
> +	spdm_state->leaf_key = NULL;
> +
> +	kfree(spdm_state->desc);
> +	spdm_state->desc = NULL;
> +
> +	crypto_free_shash(spdm_state->shash);
> +	spdm_state->shash = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_authenticate() - Authenticate device
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + *
> + * Authenticate a device through a sequence of GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES,
> + * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE exchanges.
> + *
> + * Perform internal locking to serialize multiple concurrent invocations.
> + * Can be called repeatedly for reauthentication.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.  In particular, -EPROTONOSUPPORT
> + * indicates that authentication is not supported by the device.
> + */
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	size_t transcript_sz;
> +	void *transcript;
> +	int rc = -ENOMEM;
> +	u8 slot;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification, a hash is computed over
> +	 * all exchanged messages to detect modification by a man-in-the-middle
> +	 * or media error.  However the hash algorithm is not known until the
> +	 * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS response has been received.  The preceding
> +	 * GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges are therefore stashed
> +	 * in a transcript buffer and consumed once the algorithm is known.
> +	 * The buffer size is sufficient for the largest possible messages with
> +	 * 255 version entries and the capability fields added by SPDM 1.2.
> +	 */
> +	transcript = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct spdm_get_version_rsp,
> +					   version_number_entries, 255) +
> +			     sizeof(struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp) * 2,
> +			     GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!transcript)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_version(spdm_state, transcript, &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_capabilities(spdm_state, transcript + transcript_sz,
> +				   &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_negotiate_algs(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_digests(spdm_state);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	for_each_set_bit(slot, &spdm_state->slot_mask, SPDM_SLOTS) {
> +		rc = spdm_get_certificate(spdm_state, slot);
> +		if (rc == 0)
> +			break; /* success */
> +		if (rc != -ENOKEY && rc != -EKEYREJECTED)
> +			break; /* try next slot only on signature error */
> +	}
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot);
> +
> +unlock:
> +	if (rc)
> +		spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +	spdm_state->authenticated = !rc;
> +	mutex_unlock(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	kfree(transcript);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticate);
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_authenticated() - Whether device was authenticated successfully
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + *
> + * Return true if the most recent spdm_authenticate() call was successful.
> + */
> +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	return spdm_state->authenticated;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticated);
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_create() - Allocate SPDM session
> + *
> + * @dev: Transport device
> + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange
> + * @transport_priv: Transport private data
> + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes)
> + * @keyring: Trusted root certificates
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the allocated SPDM session state or NULL on error.
> + */
> +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
> +			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
> +			       struct key *keyring)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_state *spdm_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state), GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> +	if (!spdm_state)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	spdm_state->dev = dev;
> +	spdm_state->transport = transport;
> +	spdm_state->transport_priv = transport_priv;
> +	spdm_state->transport_sz = transport_sz;
> +	spdm_state->root_keyring = keyring;
> +
> +	mutex_init(&spdm_state->lock);
> +
> +	return spdm_state;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_create);
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + */
> +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +	mutex_destroy(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	kfree(spdm_state);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_destroy);
> +
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
>

Jonathan Cameron Oct. 3, 2023, 2:39 p.m. UTC | #2

On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200
Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:

> From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> 
> The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.
> 
> A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is attestation.
> 
> SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
> Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken between
> host and attached devices over a variety of transports:
> 
>   https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> 
> This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest version).

I've no strong objection in allowing 1.0, but I think we do need
to control min version accepted somehow as I'm not that keen to get
security folk analyzing old version...

> It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already supports
> two different SPDM-capable transports:
> 
> * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
> * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
>   Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)

The MCTP side of things is going to be interesting because mostly you
need to jump through a bunch of hoops (address assignment, routing setup
etc) before you can actually talk to a device.   That all involves
a userspace agent.  So I'm not 100% sure how this will all turn out.
However still makes sense to have a transport agnostic implementation
as if nothing else it makes it easier to review as keeps us within
one specification.

> 
> Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:
> 
> * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31)
> * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
> * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
>   https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf

Alastair, would it make sense to also call out some of the storage
use cases you are interested in?

> 
> The initial focus of this implementation is enabling PCIe CMA device
> authentication.  As such, only a subset of the SPDM specification is
> contained herein, namely the request/response sequence GET_VERSION,
> GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE
> and CHALLENGE.
> 
> A simple API is provided for subsystems wishing to authenticate devices:
> spdm_create(), spdm_authenticate() (can be called repeatedly for
> reauthentication) and spdm_destroy().  Certificates presented by devices
> are validated against an in-kernel keyring of trusted root certificates.
> A pointer to the keyring is passed to spdm_create().
> 
> The set of supported cryptographic algorithms is limited to those
> declared mandatory in PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3.  Adding more algorithms
> is straightforward as long as the crypto subsystem supports them.
> 
> Future commits will extend this implementation with support for
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions.
> 
> So far, only the SPDM requester role is implemented.  Care was taken to
> allow for effortless addition of the responder role at a later stage.
> This could be needed for a PCIe host bridge operating in endpoint mode.
> The responder role will be able to reuse struct definitions and helpers
> such as spdm_create_combined_prefix().  Those can be moved to
> spdm_common.{h,c} files upon introduction of the responder role.
> For now, all is kept in a single source file to avoid polluting the
> global namespace with unnecessary symbols.
> 
> Credits:  Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this SPDM implementation.
> Lukas reworked it for upstream.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
Feels like a Co-developed Lukas ...
is appropriate use of that tag here as you've done quite
a lot of work on this.

I've forgotten most of this code. Hopefully I'll be more
able to spot bugs than if I remembered how it works :)
All comments ended up being fairly superficial stuff,
Looks good to me otherwise and anyway would be odd if I gave a
RB on 'my own patch ' :)

> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS          |    9 +
>  include/linux/spdm.h |   35 +
>  lib/Kconfig          |   15 +
>  lib/Makefile         |    2 +
>  lib/spdm_requester.c | 1487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/spdm.h
>  create mode 100644 lib/spdm_requester.c
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 90f13281d297..2591d2217d65 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -19299,6 +19299,15 @@ M:	Security Officers <[e-mail]>
>  S:	Supported
>  F:	Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
>  
> +SECURITY PROTOCOL AND DATA MODEL (SPDM)
> +M:	Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> +M:	Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +S:	Maintained
> +F:	include/linux/spdm.h
> +F:	lib/spdm*
> +
>  SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
>  M:	Paul Moore <[e-mail]>
>  M:	James Morris <[e-mail]>
> diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e824063793a7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
> + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
> + *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SPDM_H_
> +#define _SPDM_H_
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct key;
> +struct device;
> +struct spdm_state;
> +
> +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
> +			     const void *request, size_t request_sz,
> +			     void *response, size_t response_sz);
> +
> +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
> +			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
> +			       struct key *keyring);
> +
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
> index c686f4adc124..3516cf1dad16 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig
> @@ -764,3 +764,18 @@ config ASN1_ENCODER
>  
>  config POLYNOMIAL
>         tristate
> +
> +config SPDM_REQUESTER
> +	tristate
> +	select KEYS
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
> +	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
> +	help
> +	 The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,

This file is inconsistent but tab + 2 spaces seems more common for help
text. I don't mind though if you prefer this.

> +	 measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.  This
> +	 option enables support for the SPDM requester role.
> +
> +	 Crypto algorithms offered to SPDM responders are limited to those
> +	 enabled in .config.  Drivers selecting SPDM_REQUESTER need to also
> +	 select any algorithms they deem mandatory.
> diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> index 740109b6e2c8..d9ae58a9ca83 100644
> --- a/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/Makefile
> @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
>  
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SPDM_REQUESTER) += spdm_requester.o
> +
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
>  
>  hostprogs	:= gen_crc32table
> diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..407041036599
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1487 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
> + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
> + *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "SPDM: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
> +#include <linux/key.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/spdm.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/unaligned.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <crypto/public_key.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> +#include <keys/x509-parser.h>
> +
> +/* SPDM versions supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_MIN_VER 0x10
> +#define SPDM_MAX_VER 0x13
> +
Given how hard I fin the SPDM specifications to navigate
perhaps we should provide some breadcrumbs for reviewers?
/*
 * SPDM 1.3.0
 * Table 13 - Flag Fields definitions for the Requester
 * Table 14 - Flag Fields definitions for the Responder
 */
> +#define SPDM_CACHE_CAP			BIT(0)		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_CERT_CAP			BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_CHAL_CAP			BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(4, 3)	    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_NO		0		    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS		1		    /* response only */
> +#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS_SIG	2		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_MEAS_FRESH_CAP		BIT(5)		    /* response only */

This is awkward but SPDM 1.01 has PSS_CAP in bits 6 and 7 of byte 1.
Looks good by time of 1.1.0 

> +#define SPDM_ENCRYPT_CAP		BIT(6)
> +#define SPDM_MAC_CAP			BIT(7)
> +#define SPDM_MUT_AUTH_CAP		BIT(8) 
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_KEY_EX_CAP			BIT(9)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(11, 10)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_NO		0
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK		1
> +#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK_CTX		2		    /* response only */
> +#define SPDM_ENCAP_CAP			BIT(12)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_HBEAT_CAP			BIT(13)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_KEY_UPD_CAP		BIT(14)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_HANDSHAKE_ITC_CAP		BIT(15)
/* 1.1.0 */
> +#define SPDM_PUB_KEY_ID_CAP		BIT(16)
/* 1.1.0 */

> +#define SPDM_CHUNK_CAP			BIT(17)		/* 1.2 */
> +#define SPDM_ALIAS_CERT_CAP		BIT(18)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_SET_CERT_CAP		BIT(19)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_CSR_CAP			BIT(20)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_CERT_INST_RESET_CAP	BIT(21)		/* 1.2 response only */
> +#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(23, 22) /* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP		1		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP_SIG	2		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_MEL_CAP			BIT(24)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +#define SPDM_EVENT_CAP			BIT(25)		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(27, 26)	/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_ONLY	1		/* 1.3 */
> +#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_SEL	2		/* 1.3 */
> +#define SPDM_GET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(28)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +#define SPDM_SET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(29)		/* 1.3 response only */
> +
> +/* SPDM capabilities supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
> +
> +/* SPDM capabilities required from responders */
> +#define SPDM_MIN_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
> +
> +/*
> + * SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation:
> + * Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals
> + * roughly 1 << 20.  That's within the limits mandated for responders by CMA
> + * (1 << 23 usec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3) and DOE (1 sec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30.2).
> + * Used in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + */
> +#define SPDM_CTEXPONENT			20
> +
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048		BIT(0)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_2048		BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072		BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_3072		BIT(3)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256	BIT(4)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096		BIT(5)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_4096		BIT(6)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384	BIT(7)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521	BIT(8)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256	BIT(9)
/* 1.2.0 */
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED25519		BIT(10)
/* 1.2.0 */
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED448		BIT(11)
/* 1.2.0 */
I have far too many versions of this spec open currently...

> +
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_256		BIT(0)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_384		BIT(1)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_512		BIT(2)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_256		BIT(3)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_384		BIT(4)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_512		BIT(5)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SM3_256		BIT(6)
/* 1.2.0 */

> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_RSA			SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 |		\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 |		\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096 |

I'm not keen on the trailing | 

Maybe,

#else
#define SPDM_ASYM_RSA 0
#endif


> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA)
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA			SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 |	\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 |
> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		SPDM_HASH_SHA_256 |
> +#endif
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512)
> +#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512		SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 |		\
> +					SPDM_HASH_SHA_512 |
> +#endif
> +
> +/* SPDM algorithms supported by this implementation */
> +#define SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS		       (SPDM_ASYM_RSA			\
> +					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA	0)
Doesn't this give errors for not defined for these if the config options not set
above? I think we need #else for each of them.
> +
> +#define SPDM_HASH_ALGOS		       (SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		\
> +					SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512 0)
> +
...

> +#define SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES 0xE1
> +#define SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE 42 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 226 */
> +
> +/* For this exchange the request and response messages have the same form */

Not before 1.1.0 they don't...

> +struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1;
> +	u8 param2;
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.0 structure */

True for request, but response is different (which breaks the comment above)
That means we should probably split this just for documentation purposes.
Or add more comments...

You have it right where it's used, so just a question of bringing comments
inline with that code



> +
> +	u8 reserved1;
> +	u8 ctexponent;
> +	u16 reserved2;
> +
> +	__le32 flags;
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.1 structure */
> +
> +	__le32 data_transfer_size;			/* 1.2+ */
> +	__le32 max_spdm_msg_size;			/* 1.2+ */

There's potentially more for the 1.3 response...
Supported Algorithms seems to have been added of AlgSize if
param1 bit 1 is set.


> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS 0xE3
> +
> +struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Number of ReqAlgStruct entries at end */
> +	u8 param2;
> +
> +	__le16 length;
> +	u8 measurement_specification;
> +	u8 other_params_support;			/* 1.2+ */

Probably comment that it's reserved pre 1.2 rather than later elements
moving around. I guess some catch all text at the top of the file
to say that fields at the end that don't exist for earlier structures
mean shorter structures but fields in the middle replace reserved
space.

> +
> +	__le32 base_asym_algo;
> +	__le32 base_hash_algo;
> +
> +	u8 reserved1[12];
> +	u8 ext_asym_count;
> +	u8 ext_hash_count;
> +	u8 reserved2;
> +	u8 mel_specification;				/* 1.3+ */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count
> +	 * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count
> +	 * - ReqAlgStruct: variable size * param1	 * 1.1+ *
> +	 */
> +} __packed;

...

