Message ID | 72ede0f6dab61f7f23df9ac7a70666e07ef314b0.1635055496.git.leonro@nvidia.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Accepted |
Delegated to: | Jason Gunthorpe |
Headers | show |
Series | Two IB/core fixes | expand |
On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 09:08:20AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > From: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com> > > When copy the device name, the length of data memcpy copied exceeds > the length of the source buffer, which cause the KASAN issue below. > Use strscpy_pad instead. > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] > Read of size 64 at addr ffff88811a10f5e0 by task rping/140263 > CPU: 3 PID: 140263 Comm: rping Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1+ #1 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 > Call Trace: > dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d > print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0xa0 > kasan_report+0xcb/0x110 > ? lock_downgrade+0xb0/0xc0 > ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] > kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 > memcpy+0x20/0x60 > ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core] > ? init_mad+0xf0/0xf0 [ib_core] > ? __nlmsg_put+0x9a/0xb0 > ? ibnl_put_msg+0x90/0xd0 [ib_core] > ib_nl_make_request+0x1c6/0x380 [ib_core] > ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x320/0x320 [ib_core] > ? netlink_has_listeners+0x114/0x210 > send_mad+0x20a/0x220 [ib_core] > ? ib_nl_make_request+0x380/0x380 [ib_core] > ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 > ? value_read+0x20/0x80 [ib_core] > ? ib_pack+0x140/0x2a0 [ib_core] > ib_sa_path_rec_get+0x3e3/0x800 [ib_core] > ? alloc_mad+0x390/0x390 [ib_core] > ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 > ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] > ? ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm] > ? ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm] > ? vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0 > ? ksys_write+0x133/0x160 > ? do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 > ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 > ? lock_downgrade+0xc0/0xc0 > cma_query_ib_route+0x29b/0x390 [rdma_cm] > ? rdma_set_ib_path+0x150/0x150 [rdma_cm] > ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200 > ? rdma_create_user_id+0x80/0x80 [rdma_cm] > ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] > ? rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] > rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm] > ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm] > ? ucma_disconnect+0x140/0x140 [rdma_ucm] > ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm] > ? ucma_copy_ib_route+0x1a0/0x1a0 [rdma_ucm] > ? __fget_files+0x146/0x240 > vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0 > ksys_write+0x133/0x160 > ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 > ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200 > ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 > do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > RIP: 0033:0x7f26499aa90f > Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 29 fd ff ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 5c fd ff ff 48 > RSP: 002b:00007f26495f2dc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000007d0 RCX: 00007f26499aa90f > RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007f26495f2e00 RDI: 0000000000000003 > RBP: 00005632a8315440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f26495f2e00 > R13: 00005632a83154e0 R14: 00005632a8315440 R15: 00005632a830a810 > > Allocated by task 131419: > kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 > __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 > proc_self_get_link+0x8b/0x100 > pick_link+0x4f1/0x5c0 > step_into+0x2eb/0x3d0 > walk_component+0xc8/0x2c0 > link_path_walk+0x3b8/0x580 > path_openat+0x101/0x230 > do_filp_open+0x12e/0x240 > do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x280 > __x64_sys_openat+0xce/0x140 > do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811a10f5e0 > kmalloc-16 of size 16 > The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of > 10f5e0, ffff88811a10f5f0) > The buggy address belongs to the page: > page:000000007b6da7b1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88811a10f1e0 pfn:0x11a10f > flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab|zone=2) > raw: 8000000000000200 ffffea0004463040 0000001200000012 ffff8881000423c0 > raw: ffff88811a10f1e0 000000008080007f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > Memory state around the buggy address: > ffff88811a10f480: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc > ffff88811a10f500: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc > >ffff88811a10f580: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc > ^ > ffff88811a10f600: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc > ffff88811a10f680: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc > > Fixes: 2ca546b92a02 ("IB/sa: Route SA pathrecord query through netlink") > Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com> > Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> > Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> > --- > drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 5 +++-- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Applied to for-rc, thanks Jason
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c index 4220a545387f..74ecd7456a11 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c @@ -706,8 +706,9 @@ static void ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs(struct sk_buff *skb, /* Construct the family header first */ header = skb_put(skb, NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(*header))); - memcpy(header->device_name, dev_name(&query->port->agent->device->dev), - LS_DEVICE_NAME_MAX); + strscpy_pad(header->device_name, + dev_name(&query->port->agent->device->dev), + LS_DEVICE_NAME_MAX); header->port_num = query->port->port_num; if ((comp_mask & IB_SA_PATH_REC_REVERSIBLE) &&