| Message ID | 20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries | expand |
> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 25. Januar 2019 um 19:06 geschrieben: > > > Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable > vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in > /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities > > This series enables that behavior by providing the expected > functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature > states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately > to display the overall machine status. This means that in a > heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated > or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or > mitigated. > The whole series is: Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> with a Raspberry Pi 3 B+
Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities This series enables that behavior by providing the expected functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately to display the overall machine status. This means that in a heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or mitigated. v3->v4: Drop the patch which selectivly exports sysfs entries Remove the CONFIG_EXPERT hidden options which allowed the kernel to be built without the vulnerability detection code. Pick Marc Z's patches which invert the white/black lists for spectrev2 and clean up the firmware detection logic. Document the existing kpti controls Add a nospectre_v2 option to boot time disable the mitigation v2->v3: Remove "Unknown" states, replace with further blacklists and default vulnerable/not affected states. Add the ability for an arch port to selectively export sysfs vulnerabilities. v1->v2: Add "Unknown" state to ABI/testing docs. Minor tweaks. Jeremy Linton (8): Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without hardened branch predictors arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without kpti arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Marc Zyngier (2): arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Mian Yousaf Kaukab (2): arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 14 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 39 +-- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 8 - arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h | 2 - arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 19 -- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 19 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/sdei.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 - arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 242 ++++++++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 41 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 15 +- arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c | 2 - arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 - arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 3 - arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 4 - arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 4 - arch/arm64/mm/context.c | 6 - arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 2 - arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 2 - 20 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 230 deletions(-)