| Message ID | 20241203090045.942078-2-nikunj@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests | expand |
On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:33PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote: > Currently, the sev-guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging. > All routines for initializing SNP guest messaging are implemented within > the sev-guest driver and are not available during early boot. In > prepratation for adding Secure TSC guest support, carve out APIs to Unknown word [prepratation] in commit message. Suggestions: ['preparation', 'preparations', 'reparation', 'perpetration', 'reputation', 'perpetuation', 'peroration', 'presentation', 'repatriation', 'propagation', "preparation's"] Please introduce a spellchecker into your patch creation workflow. > allocate and initialize guest messaging descriptor context and make it part > of coco/sev/core.c. As there is no user of sev_guest_platform_data anymore, > remove the structure. > > Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> > Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 24 ++- > arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 183 +++++++++++++++++++++- > drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 197 +++--------------------- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 1 - > 5 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h > index 91f08af31078..f78c94e29c74 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ > #include <asm/insn.h> > #include <asm/sev-common.h> > #include <asm/coco.h> > +#include <asm/set_memory.h> > > #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN 1ULL > #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 2ULL > @@ -170,10 +171,6 @@ struct snp_guest_msg { > u8 payload[PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg_hdr)]; > } __packed; > > -struct sev_guest_platform_data { > - u64 secrets_gpa; > -}; > - > struct snp_guest_req { > void *req_buf; > size_t req_sz; > @@ -253,6 +250,7 @@ struct snp_msg_desc { > > u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; > u8 *vmpck; > + int vmpck_id; > }; > > /* > @@ -458,6 +456,20 @@ void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot); > void snp_kexec_finish(void); > void snp_kexec_begin(void); > > +static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) > +{ > + static const char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; > + > + if (mdesc->vmpck) > + return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); > + > + return true; > +} This function looks silly in a header with that array allocation. I think you should simply do: if (memchr_inv(mdesc->vmpck, 0, VMPCK_KEY_LEN)) at the call sites and not have this helper at all. But please do verify whether what I'm saying actually makes sense and if it does, this can be a cleanup pre-patch. > + > +int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id); > +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void); > +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc); > + > #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ > > #define snp_vmpl 0 > @@ -498,6 +510,10 @@ static inline int prepare_pte_enc(struct pte_enc_desc *d) { return 0; } > static inline void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot) { } > static inline void snp_kexec_finish(void) { } > static inline void snp_kexec_begin(void) { } > +static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { return false; } > +static inline int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id) { return -1; } > +static inline struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) { return NULL; } > +static inline void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { } > > #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ > > diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c > index c5b0148b8c0a..3cc741eefd06 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c > +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > #include <linux/psp-sev.h> > #include <linux/dmi.h> > #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> > +#include <crypto/gcm.h> > > #include <asm/init.h> > #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> > @@ -2580,15 +2581,9 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = { > > static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void) > { > - struct sev_guest_platform_data data; > - > if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) > return -ENODEV; > > - data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa; > - if (platform_device_add_data(&sev_guest_device, &data, sizeof(data))) > - return -ENODEV; > - > if (platform_device_register(&sev_guest_device)) > return -ENODEV; > > @@ -2667,3 +2662,179 @@ static int __init sev_sysfs_init(void) > } > arch_initcall(sev_sysfs_init); > #endif // CONFIG_SYSFS > + > +static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + int ret; > + > + if (!buf) > + return; > + > + ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages); > + if (ret) { > + WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n"); Looking at where this lands: set_memory_encrypted |-> __set_memory_enc_dec and that doing now: if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (!down_read_trylock(&mem_enc_lock)) return -EBUSY; after 859e63b789d6 ("x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec") we probably should pay attention to this here firing and maybe turning that _trylock() into a normal down_read* Anyway, just something to pay attention to in the future. > + return; > + } > + > + __free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz)); > +} ... > +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) > +{ > + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; > + void __iomem *mem; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE); > + > + mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); The above ones use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. What's the difference? > + if (!mdesc) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + mem = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE); > + if (!mem) > + goto e_free_mdesc; > + > + mdesc->secrets = (__force struct snp_secrets_page *)mem; > + > + /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ > + mdesc->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > + if (!mdesc->request) > + goto e_unmap; > + > + mdesc->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > + if (!mdesc->response) > + goto e_free_request; > + > + mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); > + if (!mdesc->certs_data) > + goto e_free_response; > + > + /* initial the input address for guest request */ > + mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request); > + mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response); > + mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data); > + > + return mdesc; > + > +e_free_response: > + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > +e_free_request: > + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > +e_unmap: > + iounmap(mem); > +e_free_mdesc: > + kfree(mdesc); > + > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_alloc); > + > +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) > +{ > + if (!mdesc) > + return; > + > + mdesc->vmpck = NULL; > + mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno = NULL; memset(mdesc, ...); at the end instead of those assignments. > + kfree(mdesc->ctx); > + > + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); > + iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets); > + kfree(mdesc); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_free); > diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c > index b699771be029..5268511bc9b8 100644 > --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c > +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c ... > @@ -993,115 +898,57 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) > if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) > return -ENODEV; > > - if (!dev->platform_data) > - return -ENODEV; > - > - data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data; > - mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE); > - if (!mapping) > - return -ENODEV; > - > - secrets = (__force void *)mapping; > - > - ret = -ENOMEM; > snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!snp_dev) > - goto e_unmap; > - > - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!mdesc) > - goto e_unmap; > - > - /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */ > - if (vmpck_id == -1) > - vmpck_id = snp_vmpl; > + return -ENOMEM; > > - ret = -EINVAL; > - mdesc->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno); > - if (!mdesc->vmpck) { > - dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); > - goto e_unmap; > - } > + mdesc = snp_msg_alloc(); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc)) > + return -ENOMEM; > > - /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ > - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { > - dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); > - goto e_unmap; > - } > + ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id); > + if (ret) > + return -EIO; You just leaked mdesc here. Audit all your error paths. Thx.
On 12/3/2024 7:49 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:33PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote: >> Currently, the sev-guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging. >> All routines for initializing SNP guest messaging are implemented within >> the sev-guest driver and are not available during early boot. In >> prepratation for adding Secure TSC guest support, carve out APIs to > > Unknown word [prepratation] in commit message. > Suggestions: ['preparation', 'preparations', 'reparation', 'perpetration', 'reputation', 'perpetuation', 'peroration', 'presentation', 'repatriation', 'propagation', "preparation's"] > > Please introduce a spellchecker into your patch creation workflow. This is what I use with checkpatch, that didnt catch the wrong spelling. Do you suggest using something else ? ./scripts/checkpatch.pl --codespell < sectsc_v15/v15-0001-x86-sev-Carve-out-and-export-SNP-guest-messaging.patch total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 569 lines checked "[PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging" has no obvious style problems and is ready for submission. Regards Nikunj
On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 08:05:32PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: > This is what I use with checkpatch, that didnt catch the wrong spelling. Not surprised. > Do you suggest using something else ? You can enable spellchecking in your editor with which you write the commit messages. For example: https://www.linux.com/training-tutorials/using-spell-checking-vim/ Or, you can use my tool: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bp/bp.git/log/?h=vp You'd need to fish it out of the repo. It doesn't completely replace checkpatch yet but I am extending it with features as I go. But it does spellcheck: $ ~/dev/vp/.tip/bin/vp.py ~/tmp/review/new prepratation for adding Secure TSC guest support, carve out APIs to Unknown word [prepratation] in commit message. Suggestions: ['preparation', 'preparations', 'reparation', 'perpetration', 'reputation', 'perpetuation', 'peroration', 'presentation', 'repatriation', 'propagation', "preparation's"] Class patch: original subject: [[PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines] subject: [x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines] sender: [Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>] author: [Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>] version: [15] number: [1] name: [x86-sev-carve_out_and_export_snp_guest_messaging_init_routines] date: [Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:30:33 +0530] message-id: [20241203090045.942078-2-nikunj@amd.com] I'm sure there are gazillion other ways to automate it, ofc. HTH.
