diff mbox series

[RFC,v5,010/104] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported

Message ID 0596db2913da40660e87d5005167c623cee14765.1646422845.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series KVM TDX basic feature support | expand

Commit Message

Isaku Yamahata March 4, 2022, 7:48 p.m. UTC
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device
model, e.g. qemu.  The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for
KVM_CREATE_VM.  Add a place holder function and call a function to
initialize TDX module on demand because in that callback VMX is enabled by
hardware_enable callback (vmx_hardware_enable).

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     |  5 -----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |  3 ++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Comments

Huang, Kai March 13, 2022, 11:08 p.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, 2022-03-04 at 11:48 -0800, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> 
> As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device
> model, e.g. qemu.  The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for
> KVM_CREATE_VM.  Add a place holder function and call a function to
> initialize TDX module on demand because in that callback VMX is enabled by
> hardware_enable callback (vmx_hardware_enable).

Should we put this patch at the end of series until all changes required to run
TD are introduced?  This patch essentially tells userspace KVM is ready to
support a TD but actually it's not ready.  And this might also cause bisect
issue I suppose?
Isaku Yamahata March 15, 2022, 9:03 p.m. UTC | #2
On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 12:08:59PM +1300,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:

> On Fri, 2022-03-04 at 11:48 -0800, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> > 
> > As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device
> > model, e.g. qemu.  The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for
> > KVM_CREATE_VM.  Add a place holder function and call a function to
> > initialize TDX module on demand because in that callback VMX is enabled by
> > hardware_enable callback (vmx_hardware_enable).
> 
> Should we put this patch at the end of series until all changes required to run
> TD are introduced?  This patch essentially tells userspace KVM is ready to
> support a TD but actually it's not ready.  And this might also cause bisect
> issue I suppose?

The intention is that developers can exercise the new code step-by-step even if
the TDX KVM isn't complete.
How about introducing new config and remove it at the last of the patch series?

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 2b1548da00eb..a3287440aa9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -98,6 +98,20 @@ config X86_SGX_KVM
 
          If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_TDX_KVM_EXPERIMENTAL
+       bool "EXPERIMENTAL Trust Domian Extensions (TDX) KVM support"
+       default n
+       depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
+       depends on KVM_INTEL
+       help
+         Enable experimental TDX KVM support.  TDX KVM needs many patches and
+         the patches will be merged step by step, not at once. Even if TDX KVM
+         support is incomplete, enable TDX KVM support so that developper can
+         exercise TDX KVM code.  TODO: Remove this configuration once the
+         (first step of) TDX KVM support is complete.
+
+         If unsure, say N.
+
 config KVM_AMD
        tristate "KVM for AMD processors support"
        depends on KVM
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index b16e2ed3b204..e31d6902e49c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -170,7 +170,11 @@ int tdx_module_setup(void)
 
 bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_TDX_KVM_EXPERIMENTAL
        return type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM && READ_ONCE(enable_tdx);
+#else
+       return false;
+#endif
 }
 
 static int __init __tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
Huang, Kai March 15, 2022, 9:47 p.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, 2022-03-15 at 14:03 -0700, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 12:08:59PM +1300,
> Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, 2022-03-04 at 11:48 -0800, isaku.yamahata@intel.com wrote:
> > > From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> > > 
> > > As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device
> > > model, e.g. qemu.  The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for
> > > KVM_CREATE_VM.  Add a place holder function and call a function to
> > > initialize TDX module on demand because in that callback VMX is enabled by
> > > hardware_enable callback (vmx_hardware_enable).
> > 
> > Should we put this patch at the end of series until all changes required to run
> > TD are introduced?  This patch essentially tells userspace KVM is ready to
> > support a TD but actually it's not ready.  And this might also cause bisect
> > issue I suppose?
> 
> The intention is that developers can exercise the new code step-by-step even if
> the TDX KVM isn't complete.

What is the purpose/value to allow developers to exercise the new code step-by-
step?  Userspace cannot create TD successfully anyway until all patches are
ready.
Paolo Bonzini March 15, 2022, 9:49 p.m. UTC | #4
On 3/15/22 22:47, Kai Huang wrote:
>> The intention is that developers can exercise the new code step-by-step even if
>> the TDX KVM isn't complete.
> What is the purpose/value to allow developers to exercise the new code step-by-
> step?  Userspace cannot create TD successfully anyway until all patches are
> ready.

We can move this to the end when the patch is committed, but I think 
there is value in showing that the series works (for partial definitions 
of "work") at every step of the enablement process.

Paolo
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 77da926ee505..8103d1c32cc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ 
 #include "vmx.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
+
+static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+	return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || tdx_is_vm_type_supported(type);
+}
 
 static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 {
@@ -19,6 +25,20 @@  static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (is_td(kvm)) {
+		ret = tdx_module_setup();
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;	/* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
+	}
+
+	return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
+}
+
 struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.name = "kvm_intel",
 
@@ -29,9 +49,9 @@  struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
 	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
-	.is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported,
+	.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
 	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
-	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+	.vm_init = vt_vm_init,
 
 	.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
 	.vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 8adc87ad1807..e8d293a3c11c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@  int tdx_module_setup(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+	return type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM && READ_ONCE(enable_tdx);
+}
+
 static int __init __tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
 {
 	u32 max_pa;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 3c7b3f245fee..7838cd177f0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7079,11 +7079,6 @@  int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return err;
 }
 
-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
-{
-	return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
-}
-
 #define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 #define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index f7327bc73be0..78331dbc29f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@  void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
 int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
 void vmx_hardware_disable(void);
 bool report_flexpriority(void);
-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
 int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -130,10 +129,12 @@  void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
 void __init tdx_pre_kvm_init(unsigned int *vcpu_size,
 			unsigned int *vcpu_align, unsigned int *vm_size);
+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
 void __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
 #else
 static inline void tdx_pre_kvm_init(
 	unsigned int *vcpu_size, unsigned int *vcpu_align, unsigned int *vm_size) {}
+static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
 static inline void tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {}
 #endif