| Message ID | fc689865-f8ff-1e85-ac0c-b2f1c28b7eb6@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand |
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. > Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the > rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the > credentials and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring > remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN > usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to > CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 19e793aa441a..70e8249eebe5 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; int ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) return -EINVAL;
Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)