> +struct spdm_get_digests_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* SupportedSlotMask */		/* 1.3+ */
> +	u8 param2; /* ProvisionedSlotMask */
> +	u8 digests[]; /* Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for each slot */
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */

1.2 and earlier?

> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * (omitted as long as we do not advertise MULTI_KEY_CAP)
> +	 * - KeyPairID: 1 byte for each slot		 * 1.3+ *
> +	 * - CertificateInfo: 1 byte for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
> +	 * - KeyUsageMask: 2 bytes for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
> +	 */
> +} __packed;

...

> +struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* CertModel */			/* 1.3+ */
Why CertModel?  I'm seeing Cerificate Response Attributes which has
a field called CertificateInfo. Format of that is defined by CertModel
back in the digests request, but CertModel seems inappropriate here..

Mind you I've not read that bit of 1.3.0 yet so maybe this is appropriate
short hand.
 
> +	__le16 portion_length;
> +	__le16 remainder_length;
> +	u8 cert_chain[]; /* PortionLength long */
> +} __packed;

...

> +#define SPDM_CHALLENGE 0x83
> +#define SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA 1024 /* SPDM 1.0.0 table 21 */
> +
> +struct spdm_challenge_req {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* MeasurementSummaryHash type */
> +	u8 nonce[32];
> +	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */

1.2 and earlier


> +
> +	u8 context[8];					/* 1.3+ */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +struct spdm_challenge_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
> +	u8 param2; /* Slot mask */
> +	/*
> +	 * Additional fields at end of this structure:
> +	 * - CertChainHash: Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for selected slot
> +	 * - Nonce: 32 bytes long
> +	 * - MeasurementSummaryHash: Optional hash of selected measurements
> +	 * - OpaqueDataLength: 2 bytes long
> +	 * - OpaqueData: Up to 1024 bytes long
> +	 * - RequesterContext: 8 bytes long		 * 1.3+ *

Perhaps call out that this is not a case of reserved field being filled in.
It moves the signature field. Which is different to other cases above
where prior to 1.3 there was a reserved field.


> +	 * - Signature
> +	 */
> +} __packed;
> +
> +#define SPDM_ERROR 0x7f
> +
> +enum spdm_error_code {
> +	spdm_invalid_request = 0x01,
> +	spdm_invalid_session = 0x02,			/* 1.1 only */
> +	spdm_busy = 0x03,
> +	spdm_unexpected_request = 0x04,
> +	spdm_unspecified = 0x05,
> +	spdm_decrypt_error = 0x06,
/* 1.1+ */

> +	spdm_unsupported_request = 0x07,
> +	spdm_request_in_flight = 0x08,
/* 1.1+ */
> +	spdm_invalid_response_code = 0x09,
/* 1.1+ */
> +	spdm_session_limit_exceeded = 0x0a,
/* 1.1+ */

> +	spdm_session_required = 0x0b,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_reset_required = 0x0c,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_response_too_large = 0x0d,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_request_too_large = 0x0e,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_large_response = 0x0f,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_message_lost = 0x10,
/* 1.2+ */
> +	spdm_invalid_policy = 0x11,			/* 1.3+ */

> +	spdm_version_mismatch = 0x41,
> +	spdm_response_not_ready = 0x42,
> +	spdm_request_resynch = 0x43,
> +	spdm_operation_failed = 0x44,			/* 1.3+ */
> +	spdm_no_pending_requests = 0x45,		/* 1.3+ */
> +	spdm_vendor_defined_error = 0xff,
> +};
...


> +/**
> + * struct spdm_state - SPDM session state
> + *
> + * @lock: Serializes multiple concurrent spdm_authenticate() calls.
> + * @authenticated: Whether device was authenticated successfully.
> + * @dev: Transport device.  Used for error reporting and passed to @transport.
> + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange.
> + * @transport_priv: Transport private data.
> + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes).
> + *	Used as DataTransferSize in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + * @version: Maximum common supported version of requester and responder.
> + *	Negotiated during GET_VERSION exchange.
> + * @responder_caps: Cached capabilities of responder.
> + *	Received during GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
> + * @base_asym_alg: Asymmetric key algorithm for signature verification of
> + *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
> + *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
> + * @base_hash_alg: Hash algorithm for signature verification of
> + *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
> + *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
> + * @slot_mask: Bitmask of populated certificate slots in the responder.
> + *	Received during GET_DIGESTS exchange.
> + * @base_asym_enc: Human-readable name of @base_asym_alg's signature encoding.
> + *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling verify_signature().
> + * @s: Signature length of @base_asym_alg (in bytes).  S or SigLen in SPDM
> + *	specification.
> + * @base_hash_alg_name: Human-readable name of @base_hash_alg.
> + *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling crypto_alloc_shash() and
> + *	verify_signature().
> + * @shash: Synchronous hash handle for @base_hash_alg computation.
> + * @desc: Synchronous hash context for @base_hash_alg computation.
> + * @h: Hash length of @base_hash_alg (in bytes).  H in SPDM specification.
> + * @leaf_key: Public key portion of leaf certificate against which to check
> + *	responder's signatures.
> + * @root_keyring: Keyring against which to check the first certificate in
> + *	responder's certificate chain.
> + */
> +struct spdm_state {
> +	struct mutex lock;
> +	unsigned int authenticated:1;
> +
> +	/* Transport */
> +	struct device *dev;
> +	spdm_transport *transport;
> +	void *transport_priv;
> +	u32 transport_sz;
> +
> +	/* Negotiated state */
> +	u8 version;
> +	u32 responder_caps;
> +	u32 base_asym_alg;
> +	u32 base_hash_alg;
> +	unsigned long slot_mask;
> +
> +	/* Signature algorithm */
> +	const char *base_asym_enc;
> +	size_t s;
> +
> +	/* Hash algorithm */
> +	const char *base_hash_alg_name;
> +	struct crypto_shash *shash;
> +	struct shash_desc *desc;
> +	size_t h;
> +
> +	/* Certificates */
> +	struct public_key *leaf_key;
> +	struct key *root_keyring;
> +};

...


> +
> +static const struct spdm_get_version_req spdm_get_version_req = {
> +	.version = 0x10,
> +	.code = SPDM_GET_VERSION,
> +};

...

> +static int spdm_get_capabilities(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +				 struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *req,
> +				 size_t *reqrsp_sz)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *rsp;
> +	size_t req_sz;
> +	size_t rsp_sz;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	req->code = SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES;
> +	req->ctexponent = SPDM_CTEXPONENT;
> +	req->flags = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_CAPS);
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version == 0x10) {
> +		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), reserved1);

For all these, maybe offsetofend() would be easier to compare with the
specification than offsetof() field only defined in later spec?

> +		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
> +	} else if (spdm_state->version == 0x11) {
> +		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), data_transfer_size);
> +		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
> +	} else {
> +		req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> +		rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> +		req->data_transfer_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +		req->max_spdm_msg_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +	}
> +
> +	rsp = (void *)req + req_sz;

Add a comment on why we are doing this packing (I'd forgotten this mess with
building the cached version for hashing later).

> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < rsp_sz) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated capabilities response\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags);
> +	if ((spdm_state->responder_caps & SPDM_MIN_CAPS) != SPDM_MIN_CAPS)
> +		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x12) {
> +		u32 data_transfer_size = le32_to_cpu(rsp->data_transfer_size);
> +		if (data_transfer_size < SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
> +				"Malformed capabilities response\n");
> +			return -EPROTO;
> +		}
> +		spdm_state->transport_sz = min(spdm_state->transport_sz,
> +					       data_transfer_size);
> +	}
> +
> +	*reqrsp_sz += req_sz + rsp_sz;

This parameter isn't obvious either.  I wonder if renaming it to transcript_sz
as per the parameter passed in is a better idea?  Or do the addition part
externally from this function where we can see why it is happening?

> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_start_hash() - Build first part of CHALLENGE_AUTH hash
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @transcript: GET_VERSION request and GET_CAPABILITIES request and response
> + * @transcript_sz: length of @transcript
> + * @req: NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request
> + * @req_sz: length of @req
> + * @rsp: ALGORITHMS response
> + * @rsp_sz: length of @rsp
> + *
> + * We've just learned the hash algorithm to use for CHALLENGE_AUTH signature
> + * verification.  Hash the GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges which
> + * have been stashed in @transcript, as well as the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS

This isn't quite right.  GET_VERSION reply is in the transcript, but the
request is const so done separately.

> + * exchange which has just been performed.  Subsequent requests and responses
> + * will be added to the hash as they become available.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
> + */
> +static int spdm_start_hash(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			   void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz,
> +			   void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	spdm_state->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
> +					       0, 0);
> +	if (!spdm_state->shash)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	spdm_state->desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state->desc) +
> +				   crypto_shash_descsize(spdm_state->shash),
> +				   GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!spdm_state->desc)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	spdm_state->desc->tfm = spdm_state->shash;
> +
> +	/* Used frequently to compute offsets, so cache H */
> +	spdm_state->h = crypto_shash_digestsize(spdm_state->shash);
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_init(spdm_state->desc);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
> +				 (u8 *)&spdm_get_version_req,
> +				 sizeof(spdm_get_version_req));
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
> +				 (u8 *)transcript, transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)req, req_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz);
> +
> +	return rc;

	return crypto_...

> +}



> +static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +			       void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct;
> +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req;
> +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp;
> +	size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> +	size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	/* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128);
> +
> +	req = kzalloc(req_sz, GFP_KERNEL);

Maybe cleanup.h magic?  Seems like it would simplify error paths here a
tiny bit. Various other cases follow, but I won't mention this every time.

> +	if (!req)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	req->code = SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS;
> +	req->length = cpu_to_le16(req_sz);
> +	req->base_asym_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS);
> +	req->base_hash_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_HASH_ALGOS);
> +
> +	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp) {
> +		rc = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto err_free_req;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	length = rc;
> +	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
> +	    length < sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct)) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated algorithms response\n");
> +		rc = -EIO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	spdm_state->base_asym_alg =
> +		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_asym_sel) & SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS;
> +	spdm_state->base_hash_alg =
> +		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_hash_sel) & SPDM_HASH_ALGOS;

Isn't it a bug if the responder gives us more options than we asked about?
If that happens we should scream about it.

> +
> +	/* Responder shall select exactly 1 alg (SPDM 1.0.0 table 14) */
> +	if (hweight32(spdm_state->base_asym_alg) != 1 ||
> +	    hweight32(spdm_state->base_hash_alg) != 1 ||
> +	    rsp->ext_asym_sel_count != 0 ||
> +	    rsp->ext_hash_sel_count != 0 ||
> +	    rsp->param1 > req->param1) {
> +		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed algorithms response\n");
> +		rc = -EPROTO;
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = spdm_parse_algs(spdm_state);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_rsp;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If request contained a ReqAlgStruct not supported by responder,
> +	 * the corresponding RespAlgStruct may be omitted in response.
> +	 * Calculate the actual (possibly shorter) response length:
> +	 */
> +	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct);
> +
> +	rc = spdm_start_hash(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz,
> +			     req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
> +
> +err_free_rsp:
> +	kfree(rsp);
> +err_free_req:
> +	kfree(req);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
...

> +static int spdm_validate_cert_chain(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot,
> +				    u8 *certs, size_t total_length)
> +{
> +	struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev = NULL;
> +	bool is_leaf_cert;
> +	size_t offset = 0;
> +	struct key *key;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	while (offset < total_length) {
> +		rc = x509_get_certificate_length(certs + offset,
> +						 total_length - offset);
> +		if (rc < 0) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Invalid certificate length "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_prev;

If we exit here, prev == cert and double free occurs I think?

> +		}
> +
> +		length = rc;
> +		is_leaf_cert = offset + length == total_length;
> +
> +		cert = x509_cert_parse(certs + offset, length);
> +		if (IS_ERR(cert)) {
> +			rc = PTR_ERR(cert);
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Certificate parse error %d "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_prev;
> +		}
> +		if ((is_leaf_cert ==
> +		     test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &cert->pub->key_eflags)) ||
> +		    (is_leaf_cert &&
> +		     !test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &cert->pub->key_eflags))) {

I'd like a comment on these two conditions, or expand the error message
to make it clear why these options are valid.

> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed certificate "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +		if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unsupported signature "
> +				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +		if (cert->blacklisted) {
> +			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (!prev) {
> +			/* First cert in chain, check against root_keyring */
> +			key = find_asymmetric_key(spdm_state->root_keyring,
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[0],
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[1],
> +						  cert->sig->auth_ids[2],
> +						  false);
> +			if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> +				dev_info(spdm_state->dev, "Root certificate "
> +					 "for slot %u not found in %s "
> +					 "keyring: %s\n", slot,
> +					 spdm_state->root_keyring->description,
> +					 cert->issuer);
> +				rc = PTR_ERR(key);
> +				goto err_free_cert;
> +			}
> +
> +			rc = verify_signature(key, cert->sig);
> +			key_put(key);
> +		} else {
> +			/* Subsequent cert in chain, check against previous */
> +			rc = public_key_verify_signature(prev->pub, cert->sig);
> +		}
> +
> +		if (rc) {
> +			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Signature validation error "
> +				"%d at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
> +			goto err_free_cert;
> +		}
> +
> +		x509_free_certificate(prev);

Even this could be done with the cleanup.h stuff with appropriate
pointer stealing and hence allow direct returns.