On 12/3/2024 8:20 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 08:05:32PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: >> This is what I use with checkpatch, that didnt catch the wrong spelling. > > Not surprised. > >> Do you suggest using something else ? > > You can enable spellchecking in your editor with which you write the commit > messages. For example: > > https://www.linux.com/training-tutorials/using-spell-checking-vim/ > > Or, you can use my tool: > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bp/bp.git/log/?h=vp > > You'd need to fish it out of the repo. Sure will give it a try. Regards Nikunj
On 12/3/2024 7:49 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:33PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote: >> @@ -458,6 +456,20 @@ void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot); >> void snp_kexec_finish(void); >> void snp_kexec_begin(void); >> >> +static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) >> +{ >> + static const char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; >> + >> + if (mdesc->vmpck) >> + return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); >> + >> + return true; >> +} > > This function looks silly in a header with that array allocation. > > I think you should simply do: > > if (memchr_inv(mdesc->vmpck, 0, VMPCK_KEY_LEN)) Just a minor nit, it will need a negation: if (!memchr_inv(mdesc->vmpck, 0, VMPCK_KEY_LEN)) > at the call sites and not have this helper at all. > > But please do verify whether what I'm saying actually makes sense and if it > does, this can be a cleanup pre-patch. Yes, it makes sense. I have verified the code and below is the cleanup pre-patch. From 4d249f393aeba7bed7fb99778b8ee8a24a33b5b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 20:48:28 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] virt: sev-guest: Remove is_vmpck_empty() helper Remove the is_vmpck_empty() helper function, which uses a local array allocation to check if the VMPCK is empty. Replace it with memchr_inv() to directly determine if the VMPCK is empty without additional memory allocation. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> --- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index b699771be029..62328d0b2cb6 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -63,16 +63,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP. /* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex); -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) -{ - char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; - - if (mdesc->vmpck) - return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); - - return true; -} - /* * If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there * are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue @@ -335,7 +325,7 @@ static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex); /* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { + if (!mdesc->vmpck || !memchr_inv(mdesc->vmpck, 0, VMPCK_KEY_LEN)) { pr_err_ratelimited("VMPCK is disabled\n"); return -ENOTTY; } @@ -1024,7 +1014,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { + if (!memchr_inv(mdesc->vmpck, 0, VMPCK_KEY_LEN)) { dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); goto e_unmap; }
On 12/3/2024 7:49 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:33PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote: >> @@ -2667,3 +2662,179 @@ static int __init sev_sysfs_init(void) >> } >> arch_initcall(sev_sysfs_init); >> #endif // CONFIG_SYSFS >> + >> +static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz) >> +{ >> + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; >> + int ret; >> + >> + if (!buf) >> + return; >> + >> + ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages); >> + if (ret) { >> + WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n"); > > Looking at where this lands: > > set_memory_encrypted > |-> __set_memory_enc_dec > > and that doing now: > > if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { > if (!down_read_trylock(&mem_enc_lock)) > return -EBUSY; > > > after > > 859e63b789d6 ("x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec") > > we probably should pay attention to this here firing and maybe turning that > _trylock() into a normal down_read* > > Anyway, just something to pay attention to in the future. Yes, will keep an eye. > >> + return; >> + } >> + >> + __free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz)); >> +} > > ... > >> +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) >> +{ >> + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; >> + void __iomem *mem; >> + >> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE); >> + >> + mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); > > The above ones use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. What's the difference? The above ones I have retained old code. GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT allocation are accounted in kmemcg and the below note from[1] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject of kmem accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set. There is the handy GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT shortcut for GFP_KERNEL allocations that should be accounted. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- For mdesc, I had kept it similar to snp_dev allocation, that is why it is having GFP_KERNEL. snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!snp_dev) - goto e_unmap; - - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); Let me know if mdesc allocation need to be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. >> +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) >> +{ >> + if (!mdesc) >> + return; >> + >> + mdesc->vmpck = NULL; >> + mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno = NULL; > > memset(mdesc, ...); > > at the end instead of those assignments. Sure. > >> + kfree(mdesc->ctx); >> + >> + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); >> + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); >> + iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets); > > >> + kfree(mdesc); >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_free); >> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c >> index b699771be029..5268511bc9b8 