This is the sort of case that I think really justifies that stuff.

> +		offset += length;
> +		prev = cert;

As above, I think you need to set 
		cert = NULL; here to avoid a double free then deal
with prev, not cert in the good path.

> +	}
> +
> +	prev = NULL;
> +	spdm_state->leaf_key = cert->pub;
> +	cert->pub = NULL;
> +
> +err_free_cert:
> +	x509_free_certificate(cert);
> +err_free_prev:
> +	x509_free_certificate(prev);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = {
> +		.code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE,
> +		.param1 = slot,
> +	};
> +	struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp;
> +	struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL;
> +	size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length;
> +	u16 remainder_length = 0xffff;
> +	u16 portion_length;
> +	u16 offset = 0;
> +	int rc, length;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * It is legal for the responder to send more bytes than requested.
> +	 * (Note the "should" in SPDM 1.0.0 table 19.)  If we allocate a
> +	 * too small buffer, we can't calculate the hash over the (truncated)
> +	 * response.  Only choice is thus to allocate the maximum possible 64k.
> +	 */

Yikes.  An alternative is just reject any device that does this until we get
a report of a device in the wild that does it. 

> +	rsp_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(*rsp) + 0xffff, spdm_state->transport_sz);
> +	rsp = kvmalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!rsp)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
...



> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_verify_signature() - Verify signature against leaf key
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @s: Signature
> + * @spdm_context: SPDM context (used to create combined_spdm_prefix)
> + *
> + * Implementation of the abstract SPDMSignatureVerify() function described in
> + * SPDM 1.2.0 section 16:  Compute the hash in @spdm_state->desc and verify
> + * that its signature @s was generated with @spdm_state->leaf_key.
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
> + */
> +static int spdm_verify_signature(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 *s,
> +				 const char *spdm_context)
> +{
> +	struct public_key_signature sig = {
> +		.s = s,
> +		.s_size = spdm_state->s,
> +		.encoding = spdm_state->base_asym_enc,
> +		.hash_algo = spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
> +	};
> +	u8 *m, *mhash = NULL;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	m = kmalloc(SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!m)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = crypto_shash_final(spdm_state->desc, m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_free_m;
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version <= 0x11) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Until SPDM 1.1, the signature is computed only over the hash
For SPDM 1.1 and earlier
(Until isn't necessarily inclusive).

> +		 * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.7).
> +		 */
> +		sig.digest = m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ;
> +		sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
> +	} else {
> +		/*
> +		 * From SPDM 1.2, the hash is prefixed with spdm_context before
> +		 * computing the signature over the resulting message M
> +		 * (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 841).
> +		 */
> +		spdm_create_combined_prefix(spdm_state, spdm_context, m);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * RSA and ECDSA algorithms require that M is hashed once more.
> +		 * EdDSA and SM2 algorithms omit that step.
> +		 * The switch statement prepares for their introduction.
> +		 */
> +		switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) {
> +		default:
> +			mhash = kmalloc(spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
> +			if (!mhash) {
> +				rc = -ENOMEM;
> +				goto err_free_m;
> +			}
> +
> +			rc = crypto_shash_digest(spdm_state->desc, m,
> +				SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h,
> +				mhash);
> +			if (rc)
> +				goto err_free_mhash;
> +
> +			sig.digest = mhash;
> +			sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = public_key_verify_signature(spdm_state->leaf_key, &sig);
> +
> +err_free_mhash:
> +	kfree(mhash);
> +err_free_m:
> +	kfree(m);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional)
> + *
> + * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields
> + * as well as optional fields.  This helper eases calculating its size.
> + *
> + * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes
> + * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21).  Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp.
> + * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack
> + * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request.
> + * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field,
> + * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261).
> + */
> +static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> +				    struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp)
> +{
> +	size_t  size  = sizeof(*rsp)		/* Header */

Double spaces look a bit strange...

> +		      + spdm_state->h		/* CertChainHash */
> +		      + 32;			/* Nonce */
> +
> +	if (rsp)
> +		/* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */
> +		size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size);
> +	else
> +		size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA;	/* OpaqueData */
> +
> +	size += 2;				/* OpaqueDataLength */
> +
> +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13)
> +		size += 8;			/* RequesterContext */
> +
> +	return  size  + spdm_state->s;		/* Signature */

Double space here as well looks odd to me.

> +}



> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_authenticate() - Authenticate device
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + *
> + * Authenticate a device through a sequence of GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES,
> + * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE exchanges.
> + *
> + * Perform internal locking to serialize multiple concurrent invocations.
> + * Can be called repeatedly for reauthentication.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.  In particular, -EPROTONOSUPPORT
> + * indicates that authentication is not supported by the device.
> + */
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	size_t transcript_sz;
> +	void *transcript;
> +	int rc = -ENOMEM;
> +	u8 slot;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);

You could use
	guard(mutex)(&spdm_state->lock);
but if you prefer not that's fine by me as there are disadvantages in
readability perhaps.

Will still need the gotos though to do the rest if appropriate.

> +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification, a hash is computed over
> +	 * all exchanged messages to detect modification by a man-in-the-middle
> +	 * or media error.  However the hash algorithm is not known until the
> +	 * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS response has been received.  The preceding
> +	 * GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges are therefore stashed
> +	 * in a transcript buffer and consumed once the algorithm is known.
> +	 * The buffer size is sufficient for the largest possible messages with
> +	 * 255 version entries and the capability fields added by SPDM 1.2.
> +	 */
> +	transcript = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct spdm_get_version_rsp,
> +					   version_number_entries, 255) +
> +			     sizeof(struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp) * 2,
> +			     GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!transcript)
> +		goto unlock;
	this doesn't need to reset, so perhaps another label appropriate?

> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_version(spdm_state, transcript, &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_capabilities(spdm_state, transcript + transcript_sz,
> +				   &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_negotiate_algs(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_digests(spdm_state);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	for_each_set_bit(slot, &spdm_state->slot_mask, SPDM_SLOTS) {
> +		rc = spdm_get_certificate(spdm_state, slot);
> +		if (rc == 0)
> +			break; /* success */
> +		if (rc != -ENOKEY && rc != -EKEYREJECTED)
> +			break; /* try next slot only on signature error */
> +	}
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot);
> +
> +unlock:
> +	if (rc)
> +		spdm_reset(spdm_state);

I'd expect reset to also clear authenticated. Seems odd to do it separately
and relies on reset only being called here. If that were the case and you
were handling locking and freeing using cleanup.h magic, then

	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state);
	if (rc)
		goto reset;
	return 0;

reset:
	spdm_reset(spdm_state);

> +	spdm_state->authenticated = !rc;
> +	mutex_unlock(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	kfree(transcript);

Ordering seems strange as transcript was allocated under the lock
but freed outside it.

> +	return rc;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticate);

...

> +/**
> + * spdm_create() - Allocate SPDM session
> + *
> + * @dev: Transport device
> + * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange
> + * @transport_priv: Transport private data
> + * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes)
> + * @keyring: Trusted root certificates
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the allocated SPDM session state or NULL on error.
> + */
> +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
> +			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
> +			       struct key *keyring)
> +{
> +	struct spdm_state *spdm_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state), GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> +	if (!spdm_state)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	spdm_state->dev = dev;
> +	spdm_state->transport = transport;
> +	spdm_state->transport_priv = transport_priv;
> +	spdm_state->transport_sz = transport_sz;
> +	spdm_state->root_keyring = keyring;
> +
> +	mutex_init(&spdm_state->lock);
> +
> +	return spdm_state;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_create);

Makes sense to namespace these?

> +
> +/**
> + * spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + */
> +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +	mutex_destroy(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	kfree(spdm_state);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_destroy);
> +
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

Dan Williams Oct. 6, 2023, 8:34 p.m. UTC | #3

Lukas Wunner wrote:
> From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> 
> The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.
> 
> A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is attestation.
> 
> SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
> Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken between
> host and attached devices over a variety of transports:
> 
>   https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> 
> This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest version).
> It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already supports
> two different SPDM-capable transports:
> 
> * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
> * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
>   Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)
> 
> Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:
> 
> * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31)
> * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
> * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
>   https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf
> 
> The initial focus of this implementation is enabling PCIe CMA device
> authentication.  As such, only a subset of the SPDM specification is
> contained herein, namely the request/response sequence GET_VERSION,
> GET_CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE
> and CHALLENGE.
> 
> A simple API is provided for subsystems wishing to authenticate devices:
> spdm_create(), spdm_authenticate() (can be called repeatedly for
> reauthentication) and spdm_destroy().  Certificates presented by devices
> are validated against an in-kernel keyring of trusted root certificates.
> A pointer to the keyring is passed to spdm_create().
> 
> The set of supported cryptographic algorithms is limited to those
> declared mandatory in PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3.  Adding more algorithms
> is straightforward as long as the crypto subsystem supports them.
> 
> Future commits will extend this implementation with support for
> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions.
> 
> So far, only the SPDM requester role is implemented.  Care was taken to
> allow for effortless addition of the responder role at a later stage.
> This could be needed for a PCIe host bridge operating in endpoint mode.
> The responder role will be able to reuse struct definitions and helpers
> such as spdm_create_combined_prefix().  Those can be moved to
> spdm_common.{h,c} files upon introduction of the responder role.
> For now, all is kept in a single source file to avoid polluting the
> global namespace with unnecessary symbols.

Since you are raising design considerations for the future reuse of this
code in the responder role, I will raise some considerations for future
reuse of this code with platform security modules (the TDISP specification
calls them TSMs).

> 
> Credits:  Jonathan wrote a proof-of-concept of this SPDM implementation.
> Lukas reworked it for upstream.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS          |    9 +
>  include/linux/spdm.h |   35 +
>  lib/Kconfig          |   15 +
>  lib/Makefile         |    2 +
>  lib/spdm_requester.c | 1487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/spdm.h
>  create mode 100644 lib/spdm_requester.c
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 90f13281d297..2591d2217d65 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -19299,6 +19299,15 @@ M:	Security Officers <[e-mail]>
>  S:	Supported
>  F:	Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
>  
> +SECURITY PROTOCOL AND DATA MODEL (SPDM)
> +M:	Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> +M:	Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +L:	[e-mail]
> +S:	Maintained
> +F:	include/linux/spdm.h
> +F:	lib/spdm*
> +
>  SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
>  M:	Paul Moore <[e-mail]>
>  M:	James Morris <[e-mail]>
> diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e824063793a7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/spdm.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
> + * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
> + *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SPDM_H_
> +#define _SPDM_H_
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct key;
> +struct device;
> +struct spdm_state;
> +
> +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
> +			     const void *request, size_t request_sz,
> +			     void *response, size_t response_sz);

TIL that even though "typedef <type> (*<name>)" is the predominant kernel
style of declaring function pointer types, significant parts of the kernel
use this "typedef <type> (<name>)" and declare it a pointer at the usage
site.

> +
> +struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
> +			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
> +			       struct key *keyring);
> +
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
> index c686f4adc124..3516cf1dad16 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig
> @@ -764,3 +764,18 @@ config ASN1_ENCODER
>  
>  config POLYNOMIAL
>         tristate
> +
> +config SPDM_REQUESTER
> +	tristate
> +	select KEYS
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> +	select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
> +	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
> +	help
> +	 The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
> +	 measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.  This
> +	 option enables support for the SPDM requester role.
> +
> +	 Crypto algorithms offered to SPDM responders are limited to those
> +	 enabled in .config.  Drivers selecting SPDM_REQUESTER need to also
> +	 select any algorithms they deem mandatory.
> diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> index 740109b6e2c8..d9ae58a9ca83 100644
> --- a/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/Makefile
> @@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
>  
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SPDM_REQUESTER) += spdm_requester.o
> +
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
>  
>  hostprogs	:= gen_crc32table
> diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..407041036599
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c
[..]
> +struct spdm_error_rsp {
> +	u8 version;
> +	u8 code;
> +	enum spdm_error_code error_code:8;
> +	u8 error_data;
> +
> +	u8 extended_error_data[];
> +} __packed;
> +
> +static int spdm_err(struct device *dev, struct spdm_error_rsp *rsp)
> +{

Why not an error_code_to_string() helper and then use dev_err() directly at
the call site? rsp->error_data could be conveyed uncoditionally, but maybe
that belies that I do not understand the need for filtering ->error_data.

> +	switch (rsp->error_code) {
> +	case spdm_invalid_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid request\n");

Setting the above comment aside, do you suspect these need to be
dev_err_ratelimited() if only because it is unclear whether a user of this
library will trigger screaming error messages?


> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_invalid_session:
> +		if (rsp->version == 0x11) {
> +			dev_err(dev, "Invalid session %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +		break;
> +	case spdm_busy:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Busy\n");
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	case spdm_unexpected_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unexpected request\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_unspecified:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unspecified error\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_decrypt_error:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Decrypt error\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	case spdm_unsupported_request:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported request %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_request_in_flight:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request in flight\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_invalid_response_code:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid response code\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_session_limit_exceeded:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Session limit exceeded\n");
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	case spdm_session_required:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Session required\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_reset_required:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Reset required\n");
> +		return -ERESTART;
> +	case spdm_response_too_large:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Response too large\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_request_too_large:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request too large\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_large_response:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Large response\n");
> +		return -EMSGSIZE;
> +	case spdm_message_lost:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Message lost\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	case spdm_invalid_policy:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Invalid policy\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_version_mismatch:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Version mismatch\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_response_not_ready:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Response not ready\n");
> +		return -EINPROGRESS;
> +	case spdm_request_resynch:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Request resynchronization\n");
> +		return -ERESTART;
> +	case spdm_operation_failed:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Operation failed\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case spdm_no_pending_requests:
> +		return -ENOENT;
> +	case spdm_vendor_defined_error:
> +		dev_err(dev, "Vendor defined error\n");
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	dev_err(dev, "Undefined error %#x\n", rsp->error_code);
> +	return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
[..]
> +/**
> + * spdm_authenticate() - Authenticate device
> + *
> + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> + *
> + * Authenticate a device through a sequence of GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES,
> + * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE exchanges.
> + *
> + * Perform internal locking to serialize multiple concurrent invocations.
> + * Can be called repeatedly for reauthentication.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.  In particular, -EPROTONOSUPPORT
> + * indicates that authentication is not supported by the device.
> + */
> +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> +{
> +	size_t transcript_sz;
> +	void *transcript;
> +	int rc = -ENOMEM;
> +	u8 slot;
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);
> +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification, a hash is computed over
> +	 * all exchanged messages to detect modification by a man-in-the-middle
> +	 * or media error.  However the hash algorithm is not known until the
> +	 * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS response has been received.  The preceding
> +	 * GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges are therefore stashed
> +	 * in a transcript buffer and consumed once the algorithm is known.
> +	 * The buffer size is sufficient for the largest possible messages with
> +	 * 255 version entries and the capability fields added by SPDM 1.2.
> +	 */
> +	transcript = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct spdm_get_version_rsp,
> +					   version_number_entries, 255) +
> +			     sizeof(struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp) * 2,
> +			     GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!transcript)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_version(spdm_state, transcript, &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_capabilities(spdm_state, transcript + transcript_sz,
> +				   &transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_negotiate_algs(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	rc = spdm_get_digests(spdm_state);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	for_each_set_bit(slot, &spdm_state->slot_mask, SPDM_SLOTS) {
> +		rc = spdm_get_certificate(spdm_state, slot);

A forward looking comment here, how to structure this code for reuse when
end users opt their kernel into coordinating with a platform TSM? Since the
DOE mailbox can only be owned by 1 entity, I expect sdpdm_state could grow
additional operations beyond the raw transport. These operations would be
for higher-order flows, like "get certificates", where that operation may
be forwarded from guest-to-VMM-to-TSM, and where VMM and TSM manage the raw
transport to return the result to the guest.

Otherwise no other implementation comments from me, my eyes are not well
trained to spot misuse of the crypto apis.

Alistair Francis Oct. 12, 2023, 3:26 a.m. UTC | #4

On Tue, 2023-10-03 at 15:39 +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200
> Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> > From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
> > 
> > The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for
> > authentication,
> > measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.
> > 
> > A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is
> > attestation.
> > 
> > SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
> > Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken
> > between
> > host and attached devices over a variety of transports:
> > 
> >   https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
> > 
> > This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest
> > version).
> 
> I've no strong objection in allowing 1.0, but I think we do need
> to control min version accepted somehow as I'm not that keen to get
> security folk analyzing old version...

Agreed. I'm not sure we even need to support 1.0

> 
> > It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already
> > supports
> > two different SPDM-capable transports:
> > 
> > * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
> > * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
> >   Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)
> 
> The MCTP side of things is going to be interesting because mostly you
> need to jump through a bunch of hoops (address assignment, routing
> setup
> etc) before you can actually talk to a device.   That all involves
> a userspace agent.  So I'm not 100% sure how this will all turn out.
> However still makes sense to have a transport agnostic implementation
> as if nothing else it makes it easier to review as keeps us within
> one specification.

This list will probably expand in the future though

> > 
> > Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:
> > 
> > * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec
> > 6.31)
> > * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
> > * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
> >  
> > https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf
> 
> Alastair, would it make sense to also call out some of the storage
> use cases you are interested in?

I don't really have anything to add at the moment. I think PCIe CMA
covers the current DOE work

Alistair

Damien Le Moal Oct. 12, 2023, 4:37 a.m. UTC | #5

On 10/12/23 12:26, Alistair Francis wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-10-03 at 15:39 +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
>> On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200
>> Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
>>>
>>> The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for
>>> authentication,
>>> measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.
>>>
>>> A commonly used term for authentication and measurement is
>>> attestation.
>>>
>>> SPDM was conceived by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF).
>>> Its specification defines a request/response protocol spoken
>>> between
>>> host and attached devices over a variety of transports:
>>>
>>>   https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
>>>
>>> This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest
>>> version).
>>
>> I've no strong objection in allowing 1.0, but I think we do need
>> to control min version accepted somehow as I'm not that keen to get
>> security folk analyzing old version...
> 
> Agreed. I'm not sure we even need to support 1.0
> 
>>
>>> It is designed to be transport-agnostic as the kernel already
>>> supports
>>> two different SPDM-capable transports:
>>>
>>> * PCIe Data Object Exchange (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30, drivers/pci/doe.c)
>>> * Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP,
>>>   Documentation/networking/mctp.rst)
>>
>> The MCTP side of things is going to be interesting because mostly you
>> need to jump through a bunch of hoops (address assignment, routing
>> setup
>> etc) before you can actually talk to a device.   That all involves
>> a userspace agent.  So I'm not 100% sure how this will all turn out.
>> However still makes sense to have a transport agnostic implementation
>> as if nothing else it makes it easier to review as keeps us within
>> one specification.
> 
> This list will probably expand in the future though
> 
>>>
>>> Use cases for SPDM include, but are not limited to:
>>>
>>> * PCIe Component Measurement and Authentication (PCIe r6.1 sec
>>> 6.31)
>>> * Compute Express Link (CXL r3.0 sec 14.11.6)
>>> * Open Compute Project (Attestation of System Components r1.0)
>>>  
>>> https://www.opencompute.org/documents/attestation-v1-0-20201104-pdf
>>
>> Alastair, would it make sense to also call out some of the storage
>> use cases you are interested in?
> 
> I don't really have anything to add at the moment. I think PCIe CMA
> covers the current DOE work

Specifications for SPDM encapsulation in SCSI and ATA commands (SECURITY
PROTOCOL IN/OUT and TRUSTED SNED/RECEIVE) is being worked on now but that is
still in early phases of definition. So that support can come later. I suspect
the API may need some modification to accommodate that use case, but we need
more complete specification first to clearly see what is needed (if anything at
all).

Lukas Wunner Oct. 12, 2023, 7:16 a.m. UTC | #6

On Thu, Oct 12, 2023 at 03:26:44AM +0000, Alistair Francis wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-10-03 at 15:39 +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> > On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200 Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > > This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest
> > > version).
> > 
> > I've no strong objection in allowing 1.0, but I think we do need
> > to control min version accepted somehow as I'm not that keen to get
> > security folk analyzing old version...
> 
> Agreed. I'm not sure we even need to support 1.0

According to PCIe r6.1 page 115 ("Reference Documents"):

   "CMA requires SPDM Version 1.0 or above.  IDE requires SPDM Version 1.1
    or above.  TDISP requires version 1.2 or above."

This could be interpreted as SPDM 1.0 support being mandatory to be
spec-compliant.  Even if we drop support for 1.0 from the initial
bringup patches, someone could later come along and propose a patch
to re-add it on the grounds of the above-quoted spec section.
So I think we can't avoid it.

Thanks,

Lukas

Jonathan Cameron Oct. 12, 2023, 3:09 p.m. UTC | #7

On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 09:16:29 +0200
Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 12, 2023 at 03:26:44AM +0000, Alistair Francis wrote:
> > On Tue, 2023-10-03 at 15:39 +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:  
> > > On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200 Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:  
> > > > This implementation supports SPDM 1.0 through 1.3 (the latest
> > > > version).  
> > > 
> > > I've no strong objection in allowing 1.0, but I think we do need
> > > to control min version accepted somehow as I'm not that keen to get
> > > security folk analyzing old version...  
> > 
> > Agreed. I'm not sure we even need to support 1.0  
> 
> According to PCIe r6.1 page 115 ("Reference Documents"):
> 
>    "CMA requires SPDM Version 1.0 or above.  IDE requires SPDM Version 1.1
>     or above.  TDISP requires version 1.2 or above."
> 
> This could be interpreted as SPDM 1.0 support being mandatory to be
> spec-compliant.  Even if we drop support for 1.0 from the initial
> bringup patches, someone could later come along and propose a patch
> to re-add it on the grounds of the above-quoted spec section.
> So I think we can't avoid it.

I checked with some of our security folk and they didn't provide a
reason to avoid 1.0.  It's not feature complete, but for what it does
it's fine.  So given the PCI spec line you quote keep it for now.
We should be careful to require the newer versions for the additional
features though. Can address that when it's relevant.

Jonathan
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Lukas
>

Lukas Wunner Feb. 4, 2024, 5:25 p.m. UTC | #8

On Tue, Oct 03, 2023 at 03:39:37PM +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200 Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > +/**
> > + * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size
> > + *
> > + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> > + * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional)
> > + *
> > + * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields
> > + * as well as optional fields.  This helper eases calculating its size.
> > + *
> > + * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes
> > + * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21).  Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp.
> > + * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack
> > + * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request.
> > + * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field,
> > + * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261).
> > + */
> > +static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > +				    struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp)
> > +{
> > +	size_t  size  = sizeof(*rsp)		/* Header */
> 
> Double spaces look a bit strange...
> 
> > +		      + spdm_state->h		/* CertChainHash */
> > +		      + 32;			/* Nonce */
> > +
> > +	if (rsp)
> > +		/* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */
> > +		size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size);
> > +	else
> > +		size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA;	/* OpaqueData */
> > +
> > +	size += 2;				/* OpaqueDataLength */
> > +
> > +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13)
> > +		size += 8;			/* RequesterContext */
> > +
> > +	return  size  + spdm_state->s;		/* Signature */
> 
> Double space here as well looks odd to me.

This was criticized by Ilpo as well, but the double spaces are
intentional to vertically align "size" on each line for neatness.

How strongly do you guys feel about it? ;)


> > +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> > +{
> > +	size_t transcript_sz;
> > +	void *transcript;
> > +	int rc = -ENOMEM;
> > +	u8 slot;
> > +
> > +	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);
> > +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
[...]
> > +	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot);
> > +
> > +unlock:
> > +	if (rc)
> > +		spdm_reset(spdm_state);
> 
> I'd expect reset to also clear authenticated. Seems odd to do it separately
> and relies on reset only being called here. If that were the case and you
> were handling locking and freeing using cleanup.h magic, then
> 
> 	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state);
> 	if (rc)
> 		goto reset;
> 	return 0;
> 
> reset:
> 	spdm_reset(spdm_state);

Unfortunately clearing "authenticated" in spdm_reset() is not an
option:

Note that spdm_reset() is also called at the top of spdm_authenticate().

If the device was previously successfully authenticated and is now
re-authenticated successfully, clearing "authenticated" in spdm_reset()
would cause the flag to be briefly set to false, which may irritate
user space inspecting the sysfs attribute at just the wrong moment.

If the device was previously successfully authenticated and is
re-authenticated successfully, I want the "authenticated" attribute
to show "true" without any gaps.  Hence it's only cleared at the end
of spdm_authenticate() if there was an error.

I agree with all your other review feedback and have amended the
patch accordingly.  Thanks a lot!

Lukas

Jonathan Cameron Feb. 5, 2024, 10:07 a.m. UTC | #9

On Sun, 4 Feb 2024 18:25:10 +0100
Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 03, 2023 at 03:39:37PM +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> > On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:37 +0200 Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]> wrote:  
> > > +/**
> > > + * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size
> > > + *
> > > + * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
> > > + * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional)
> > > + *
> > > + * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields
> > > + * as well as optional fields.  This helper eases calculating its size.
> > > + *
> > > + * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes
> > > + * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21).  Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp.
> > > + * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack
> > > + * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request.
> > > + * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field,
> > > + * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261).
> > > + */
> > > +static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > > +				    struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp)
> > > +{
> > > +	size_t  size  = sizeof(*rsp)		/* Header */  
> > 
> > Double spaces look a bit strange...
> >   
> > > +		      + spdm_state->h		/* CertChainHash */
> > > +		      + 32;			/* Nonce */
> > > +
> > > +	if (rsp)
> > > +		/* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */
> > > +		size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size);
> > > +	else
> > > +		size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA;	/* OpaqueData */
> > > +
> > > +	size += 2;				/* OpaqueDataLength */
> > > +
> > > +	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13)
> > > +		size += 8;			/* RequesterContext */
> > > +
> > > +	return  size  + spdm_state->s;		/* Signature */  
> > 
> > Double space here as well looks odd to me.  
> 
> This was criticized by Ilpo as well, but the double spaces are
> intentional to vertically align "size" on each line for neatness.
> 
> How strongly do you guys feel about it? ;)

I suspect we'll see 'fixes' for this creating noise for maintainers.
So whilst I don't feel that strongly about it I'm not sure the alignment
really helps much with readability either.
 