100644 >> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c >> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c > > ... > >> @@ -993,115 +898,57 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) >> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) >> return -ENODEV; >> >> - if (!dev->platform_data) >> - return -ENODEV; >> - >> - data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data; >> - mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE); >> - if (!mapping) >> - return -ENODEV; >> - >> - secrets = (__force void *)mapping; >> - >> - ret = -ENOMEM; >> snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); >> if (!snp_dev) >> - goto e_unmap; >> - >> - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); >> - if (!mdesc) >> - goto e_unmap; >> - >> - /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */ >> - if (vmpck_id == -1) >> - vmpck_id = snp_vmpl; >> + return -ENOMEM; >> >> - ret = -EINVAL; >> - mdesc->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno); >> - if (!mdesc->vmpck) { >> - dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); >> - goto e_unmap; >> - } >> + mdesc = snp_msg_alloc(); >> + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc)) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> >> - /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ >> - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { >> - dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); >> - goto e_unmap; >> - } >> + ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id); >> + if (ret) >> + return -EIO; > > You just leaked mdesc here. Right > Audit all your error paths. Sure I will audit and send updated patch. Regards Nikunj 1) https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.12/core-api/memory-allocation.html
On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 03:30:13PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: > The above ones I have retained old code. Right. > GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT allocation are accounted in kmemcg and the below note from[1] > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject of kmem > accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set. There is the handy > GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT shortcut for GFP_KERNEL allocations that should be accounted. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interesting. > For mdesc, I had kept it similar to snp_dev allocation, that is why it is > having GFP_KERNEL. > > snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!snp_dev) > - goto e_unmap; > - > - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); > > Let me know if mdesc allocation need to be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. Let's audit that thing: * snp_init_crypto - not really untrusted allocation. It is on the driver probe path. * get_report - I don't think so: /* * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the * authtag. */ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); That resp_len is limited and that's on the guest_ioctl path which cannot happen concurrently? * get_ext_report - ditto * alloc_shared_pages - all the allocations are limited but I guess that could remain _ACCOUNT as a measure for future robustness. And that was it. So AFAICT, only one use case is semi-valid. So maybe we should convert those remaining ones to boring GFP_KERNEL...
On 12/5/2024 1:32 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 03:30:13PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: >> The above ones I have retained old code. > > Right. > >> GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT allocation are accounted in kmemcg and the below note from[1] >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject of kmem >> accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set. There is the handy >> GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT shortcut for GFP_KERNEL allocations that should be accounted. >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Interesting. > >> For mdesc, I had kept it similar to snp_dev allocation, that is why it is >> having GFP_KERNEL. >> >> snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); >> if (!snp_dev) >> - goto e_unmap; >> - >> - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); >> >> Let me know if mdesc allocation need to be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. > > Let's audit that thing: > > * snp_init_crypto - not really untrusted allocation. It is on the driver probe > path. > > * get_report - I don't think so: > > /* > * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the > * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the > * authtag. > */ > resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; > report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > > That resp_len is limited and that's on the guest_ioctl path which cannot > happen concurrently? It is a trusted allocation, but should it be accounted as it is part of the userspace ioctl path ? > > * get_ext_report - ditto > > * alloc_shared_pages - all the allocations are limited but I guess that could > remain _ACCOUNT as a measure for future robustness. Ok. > And that was it. > > So AFAICT, only one use case is semi-valid. > > So maybe we should convert those remaining ones to boring GFP_KERNEL... > Sure, let me add this as a pre-patch. Regards, Nikunj
On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 11:53:53AM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: > > * get_report - I don't think so: > > > > /* > > * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the > > * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the > > * authtag. > > */ > > resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; > > report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > > > > That resp_len is limited and that's on the guest_ioctl path which cannot > > happen concurrently? > > It is a trusted allocation, but should it be accounted as it is part of > the userspace ioctl path ? Well, it is unlocked_ioctl() and snp_guest_ioctl() is not taking any locks. What's stopping anyone from writing a nasty little program which hammers the sev-guest on the ioctl interface until the OOM killer activates? IOW, this should probably remain _ACCOUNT AFAICT.