> 
> 
> > > +int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
> > > +{
> > > +	size_t transcript_sz;
> > > +	void *transcript;
> > > +	int rc = -ENOMEM;
> > > +	u8 slot;
> > > +
> > > +	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);
> > > +	spdm_reset(spdm_state);  
> [...]
> > > +	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot);
> > > +
> > > +unlock:
> > > +	if (rc)
> > > +		spdm_reset(spdm_state);  
> > 
> > I'd expect reset to also clear authenticated. Seems odd to do it separately
> > and relies on reset only being called here. If that were the case and you
> > were handling locking and freeing using cleanup.h magic, then
> > 
> > 	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state);
> > 	if (rc)
> > 		goto reset;
> > 	return 0;
> > 
> > reset:
> > 	spdm_reset(spdm_state);  
> 
> Unfortunately clearing "authenticated" in spdm_reset() is not an
> option:
> 
> Note that spdm_reset() is also called at the top of spdm_authenticate().
> 
> If the device was previously successfully authenticated and is now
> re-authenticated successfully, clearing "authenticated" in spdm_reset()
> would cause the flag to be briefly set to false, which may irritate
> user space inspecting the sysfs attribute at just the wrong moment.

That makes sense. Thanks.

> 
> If the device was previously successfully authenticated and is
> re-authenticated successfully, I want the "authenticated" attribute
> to show "true" without any gaps.  Hence it's only cleared at the end
> of spdm_authenticate() if there was an error.
> 
> I agree with all your other review feedback and have amended the
> patch accordingly.  Thanks a lot!
> 
> Lukas
>

Lukas Wunner Feb. 9, 2024, 8:32 p.m. UTC | #10

On Tue, Oct 03, 2023 at 01:35:26PM +0300, Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Sep 2023, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> > +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
> > +                          const void *request, size_t request_sz,
> > +                          void *response, size_t response_sz);
> 
> This returns a length or an error, right? If so return ssize_t instead.
> 
> If you make this change, alter the caller types too.

Alright, I've changed the types in __spdm_exchange() and spdm_exchange().

However the callers of those functions assign the result to an "rc" variable
which is also used to receive an "int" return value.
E.g. spdm_get_digests() assigns the ssize_t result of spdm_exchange() to rc
but also the int result of crypto_shash_update().

It feels awkward to change the type of "rc" to "ssize_t" in those
functions, so I kept "int".


> > +} __packed;
> > +
> > +#define SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES 0xE1
> 
> There's non-capital hex later in the file, please try to be consistent.

The spec uses capital hex characters, so this was done to ease
connecting the implementation to the spec.

OTOH I don't want to capitalize all the hex codes in enum spdm_error_code.

So I guess consistency takes precedence and I've amended the
patch to downcase all hex characters, as you've requested.


> > +struct spdm_error_rsp {
> > +	u8 version;
> > +	u8 code;
> > +	enum spdm_error_code error_code:8;
> > +	u8 error_data;
> > +
> > +	u8 extended_error_data[];
> > +} __packed;
> 
> Is this always going to produce the layout you want given the alignment 
> requirements for the storage unit for u8 and enum are probably different?

Yes, the __packed attribute forces the compiler to avoid padding.


> > +	spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags);
> 
> Earlier, unaligned accessors where used with the version_number_entries.
> Is it intentional they're not used here (I cannot see what would be 
> reason for this difference)?

Thanks, good catch.  Indeed this is not necessarily naturally aligned
because the GET_CAPABILITIES request and response succeeds the
GET_VERSION response in the same allocation.  And the GET_VERSION
response size is a multiple of 2, but not always a multiple of 4.

So I've amended the patch to use a separate allocation for the
GET_CAPABILITIES request and response.  The spec-defined struct layout
of those messages is such that the 32-bit accesses are indeed always
naturally aligned.

The existing unaligned accessor in spdm_get_version() turned out
to be unnecessary after taking a closer look, so I dropped that one.


> > +static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > +			       void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz)
> > +{
> > +	struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct;
> > +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req;
> > +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp;
> > +	size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> > +	size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> > +	int rc, length;
> > +
> > +	/* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */
> > +	BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128);
> 
> I don't know why this really has to be here? This could be static_assert()
> below the struct declaration.

A follow-on patch to add key exchange support increases req_sz based on
an SPDM_MAX_REQ_ALG_STRUCT macro defined here in front of the function
where it's used.  That's the reason why the size is checked here as well.


> > +static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
> > +{
> > +	struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = {
> > +		.code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE,
> > +		.param1 = slot,
> > +	};
> > +	struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp;
> > +	struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL;
> > +	size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length;
> > +	u16 remainder_length = 0xffff;
> 
> 0xffff in this function should use either U16_MAX or SZ_64K - 1.

The SPDM spec uses 0xffff so I'm deliberately using that as well
to make the connection to the spec obvious.


> > +static void spdm_create_combined_prefix(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > +					const char *spdm_context, void *buf)
> > +{
> > +	u8 minor = spdm_state->version & 0xf;
> > +	u8 major = spdm_state->version >> 4;
> > +	size_t len = strlen(spdm_context);
> > +	int rc, zero_pad;
> > +
> > +	rc = snprintf(buf, SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1,
> > +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*"
> > +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*",
> > +		      major, minor, major, minor, major, minor, major, minor);
> 
> Why are these using s8 formatting specifier %hhx ??

I don't quite follow, "%hhx" is an unsigned char, not a signed char.

spdm_state->version may contain e.g. 0x12 which is converted to
"dmtf-spdm-v1.2.*" here.

The question is what happens if the major or minor version goes beyond 9.
The total length of the prefix is hard-coded by the spec, hence my
expectation is that 1.10 will be represented as "dmtf-spdm-v1.a.*"
to not exceed the length.  The code follows that expectation.

Thanks for taking a look!   I've amended the patch to take all your
other feedback into account.

Lukas

Ilpo Järvinen Feb. 12, 2024, 11:47 a.m. UTC | #11

On Fri, 9 Feb 2024, Lukas Wunner wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 03, 2023 at 01:35:26PM +0300, Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> > On Thu, 28 Sep 2023, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> > > +typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
> > > +                          const void *request, size_t request_sz,
> > > +                          void *response, size_t response_sz);
> > 
> > This returns a length or an error, right? If so return ssize_t instead.
> > 
> > If you make this change, alter the caller types too.
> 
> Alright, I've changed the types in __spdm_exchange() and spdm_exchange().
> 
> However the callers of those functions assign the result to an "rc" variable
> which is also used to receive an "int" return value.
> E.g. spdm_get_digests() assigns the ssize_t result of spdm_exchange() to rc
> but also the int result of crypto_shash_update().
> 
> It feels awkward to change the type of "rc" to "ssize_t" in those
> functions, so I kept "int".

Using ssize_t type variable for return values is not that uncommon (kernel 
wide). Obviously that results in int -> ssize_t conversion if they call 
any function that only needs to return an int. But it seems harmless.

crypto_shash_update() doesn't input size_t like (spdm_transport)() does.

> > > +struct spdm_error_rsp {
> > > +	u8 version;
> > > +	u8 code;
> > > +	enum spdm_error_code error_code:8;
> > > +	u8 error_data;
> > > +
> > > +	u8 extended_error_data[];
> > > +} __packed;
> > 
> > Is this always going to produce the layout you want given the alignment 
> > requirements for the storage unit for u8 and enum are probably different?
> 
> Yes, the __packed attribute forces the compiler to avoid padding.

Okay, so I assume compiler is actually able put enum with u8, seemingly 
bitfield code generation has gotten better than it used to be.

With how little is promised wordings in the spec (unless there is later 
update I've not seen), I'd suggest you still add a static_assert for the 
sizeof of the struct to make sure it is always of correct size. 
Mislayouting is much easier to catch on build time.

> > > +static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > > +			       void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz)
> > > +{
> > > +	struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct;
> > > +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req;
> > > +	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp;
> > > +	size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req);
> > > +	size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
> > > +	int rc, length;
> > > +
> > > +	/* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */
> > > +	BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128);
> > 
> > I don't know why this really has to be here? This could be static_assert()
> > below the struct declaration.
> 
> A follow-on patch to add key exchange support increases req_sz based on
> an SPDM_MAX_REQ_ALG_STRUCT macro defined here in front of the function
> where it's used.  That's the reason why the size is checked here as well.

Okay, understood. I didn't go that in my analysis so I missed the later 
addition.

> > > +static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
> > > +{
> > > +	struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = {
> > > +		.code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE,
> > > +		.param1 = slot,
> > > +	};
> > > +	struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp;
> > > +	struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL;
> > > +	size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length;
> > > +	u16 remainder_length = 0xffff;
> > 
> > 0xffff in this function should use either U16_MAX or SZ_64K - 1.
> 
> The SPDM spec uses 0xffff so I'm deliberately using that as well
> to make the connection to the spec obvious.

It's not obvious when somebody is reading 0xffff. If you want to make the 
connection obvious, you create a proper #define + add a comment where its 
defined with the spec ref.

> > > +static void spdm_create_combined_prefix(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
> > > +					const char *spdm_context, void *buf)
> > > +{
> > > +	u8 minor = spdm_state->version & 0xf;
> > > +	u8 major = spdm_state->version >> 4;
> > > +	size_t len = strlen(spdm_context);
> > > +	int rc, zero_pad;
> > > +
> > > +	rc = snprintf(buf, SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1,
> > > +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*"
> > > +		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*",
> > > +		      major, minor, major, minor, major, minor, major, minor);
> > 
> > Why are these using s8 formatting specifier %hhx ??
> 
> I don't quite follow, "%hhx" is an unsigned char, not a signed char.
> 
> spdm_state->version may contain e.g. 0x12 which is converted to
> "dmtf-spdm-v1.2.*" here.
> 
> The question is what happens if the major or minor version goes beyond 9.
> The total length of the prefix is hard-coded by the spec, hence my
> expectation is that 1.10 will be represented as "dmtf-spdm-v1.a.*"
> to not exceed the length.  The code follows that expectation.

It's actually fine.

I just got tunnel vision when looking what that %hhx is in the first 
place, in Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst there's this list:

	        signed char             %d or %hhx
                unsigned char           %u or %x

But of course %hhx is just as valid for unsigned.

Lukas Wunner March 20, 2024, 8:33 a.m. UTC | #12

On Fri, Feb 09, 2024 at 09:32:04PM +0100, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 03, 2023 at 01:35:26PM +0300, Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> > On Thu, 28 Sep 2023, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> > > +	spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags);
> > 
> > Earlier, unaligned accessors where used with the version_number_entries.
> > Is it intentional they're not used here (I cannot see what would be 
> > reason for this difference)?
> 
> Thanks, good catch.  Indeed this is not necessarily naturally aligned
> because the GET_CAPABILITIES request and response succeeds the
> GET_VERSION response in the same allocation.  And the GET_VERSION
> response size is a multiple of 2, but not always a multiple of 4.

Actually, scratch that.

I've realized that since all the SPDM request/response structs are
declared __packed, the alignment requirement for the struct members
becomes 1 byte and hence they're automatically accessed byte-wise on
arches which require that:

https://stackoverflow.com/questions/73152859/accessing-unaligned-struct-member-using-pointers#73154825

E.g. this line...

        req->data_transfer_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);

...becomes this on arm 32-bit (multi_v4t_defconfig)...

        ldr        r3, [r5, #0x1c]   ; load spdm_state->transport_sz into r3
        lsr        r2, r3, lsr #8    ; right-shift r3 into r2 by 8 bits
        strb       r3, [r7, #0xc]    ; copy lowest byte from r3 into request
        strb       r2, [r7, #0xd]    ; copy next byte from r2 into request
        lsr        r2, r3, lsr #16   ; right-shift r3 into r2 by 16 bits
        lsr        r3, r3, lsr #24   ; right-shift r3 into r3 by 24 bits
        strb       r2, [r7, #0xe]    ; copy next byte from r2 into request
        strb       r3, [r7, #0xf]    ; copy next byte from r3 into request

...and it becomes this on x64_64, which has no alignment requirements:

        mov        eax, dword [r15+0x40] ; load spdm_state->transport_sz
        mov        dword [r12+0xc], eax  ; copy into request

So for __packed structs, get_unaligned_*() / put_unaligned_*() accessors
are not necessary and I will drop them when respinning.

Thanks,

Lukas

Patch

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 90f13281d297..2591d2217d65 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -19299,6 +19299,15 @@  M:	Security Officers <[e-mail]>
 S:	Supported
 F:	Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
 
+SECURITY PROTOCOL AND DATA MODEL (SPDM)
+M:	Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
+M:	Lukas Wunner <[e-mail]>
+L:	[e-mail]
+L:	[e-mail]
+S:	Maintained
+F:	include/linux/spdm.h
+F:	lib/spdm*
+
 SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Paul Moore <[e-mail]>
 M:	James Morris <[e-mail]>
diff --git a/include/linux/spdm.h b/include/linux/spdm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e824063793a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/spdm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ 
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
+ * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
+ *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SPDM_H_
+#define _SPDM_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct key;
+struct device;
+struct spdm_state;
+
+typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
+			     const void *request, size_t request_sz,
+			     void *response, size_t response_sz);
+
+struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
+			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
+			       struct key *keyring);
+
+int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
+
+bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
+
+void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index c686f4adc124..3516cf1dad16 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -764,3 +764,18 @@  config ASN1_ENCODER
 
 config POLYNOMIAL
        tristate
+
+config SPDM_REQUESTER
+	tristate
+	select KEYS
+	select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+	select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	 The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) allows for authentication,
+	 measurement, key exchange and encrypted sessions with devices.  This
+	 option enables support for the SPDM requester role.
+
+	 Crypto algorithms offered to SPDM responders are limited to those
+	 enabled in .config.  Drivers selecting SPDM_REQUESTER need to also
+	 select any algorithms they deem mandatory.
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 740109b6e2c8..d9ae58a9ca83 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@  obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_SPDM_REQUESTER) += spdm_requester.o
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
 