> > Well, it is unlocked_ioctl() and snp_guest_ioctl() is not taking any locks. > What's stopping anyone from writing a nasty little program which hammers the > sev-guest on the ioctl interface until the OOM killer activates? > Given sev-guest requires heightened privileges, can we not assume a reasonable user space? I thought that was an organizing principle. > IOW, this should probably remain _ACCOUNT AFAICT. > > -- > Regards/Gruss, > Boris. > > https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette >
On 12/7/2024 1:57 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 11:53:53AM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: >>> * get_report - I don't think so: >>> >>> /* >>> * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the >>> * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the >>> * authtag. >>> */ >>> resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; >>> report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); >>> >>> That resp_len is limited and that's on the guest_ioctl path which cannot >>> happen concurrently? >> >> It is a trusted allocation, but should it be accounted as it is part of >> the userspace ioctl path ? > > Well, it is unlocked_ioctl() and snp_guest_ioctl() is not taking any locks. > What's stopping anyone from writing a nasty little program which hammers the > sev-guest on the ioctl interface until the OOM killer activates? > > IOW, this should probably remain _ACCOUNT AFAICT. Both get_report()/get_ext_report() are in the unlocked_ioctl(), we will retain the _ACCOUNT That leaves us with only one site: snp_init_crypto(), should I fold this change in current patch ? Regards Nikunj
On Fri, Dec 06, 2024 at 04:27:40PM -0800, Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote: > Given sev-guest requires heightened privileges, can we not assume a > reasonable user space? And that sev-guest driver runs in the guest so the worst that can happen is, the guest gets killed for misbehaving. Oh well... I guess that's ok.
On Mon, Dec 09, 2024 at 11:46:44AM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: > That leaves us with only one site: snp_init_crypto(), should I fold this > change in current patch ? Nah, a pre-patch pls. Along with an explanation summing up our discussion in the commit message. This patch is already doing enough. Thx.
On 12/9/2024 9:08 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Mon, Dec 09, 2024 at 11:46:44AM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: >> That leaves us with only one site: snp_init_crypto(), should I fold this >> change in current patch ? > > Nah, a pre-patch pls. > > Along with an explanation summing up our discussion in the commit message. > This patch is already doing enough. From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2024 12:00:56 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] virt: sev-guest: Replace GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL Replace GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL in the sev-guest driver code. GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is typically used for accounting untrusted userspace allocations. After auditing the sev-guest code, the following changes are necessary: * snp_init_crypto(): Use GFP_KERNEL as this is a trusted device probe path. Retain GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT in the following cases for robustness and specific path requirements: * alloc_shared_pages(): Although all allocations are limited, retain GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for future robustness. * get_report() and get_ext_report(): These functions are on the unlocked ioctl path and should continue using GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> --- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index 62328d0b2cb6..250ce92d816b 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen) { struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 91f08af31078..f78c94e29c74 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/sev-common.h> #include <asm/coco.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN 1ULL #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 2ULL @@ -170,10 +171,6 @@ struct snp_guest_msg { u8 payload[PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg_hdr)]; } __packed; -struct sev_guest_platform_data { - u64 secrets_gpa; -}; - struct snp_guest_req { void *req_buf; size_t req_sz; @@ -253,6 +250,7 @@ struct snp_msg_desc { u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; u8 *vmpck; + int vmpck_id; }; /* @@ -458,6 +456,20 @@ void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot); void snp_kexec_finish(void); void snp_kexec_begin(void); +static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) +{ + static const char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; + + if (mdesc->vmpck) + return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + + return true; +} + +int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id); +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void); +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc); + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #define snp_vmpl 0 @@ -498,6 +510,10 @@ static inline int prepare_pte_enc(struct pte_enc_desc *d) { return 0; } static inline void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot) { } static inline void snp_kexec_finish(void) { } static inline void snp_kexec_begin(void) { } +static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { return false; } +static inline int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id) { return -1; } +static inline struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) { return NULL; } +static inline void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { } #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c index c5b0148b8c0a..3cc741eefd06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/psp-sev.h> #include <linux/dmi.h> #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> +#include <crypto/gcm.h> #include <asm/init.