 hostprogs	:= gen_crc32table
diff --git a/lib/spdm_requester.c b/lib/spdm_requester.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..407041036599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/spdm_requester.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1487 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
+ * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
+ *     Jonathan Cameron <[e-mail]>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022-23 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#define dev_fmt(fmt) "SPDM: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/spdm.h>
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/x509-parser.h>
+
+/* SPDM versions supported by this implementation */
+#define SPDM_MIN_VER 0x10
+#define SPDM_MAX_VER 0x13
+
+#define SPDM_CACHE_CAP			BIT(0)		    /* response only */
+#define SPDM_CERT_CAP			BIT(1)
+#define SPDM_CHAL_CAP			BIT(2)
+#define SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(4, 3)	    /* response only */
+#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_NO		0		    /* response only */
+#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS		1		    /* response only */
+#define   SPDM_MEAS_CAP_MEAS_SIG	2		    /* response only */
+#define SPDM_MEAS_FRESH_CAP		BIT(5)		    /* response only */
+#define SPDM_ENCRYPT_CAP		BIT(6)
+#define SPDM_MAC_CAP			BIT(7)
+#define SPDM_MUT_AUTH_CAP		BIT(8)
+#define SPDM_KEY_EX_CAP			BIT(9)
+#define SPDM_PSK_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(11, 10)
+#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_NO		0
+#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK		1
+#define   SPDM_PSK_CAP_PSK_CTX		2		    /* response only */
+#define SPDM_ENCAP_CAP			BIT(12)
+#define SPDM_HBEAT_CAP			BIT(13)
+#define SPDM_KEY_UPD_CAP		BIT(14)
+#define SPDM_HANDSHAKE_ITC_CAP		BIT(15)
+#define SPDM_PUB_KEY_ID_CAP		BIT(16)
+#define SPDM_CHUNK_CAP			BIT(17)		/* 1.2 */
+#define SPDM_ALIAS_CERT_CAP		BIT(18)		/* 1.2 response only */
+#define SPDM_SET_CERT_CAP		BIT(19)		/* 1.2 response only */
+#define SPDM_CSR_CAP			BIT(20)		/* 1.2 response only */
+#define SPDM_CERT_INST_RESET_CAP	BIT(21)		/* 1.2 response only */
+#define SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(23, 22) /* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP		1		/* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_EP_INFO_CAP_RSP_SIG	2		/* 1.3 */
+#define SPDM_MEL_CAP			BIT(24)		/* 1.3 response only */
+#define SPDM_EVENT_CAP			BIT(25)		/* 1.3 */
+#define SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_MASK		GENMASK(27, 26)	/* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_NO		0		/* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_ONLY	1		/* 1.3 */
+#define   SPDM_MULTI_KEY_CAP_SEL	2		/* 1.3 */
+#define SPDM_GET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(28)		/* 1.3 response only */
+#define SPDM_SET_KEY_PAIR_INFO_CAP	BIT(29)		/* 1.3 response only */
+
+/* SPDM capabilities supported by this implementation */
+#define SPDM_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
+
+/* SPDM capabilities required from responders */
+#define SPDM_MIN_CAPS			(SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP)
+
+/*
+ * SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation:
+ * Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals
+ * roughly 1 << 20.  That's within the limits mandated for responders by CMA
+ * (1 << 23 usec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31.3) and DOE (1 sec, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.30.2).
+ * Used in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
+ */
+#define SPDM_CTEXPONENT			20
+
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048		BIT(0)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_2048		BIT(1)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072		BIT(2)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_3072		BIT(3)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256	BIT(4)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096		BIT(5)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_4096		BIT(6)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384	BIT(7)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521	BIT(8)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256	BIT(9)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED25519		BIT(10)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED448		BIT(11)
+
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_256		BIT(0)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_384		BIT(1)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA_512		BIT(2)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_256		BIT(3)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_384		BIT(4)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA3_512		BIT(5)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SM3_256		BIT(6)
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_RSA			SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 |		\
+					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 |		\
+					SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096 |
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA)
+#define SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA			SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 |	\
+					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 |
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		SPDM_HASH_SHA_256 |
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512)
+#define SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512		SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 |		\
+					SPDM_HASH_SHA_512 |
+#endif
+
+/* SPDM algorithms supported by this implementation */
+#define SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS		       (SPDM_ASYM_RSA			\
+					SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA	0)
+
+#define SPDM_HASH_ALGOS		       (SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256		\
+					SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512 0)
+
+/*
+ * Common header shared by all messages.
+ * Note that the meaning of param1 and param2 is message dependent.
+ */
+struct spdm_header {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;  /* RequestResponseCode */
+	u8 param1;
+	u8 param2;
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_REQ 0x80
+#define SPDM_GET_VERSION 0x84
+
+struct spdm_get_version_req {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1;
+	u8 param2;
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_get_version_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1;
+	u8 param2;
+
+	u8 reserved;
+	u8 version_number_entry_count;
+	__le16 version_number_entries[];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES 0xE1
+#define SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE 42 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 226 */
+
+/* For this exchange the request and response messages have the same form */
+struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1;
+	u8 param2;
+	/* End of SPDM 1.0 structure */
+
+	u8 reserved1;
+	u8 ctexponent;
+	u16 reserved2;
+
+	__le32 flags;
+	/* End of SPDM 1.1 structure */
+
+	__le32 data_transfer_size;			/* 1.2+ */
+	__le32 max_spdm_msg_size;			/* 1.2+ */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS 0xE3
+
+struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Number of ReqAlgStruct entries at end */
+	u8 param2;
+
+	__le16 length;
+	u8 measurement_specification;
+	u8 other_params_support;			/* 1.2+ */
+
+	__le32 base_asym_algo;
+	__le32 base_hash_algo;
+
+	u8 reserved1[12];
+	u8 ext_asym_count;
+	u8 ext_hash_count;
+	u8 reserved2;
+	u8 mel_specification;				/* 1.3+ */
+
+	/*
+	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
+	 * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count
+	 * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count
+	 * - ReqAlgStruct: variable size * param1	 * 1.1+ *
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Number of RespAlgStruct entries at end */
+	u8 param2;
+
+	__le16 length;
+	u8 measurement_specification_sel;
+	u8 other_params_sel;				/* 1.2+ */
+
+	__le32 measurement_hash_algo;
+	__le32 base_asym_sel;
+	__le32 base_hash_sel;
+
+	u8 reserved1[11];
+	u8 mel_specification_sel;			/* 1.3+ */
+	u8 ext_asym_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */
+	u8 ext_hash_sel_count; /* Either 0 or 1 */
+	u8 reserved2[2];
+
+	/*
+	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
+	 * - ExtAsym: 4 bytes * ext_asym_count
+	 * - ExtHash: 4 bytes * ext_hash_count
+	 * - RespAlgStruct: variable size * param1	 * 1.1+ *
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_req_alg_struct {
+	u8 alg_type;
+	u8 alg_count; /* 0x2K where K is number of alg_external entries */
+	__le16 alg_supported; /* Size is in alg_count[7:4], always 2 */
+	__le32 alg_external[];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_GET_DIGESTS 0x81
+
+struct spdm_get_digests_req {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Reserved */
+	u8 param2; /* Reserved */
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_get_digests_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* SupportedSlotMask */		/* 1.3+ */
+	u8 param2; /* ProvisionedSlotMask */
+	u8 digests[]; /* Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for each slot */
+	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */
+
+	/*
+	 * Additional optional fields at end of this structure:
+	 * (omitted as long as we do not advertise MULTI_KEY_CAP)
+	 * - KeyPairID: 1 byte for each slot		 * 1.3+ *
+	 * - CertificateInfo: 1 byte for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
+	 * - KeyUsageMask: 2 bytes for each slot	 * 1.3+ *
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE 0x82
+#define SPDM_SLOTS 8 /* SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1 */
+
+struct spdm_get_certificate_req {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
+	u8 param2; /* SlotSizeRequested */		/* 1.3+ */
+	__le16 offset;
+	__le16 length;
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
+	u8 param2; /* CertModel */			/* 1.3+ */
+	__le16 portion_length;
+	__le16 remainder_length;
+	u8 cert_chain[]; /* PortionLength long */
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_cert_chain {
+	__le16 length;
+	u8 reserved[2];
+	/*
+	 * Additional fields at end of this structure:
+	 * - RootHash: Digest of Root Certificate
+	 * - Certificates: Chain of ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_CHALLENGE 0x83
+#define SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA 1024 /* SPDM 1.0.0 table 21 */
+
+struct spdm_challenge_req {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
+	u8 param2; /* MeasurementSummaryHash type */
+	u8 nonce[32];
+	/* End of SPDM 1.2 structure */
+
+	u8 context[8];					/* 1.3+ */
+} __packed;
+
+struct spdm_challenge_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	u8 param1; /* Slot number 0..7 */
+	u8 param2; /* Slot mask */
+	/*
+	 * Additional fields at end of this structure:
+	 * - CertChainHash: Hash of struct spdm_cert_chain for selected slot
+	 * - Nonce: 32 bytes long
+	 * - MeasurementSummaryHash: Optional hash of selected measurements
+	 * - OpaqueDataLength: 2 bytes long
+	 * - OpaqueData: Up to 1024 bytes long
+	 * - RequesterContext: 8 bytes long		 * 1.3+ *
+	 * - Signature
+	 */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SPDM_ERROR 0x7f
+
+enum spdm_error_code {
+	spdm_invalid_request = 0x01,
+	spdm_invalid_session = 0x02,			/* 1.1 only */
+	spdm_busy = 0x03,
+	spdm_unexpected_request = 0x04,
+	spdm_unspecified = 0x05,
+	spdm_decrypt_error = 0x06,
+	spdm_unsupported_request = 0x07,
+	spdm_request_in_flight = 0x08,
+	spdm_invalid_response_code = 0x09,
+	spdm_session_limit_exceeded = 0x0a,
+	spdm_session_required = 0x0b,
+	spdm_reset_required = 0x0c,
+	spdm_response_too_large = 0x0d,
+	spdm_request_too_large = 0x0e,
+	spdm_large_response = 0x0f,
+	spdm_message_lost = 0x10,
+	spdm_invalid_policy = 0x11,			/* 1.3+ */
+	spdm_version_mismatch = 0x41,
+	spdm_response_not_ready = 0x42,
+	spdm_request_resynch = 0x43,
+	spdm_operation_failed = 0x44,			/* 1.3+ */
+	spdm_no_pending_requests = 0x45,		/* 1.3+ */
+	spdm_vendor_defined_error = 0xff,
+};
+
+struct spdm_error_rsp {
+	u8 version;
+	u8 code;
+	enum spdm_error_code error_code:8;
+	u8 error_data;
+
+	u8 extended_error_data[];
+} __packed;
+
+static int spdm_err(struct device *dev, struct spdm_error_rsp *rsp)
+{
+	switch (rsp->error_code) {
+	case spdm_invalid_request:
+		dev_err(dev, "Invalid request\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_invalid_session:
+		if (rsp->version == 0x11) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Invalid session %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		break;
+	case spdm_busy:
+		dev_err(dev, "Busy\n");
+		return -EBUSY;
+	case spdm_unexpected_request:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unexpected request\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_unspecified:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unspecified error\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_decrypt_error:
+		dev_err(dev, "Decrypt error\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	case spdm_unsupported_request:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported request %#x\n", rsp->error_data);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_request_in_flight:
+		dev_err(dev, "Request in flight\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_invalid_response_code:
+		dev_err(dev, "Invalid response code\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_session_limit_exceeded:
+		dev_err(dev, "Session limit exceeded\n");
+		return -EBUSY;
+	case spdm_session_required:
+		dev_err(dev, "Session required\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_reset_required:
+		dev_err(dev, "Reset required\n");
+		return -ERESTART;
+	case spdm_response_too_large:
+		dev_err(dev, "Response too large\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_request_too_large:
+		dev_err(dev, "Request too large\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_large_response:
+		dev_err(dev, "Large response\n");
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+	case spdm_message_lost:
+		dev_err(dev, "Message lost\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	case spdm_invalid_policy:
+		dev_err(dev, "Invalid policy\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_version_mismatch:
+		dev_err(dev, "Version mismatch\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_response_not_ready:
+		dev_err(dev, "Response not ready\n");
+		return -EINPROGRESS;
+	case spdm_request_resynch:
+		dev_err(dev, "Request resynchronization\n");
+		return -ERESTART;
+	case spdm_operation_failed:
+		dev_err(dev, "Operation failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case spdm_no_pending_requests:
+		return -ENOENT;
+	case spdm_vendor_defined_error:
+		dev_err(dev, "Vendor defined error\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dev_err(dev, "Undefined error %#x\n", rsp->error_code);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct spdm_state - SPDM session state
+ *
+ * @lock: Serializes multiple concurrent spdm_authenticate() calls.
+ * @authenticated: Whether device was authenticated successfully.
+ * @dev: Transport device.  Used for error reporting and passed to @transport.
+ * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange.
+ * @transport_priv: Transport private data.
+ * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes).
+ *	Used as DataTransferSize in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
+ * @version: Maximum common supported version of requester and responder.
+ *	Negotiated during GET_VERSION exchange.
+ * @responder_caps: Cached capabilities of responder.
+ *	Received during GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
+ * @base_asym_alg: Asymmetric key algorithm for signature verification of
+ *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
+ *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
+ * @base_hash_alg: Hash algorithm for signature verification of
+ *	CHALLENGE_AUTH messages.
+ *	Selected by responder during NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange.
+ * @slot_mask: Bitmask of populated certificate slots in the responder.
+ *	Received during GET_DIGESTS exchange.
+ * @base_asym_enc: Human-readable name of @base_asym_alg's signature encoding.
+ *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling verify_signature().
+ * @s: Signature length of @base_asym_alg (in bytes).  S or SigLen in SPDM
+ *	specification.
+ * @base_hash_alg_name: Human-readable name of @base_hash_alg.
+ *	Passed to crypto subsystem when calling crypto_alloc_shash() and
+ *	verify_signature().
+ * @shash: Synchronous hash handle for @base_hash_alg computation.
+ * @desc: Synchronous hash context for @base_hash_alg computation.
+ * @h: Hash length of @base_hash_alg (in bytes).  H in SPDM specification.
+ * @leaf_key: Public key portion of leaf certificate against which to check
+ *	responder's signatures.
+ * @root_keyring: Keyring against which to check the first certificate in
+ *	responder's certificate chain.
+ */
+struct spdm_state {
+	struct mutex lock;
+	unsigned int authenticated:1;
+
+	/* Transport */
+	struct device *dev;
+	spdm_transport *transport;
+	void *transport_priv;
+	u32 transport_sz;
+
+	/* Negotiated state */
+	u8 version;
+	u32 responder_caps;
+	u32 base_asym_alg;
+	u32 base_hash_alg;
+	unsigned long slot_mask;
+
+	/* Signature algorithm */
+	const char *base_asym_enc;
+	size_t s;
+
+	/* Hash algorithm */
+	const char *base_hash_alg_name;
+	struct crypto_shash *shash;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t h;
+
+	/* Certificates */
+	struct public_key *leaf_key;
+	struct key *root_keyring;
+};
+
+static int __spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+			   const void *req, size_t req_sz,
+			   void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
+{
+	const struct spdm_header *request = req;
+	struct spdm_header *response = rsp;
+	int length;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = spdm_state->transport(spdm_state->transport_priv, spdm_state->dev,
+				   req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	length = rc;
+	if (length < sizeof(struct spdm_header))
+		return -EPROTO;
+
+	if (response->code == SPDM_ERROR)
+		return spdm_err(spdm_state->dev, (struct spdm_error_rsp *)rsp);
+
+	if (response->code != (request->code & ~SPDM_REQ)) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+			"Response code %#x does not match request code %#x\n",
+			response->code, request->code);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static int spdm_exchange(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+			 void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
+{
+	struct spdm_header *req_header = req;
+
+	if (req_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header) ||
+	    rsp_sz < sizeof(struct spdm_header))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	req_header->version = spdm_state->version;
+
+	return __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
+}
+
+static const struct spdm_get_version_req spdm_get_version_req = {
+	.version = 0x10,
+	.code = SPDM_GET_VERSION,
+};
+
+static int spdm_get_version(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+			    struct spdm_get_version_rsp *rsp, size_t *rsp_sz)
+{
+	u8 version = SPDM_MIN_VER;
+	bool foundver = false;
+	int rc, length, i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Bypass spdm_exchange() to be able to set version = 0x10.
+	 * rsp buffer is large enough for the maximum possible 255 entries.
+	 */
+	rc = __spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &spdm_get_version_req,
+			     sizeof(spdm_get_version_req), rsp,
+			     struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries, 255));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	length = rc;
+	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
+	    length < struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries,
+				 rsp->version_number_entry_count)) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated version response\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rsp->version_number_entry_count; i++) {
+		u8 ver = get_unaligned_le16(&rsp->version_number_entries[i]) >> 8;
+
+		if (ver >= version && ver <= SPDM_MAX_VER) {
+			foundver = true;
+			version = ver;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!foundver) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No common supported version\n");
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+	spdm_state->version = version;
+
+	*rsp_sz = struct_size(rsp, version_number_entries,
+			      rsp->version_number_entry_count);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int spdm_get_capabilities(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+				 struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *req,
+				 size_t *reqrsp_sz)
+{
+	struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp *rsp;
+	size_t req_sz;
+	size_t rsp_sz;
+	int rc, length;
+
+	req->code = SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES;
+	req->ctexponent = SPDM_CTEXPONENT;
+	req->flags = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_CAPS);
+
+	if (spdm_state->version == 0x10) {
+		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), reserved1);
+		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
+	} else if (spdm_state->version == 0x11) {
+		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(*req), data_transfer_size);
+		rsp_sz = offsetof(typeof(*rsp), data_transfer_size);
+	} else {
+		req_sz = sizeof(*req);
+		rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
+		req->data_transfer_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
+		req->max_spdm_msg_size = cpu_to_le32(spdm_state->transport_sz);
+	}
+
+	rsp = (void *)req + req_sz;
+
+	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	length = rc;
+	if (length < rsp_sz) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated capabilities response\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	spdm_state->responder_caps = le32_to_cpu(rsp->flags);
+	if ((spdm_state->responder_caps & SPDM_MIN_CAPS) != SPDM_MIN_CAPS)
+		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+
+	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x12) {
+		u32 data_transfer_size = le32_to_cpu(rsp->data_transfer_size);
+		if (data_transfer_size < SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE) {
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+				"Malformed capabilities response\n");
+			return -EPROTO;
+		}
+		spdm_state->transport_sz = min(spdm_state->transport_sz,
+					       data_transfer_size);
+	}
+
+	*reqrsp_sz += req_sz + rsp_sz;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spdm_start_hash() - Build first part of CHALLENGE_AUTH hash
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ * @transcript: GET_VERSION request and GET_CAPABILITIES request and response
+ * @transcript_sz: length of @transcript
+ * @req: NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request
+ * @req_sz: length of @req
+ * @rsp: ALGORITHMS response
+ * @rsp_sz: length of @rsp
+ *
+ * We've just learned the hash algorithm to use for CHALLENGE_AUTH signature
+ * verification.  Hash the GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges which
+ * have been stashed in @transcript, as well as the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS
+ * exchange which has just been performed.  Subsequent requests and responses
+ * will be added to the hash as they become available.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
+ */
+static int spdm_start_hash(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+			   void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz,
+			   void *req, size_t req_sz, void *rsp, size_t rsp_sz)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	spdm_state->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
+					       0, 0);
+	if (!spdm_state->shash)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spdm_state->desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state->desc) +
+				   crypto_shash_descsize(spdm_state->shash),
+				   GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!spdm_state->desc)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spdm_state->desc->tfm = spdm_state->shash;
+
+	/* Used frequently to compute offsets, so cache H */
+	spdm_state->h = crypto_shash_digestsize(spdm_state->shash);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(spdm_state->desc);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
+				 (u8 *)&spdm_get_version_req,
+				 sizeof(spdm_get_version_req));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc,
+				 (u8 *)transcript, transcript_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)req, req_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int spdm_parse_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) {
+	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048:
+		spdm_state->s = 256;
+		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072:
+		spdm_state->s = 384;
+		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096:
+		spdm_state->s = 512;
+		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "pkcs1";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256:
+		spdm_state->s = 64;
+		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384:
+		spdm_state->s = 96;
+		spdm_state->base_asym_enc = "p1363";
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown asym algorithm\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	switch (spdm_state->base_hash_alg) {
+	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_256:
+		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha256";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_384:
+		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha384";
+		break;
+	case SPDM_HASH_SHA_512:
+		spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name = "sha512";
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unknown hash algorithm\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int spdm_negotiate_algs(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+			       void *transcript, size_t transcript_sz)
+{
+	struct spdm_req_alg_struct *req_alg_struct;
+	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_req *req;
+	struct spdm_negotiate_algs_rsp *rsp;
+	size_t req_sz = sizeof(*req);
+	size_t rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp);
+	int rc, length;
+
+	/* Request length shall be <= 128 bytes (SPDM 1.1.0 margin no 185) */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(req_sz > 128);
+
+	req = kzalloc(req_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	req->code = SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS;
+	req->length = cpu_to_le16(req_sz);
+	req->base_asym_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS);
+	req->base_hash_algo = cpu_to_le32(SPDM_HASH_ALGOS);
+
+	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rsp) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_free_req;
+	}
+
+	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	length = rc;
+	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
+	    length < sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct)) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated algorithms response\n");
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+	}
+
+	spdm_state->base_asym_alg =
+		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_asym_sel) & SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS;
+	spdm_state->base_hash_alg =
+		le32_to_cpu(rsp->base_hash_sel) & SPDM_HASH_ALGOS;
+
+	/* Responder shall select exactly 1 alg (SPDM 1.0.0 table 14) */
+	if (hweight32(spdm_state->base_asym_alg) != 1 ||
+	    hweight32(spdm_state->base_hash_alg) != 1 ||
+	    rsp->ext_asym_sel_count != 0 ||
+	    rsp->ext_hash_sel_count != 0 ||
+	    rsp->param1 > req->param1) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed algorithms response\n");
+		rc = -EPROTO;
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+	}
+
+	rc = spdm_parse_algs(spdm_state);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	/*
+	 * If request contained a ReqAlgStruct not supported by responder,
+	 * the corresponding RespAlgStruct may be omitted in response.
+	 * Calculate the actual (possibly shorter) response length:
+	 */
+	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + rsp->param1 * sizeof(*req_alg_struct);
+
+	rc = spdm_start_hash(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz,
+			     req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz);
+
+err_free_rsp:
+	kfree(rsp);
+err_free_req:
+	kfree(req);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int spdm_get_digests(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	struct spdm_get_digests_req req = { .code = SPDM_GET_DIGESTS };
+	struct spdm_get_digests_rsp *rsp;
+	size_t rsp_sz;
+	int rc, length;
+
+	/*
+	 * Assume all 8 slots are populated.  We know the hash length (and thus
+	 * the response size) because the responder only returns digests for
+	 * the hash algorithm selected during the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS exchange
+	 * (SPDM 1.1.2 margin no 206).
+	 */
+	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + SPDM_SLOTS * spdm_state->h;
+	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rsp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	length = rc;
+	if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
+	    length < sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated digests response\n");
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+	}
+
+	rsp_sz = sizeof(*rsp) + hweight8(rsp->param2) * spdm_state->h;
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication-capable endpoints must carry at least 1 cert chain
+	 * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.1).
+	 */
+	spdm_state->slot_mask = rsp->param2;
+	if (!spdm_state->slot_mask) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "No certificates provisioned\n");
+		rc = -EPROTO;
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, sizeof(req));
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, rsp_sz);
+
+err_free_rsp:
+	kfree(rsp);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int spdm_validate_cert_chain(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot,
+				    u8 *certs, size_t total_length)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev = NULL;
+	bool is_leaf_cert;
+	size_t offset = 0;
+	struct key *key;
+	int rc, length;
+
+	while (offset < total_length) {
+		rc = x509_get_certificate_length(certs + offset,
+						 total_length - offset);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Invalid certificate length "
+				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
+			goto err_free_prev;
+		}
+
+		length = rc;
+		is_leaf_cert = offset + length == total_length;
+
+		cert = x509_cert_parse(certs + offset, length);
+		if (IS_ERR(cert)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(cert);
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Certificate parse error %d "
+				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
+			goto err_free_prev;
+		}
+		if ((is_leaf_cert ==
+		     test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &cert->pub->key_eflags)) ||
+		    (is_leaf_cert &&
+		     !test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &cert->pub->key_eflags))) {
+			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Malformed certificate "
+				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
+			goto err_free_cert;
+		}
+		if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
+			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Unsupported signature "
+				"at slot %u offset %zu\n", slot, offset);
+			goto err_free_cert;
+		}
+		if (cert->blacklisted) {
+			rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto err_free_cert;
+		}
+
+		if (!prev) {
+			/* First cert in chain, check against root_keyring */
+			key = find_asymmetric_key(spdm_state->root_keyring,
+						  cert->sig->auth_ids[0],
+						  cert->sig->auth_ids[1],
+						  cert->sig->auth_ids[2],
+						  false);
+			if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+				dev_info(spdm_state->dev, "Root certificate "
+					 "for slot %u not found in %s "
+					 "keyring: %s\n", slot,
+					 spdm_state->root_keyring->description,
+					 cert->issuer);
+				rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+				goto err_free_cert;
+			}
+
+			rc = verify_signature(key, cert->sig);
+			key_put(key);
+		} else {
+			/* Subsequent cert in chain, check against previous */
+			rc = public_key_verify_signature(prev->pub, cert->sig);
+		}
+
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Signature validation error "
+				"%d at slot %u offset %zu\n", rc, slot, offset);
+			goto err_free_cert;
+		}
+
+		x509_free_certificate(prev);
+		offset += length;
+		prev = cert;
+	}
+
+	prev = NULL;
+	spdm_state->leaf_key = cert->pub;
+	cert->pub = NULL;
+
+err_free_cert:
+	x509_free_certificate(cert);
+err_free_prev:
+	x509_free_certificate(prev);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int spdm_get_certificate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
+{
+	struct spdm_get_certificate_req req = {
+		.code = SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE,
+		.param1 = slot,
+	};
+	struct spdm_get_certificate_rsp *rsp;
+	struct spdm_cert_chain *certs = NULL;
+	size_t rsp_sz, total_length, header_length;
+	u16 remainder_length = 0xffff;
+	u16 portion_length;
+	u16 offset = 0;
+	int rc, length;
+
+	/*
+	 * It is legal for the responder to send more bytes than requested.
+	 * (Note the "should" in SPDM 1.0.0 table 19.)  If we allocate a
+	 * too small buffer, we can't calculate the hash over the (truncated)
+	 * response.  Only choice is thus to allocate the maximum possible 64k.
+	 */
+	rsp_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(*rsp) + 0xffff, spdm_state->transport_sz);
+	rsp = kvmalloc(rsp_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rsp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	do {
+		/*
+		 * If transport_sz is sufficiently large, first request will be
+		 * for offset 0 and length 0xffff, which means entire cert
+		 * chain (SPDM 1.0.0 table 18).
+		 */
+		req.offset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
+		req.length = cpu_to_le16(min_t(size_t, remainder_length,
+					       rsp_sz - sizeof(*rsp)));
+
+		rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, sizeof(req), rsp, rsp_sz);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto err_free_certs;
+
+		length = rc;
+		if (length < sizeof(*rsp) ||
+		    length < sizeof(*rsp) + le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length)) {
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+				"Truncated certificate response\n");
+			rc = -EIO;
+			goto err_free_certs;
+		}
+
+		portion_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->portion_length);
+		remainder_length = le16_to_cpu(rsp->remainder_length);
+
+		/*
+		 * On first response we learn total length of cert chain.
+		 * Should portion_length + remainder_length exceed 0xffff,
+		 * the min() ensures that the malformed check triggers below.
+		 */
+		if (!certs) {
+			total_length = min(portion_length + remainder_length,
+					   0xffff);
+			certs = kvmalloc(total_length, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!certs) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto err_free_certs;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!portion_length ||
+		    (rsp->param1 & 0xf) != slot ||
+		    offset + portion_length + remainder_length != total_length)
+		{
+			dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+				"Malformed certificate response\n");
+			rc = -EPROTO;
+			goto err_free_certs;
+		}
+
+		memcpy((u8 *)certs + offset, rsp->cert_chain, portion_length);
+		offset += portion_length;
+
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req,
+					 sizeof(req));
+		if (rc)
+			goto err_free_certs;
+
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp,
+					 sizeof(*rsp) + portion_length);
+		if (rc)
+			goto err_free_certs;
+
+	} while (remainder_length > 0);
+
+	header_length = sizeof(struct spdm_cert_chain) + spdm_state->h;
+
+	if (total_length < header_length ||
+	    total_length != le16_to_cpu(certs->length)) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+			"Malformed certificate chain in slot %u\n", slot);
+		rc = -EPROTO;
+		goto err_free_certs;
+	}
+
+	rc = spdm_validate_cert_chain(spdm_state, slot,
+				      (u8 *)certs + header_length,
+				      total_length - header_length);
+
+err_free_certs:
+	kvfree(certs);
+	kvfree(rsp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define SPDM_PREFIX_SZ 64 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 803 */
+#define SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ 100 /* SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 806 */
+
+/**
+ * spdm_create_combined_prefix() - Create combined_spdm_prefix for a hash
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ * @spdm_context: SPDM context
+ * @buf: Buffer to receive combined_spdm_prefix (100 bytes)
+ *
+ * From SPDM 1.2, a hash is prefixed with the SPDM version and context before
+ * a signature is generated (or verified) over the resulting concatenation
+ * (SPDM 1.2.0 section 15).  Create that prefix.
+ */
+static void spdm_create_combined_prefix(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+					const char *spdm_context, void *buf)
+{
+	u8 minor = spdm_state->version & 0xf;
+	u8 major = spdm_state->version >> 4;
+	size_t len = strlen(spdm_context);
+	int rc, zero_pad;
+
+	rc = snprintf(buf, SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1,
+		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*"
+		      "dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*dmtf-spdm-v%hhx.%hhx.*",
+		      major, minor, major, minor, major, minor, major, minor);
+	WARN_ON(rc != SPDM_PREFIX_SZ);
+
+	zero_pad = SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ - SPDM_PREFIX_SZ - 1 - len;
+	WARN_ON(zero_pad < 0);
+
+	memset(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1, 0, zero_pad);
+	memcpy(buf + SPDM_PREFIX_SZ + 1 + zero_pad, spdm_context, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * spdm_verify_signature() - Verify signature against leaf key
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ * @s: Signature
+ * @spdm_context: SPDM context (used to create combined_spdm_prefix)
+ *
+ * Implementation of the abstract SPDMSignatureVerify() function described in
+ * SPDM 1.2.0 section 16:  Compute the hash in @spdm_state->desc and verify
+ * that its signature @s was generated with @spdm_state->leaf_key.
+ * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.
+ */
+static int spdm_verify_signature(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 *s,
+				 const char *spdm_context)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature sig = {
+		.s = s,
+		.s_size = spdm_state->s,
+		.encoding = spdm_state->base_asym_enc,
+		.hash_algo = spdm_state->base_hash_alg_name,
+	};
+	u8 *m, *mhash = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	m = kmalloc(SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!m)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(spdm_state->desc, m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_free_m;
+
+	if (spdm_state->version <= 0x11) {
+		/*
+		 * Until SPDM 1.1, the signature is computed only over the hash
+		 * (SPDM 1.0.0 section 4.9.2.7).
+		 */
+		sig.digest = m + SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ;
+		sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * From SPDM 1.2, the hash is prefixed with spdm_context before
+		 * computing the signature over the resulting message M
+		 * (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 841).
+		 */
+		spdm_create_combined_prefix(spdm_state, spdm_context, m);
+
+		/*
+		 * RSA and ECDSA algorithms require that M is hashed once more.
+		 * EdDSA and SM2 algorithms omit that step.
+		 * The switch statement prepares for their introduction.
+		 */
+		switch (spdm_state->base_asym_alg) {
+		default:
+			mhash = kmalloc(spdm_state->h, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!mhash) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto err_free_m;
+			}
+
+			rc = crypto_shash_digest(spdm_state->desc, m,
+				SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ + spdm_state->h,
+				mhash);
+			if (rc)
+				goto err_free_mhash;
+
+			sig.digest = mhash;
+			sig.digest_size = spdm_state->h;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = public_key_verify_signature(spdm_state->leaf_key, &sig);
+
+err_free_mhash:
+	kfree(mhash);
+err_free_m:
+	kfree(m);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spdm_challenge_rsp_sz() - Calculate CHALLENGE_AUTH response size
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ * @rsp: CHALLENGE_AUTH response (optional)
+ *
+ * A CHALLENGE_AUTH response contains multiple variable-length fields
+ * as well as optional fields.  This helper eases calculating its size.
+ *
+ * If @rsp is %NULL, assume the maximum OpaqueDataLength of 1024 bytes
+ * (SPDM 1.0.0 table 21).  Otherwise read OpaqueDataLength from @rsp.
+ * OpaqueDataLength can only be > 0 for SPDM 1.0 and 1.1, as they lack
+ * the OtherParamsSupport field in the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request.
+ * For SPDM 1.2+, we do not offer any Opaque Data Formats in that field,
+ * which forces OpaqueDataLength to 0 (SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 261).
+ */
+static size_t spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(struct spdm_state *spdm_state,
+				    struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp)
+{
+	size_t  size  = sizeof(*rsp)		/* Header */
+		      + spdm_state->h		/* CertChainHash */
+		      + 32;			/* Nonce */
+
+	if (rsp)
+		/* May be unaligned if hash algorithm has unusual length. */
+		size += get_unaligned_le16((u8 *)rsp + size);
+	else
+		size += SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA;	/* OpaqueData */
+
+	size += 2;				/* OpaqueDataLength */
+
+	if (spdm_state->version >= 0x13)
+		size += 8;			/* RequesterContext */
+
+	return  size  + spdm_state->s;		/* Signature */
+}
+
+static int spdm_challenge(struct spdm_state *spdm_state, u8 slot)
+{
+	size_t req_sz, rsp_sz, rsp_sz_max, sig_offset;
+	struct spdm_challenge_req req = {
+		.code = SPDM_CHALLENGE,
+		.param1 = slot,
+		.param2 = 0, /* no measurement summary hash */
+	};
+	struct spdm_challenge_rsp *rsp;
+	int rc, length;
+
+	get_random_bytes(&req.nonce, sizeof(req.nonce));
+
+	if (spdm_state->version <= 0x12)
+		req_sz = offsetof(typeof(req), context);
+	else
+		req_sz = sizeof(req);
+
+	rsp_sz_max = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, NULL);
+	rsp = kzalloc(rsp_sz_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rsp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = spdm_exchange(spdm_state, &req, req_sz, rsp, rsp_sz_max);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	length = rc;
+	rsp_sz = spdm_challenge_rsp_sz(spdm_state, rsp);
+	if (length < rsp_sz) {
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev, "Truncated challenge_auth response\n");
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+	}
+
+	/* Last step of building the hash */
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)&req, req_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	sig_offset = rsp_sz - spdm_state->s;
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(spdm_state->desc, (u8 *)rsp, sig_offset);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_free_rsp;
+
+	/* Hash is complete and signature received; verify against leaf key */
+	rc = spdm_verify_signature(spdm_state, (u8 *)rsp + sig_offset,
+				   "responder-challenge_auth signing");
+	if (rc)
+		dev_err(spdm_state->dev,
+			"Failed to verify challenge_auth signature: %d\n", rc);
+
+err_free_rsp:
+	kfree(rsp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void spdm_reset(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	public_key_free(spdm_state->leaf_key);
+	spdm_state->leaf_key = NULL;
+
+	kfree(spdm_state->desc);
+	spdm_state->desc = NULL;
+
+	crypto_free_shash(spdm_state->shash);
+	spdm_state->shash = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spdm_authenticate() - Authenticate device
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ *
+ * Authenticate a device through a sequence of GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES,
+ * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, GET_DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE and CHALLENGE exchanges.
+ *
+ * Perform internal locking to serialize multiple concurrent invocations.
+ * Can be called repeatedly for reauthentication.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success or a negative errno.  In particular, -EPROTONOSUPPORT
+ * indicates that authentication is not supported by the device.
+ */
+int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	size_t transcript_sz;
+	void *transcript;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	u8 slot;
+
+	mutex_lock(&spdm_state->lock);
+	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
+
+	/*
+	 * For CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification, a hash is computed over
+	 * all exchanged messages to detect modification by a man-in-the-middle
+	 * or media error.  However the hash algorithm is not known until the
+	 * NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS response has been received.  The preceding
+	 * GET_VERSION and GET_CAPABILITIES exchanges are therefore stashed
+	 * in a transcript buffer and consumed once the algorithm is known.
+	 * The buffer size is sufficient for the largest possible messages with
+	 * 255 version entries and the capability fields added by SPDM 1.2.
+	 */
+	transcript = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct spdm_get_version_rsp,
+					   version_number_entries, 255) +
+			     sizeof(struct spdm_get_capabilities_reqrsp) * 2,
+			     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!transcript)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = spdm_get_version(spdm_state, transcript, &transcript_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = spdm_get_capabilities(spdm_state, transcript + transcript_sz,
+				   &transcript_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = spdm_negotiate_algs(spdm_state, transcript, transcript_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = spdm_get_digests(spdm_state);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(slot, &spdm_state->slot_mask, SPDM_SLOTS) {
+		rc = spdm_get_certificate(spdm_state, slot);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			break; /* success */
+		if (rc != -ENOKEY && rc != -EKEYREJECTED)
+			break; /* try next slot only on signature error */
+	}
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = spdm_challenge(spdm_state, slot);
+
+unlock:
+	if (rc)
+		spdm_reset(spdm_state);
+	spdm_state->authenticated = !rc;
+	mutex_unlock(&spdm_state->lock);
+	kfree(transcript);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticate);
+
+/**
+ * spdm_authenticated() - Whether device was authenticated successfully
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ *
+ * Return true if the most recent spdm_authenticate() call was successful.
+ */
+bool spdm_authenticated(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	return spdm_state->authenticated;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_authenticated);
+
+/**
+ * spdm_create() - Allocate SPDM session
+ *
+ * @dev: Transport device
+ * @transport: Transport function to perform one message exchange
+ * @transport_priv: Transport private data
+ * @transport_sz: Maximum message size the transport is capable of (in bytes)
+ * @keyring: Trusted root certificates
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the allocated SPDM session state or NULL on error.
+ */
+struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
+			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
+			       struct key *keyring)
+{
+	struct spdm_state *spdm_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*spdm_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!spdm_state)
+		return NULL;
+
+	spdm_state->dev = dev;
+	spdm_state->transport = transport;
+	spdm_state->transport_priv = transport_priv;
+	spdm_state->transport_sz = transport_sz;
+	spdm_state->root_keyring = keyring;
+
+	mutex_init(&spdm_state->lock);
+
+	return spdm_state;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_create);
+
+/**
+ * spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session
+ *
+ * @spdm_state: SPDM session state
+ */
+void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state)
+{
+	spdm_reset(spdm_state);
+	mutex_destroy(&spdm_state->lock);
+	kfree(spdm_state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spdm_destroy);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");