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> @@ -2580,15 +2581,9 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = { static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void) { - struct sev_guest_platform_data data; - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) return -ENODEV; - data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa; - if (platform_device_add_data(&sev_guest_device, &data, sizeof(data))) - return -ENODEV; - if (platform_device_register(&sev_guest_device)) return -ENODEV; @@ -2667,3 +2662,179 @@ static int __init sev_sysfs_init(void) } arch_initcall(sev_sysfs_init); #endif // CONFIG_SYSFS + +static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int ret; + + if (!buf) + return; + + ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages); + if (ret) { + WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n"); + return; + } + + __free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz)); +} + +static void *alloc_shared_pages(size_t sz) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + struct page *page; + int ret; + + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(sz)); + if (!page) + return NULL; + + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), npages); + if (ret) { + pr_err("failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret); + __free_pages(page, get_order(sz)); + return NULL; + } + + return page_address(page); +} + +static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page *secrets, u32 **seqno) +{ + u8 *key = NULL; + + switch (id) { + case 0: + *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_0; + key = secrets->vmpck0; + break; + case 1: + *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_1; + key = secrets->vmpck1; + break; + case 2: + *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_2; + key = secrets->vmpck2; + break; + case 3: + *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_3; + key = secrets->vmpck3; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return key; +} + +static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen) +{ + struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!ctx) + return NULL; + + if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, keylen, AUTHTAG_LEN)) { + pr_err("Crypto context initialization failed\n"); + kfree(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + return ctx; +} + +int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id) +{ + /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */ + if (vmpck_id == -1) + vmpck_id = snp_vmpl; + + mdesc->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, mdesc->secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno); + if (!mdesc->vmpck) { + pr_err("Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ + if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { + pr_err("Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + mdesc->vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + + mdesc->ctx = snp_init_crypto(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (!mdesc->ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_init); + +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) +{ + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; + void __iomem *mem; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE); + + mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mdesc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + mem = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!mem) + goto e_free_mdesc; + + mdesc->secrets = (__force struct snp_secrets_page *)mem; + + /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ + mdesc->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!mdesc->request) + goto e_unmap; + + mdesc->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!mdesc->response) + goto e_free_request; + + mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); + if (!mdesc->certs_data) + goto e_free_response; + + /* initial the input address for guest request */ + mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request); + mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response); + mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data); + + return mdesc; + +e_free_response: + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); +e_free_request: + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); +e_unmap: + iounmap(mem); +e_free_mdesc: + kfree(mdesc); + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_alloc); + +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) +{ + if (!mdesc) + return; + + mdesc->vmpck = NULL; + mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno = NULL; + kfree(mdesc->ctx); + + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets); + kfree(mdesc); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_free); diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index b699771be029..5268511bc9b8 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -63,16 +63,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP. /* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex); -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) -{ - char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; - - if (mdesc->vmpck) - return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); - - return true; -} - /* * If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there * are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue @@ -93,7 +83,7 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { pr_alert("Disabling VMPCK%d communication key to prevent IV reuse.\n", - vmpck_id); + mdesc->vmpck_id); memzero_explicit(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); mdesc->vmpck = NULL; } @@ -147,23 +137,6 @@ static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file) return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc); } -static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen) -{ - struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); - if (!ctx) - return NULL; - - if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, keylen, AUTHTAG_LEN)) { - pr_err("Crypto context initialization failed\n"); - kfree(ctx); - return NULL; - } - - return ctx; -} - static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req) { struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg = &mdesc->secret_response; @@ -335,7 +308,7 @@ static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex); /* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { + if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { pr_err_ratelimited("VMPCK is disabled\n"); return -ENOTTY; } @@ -414,7 +387,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; - req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; req.req_buf = report_req; req.req_sz = sizeof(*report_req); req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; @@ -461,7 +434,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ; - req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; req.req_buf = derived_key_req; req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req); req.resp_buf = buf; @@ -539,7 +512,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; - req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id; req.req_buf = &report_req->data; req.req_sz = sizeof(report_req->data); req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; @@ -616,76 +589,11 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long return ret; } -static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz) -{ - unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - int ret; - - if (!buf) - return; - - ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages); - if (ret) { - WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n"); - return; - } - - __free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz)); -} - -static void *alloc_shared_pages(struct device *dev, size_t sz) -{ - unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - struct page *page; - int ret; - - page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(sz)); - if (!page) - return NULL; - - ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), npages); - if (ret) { - dev_err(dev, "failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret); - __free_pages(page, get_order(sz)); - return NULL; - } - - return page_address(page); -} - static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl, }; -static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page *secrets, u32 **seqno) -{ - u8 *key = NULL; - - switch (id) { - case 0: - *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_0; - key = secrets->vmpck0; - break; - case 1: - *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_1; - key = secrets->vmpck1; - break; - case 2: - *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_2; - key = secrets->vmpck2; - break; - case 3: - *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_3; - key = secrets->vmpck3; - break; - default: - break; - } - - return key; -} - struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr { u32 status; u32 report_size; @@ -979,13 +887,10 @@ static void unregister_sev_tsm(void *data) static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { - struct sev_guest_platform_data *data; - struct snp_secrets_page *secrets; struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev; struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; struct miscdevice *misc; - void __iomem *mapping; int ret; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE); @@ -993,115 +898,57 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) return -ENODEV; - if (!dev->platform_data) - return -ENODEV; - - data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data; - mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE); - if (!mapping) - return -ENODEV; - - secrets = (__force void *)mapping; - - ret = -ENOMEM; snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!snp_dev) - goto e_unmap; - - mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!mdesc) - goto e_unmap; - - /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */ - if (vmpck_id == -1) - vmpck_id = snp_vmpl; + return -ENOMEM; - ret = -EINVAL; - mdesc->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno); - if (!mdesc->vmpck) { - dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); - goto e_unmap; - } + mdesc = snp_msg_alloc(); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc)) + return -ENOMEM; - /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { - dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); - goto e_unmap; - } + ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id); + if (ret) + return -EIO; platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev); snp_dev->dev = dev; - mdesc->secrets = secrets; - - /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ - mdesc->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - if (!mdesc->request) - goto e_unmap; - - mdesc->response = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - if (!mdesc->response) - goto e_free_request; - - mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(dev, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); - if (!mdesc->certs_data) - goto e_free_response; - - ret = -EIO; - mdesc->ctx = snp_init_crypto(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); - if (!mdesc->ctx) - goto e_free_cert_data; misc = &snp_dev->misc; misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR; misc->name = DEVICE_NAME; misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops; - /* Initialize the input addresses for guest request */ - mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request); - mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response); - mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data); - /* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */ - sev_tsm_ops.privlevel_floor = vmpck_id; + sev_tsm_ops.privlevel_floor = mdesc->vmpck_id; ret = tsm_register(&sev_tsm_ops, snp_dev); if (ret) - goto e_free_cert_data; + goto e_msg_init; ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&pdev->dev, unregister_sev_tsm, NULL); if (ret) - goto e_free_cert_data; + goto e_msg_init; ret = misc_register(misc); if (ret) - goto e_free_ctx; + goto e_msg_init; snp_dev->msg_desc = mdesc; - dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication key)\n", vmpck_id); + dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication key)\n", + mdesc->vmpck_id); return 0; -e_free_ctx: - kfree(mdesc->ctx); -e_free_cert_data: - free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); -e_free_response: - free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); -e_free_request: - free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); -e_unmap: - iounmap(mapping); +e_msg_init: + snp_msg_free(mdesc); + return ret; } static void __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); - struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc; - free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); - free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - kfree(mdesc->ctx); + snp_msg_free(snp_dev->msg_desc); misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc); } diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 9d7bd0ae48c4..0f7e3acf37e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1559,6 +1559,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT select UNACCEPTED_MEMORY + select CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig index 0b772bd921d8..a6405ab6c2c3 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ config SEV_GUEST tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver" default m depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - select CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM select TSM_REPORTS help SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with